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Introduction 
DoEs THE couRsE of history manifest any significant trend 
upward and forward? Is historical development an epical 
rhythm of positive achievement which we can scan; or 
is it a continual decline; or else is it merely a fortuitous 
or cyclical rise and fall, or even a random, meaningless 
succession of events? In fact, are we warranted in speak-
ing at all of historical development and growth? These 
questions are implicit in the problem of social progress. 
This problem has reemerged in a new context of 
harsh negation. On all sides today we hear grim words. 
In books and articles and in general discussion the view 
is expressed that our civilization is on the verge of col-
lapse, that our traditional values are discredited, that our 
entire social system faces ruin. Many evils now appear 
in our technical and industrial society, which had been 
regarded as destined eventually to raise human life to 
much higher levels. To many, our hopes now appear 
illusory, our society heading toward disaster. 
It should be noted that our age does not disparage 
technical advance itself. We would not consider de-
claring a moratorium on scientific research or on technical 
applications of it. What we deplore is the disparity 
between technical proficiency and human welfare in our 
civilization. 
In raising the problem of social progress we are probing 
the principles of critical evaluation of social order and 
history. We may begin by an explanation of terms. What 
do we mean by progress? A mere dictionary definition 
of course will not suffice; all the same, the etymology of 
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the word may be found enlightening. Progress, coming 
from the Latin verb progredior, means "going forward." 
Now, all going is not going forward. Some crustaceans 
move backward; crabs usually crawl sidewise and can 
proceed in any direction without really turning. In the 
crab's philosophy of life the term progress, as moving 
forward, would be confusing; forward and back, outward 
and in-all would be one to the crab. And also to many 
men who see progress mainly as vigorous movement. If 
the going is ceaseless and energetic, it is judged by some 
to be progressive, as with the man who "never lets up," 
or of a community in which "something's doing every 
minute." 
The least reflection should serve to dismiss this identi-
fication of progress with mere energetic activity or change, 
for the most vigorous movement may be most futile or 
ruinous if it is misdirected. Vigorous and energetic ac-
tivity and development are, of course, the media through 
which progress may be achieved. But the decisive factor 
in progress is the direction of movement: toward what 
value does activity tend? Progress, individual and social, 
involves unambiguously personal fulfillment in terms of 
values that were not but now are, and are yet to be. 
The idea of progress emphasizing personal fulfillment 
may be stated simply as a change for the better in this 
world. That there is really a "better," is the basic convic-
tion of moral intelligence. It is the great word alike of 
classical and Christian wisdom, the acknowledgment of 
a Highest Good or summum bonum, a Pearl of Great 
Price, the pursuit and possession of which mark the life 
really worth living. The ABC of morals is this hierarchical 
outlook on the values of life: that some are to be spurned, 
and others to be kept subordinate, while our chief concern 
is with the highest and supreme values. The dismissal 
of this selective judgment by thoughtless or skeptical 
minds is the devil's folly in men's lives. 
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The second fundamental feature of the idea of human 
progress is the recognition of its secular aspect. While 
it transcends the perspectives of mechanical determinism, 
it is also to be distinguished from the opposite rigid 
providential determinism of some types of theology. There 
have always been grave doubts in most of the world's 
religions that man could achieve progress by his own 
efforts. The Islamic notion of kismet or fate in Muham-
madan doctrine, that all of our thoughts and words and 
deeds have been eternally written in the Book of Allah, 
rules out any belief in man's own achievement. History 
could only be the unrolling of Allah's everlasting scroll. 
Many Christian theologians who do not expound pre-
destination in its extreme form, fatalist or Calvinist or 
even Augustinian, are yet finally insistent on a providen-
tial determination of men's lives and of the whole his-
torical process. In that outlook the idea of progress as 
man's own active attainment and increasing possession 
of high values must appear ambiguous, if not impious. 
As our historical review will show, the clear idea of 
progress is a modern expression, emerging since the 
Renaissance and that "century of genius," the seventeenth. 
The belief in progress has been called the modern man's 
secular religion, and some traditional religionists have 
considered it as ungodly. The important point is to recog-
nize the characteristic perspective in which the idea of 
progress is manifested significantly: in an outlook on life 
definitely secular which just as definitely and unambig-
uously acknowledges personal and spiritual activities and 
values. In this view of human lives and historical processes 
we can raise significantly the question of progress; but 
how is it to be answered? 
The first part of our work is a review of the idea of 
social progress as it has been entertained in the history 
of thought. The belief in progress was not a vital idea in 
classical antiquity which in the main did not view history 
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as a progressive achievement. The classical mind gen-
erally viewed the course of history either as a continual 
decline from an original golden age to lower and lower 
grades of living; or else as a cyclical process of eternal 
recurrence, in which a round of cosmic processes repeats 
itself aeon after aeon through measureless time. Some 
notable classical approaches to a belief in progress, how-
ever, are cited as early anticipations of later views. 
The second chapter reviews the medieval-Christian 
tradition which in its orthodox development emphasized 
both the idea of original sin and a providential determina-
tion of human life and destiny not only in men's daily 
careers but also in its expectations of some coming mil-
lennium and in apocalyptic visions of God's final judgment. 
While the many extravagant expressions of these pious 
speculations were rejected by more sober religious re-
flection, the basic conviction of human life under divine 
Providence resisted any recognition of progress as attain-
able by man's own endeavors. 
The following four chapters, surveying the secular ideas 
of social-historical progress since the Renaissance, contain 
a review of alternative affirmations and denials, and some 
considerable suspense of judgment. Outstanding and gen-
erally familiar has been the liberal view of progress de-
rived from the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. 
Here human nature is regarded as developing in the 
process of experience. Under the right conditions of 
education and social-political order, with governments 
subject to popular control and sovereignty, men's capac-
ities for improvement would be realized in ongoing 
progress. The later development of modern Idealism 
after Kant displayed progress as a universal process of 
Mind as basic reality ever proceeding to fulfillment and 
perfection. The ground for this confidence has been the 
recognition of a growing maturity of critical intelligence 
so characteristic of the modern temper. The realization 
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of man's "natural desire to know," signalized in the first 
sentence of Aristotle's Metaphysics, has led to almost in-
credible advance of scientific knowledge and of its tech-
nical applications to men's advantage in every field of 
experience. Some of these theories have traced men's 
advance in a more thoroughly applied recognition of 
human rights and personal dignity and worth as the 
reliable basis of a sound political and social order, the 
attainment of a true civilization. 
But this optimistic liberal outlook has been shocked 
in our day by the spread of totalitarianism, exploitation 
and oppression by societies which have indeed been con-
sidered enlightened. Thus the confident reliance that 
spreading enlightenment alone could achieve social prog-
ress has been unsettled in our age by two world wars and 
the brutal destruction of millions by civilized powers. 
Advancing science and technology, themselves outstand-
ing instruments for progress, have also shown themselves 
as the producers of unspeakable weapons of war that 
threaten the utter extinction of civilization, and indeed 
of all human life. The confidence in the vitality of our 
civilization has been shaken by the spreading looseness 
of standards and conduct, creating a state of affairs in 
which violence may end any prospect of progress or 
civilization. As a modem reverberation of the theological 
view of man's unregenerate depravity, the Freudian psy-
chology has been probing chasms of evil in man's sub-
conscious, unsettling any trust in the likely reliability of 
human betterment. 
Resistance, much of it sharply radical, to the traditional 
idea of progress is not new. During the eighteenth century 
Rousseau repudiated the cultural theses of the Enlighten-
ment. In his view the course of civilization was a process 
of corrupting the primitive soundness of human nature. 
Social progress, if it could be called progress, demanded 
the reversal of the historical course; it required man's 
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return from the artificialities and injustices of civilization 
to men's primitive freedom in nature. The revolutionary 
approach of Marxist "scientific socialism" has advanced 
the materialistic-economic interpretation of history in its 
many stages, from ancient slavery to modern capitalism, 
as corruption and enslavement of men and as leading with 
dialectical necessity to its own refutation and the total 
overthrowing of the established order in the proletarian 
revolution as the only prospect of social-economic 
progress. 
In the biological sciences evolutionary theories have 
spurred speculation beyond their strictly scientific range. 
The basic Darwinian thesis of the survival of the fittest 
in the struggle for existence has been countered by the 
report of mutual aid as a factor in evolution. In its bear-
ing on ethical interpretation and historical progress, the 
varying distribution of emphasis between these two evolu-
tionary views has pointed in different directions. Some 
theories have proceeded from utilitarian ethics of social 
progress, regarded as advance in philanthropic pursuit 
of the general happiness and social welfare, and have 
sought evidence and support in the survey of the evolu-
tionary process. Others, committeed to the idea of evolu-
tion in the struggle for existence, have regarded moral 
conduct and more generally social progress as consisting 
in men's resistance to the ruthlessness of the evolutionary 
conflict. Still others, more radically, have sought to trace 
social progress in the very struggle for existence, looking 
upon competition as the way to advance by eliminating 
the unfit, thus glorifying conflict and prevailing might as 
the principles of a heroic ethics. Along a vaster range 
of cosmic speculation progress has been viewed by some 
evolutionary metaphysicians as evidence of a creative 
urge in nature or as an upward emergence from a space-
time mechanism to higher levels of existence, to life and 
then to mind, with a boundless divine prospect. But 
against any assurance of expanding progressive life and 
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activity, modern genetics has held that man and all that 
he is and can become depends upon his genes, his 
heritage, not alterable by environmental changes and 
nurture, except by chance mutation. 
The modern secular approach to the problem of prog-
ress has also influenced some religious views. While 
readily acknowledging men's own endeavors and attain-
ments, sometimes futile but often successful, many modern 
minds of religious outlook and spiritual penetration have 
raised again the old problem, whether men's strivings 
after perfection can be understood fully in a nonreligious 
perspective. This sort of critical comment may be ex-
pressed in the question: Can man perfect himself by his 
own efforts alone? More positively, the striving after 
perfection itself has been viewed as pointing to a spiritual 
dynamic, the full expression of which requires religious 
insight. 
The review of the idea of social progress in the history 
of thought discloses in sharp outline alternative ap-
praisals both positive and negative. This does not dismiss 
but rather accentuates the importance of our basic in-
quiry: Does the course of history reveal any upward 
march of humanity in the pursuit and attainment of values, 
and of the highest values? Conflict and bafflement on this 
issue is a major aspect of the social crisis in our day. 
If we are to preserve balanced judgment we should 
remember that topics of this sort have always been the 
province of the special pleader. On the one hand we 
have placid defense of the course of human affairs; on 
the other hand, tragic intensity or violent condemnation. 
The partisan arguments on opposite sides seem to express 
conflicting temperaments, agreeing only in their tendency 
to extreme emphasis. But though the extremist may not 
convince us, we can learn much from him, for his very 
onesidedness enables him to present very strongly his 
side of the argument. 
Both optimists and pessimists may suffer from another 
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kind of onesidedness. Starting from too narrow preoccupa-
tion with some specific value of human life, which they 
regard as all-important and decisive, they may reach their 
judgment by trying to ascertain men's achievement in 
terms of that specific supreme value. Even a brief report 
of the debate about progress readily discloses this one-
sided inspection of human values. Optimists and pes-
simists might argue whether men's pursuit of happiness 
has been successful or futile, but they may not consider 
the further question: whether the issue about progress 
hangs altogether upon the attainability of happiness, since 
other values may be equally important or even more 
decisive. 
Does the general course of human affairs indicate then 
a tendency toward improvement or toward deterioration? 
We may judge that our civilization is fundamentally 
sound and that it has steadily improved through the cen-
turies, although our generally optimistic appraisal of 
human life may be disturbed by signs of lag or corruption 
here and there. On the other hand, a pessimist's con-
demnation of civilization may be intensified by his dour 
reflection that things are not only bad, but are getting 
worse. Or his dismay may be somewhat tempered by a 
grim reflection that life might be worse. 
Consider first the optimist's reassuring reply. In the 
growing complexity of modern life, surely nothing seems 
more obvious than the progressive mastery of the natural 
forces and resources available for human use. We are 
harnessing nature in more and more various and extensive 
ways. We are discovering and utilizing increasing supplies 
of food and secure subsistence. We are solving the secrets 
of one disease after another and steadily lengthening the 
average span of human life. We are perfecting transporta-
tion and communication to the point where we have al-
most wiped out the barriers of space and time. We are 
placing within the reach of growing millions the appliances 
INTRODUCTION 9 
which make possible a more efficient and comfortable 
household economy as well as cultural and artistic ad-
vantages. Our systems of public education are preparing 
our young people to outstrip us and move forward to 
still larger horizons. 
But this laudation of modern progress has been scorned 
by the pessimist. Beneath the garish trumpery is spiritual 
emptiness and boredom. Granting the great advances of 
technology, do we find convincing evidence of the attain-
ment of happiness, knowledge, justice, peace? Even in 
material welfare the luxuries of the few and the comforts 
of the many are in flagrant contrast to the hardships of 
multitudes. Our vast industrial expansion has its slimy 
by-products; it has led to the pollution of our whole en-
vironment, air and land and rivers and oceans; it threatens 
our very survival in the not distant future. While medical 
science is discovering the cause and cure of one disease 
after another, the strains and evils of our modern ways of 
life are breaking down bodies and minds and filling our 
hospitals and mental institutions faster than our doctors 
can empty them. From an opposite angle, the very suc-
cesses of medical science in perfecting sanitary and cura-
tive methods, in sharply reducing infant mortality, have 
released the population flood, and mankind faces ultimate 
starvation. Our intellectual search leads us to perplexities 
on deeper and deeper levels. We raise more problems than 
we can solve and despite our expanding fund of knowledge 
we find ourselves groping in darkness in our fundamental 
inquiries. As to justice and peace, it seems a humiliation 
even to utter these words. Presumptuous statesmen pro-
pose to build for ages, but nothing is as forgotten as last 
year's plans and treaties. In our country the most im-
pressive plans of racial and social reform have been upset 
and thrown into confusion by lawless riots with their 
violence, arson, and looting. Throughout the world men 
are depraved by the devotion which should exalt them. 
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Patriotism and religion stiffen them into bigotry and in-
flame them to bloodshed. How can we believe in pro-
gressive attainment of the higher values when we see 
the best motives in us perverted to corruption and ruin? 
We cannot dismiss either the optimistic or the pessi-
mistic recitals as merely temperamental reactions, as sub-
jective inferences from personal well-being or woe, or as 
expressions influenced by periods of relative peace and 
prosperity or of crisis and chaos. Pessimistic and opti-
mistic accounts of human experience suffer from a con-
fusion which is familiar in the philosophy of history and 
in the social sciences generally. The available data which 
might be used as evidence are so vast and complex and 
so various that by partial selection, one way or the other, 
a plausible case can be made for either one of two contrary 
theses. The facts which the optimist cites in his paean 
of the onward march of humanity are just as genuine as 
the opposite woeful record which is exposed in the pessi-
mist's damning verdict. Both accounts are in a measure 
correct, but each may be onesided and neither be a 
thoroughly true interpretation. We must attempt a 
broader value perspective if we are to deal more fairly 
with this great issue. 
A basic characteristic of value in the course of the 
historical process is its bipolarity: that is to say, a moral 
value must always be expressed in a contending relation to 
a countervalue. It is never neutrally actual; it has always 
an impending alternative, challenging and claiming our 
choice and preference or its resistance to another alterna-
tive value. The interplay of contending purposes and 
directions of our will constitutes the real drama of our 
lives. Each main value manifests itself in some field of 
human striving or expression, be it achievement or frustra-
tion, positive or negative. Truth is attained and acknow-
ledged through the exposure of error. Justice is pursued 
and achieved in the correction of injustice and lawlessness. 
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Likewise with beauty and harmony and honor and friend-
ship and peace. 
This means that at any stage in a man's activity and 
character, his outlook on life, his emotional attitude, his 
will are all engaged across a field of various impending 
choices up and down the scale of values, toward eventual 
good or evil, or rather toward eventual better and not so 
good, worse or not so bad. In this perennial drama of 
human life, the good choices and actions are those which 
prefer and pursue the upward course that assures the 
more nearly perfect fulfillment of personality. But evil 
is the misdirecting of the will which leads to stunting 
and frustration of character, the perverse choice which 
spurns the higher values and indulges lower appetites. 
In any individual's life, progress would be the advanc-
ing from one right choice of the higher value in one situa-
tion to the next similarly right choice in the next situation. 
So we may always be facing the rival spur to lower issues 
but would steadily reaffirm the better preference and 
advance along the higher reaches of conduct toward ex-
panding fulfillment of personality. Now how is this drama 
of human experience unfolded on the historical stage in 
the course of civilization? Can we say that historical 
development itself is a condition and a factor in progress, 
and if so, in what sense and to what extent? 
The history of civilization manifests the expanding 
scope of human activities. It cannot be described fairly 
either by an upward curve of progress or by a downward 
curve of degradation or by a random line of meaningless 
futility. The entire scale of values, for good or ill, for 
better or worse, is spread on an increasingly vaster field. 
Both fulfillment and frustration of personality become 
more extensive and more important. Men's purposes be-
come more far-reaching and their choices more momen-
tous. Men can rise higher to possess a richer treasury of 
values, but if they turn the wrong way, their straying and 
12 INTRODUCTION 
downfall are more disastrous. In the ongoing course of 
cultural expansion we can see how much higher and higher 
men can rise, but also how much lower and lower men 
might sink. 
The historical course of men's advance, from primitive 
to barbaric to civilized existence, is thus not identical 
with men's curve of progress. As distinguished from 
primitive life or from barbaric epochs, our modern civiliza-
tion is both better and worse; but we should not mis-
understand this seemingly evasive appraisal, for in one 
sense the march of civilization can fairly be called a 
march of progress. While the historical past does record 
sublime achievements but also perverse choices, the in-
creasing complexity and expanding range of human 
powers and activities does provide a field of available 
high attainments which the earlier historical stages did 
not afford. Through the ages history has presented to 
men of the right choice and goodwill an increasingly 
vaster field of fulfillment and perfection. Civilization is 
not the assured upward course, but if men do move up-
ward and forward in the achievement of values they can 
move to much higher levels in the range of civilization. 
The hazard of the more disastrous failure is always facing 
civilized man, but in resisting and overcoming this hazard 
he has the opportunity to achieve values higher than any 
within the reach of lower societies. In this view one may 
fairly be an optimist in one's outlook on history, not in a 
docile spirit of uncritical laudation, but heroically and 
with a grave sense of responsibility, as clearly aware of 
the higher prospect as of the mortal perils of our civili-
zation. 
We should grasp this point to avoid any ambiguity. 
While recognizing this aspect of progressiveness in his-
torical development, it is important to insist that our 
cultural outlook is neither one of pessimistic dismay nor 
of bland optimism. We aim at clear-sighted and respon-
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sible appraisal. The course of history is as the transition 
from childhood to adolescence and to maturity. Shall we 
praise or shall we bewail this transition which is normal 
in everyone's life? The course from infancy to youth and 
to advancing age is not be described either as an increas-
ing gain or as a steady loss of values, as either more or 
less happy, more or less satisfactory, more or less worth 
living. A person's satisfactions are relative to his general 
character and development. The joys and sorrows of a 
child are both simple. Under normal conditions, with the 
proper care, the problem of a child's happiness is soluble 
to a degree that it can hardly be in the life of an adult. 
But are we to fret about our lost and irretrievable blessed-
ness? Would the pleasures of youth be assured pleasures 
to us as adults? In our experience of happiness just as 
in the more saintly ways of which the apostle Paul wrote, 
as we become men we should outgrow childish ways. 
Just as in individual careers so in social-historical 
processes and institutions, human abilities sweep out in 
both directions, for good or for ill. Men's resources multi-
ply-both their technical and other powers of realizing 
their purposes, and their misdirections and perversities 
which lead them astray. Achievement and frustration, 
creative advance and corruption contend precariously at 
each turn of the historical march. The outcome is often 
complicated by conditions beyond men's control or reach, 
but it depends in large measure upon their choices be-
tween alternative interests, purposes, and values. And the 
choosing is ever more momentous. 
In surveying the historical process to test the idea of 
progress, we should be on guard not to identify temporal 
sequence with social advance. Progress is not a function 
of mere chronology; the earlier is not always the lower, 
nor is the latest necessarily the best. That is the confusion 
of those for whom the term modern is the highest form 
of praise. To be sure, we can trace definite human ad-
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vancement from primitive to barbarian to civilized so-
cieties, and likewise along many lines of activities from 
classical antiquity to medieval culture and to modem 
civilization. But the historical curve is not altogether 
one of a constant upward trend. In the story of humanity 
just as in the lives of individuals there are moments or 
periods of great achievement and expression, and there 
is also decline and backwash. Later years may strive to 
regain the lost ground, and long centuries may gain their 
inspiration from the lofty ascents of bygone genius to 
which they aspire but do not attain. In speaking of 
progress we are concerned not so much with the calendar 
of humanity as with the ongoing march of civilization in 
the realization of values. 
This broad view of the meaning and the course of 
progress may be illustrated in two fields of experience. 
Consider the history of intellectual advance. In science 
and in philosophy progress may be measured by the in-
creasing scope of reliably surveyed and tested evidence, 
by the adequate and coherent organization of ideas, by 
significant interpretation and fruitful theory. In this prog-
ress the solutions of critical problems stand out as mile-
stones in the march of reason; but equally important is 
the deepening insight that is shown in the recognition of 
new and far-reaching problems. The intellectual enter-
prise is by its very nature endless. Nature has neither top 
nor bottom, and human nature is inexhaustible. But in 
probing these depths and exploring this boundless range 
men can gain in understanding; they can expand the area 
of accurate and tested knowledge; they can recognize 
more clearly the problems that still elude them. And in 
all these directions the history of thought has recorded 
real advance. 
So likewise in our estimate of the course of civilization 
regarding the quest for happiness. The important ques-
tion here is not whether civilized man is actually happier 
than primitive man. Real progress in happiness is in the 
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development and growing maturity of enjoyment. The 
problem is this: to what extent are we able to realize 
the resources of satisfaction which our complex modern 
life affords, to choose and to experience the riper enjoy-
ments that should be ours in the fruition of civilization. 
To long for the idyllic joys of bygone days is maudlin 
and futile. Our real happiness can only be the happiness 
of our age and of our range. 
Our further inquiry in this study must be a testing of 
the validity or significance of our proposed approach to 
the problem of historical progress. In successive chapters 
we shall consider the principal fields of social experience 
in their historical course so as to test our proposed inter-
pretation of the process of civilization as an expanding 
range of human capacities that might lead to greater good 
or to more grievous evil, depending upon an ever more 
momentous choice between contending purposes and 
values. 
It may not be impertinent here to mention a personal 
motivation in writing this book. I outlined my broad 
view of civilization in its relation to progress forty years 
ago in a chapter on "The Despair of Civilization," in a 
book entitled The Nature of Evil. While my conviction 
of the essential validity of my basic idea has been con-
firmed by the turn of events during the past generation, 
I have felt increasingly bound to reexamine in greater 
detail the evidence on which my interpretation was in-
tended to rest. And while thus undertaking this inquiry 
for my own enlightenment I have come to believe that 
it is timely and likely to be of interest to others who are 
also seeking their way through the troubled paths of 
contemporary reflection. 
The problem of historical progress faces us squarely 
today on a worldwide scale. Our crisis arises in the very 
conditions of modern life that could also become factors 
in realizing a more perfect civilization. The tragedy of 
our time is that in its political and economic development 
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modern life has become increasingly global, but we have 
not attained a global outlook on life and an international 
morality. 
This crisis does not prove that our modern life is hope-
lessly incapable of progress. Nor can the problem be 
solved by turning back the pages of historical develop-
ment, even if that were possible. Our problem and our 
chances of eventual collapse or progress are as they have 
been in any society at any time, but the present world 
crisis has dramatized them most emphatically. The the-
oretical and technical achievements of modern science 
have unlocked natural resources and energies available 
for human use which would enable us to achieve a world 
community that could be a masterpiece of civilization. 
We are on the threshold of an age of unparalleled increase 
in the means of perfecting human welfare in all directions. 
But the released atomic energies can also be used to 
destroy, and we find ourselves on the brink of exploding 
our whole civilization to deadly ashes. 
Our belief in historical progress has both an inspiring 
and a tragic aspect. It should express a clear awareness 
of the expanding range and complexity of modern life. 
Before us are marvelous opportunities of unprecedented 
cultural achievements, but also stunning perils of cata-
strophic disaster. Our destiny hangs upon our choice 
between conflicting values. We should confront resolutely 
our alternatives: what in them is of subsidiary import, to 
be subordinated and in a threatened fatal conflict to be 
conceded, and what in them is crucial; where is that 
crossroad of decision, final and unwavering, and where 
on that crossroad is the upward and where the downward 
course? We need that supreme insight and the will to 
go forward where it directs us. If ever there was an all-
human drama enacted before us and within us which 
sways life itself on the balance, here it is, and we dare not 
shirk it, 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Alternatives and Approaches 
to the Idea of Progress m 
Classical Antiquity 
THE BELIEF IN PROGRESS was not a vital idea for classical 
minds. The Greeks did not view history as a process of 
progressive achievement, realization, and expansion of 
values. Even their greatest historian, Thucydides (c. 460-
400), did not contemplate the events of his time in the 
context of an advancing march out of the past. On his 
first page he tells us that his inquiries into remote an-
tiquity and into more recent times failed to reveal to him 
anything "on a great scale, either in war or in other 
matters." No classical poet sings: "1, the heir of all the 
ages." 
If we follow the example of the chronicler who was 
content with the bare statement that there are no snakes 
in Iceland, we shall find that our discussion of the idea 
of progress in the Christian-medieval period will be just 
as brief. But then we shall be failing to recognize the 
distinctive qualities of classical and the medieval Chris-
tian ideas of history-radically different views, both un-
like our modem outlook. The examination of these dif-
ferences and contending views should enable us to grasp 
better the motivation and the range of our modem doc-
trine of progress. 
Before tracing some of the ancient classical approaches 
to the idea of progress we should examine two Greek 
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views which also persisted, though not steadily, in Roman 
thought: the view of a series of world ages marked by 
an increasing degeneration, and the view of the cosmic 
process as cyclical, a treadmill of eternal recurrence. The 
first of these beliefs pervaded Greek mythology and 
characterized the world outlook of some poets and 
philosophers. The second was a theory of cosmological 
speculation, with significant implications. 
It should be stated clearly at the outset that neither 
of these ideas commanded general acceptance. Thucy-
dides writes in his account of the rude early beginnings 
of the Greek tribes, unsettled in habitation and in customs, 
many of them pirates and lawless nomads. While he un-
rolls before us the tragic events of the Peloponnesian war, 
Thucydides is not marked by any nostalgia for bygone 
primitive glories. Even in its disasters the Athens of his 
day could not lose the first memories which he engraved 
in his version of Pericles' funeral oration. And he appealed 
to the undoubted judgment of the posterity: "I have 
written my work ... as a possession for all time."1 
The issue between the doctrines of historical degenera-
tion and eternal recurrence was not always drawn sharply. 
Both were held by many minds in ambiguous indecision. 
And alongside of them there were also some approaches 
to the belief in progress. 
The view of history as periodic degeneration has been 
called the doctrine of cultural primitivism.2 Traditionally 
it was the belief in a bygone Golden Age. Hesiod in the 
eighth century gave us an early version of it in his Works 
and Days. The deathless Olympian gods made first of all 
"a golden race of mortal men who ... lived like gods 
1 Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Richard Crawley, 
Everyman's Library edition, p. 15. 
2 The doctrine of cultural primitivism has been studied by Professors 
Arthur 0. Lovejoy and George Boas with thorough analysis and the most 
extensive documentation across the entire range of classical literature. 
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without sorrow of heart, remote and free from toil and 
grief."3 The portrayal of their blessed light of existence 
is in sharp contrast to the series of lower and lower types 
of humanity which darkened the succeeding ages. Phys-
ically and mentally the men of the Silver Age were inferior 
to their predecessors. And down the scale of baser metals, 
the Bronze Age and the Iron Age marked the spreading 
degeneration of human nature. 
The golden men lived in justice and ease and joy. 
Peaceful were their lives and their death was as a gentle 
sleep. The silver men were slow-witted and insolent, 
without piety, so that they angered the gods who did 
away with them. The brazen men were a race of terrible 
warriors, violent and hard of heart. They crushed and 
destroyed each other and without any abiding achieve-
ment sank into the chill muck of Hades. Hesiod com-
plained: Ours is the age of the men of iron; in toil and 
grief we grind out our days; wrangling and trickery sully 
our homelife and our dealings with each other. Neither 
justice nor reverence are to be found among us, but "envy, 
foul-mouthed, delighting in evil."4 
The poet bewailed his lot, that he had been born in the 
Age of Iron. He interrupted his account of man's de-
terioration by singing of the great Age of Heroes, between 
the Brazen and the Iron eras. Some of them were war-
like, like the men of bronze and perished in dread battles, 
but others, nobler and more righteous, still live without 
grief or want in the Islands of the Blessed. Was Hesiod' s 
heroic episode in the dismal tale of human degeneration 
a hint of possible future hope of restoration, or was it a 
note of added dismay? Zeus the farseeing might just as 
well have allowed us to be born in the heroic mould. 
3 Hesiod Works and Days II. 109 ff., trans. Hugh G. Evelyn-White, 
Loeb Classical Library. 
4 Ibid., II. 195 f. 
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The Golden Age doctrine persisted in the thought of 
both philosophers and poets, but it was slanted differently 
in various cosmic outlooks. Plato ( 427-347) seems to 
have regarded the myth of the Golden Age, along with 
some of his own myths, as an imaginative version of a 
deep truth. The truth would appear to be that individual 
human well-being and perfection come through divine 
guidance; but if, or rather when, God's hand is with-
drawn, men left to themselves go astray and the whole 
world reverts toward confusion and evil. This view of 
the world course, which we may call pendular, has kin-
ships with the doctrine of eternal recurrence. It is also 
involved in Plato's approach to the abysmal problem of 
evil. That evil can in any way be attributed to God, 
Plato rejected emphatically as an impious error. God is 
the author of good, and of good only. But there is in the 
constitution of the world a corrupt material strain, and 
in the very nature of things "there must always remain 
something which is antagonistic to good." He declared 
further: "God desired that all things should be good and 
nothing bad, so far as this was attainable" ;5 but left to 
our own devices we men let our lower impulses prevail. 
In this Platonic perspective of theodicy the legend of the 
Golden Age expressed deep significance. 
During the Augustan period in Rome the myth of the 
Golden Age was given an optimistic turn in the prospect 
of its possible return, as in Virgil's Fourth Eclogue: a 
kind of millennia! hope, but hardly ongoing progress. This 
chant of divine restoration of mankind to a high estate 
was interpreted by Christian theologians in messianic, 
providential terms. A closer echo of Hesiod's myth in 
Roman poetry is found in Ovid's Metamorphoses. Ovid 
glorified especially the primeval perfection of mankind. 
"Golden was that first age, which, with no one to compel, 
5 Plato Theaetetus 176; Timaeus 30; trans. Benjamin Jowett (Oxford, 
1892). 
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without a law, of its own will, kept faith and did the 
right."6 He also sang in Latin verse the old story of the 
several ages, but proceeding from the silver and the 
brazen directly to his age of hard iron, in which "modesty 
and truth and faith fled the earth, and in their place 
came tricks and plots and snares, violence and cursed 
love of gain."7 
The poetic version of the return of the Golden Age 
was not only a vision of eventual restoration but also a 
mediation between the doctrine of cultural degeneration 
and the cyclic cosmology of eternal recurrence. This 
second doctrine finds many expressions throughout the 
entire course of Greek thought, from Heraclitus to Plo-
tinus. The world process goes through the entire scale 
of possible conditions or events and then returns to re-
trace its course to the least detail, aeon after aeon. 
The basic idea of eternal recurrence was not exclusively 
or originally Greek Its various versions may be studied 
in Babylonian, Brahmanic, Buddhist, and Chinese cos-
mogonies. It stimulated the Oriental zeal for vastness and 
infinitude, of which Buddhism provided the most elab-
orate expressions. The Buddhist kalpas, or aeons of 
world-destruction and world-restoration, were regarded 
as incalculable cosmic eras: how incalculable, Buddhist 
speculation taxed its resources to conceive. The monsoon 
rains of the Bay of Bengal discharge in some four months 
thirty or forty feet of flood. The Buddhist imagined such 
a downpour, but of three years' duration: the total sum 
of raindrops would still come short of the number of 
years in an asankhyeya kalpa. And these cosmic aeons 
return cyclically, marked by the alternative destruction 
and restoration of the world. Our folktales begin with 
the familiar "once upon a time"; but a Buddhist legend is 
6 Ovid Metamorphoses 1. 89 ff., trans. F. J. Miller, Loeb Classical 
Library. 
7 Ibid., II. 127 ff. 
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more expansive: "Ten quadrillion times a hundred quad-
rillions of kalpas ago, there lived a righteous king."8 A 
dim recollection, and hardly a hope, yet Buddhist piety 
sought to sustain its serene prospect. Even if in this 
kalpa no lotus flower may appear on the primordial deep 
(and so no Buddha will come to teach men deliverance 
from misery), yet in some incredibly distant future, salva-
tion and enlightenment will again return to wretched 
mankind. Even this brief passing mention of Oriental 
speculation may enable us to keep in mind the worldwide 
spread of the idea of eternal recurrence, as we consider 
it more directly in some of its Greek versions. 
In Pre-Socratic philosophy the world course of eternal 
recurrence was conceived in pendular and in cyclical 
terms. Heraclitus viewed nature as a process of endless 
change of contending activities, as the opposition of up-
building and downgrading. All things arising from cosmic 
fire are eventually consumed by fire, worlds without end. 
Empedocles envisioned a similar counteraction of love 
and strife, or attraction and repulsion, throughout the 
course of existence. He seems to have entertained also a 
cyclical cosmogony and was a believer in the transmigra-
tion of souls. These two beliefs found strong support in 
the Pythagorean school. Pythagorean influence may be 
traced in Plato's advocacy of these doctrines, very definite 
in the case of transmigration, only occasional in the case 
of eternal recurrence. Aristotle also conceived of the 
course of existence in terms of circular motion, for it 
alone is continuous and in accord with his view of the 
universe as eternaJ.9 But while one can cite from Aristotle 
passages from which a cyclical doctrine might be sur-
mised, he can hardly be listed with the definite advocates 
of eternal recurrence. 
8 Spence Hardy, The Legends and Theories of the Buddhists, 2d ed. 
(London, 1881), pp. 159 ff. 
9 Compare Aristotle De generatione et corroptione 337a. 
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In Post-Aristotelian philosophy eternal recurrence was 
entertained by the Epicurean poet Lucretius ( c.94-c.55), 
found its active expression among the earlier Stoics, and 
was viewed by Plotinus in a mystical perspective. 
Lucretius saw in nature a mechanical scrambling and 
unscrambling of material particles: his world was one 
of atoms-in-motion-in-space. Thus everything is an im-
permanent combination or cluster of atoms, and since 
the number of different combinations, no matter how vast, 
is yet exhaustible in eternity, there is bound to be re-
currence and return not only in general terms but in 
detail. To a truly cosmic survey, "all things are always 
the same, eadem sunt omnia semper."10 
The Stoic sages were more explicit and detailed. Re-
viving the Heraclitean belief in a Cosmic Fire, which 
they exalted as Directive Reason or as Deity, they con-
ceived of nature as a tension between refining and 
coarsening processes of material existence. When at long 
last a world aeon has gone through its whole round of 
possible conditions and events, it is all consumed in a 
cosmic conflagration, to start another world cycle re-
capitulating its predecessors to the least detail. A new 
Socrates, like so vastly many before him immemorially, 
again has his trials with his shrewish wife Xanthippe and 
his trial at court and his final cup of hemlock poison. 
These doctrines of cosmic conflagration and eternal re-
currence were held by the early Stoics, but they were 
abandoned by Panaetius who introduced Stoicism into 
Rome, and the Roman Stoics took a linear view of the 
world process, only occasionally entertaining a cyclical 
cosmogony. 
The doctrines of recurrence and rebirth were revived 
in the closing period of ancient thought by the Neo-
pythagoreans and Neoplatonists. The great€st thinker of 
1o Lucretius De rerum natura 3. 945. 
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that age, Plotinus ( 205-270), introduced these ideas into 
his mystical cosmology of divine emanation. Plotinus 
believed that the spiritual essence of man's soul was not 
extinguished along with his bodily disintegration. His 
assurance of personal immortality, like Plato's, was com-
bined with a view of the rebirth and transmigration of 
souls. In a larger cosmic setting, Plotinus regarded the 
repeated emanation of the Soul principle as an instance of 
the cyclical recapitulation of the vast cosmic process 
of Deity emanating in the three zones of existence-Nous 
or Rational Spirit, Soul, and Matter. The doctrine of 
Rational Divine Providence, which the Stoics fused subtly 
and strangely with their materialistic cosmology, was ex-
pressed by Plotinus in unmistakably spiritual terms. The 
ultimate reality for him was God, emanating radiant per-
fection throughout the universe at different levels of 
being. 
The legend of the Golden Age and the mythology of 
world degeneration yielded a dismal view which excluded 
any real historical advance. The doctrine of eternal re-
currence in its various forms viewed the world process 
either as the cyclical recapitulation of the forms of ma-
terial existence or as the periodic reenactment of the 
drama of divine Providence. These ideas may be regarded 
as dominant in ancient thought. 
The view of an upward trend to betterment in the 
world emerged with the rationalists, but it is interesting 
to note that cultural advance was recognized and the 
term progress itself was used by the Epicurean materialist 
Lucretius. Essential to all understanding of Epicureanism 
is its materialistic cosmology. Like Democritus and 
Epicurus, Lucretius recognized only atomic particles of 
matter moving in space, and he explained the nature of 
everything in terms of the cluster of atoms of which it 
was compounded, and their motions, contacts, and col-
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lisions. No divine guidance was recognized here, no 
spiritual principles, no dominant purposes and values. 
All is in a flux; the mechanics of nature is ever changing 
the composition of things, disintegrating and recombin-
ing the masses of atoms throughout existence. Besides 
this mechanical reassembling of particles, there is always 
the unaccountable power of each atom to swerve at any 
moment in any direction. In this world without plan, 
eternal duration would by the sheer calculation of chances 
yield eventual recurrence. But how could it afford, let 
alone assure, genuine and reliable progress? 
The thought of Lucretius at this point is versatile rather 
than consistent. The universal atomic whirl and pulsation 
are not altogether random and chaotic; as he sees them, 
under certain conditions certain combinations persist or 
are transformed in a definite direction. Driven by need 
or lured by use and advantage, men devised tools, per-
fected plans and methods which sustained them in what 
they possessed and opened to them still larger prospects 
of achievement and even mastery of nature. So gradually 
in every field of activity, in farming and seafaring, in 
armament and legislation, in clothing and road building, 
and in all the arts, men step by step were taught by 
practice and mental activity to progress, progredientes, 
through time and by reason.11 Surprising in the material-
istic outlook of Lucretius is this acknowledgment of di-
rective intelligence. 
The recognition of a genuinely progressive course in 
human affairs by the classical philosophers of more or 
less rationalistic bent, while it was not dominant, was 
significant in view of the generally unhistorical outlook 
of ancient thought to which we have alluded. In Plato's 
Theory of Ideas the supreme reality is the Idea of Good 
or the principle of value and prevailing perfection. There 
11 Compare De rerum natura 5.1448 ff. 
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is always evil, and lesser and lower values are always 
contending with the higher, for there must always be 
something antagonistic to good and to perfection; but 
there is also available advance in knowledge and in the 
arts, and this advance can have no bounds. This view 
accentuates one aspect of Plato's idealism, and it can 
be and has been criticized as overemphasis. For all his 
exaltation of sovereign Reason, Plato's thought is also 
marked by a deeply tragic conviction of man's finitude 
in the mastery of values. There is a pessimistic tenor in 
Plato's social philosophy. His account, in the Republic, 
of the increasing degeneration of society and forms of 
government might seem like a philosophical pendant to 
Hesiod' s dirge of the stages of men's decline from the 
primitive Golden Age. In contrast to the aristocratic 
"pattern laid in Heaven" of his ideal state of dominant 
Reason, Plato exposed the corrupt strains in human nature 
that degraded it to lower and lower states, through tim-
ocracy to oligarchy and democracy to tyranny. 
Aristotle was less dramatic about men; without exalta-
tion, he granted them some reach beyond their immediate 
grasp. Like Plato he traced the degeneration of the state, 
but he also pointed out the path of social order and 
government toward more perfect realization of justice 
and general welfare. He did not proceed to any rigid 
conclusion of a final advance or decline, for while in any 
era some progress in the crafts and arts or knowledge 
or practice may be traced, the cycle of existence may 
sweep it all away and like the mythical Pandora's box 
leave to man only hope. 
For more explicit advocacy of human progress, we 
must turn to the Stoic sages of Rome, most of whom 
did not maintain firmly the doctrine of eternal recurrence 
held by their Greek predecessors. Especially noteworthy 
here are Cicero and Seneca. Cicero ( 104-43) recognized 
both progress and the obstacles to it in man's social 
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relations and activities: "Man is the source of both the 
greatest help and the greatest harm to man."12 Yet while 
in so many ways men are hampered and also corrupted 
by the social conditions in which they have to live, it 
is in and through society that they can advance in 
knowledge and in the arts: "Without the association of 
men, cities could not have been built or peopled. . . . 
Laws and customs were established, and ... the equitable 
distribution of private rights."13 From small beginnings 
men proceed to larger gains and advantages, progres-
sionibus. Man also should seek to discover and further 
the development of which he is capable until it is fully 
attained.14 
Seneca ( 4-65) was even more explicit in his belief in 
the possibility of social progress, yet he combined it with 
his Stoic austere advocacy of the simple rational life. The 
plain virtues which he saw in the lives of bygone genera-
tions inclined him in retrospect to final resignation. But 
he also looked to future advance. So he wrote to Lucilius: 
We should emulate our forebears and advance as they 
did, going beyond them. Mankind is still in its infancy, 
and future ages will know clearly much of what now 
is unknown. We should trust to sound thinking, for "life 
is the gift of the immortal gods, but living well is the 
gift of philosophy."15 Seneca was also nostalgic in his 
reflections on the Golden Age, in his praise of the long 
past, in his revulsion at the luxuries and vulgarities of 
his age. And he viewed with deep concern the possible 
dissolution of it all, in words recalling the earlier Stoic 
belief in a cosmic conflagration: "A single day will see 
the burial of all mankind. . . . All that is famous and all 
12 Cicero De officiis 2.5.17, trans. Walter Miller, Loeb Classical 
Library. 
13 De officiis 2.4.15. 
14 Compare Cicero De finibus 5. 21, cited by Lovejoy and Boas, Prim-
itivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity (Baltimore, Md., 1935), pp. 248 f. 
15 Seneca Epist. moral. 90.1, trans. R. M. Gummere, Loeb Classical 
Library. 
PART ONE 
that is beautiful, great thrones, great nations-all will 
descend into the one abyss, will be overthrown in one 
hour."16 
There is here a characteristic tension between recogni-
tion and exaltation of great values, and doubt and dismay 
about their final undoing. This tragic outlook may be 
noted in the greatest Greek poets. Two examples may 
suffice. In the Prometheus Bound of Aeschylus ( 525-456) 
the great culture hero recites with justified pride his noble 
services to mankind. His eloquent soliloquy reviews every 
field of activity in which he had led men, from the savage 
burrows in which they groped like beasts into the light 
of day to skill and understanding and security and civilized 
life. But Aeschylus also portrays the great fire-bringer as 
chained to a rock in the Caucasus. Great Zeus had con-
demned him; his work for man and man's progress are 
doomed to ruin. 
Akin to the Promethean tragedy is the "Hymn to Man" 
in the famous Chorus of the Antigone, one of the finest 
pages in Sophocles ( 495-406): 
Wonders are many, and none is more wonderful than 
man; the power that crosses the white sea, driven by the 
stormy south-wind, making a path under surges that 
threaten to engulf him; and Earth, the eldest of the gods, 
the immortal, the unwearied, doth he wear, turning the 
soil with the offspring of horses, as the ploughs go to and 
fro from year to year. And the light-hearted race of birds, 
and the tribe of savage beasts, and the sea-brood of the 
deep, he snares in the meshes of his woven toils, he leads 
captive, man excellent in wit. And he masters by his arts 
the beast whose lair is in the wilds, who roams the hills; 
he tames the horse of shaggy mane; he puts the yoke upon 
his neck, he tames the tireless mountain bull. And speech, 
and wind-swift thought, and all the moods that mould a 
16 Seneca Quaestiones naturales 3. 29, cited in F. J. Teggart, The Idea 
of Progress, ed. G. H. Hildebrand (Berkeley, Calif., 1949), p. 106. 
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state, hath he taught himself; and how to flee the arrows 
of the frost, when 'tis hard lodging under the clear sky, 
and the arrows of the rushing rain; yea, he hath resource 
for all; without resource he meets nothing that must come: 
only against Death shall he call for aid in vain; but from 
baffiing maladies he hath devised escapes. Cunning be-
yond fancy's dream is the fertile skill which brings him, 
now to evil, now to good. When he honours the laws of 
the land, and that justice which he hath sworn by the 
gods to uphold, proudly stands his city: no city hath he 
who, for his rashness, dwells with sin. Never may he share 
my hearth, never think my thoughts, who doth these 
thingsP 
"Only against Death shall he call for aid in vain." 
This undertone in the "Hymn to Man" seems as dismal 
as in the culture paean of Prometheus. And the heroine 
of Sophocles is tragic indeed, with her utter commitment 
to the ageless laws of heaven and the doom to which her 
sublime devotion is bound. Yet the Chorus of Sophocles, 
just as the whole tragedy of Antigone, does not end on a 
note of despair. Is it not Platonic in its unwavering 
acknowledgment of the highest values? They have no 
easy prevailing power in human lives and societies, but 
they alone have right: how, then, could they be ultimately 
futile? 
17 Sophocles Antigone II. 332 ff ., trans. R. C. J ebb (Cambridge, Eng., 
1963). 
CHAPTER TWO 
Divine Providence 
and Human Progress In 
the Christian Tradition 
IN HIS Syllabus of Errors ( 1864) Pope Pius IX declared 
that he could not "reconcile himself with progress, liberal-
ism, and modern civilization."1 This pontifical pronounce-
ment expressed the traditional ecclesiastical attitude 
toward corrupt human nature, despite many liberal voices 
to the contrary. Though evidence might indicate ad-
vances in various fields of human activity, church piety 
has had no faith in secular self-reliance in individual and 
social achievement. The stricter Christian outlook from 
the very outset was not historical-progressive but prov-
idential. For good or for ill it contemplated not human 
attainment or failure but rather dependence on divine 
blessings or judgment, a divinely induced millennium or 
the crack of doom. 
In the language of the theologian the final view of 
human destinies under divine Providence has been called 
the doctrine of eschatology, of last things. Itself a verdict 
on history, this doctrine has its historical origins which 
connect it not only with Jewish prophetic and apocalyptic 
ideas but also with nonbiblical speculations in the various 
ancient civilizations and even in very early societies. 
Primitive peoples, faced with lurking danger and 
stunned by the violent upheavals in nature, saw ultimately 
the collapse of it all in some final catastrophe. The whole 
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world, they surmised, will at last be wiped out in a 
deluge; it will shrivel to a crisp in a drouth; it will be 
burned to ashes; or it will be demolished by earthquakes 
and cataclysms. 
Of more direct interest to us as likely influences on 
later Jewish and early Christian ideas are the doctrines 
of the Zoroastrian or Parsee religion. They combined 
speculations about world-ages with a stern view of final 
judgment. A basic dualism was taught by Zoroaster 
(Zarathustra): that the world is the battleground of two 
creative agencies, the all-perfect God Ahura-Mazda and 
the evil demon Ahriman. In this world conflict every 
man is involved on one side or the other, as a thrall of 
Ahriman or, in good religion, as a co-warrior with God. 
The cosmic strife covers a span of some twelve thousand 
years, in four equal aeons. Zarathustra's birth, at the 
beginning of the last quarter of world history, marks the 
beginning of true heroic religion among men and forecasts 
the final age of destiny. During the last thousand years 
the war of Ahura-Mazda against the evil forces of Ahriman 
will rage ever more violently. It will finally come to a 
climax. Stirred to their supreme onslaught by their God-
given leader Saoshyant, the hosts of the righteous will 
rout Ahriman and his wicked cohorts. The whole world 
will then be melted by fire; it will run through space like 
a flaming river, consuming all sinners but soothing the 
righteous. A new world of pure and abiding justice and 
peace and divine beatitude will then begin. 
Zoroastrianism paralleled its visions of final world-
destiny with a doctrine of personal immortality and 
judgment after death. From this life to the next across a 
vast abyss stretches Khinvat, the Bridge of Destiny. To 
the righteous man it is as a broad highway that leads him 
to the threefold Paradise of Good Thoughts, Good Words, 
Good Deeds; but as the sinner steps upon it, it narrows as 
1 Cited by W. R. Inge, The Fall of the Idols (London, 1940), p. 34. 
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sharp as a razor and hurtles him into the yawning chasm. 
These visions of heaven and hell are not dissimilar to 
those of later Jewish and Christian believers, through 
which they seem also to have influenced Muhammadan 
ideas of the hereafter. Islam had its own bridge of divine 
judgment, Al-Sirat, level and broad to the true believer, 
but to the infidel a deadly sword's edge. 
Recent discovery and interpretations of the Dead Sea 
Scrolls have impressed upon our minds the relation of 
early Christian ideas and practices to those of certain 
other Jewish religious communities with their providential 
visions of human destiny. The study of the so-called 
Jewish apocalyptic writings throw light on both the earlier 
and the later periods of the biblical tradition. Between 
the Hebrew theocratic hope of a messianic kingdom in 
Zion and the gospel teaching of the Kingdom of God 
within us, there is a radical difference but not an absolute 
gap. The transition may be traced in considerable part 
through a body of writings, some of them prior to the 
New Testament, some contemporary with it and with 
the early patristic literature, the general character of 
which may be described as being similar to that of our 
book of Revelation. 
The development of the providential eschatology in 
Judaism and in early Christianity was marked by the 
gradual universalizing and spiritualizing of the messianic 
idea: from the prophetic Day of Yahveh to the variety 
of Jewish and Christian millennia! visions and to Saint 
Augustine's "City of God." The earlier priestly and 
popular visions were those of a theocratic nationalism. 
The Day of Yahveh was to be definitely a Day of Israel, 
the day of restoration of Jerusalem to power and prosper-
ity. The prophets challenged the priestly reliance on 
ceremonial and ritual; they preached repentance and 
righteousness as the absolute conditions of salvation from 
national ruin; else the Day of Y ahveh would be a day of 
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disaster. But despite prophets of doom like Amos, Isaiah, 
or Jeremiah, the Old Testament tradition retained largely 
this ideal of a national vindication and triumph. There 
will come an end of tribulation; God will judge his people, 
destroy their enemies; God's anointed, the Messiah, shall 
establish his kingdom in Zion. In this messianic kingdom 
justice and peace will reign in righteous Israel: "the wolf 
shall dwell with the lamb, . . . and the sucking child 
shall play on the hole of the asp, . . . for the earth shall 
be full of the knowledge of the Lord" (Isa. 11:6, 8, 9). 
These messianic hopes were shaken but not quite sup-
pressed by the national disasters of the Babylonian exile. 
"Second Isaiah" inspired the Jews by the rivers of Babylon 
to renewed comfort and hope through a higher conception 
of divine Providence. Y ahveh is now a universal God of 
righteousness; he has punished his people for their sins; 
but he is also a God of mercy, who will lead them back 
to their homes. Yet even after the return to Jerusalem, 
post-exilic Israel was wracked by seemingly endless on-
slaughts of hostile powers. The Syrian king Antiochus 
Epiphanes built an altar to Zeus inside the temple of Zion 
and sacrificed a hog upon it in order to crush with his 
pagan contempt the Jewish spirit of patriotic holiness. 
In those years of national downfall some of the Hebrews 
adopted the spreading use of Greek speech and followed 
Hellenistic ways of thought and life. Others, more resolute 
in their resistance, spent themselves in the Maccabean 
uprising and other revolts. Still others retired to lives of 
hermit devotion in the caves of the southern desert or 
sought comfort for their spiritual and national anguish 
in apocalyptic visions of final providential judgment. 
These last are of especial interest to us, for in their writ-
ings we can trace the developing ideals of the kingdom 
of God on earth and in heaven. 
Our best source for the study of these Jewish apoc-
alyptic visions is The Book of Enoch, a work of composite 
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anonymous authorship, some of it written or compiled 
during the first two centuries B.C. and some later parts 
of it dating from the first Christian century. Extensive 
parallel passages in the New Testament indicate that 
The Book of Enoch was familiar to the early Christian 
writers. Some of the church fathers, among them Barnabas, 
cited it as scripture, but as the earlier millennialism was 
gradually discredited, especially by Augustine, this work 
lost its hold on Christian authority. Saint Jerome called 
it explicitly an apocryphal book, but its influence was 
not wholly wiped out. Its basic tenor found expression 
in sectarian doctrine through long centuries. 2 
Jewish millennialism or chiliasm was concerned with 
the belief in an expected thousand-year reign of the Lord 
on earth. This figure of 1,000 years was used literally 
or interpreted to signify indefinitely long duration. The 
apocalyptic seers forecast the future with assurance. The 
intolerable oppression and the terrible disasters will get 
still worse, and this fateful crisis will itself point to the 
final catastrophe and the beginning of the new age. For 
the princes of wickedness will not dominate forever; in 
its due season divine Providence will prevail. Satan will 
then be bound; his foul empire will be destroyed, "shall 
melt like wax before the flame," and the advent of the 
blessed millennium will signalize the triumph of the 
righteous.8 The expected blessedness of earth was con-
ceived in varying ways. Some of the apocalyptic visions 
were earthly: the millennium is to be on earth, and its 
joys are to be earthly joys. We read of the expected 
material satisfactions: the righteous "shall live till they 
2 Compare R. H. Charles's translation and commentary, The Book of 
Enoch, or I Enoch (London, 1917); the quotation from Saint Jerome is 
on p. xci. Compare also Charles, A Critical History of the Doctrine of a 
Future Life in Israel, in Judaism, and in Christianity (London, 1913); 
J. A. MacCulloch, Article "Eschatology" in Hastings, Encyclopedia of 
Religion and Ethics (Edinburgh and New York, 1908) and S. J. Case, 
The Millennia! Hope (Chicago, 1918). 
8 The Book of Enoch, trans. R. H. Charles, p. 7. 
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beget thousands of children."4 Abundant harvests and 
fruitfulness beyond compare will reward the tillers of 
the soil: each vine will bear a thousand measures of olives 
and "each measure of olives shall yield ten presses of oil."5 
Alongside of these material blessings, justice and right-
eousness will prevail, "truth and peace will be associated 
together throughout the days of the world."6 
The course of apocalyptic speculation is marked by the 
swaying of emphasis between these two aspects of the 
expected millennium. Both in Judaism and in Christianity 
the moral and spiritual interpretation was increasingly 
accentuated by its most influential advocates, and while 
in this way the expected millennium was viewed less 
materially, it also was no longer regarded as a millennium 
on earth. The earlier visions had been definitely ter-
restrial. But this sort of apocalypse was radically revised: 
the vision of the messianic kingdom in Jerusalem was 
gradually abandoned, and men's hopes of the kingdom of 
God were translated to the other world and to a life 
hereafter. So both the millennia! hope and the doctrine 
of immortality were spiritualized. This development of 
ideals in Jewish apocalyptic writings found not only a 
parallel but also a more significant expression in the New 
Testament and in the beliefs of the church fathers, from 
Justin Martyr and Irenaeus to Augustine. 
The interpretation of the millennia} hope in the Gospels 
requires balancing of judgment. There seems to be a 
certain gradual abatement of the eschatological vigilance, 
which is more intense in the earliest synoptic Gospel, 
Mark, than in the other two, and which is still less pro-
nounced in the Fourth Gospel. There is some ambiguity 
in the words attributed to Jesus: on the one hand, we 
read declarations of his impending and speedy return 
4 Ibid., p. 25. 
5 Ibid., p. 26. 
6 Loc. cit. 
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to solemn judgment; on the other hand, we find emphatic 
negations of the traditional hopes of a messianic restora-
tion of Zion to power and prosperity. "My kingdom is 
not of this world" (John 18:36). It is not an earthly state 
of a certain date and location: "Lo here! or lo therei-The 
Kingdom of God is within you" (Luke 17:21). 
This duality of attitude in the Gospels requires some 
latitude of interpretation. Jesus may have been leading 
his disciples to his own higher spiritual view; or else, 
despite the higher ideal of the kingdom of God, tradi-
tional versions of it may have been ascribed to him in 
the oral and the written views of the churches. The 
opposite ideas are sometimes presented in glaring con-
trast, as in two successive chapters of the Gospel accord-
ing to Matthew. When the mother of the two sons of 
Zebedee asks Jesus to grant that they may sit on his right 
and on his left hand on the day of his kingdom-as it were, 
prime minister and chancellor of the exchequer-Jesus 
replies: "Ye know not what ye ask" (20:20-28). But in 
the previous chapter he is reported as telling his disciples 
that they shall sit upon twelve thrones judging the twelve 
tribes of Israel ( 19:28). Despite the spiritualized emphasis 
of the later Jewish apocalyptic writings, the earlier earthly 
expectation persisted in the popular beliefs. Adolf von 
Harnack, the leading historian of Christian doctrines, 
stated explicitly that it is "impossible to reproduce with 
certainty the eschatological sayings of Jesus."7 The 
critical study of these sayings in their bearing on the 
basic interpretation of the Gospels gripped the searching 
mind of Albert Schweitzer, whose work The Quest of the 
Historical I esus is preeminent in its thorough exploration 
of the entire problem. Jesus' appeal to the higher vision 
of the kingdom of God is unmistakable, but the lower 
undertones are not quite silenced. In the developing 
7 Adolf von Harnack, History of Dogma, trans. Neil Buchanan, 2d ed. 
(London, 1897), 1: 101. 
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Christian doctrine of the church fathers there are dis-
agreements. And even though the deeper and more 
spiritual insight prevailed eventually, the grosser hopes 
were not utterly eclipsed. Across the ages of Catholic 
and later of Protestant thought they have been revived 
by sectarian visionaries, even to our own day. 
Saint Paul's eschatology appears to have proceeded 
through two stages similar to those recognized later by 
Augustine. In some of his epistles he writes as one ex-
pecting the immediate return of the Lord. He, Paul, will 
live to see the solemn day: "The night is far spent, the 
day is at hand .... Now is our salvation nearer than 
when we believed" (Rom. 13:12, 11). But immediately 
thereafter he writes to the church of Rome: "Whether 
we live or die, we are the Lord's" ( 14:8). Likewise in 
his view of the resurrection Paul revised the current 
beliefs so as to emphasize the immortality of the soul, a 
spiritual consummation, and yet he did not reject entirely 
the belief in the resurrection of the body: "It is sown 
a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body. There is a 
natural body and there is a spiritual body .... Behold, 
I shew you a mystery" (I Cor. 15:44, 51). 
The preeminent apocalyptic work in the New Testa-
ment, the book of Revelation, has been attributed to Saint 
John the Divine. In it millennarians have always found 
texts with which to defend their hopes of Jesus Christ's 
speedy or eventual return to judge the living and the dead. 
This book seems to have been written in the days of 
persecution that marked the close of the first Christian 
century. Even as the Jewish refugees from Seleucid or 
Roman tyrants had visions of the reestablishment of Zion, 
so the author of this book writes to the seven churches in 
Asia as their "brother, and companion in tribulation, and 
in the kingdom of patience of Jesus Christ" (Rev. 1:9). 
During his lonely exile on Patmos he had a marvelous 
revelation and a vision of the Lord's glory. He writes to 
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the seven churches to admonish them and also to renew 
their courage and their devotion in adversity. In their 
affiiction and oppression he lifts their spirits to see the 
supreme dominion and perfection of the Lord, against 
whom no powers of evil can finally prevail. God has not 
forgotten his children in their sufferings. The Christian 
martyrs have not died in vain; their souls cry out to the 
Lord for vindication, and on the day of resurrection they 
will arise in victory. 
The glories of these apocalyptic visions are intensified 
by repeated readings despite our familiarity with them. 
The author's revelation of God's holy majesty is also a 
contemplation of the last days that are at hand. Still more 
evil days are in store for the true believers. Satan has 
released all his onslaughts to destroy men, but his days 
are numbered, and the hour of divine destiny is at hand. 
In solemn rhetoric the final doom of the wicked is por-
trayed-the collapse of the Roman imperial citadel of sin 
which is denounced as the Babylon of the West: "Babylon 
the great is fallen, is fallen, and is become the habitation 
of devils, and the hold of every foul spirit, and the cage 
of every unclean and hateful bird" (Rev. 18:2). The 
powers of the Lord shall vanquish the far-flung forces of 
sin, and Satan himself shall be bound for one thousand 
years. In the millennium of the first resurrection the 
righteous shall live and reign with Christ. "And when 
the thousand years are expired, Satan shall be loosed 
out of his prison" (Rev. 20:7). He shall go out to deceive 
the nations and shall besiege the saints and their beloved 
city. But fire from heaven shall devour the demonic 
armies, and "into the lake of fire and brimstone . . . [they] 
shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever" 
(Rev. 20:10). That will be the day of the second and 
last resurrection and of God's final judgment and salva-
tion of his own, in the new heaven and new earth, in 
"the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down from God 
out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her hus-
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Band" (Rev. 21:2). The last words are those of immediacy 
and vigilance: "Behold, I come quickly; blessed is he that 
keepeth the sayings of the prophecy of this book" (Rev. 
22:7). 
In our study of the patristic millennialism we should 
keep in mind the intimacy of the church fathers with 
writings like the books of Enoch and Revelation. The 
interplay of earthly hopes with spirtitual visions is evident 
in their eschatology as it was in the Jewish apocalyptic 
writings. One of the earliest church fathers, Justin Martyr, 
in the second century, wrote with confidence that the 
Lord's saints shall dwell in Jerusalem for one thousand 
years and that the millennium will be followed by the 
eternal resurrection and the Final Judgment. Irenaeus, 
toward the end of the second century, wrote of the ex-
pected millennium in the greatest detail, as the kingdom 
of God on this earth, with unimaginable earthly blessings. 
The vindication of the saints was to be in this same world 
in which they had so long suffered persecution. They 
were to receive a hundredfold and a thousandfold for all 
their past tribulations. He quoted Isaiah in saying that 
the new Jerusalem is to be rebuilt of precious stones of 
carbuncles and sapphires and jaspers and crystals. His 
vision of the holy kingdom almost anticipated some of 
the delights of the Muhammadan paradise. One instance 
should suffice: "The days will come, in which vines shall 
grow, each having ten thousand branches, and in each 
branch ten thousand twigs, and in each twig ten thousand 
shoots, and in each one of the shoots ten thousand clusters, 
and on every one of these clusters ten thousand grapes, 
and every grape when pressed will give five and twenty 
metretes of wine. And when any one of the saints shall 
lay hold of a cluster, another shall cry out, 'I am a better 
cluster, take me; bless the Lord through me.' "8 Irenaeus 
insisted on the literal meaning of his expected millennium: 
8 Irenaeus Against Heresies 5. 33. 3, in The Ante-Nicene Fathers (New 
York, 1885) 1: 563. 
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"If any shall endeavour to allegorize [prophecies] of this 
kind, ... they ... shall be confuted."9 
This sort of millennialism found many advocates. 
Harnack records the strong support it found in Western 
Christendom during the third century: "We know of no 
bishop there who would have opposed chiliasm."10 
Tertullian and Lactantius supported Irenaeus. Tertullian 
insisted on the resurrection of the dead in the most 
literal sense. Without any allegory or metaphor, the 
saints are to be raised to their entire condition, raised 
in the flesh, with all their organs, and they are to reign 
with the Lord for one thousand years in the divinely built 
city of Jerusalem. Have not even heathen attested to a 
vision forecasting this glorious return of the Lord, how 
"in Judea there was suspended in the sky a city every 
morning for forty days"? So the coming of the millennium 
is not to be doubted, and at its close "there will ensue 
the destruction of the world and the conflagration of all 
things at the judgment."11 
Lactantius also was confident that the prince of the 
devils shall be bound with chains for one thousand years. 
He reinforced his biblical assurance with the "inspired 
predictions" of the Sibyl and quoted Virgil. His millen-
nium was conceived in terms of justice and peace but 
also of earthly glories and marvelous abundance. Like 
Isaiah and also like the poets who sang of the reign of 
Saturnus, he prophesied that "lions and calves shall stand 
together at the manger," but he also foresaw that "the 
rocky mountains shall drip with honey; streams of wine 
shall run down, and rivers flow with milk." At the con-
clusion of the blessed millennium Satan shall be loosed 
again and will lash at mankind for the last time. But 
9 Op. cit., 5. 35. 1. 
10 Harnack, History of Dogma, 2d ed. ( 1896), 2: 300. 
11 Tertullian Against Marcion 3. 25, in The Ante-Nicene Fathers, (New 
York, 1885), 3: 342 f; compare Tertullian On the Resurrection of the 
Flesh 21, 57, 61. 
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God in his wrath shall utterly destroy him and his wicked 
followers, and then will come the second resurrection and 
God's final judgment.12 
The millennia! visions of the earlier church fathers were 
hopes in despair, the visions of persecuted and martyred 
devotees who sustained their fortitude with their apoc-
alyptic expectations of final providential triumph. But 
in fact the Christian movement was advancing from 
perilous venture to more and more assured possession. 
Riper intelligence and theological insight also were grasp-
ing more firmly the spiritual core of the Christian gospel 
and the deeper Christian meaning of the kingdom of God. 
The earlier millennialism yielded gradually to a higher 
outlook This development of Christian ideas may be 
noted in the writings of Origen ( c.l85-c.254); it finds its 
fullest expression in Augustine's theology and philosophy 
of history. 
Origen's objections to the notion of a terrestrial mil-
lennium, with earthly blessings for the saints, were in 
harmony with his critical dismissal of some biblical 
stories which he regarded as mythical and acceptable 
only as allegory. The literal reading of the stories of 
creation in the book of Genesis was ruled out for anyone 
"in his right mind .... Who is so foolish as to think that 
God, like a farmer, planted trees in the garden, in Eden 
in the East?"13 And "the Gospels too are full of such 
things, as when the Devil is said to have taken Jesus to 
the top of a high mountain." The intelligent interpreta-
tion of such stories and beliefs must be allegorical. While 
Origen reaffirmed his belief in the resurrection of the 
body, he spiritualized the idea, like Saint Paul. The 
scriptural accounts of the blessings of the saints and the 
12 Lactantius The Divine Institutes 7. 24, in The Ante-Nicene Fathers 
(New York, 1886), 7: 219; compare ibid., 7. 26. 
13 Origen De principiis 2.16, cited by George Boas, Essays on Prim-
itivism and Related Ideas in the Middle Ages (Baltimore, Md., 1948), 
pp. 27 f. 
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sufferings of the damned are "figuratively indicated."14 
Likewise he allegorized the eschatology of the earlier 
church fathers. Origen was "most bitterly opposed to 
chiliasm or premillenarianism and everything that it im-
plied."15 "Certain persons . . . refusing the labour of 
thinking, ... are of the opinion that the fulfillment of the 
promises of the future are to be looked for in bodily 
pleasure and luxury."16 The millennia! vision must be 
interpreted as an allegory. We must "understand what 
we are reading." 
Augustine ( 354-430) was thoroughgoing in his re-
jection of a terrestrial millennium, and he influenced de-
cisively the main course of subsequent Christian belief. 
If we accept the words of Jesus "The Kingdom of God 
is within you" and so recognize true religion as the soul's 
intimate union with God, then we must dismiss any 
external chiliasm as chimerical. The Kingdom of God 
is a spiritual kingdom, and it is not to be realized in 
some future period of a thousand years in some terrestrial 
majesty and abundance. The Kingdom of God is a living 
reality right now, in the spirit and the life of the church 
of Christ. The blessings of divine worship are spiritual 
blessings, and its delights are also spiritual, not saintly 
"limitless gourmandizing."17 Even so "the Devil's binding 
has been a fact from the day the Church began to ex-
pand."18 In this manner Augustine reinterpreted the 
various apocalyptic passages in the Bible. 
This view of the Kingdom of God in human lives in-
volved a philosophy of history, to which Augustine de-
voted his principal treatise, The City of God. "Two 
14 De principiis 2. 10. 6. 
15 A. C. McGiffert, A History of Christian Thought (New York, 1950), 
1: 227. 
16 Origen De principiis 2.11.2, in The Ante-Nicene Fathers (New 
York, 1885), 4: 297. 
17 Augustine City of God, trans. G. G. Walsh and D. J. Honan (New 
York, 1954), p. 265. 
18 Op. cit., p. 272. 
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cities have been formed of two loves: the earthly by the 
love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly 
by the love of God, even to the contempt of sel£."19 The 
earthly city is one of force, oppression and pride and 
lust; it trusts to victory in wars and in looting prosperity. 
This city has had many names and habitations, from the 
Orient to the Roman Empire. Rome never had the life 
eternal; its heart and soul have ever been corrupt, and 
Augustine branded it as doomed to destruction and ruin. 
The City of God can also be viewed through the course 
of history, and Augustine traced its spread in the lives of 
saintly men. Its consummation is being realized in the 
life of the church, and this Christian life is the life of 
devout piety, a spiritual state. He declared emphatically: 
"God and the soul, that is all I desire to know. Nothing 
more? Nothing whatever."20 It is in the souls who serve 
God above all that the earthly city itself finds whatever 
worth of real justice and peace it may occasionally man-
ifest. And it is through the life of the church that history 
reveals its upward trend toward Christian perfection, but 
this progress is not a merely secular enterprise and 
achievement. Unless it is inspired by pious humility and 
fructified by divine grace, it is futile and self-defeating. 
So Augustine, while spiritualizing thoroughly the earlier 
patristic eschatology, stressed its basic providential note. 
This providential perspective of historical appraisal, 
however, did not rule out completely the acknowledgment 
of social advance in secular matters, in understanding, 
and in common welfare. A notable passage near the 
conclusion of The City of God should be kept in mind: 
Has not the genius of man invented and applied count-
less astonishing arts, partly the result of necessity, partly 
the result of exuberant invention, so that vigour of mind, 
19 Augustine City of God (trans. Marcus Dods) 14. 28. 
20 Augustine Soliloquies 1. 7, in The Basic Writings of St. Augustine, 
ed. '.V. J. Oates (New York, 1948), p. 262. 
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which is so active in the discovery not merely of super-
fluous but even of dangerous and destructive things, be-
tokens an inexhaustible wealth in the nature which can 
invent, learn, or employ such arts? What wonderful-one 
might wish to say stupefying-advances has human in-
dustry made in the arts of weaving and building, of 
agriculture and navigation? With what endless variety 
are designs in pottery, painting, and sculpture produced, 
and with what skill executed! What wonderful spectacles 
are exhibited in the theatres, which those who have not 
seen them cannot credit! How skilful the contrivances for 
catching, killing or taming wild beasts!21 
Two statements in the extended passage should not 
be overlooked. Augustine cites men's capacities for good 
or for ill: "How many kinds of poisons, weapons, engines 
of destruction, have been invented, while for the preserva-
tion or restoration of health the appliances and remedies 
are infinite!" And he adds toward his conclusion: "At 
present it is the nature of the human mind which adorns 
this mortal life which we are extolling, and not the faith 
and the way of truth which lead to immortality." While 
he acknowledges in great detail men's secular achieve-
ments throughout history, they do not sway his basic 
judgment of human life on which all his meditation is 
bent, on God and the soul. Those many and various 
adornments of our mortal life do not bring the soul any 
closer to God; they are not the treasures of life eternal. 
It is the gospel verdict: man may gain the whole world, 
yet forfeit his own self. Within this devout outlook, 
however, Augustine was prepared to recognize realiza-
tion of human values of whatever source or agency. Know-
ledge is knowledge, no matter through what mind it 
comes to us. The saintly soul may well learn even from 
the worldly. Augustine declared clearly: "Let every good 
21 Augustine City of God (trans. Marcus Dods), 22. 24. Compare John 
Baillie, The Belief in Progress (New York, 1951), pp. 20 f. 
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and true Christian understand that truth, wherever he 
finds it, belongs to his Lord." This fair-mindedness he 
shared with Saint Ambrose, who had written: "All that 
is true, whosoever may have said it, is from the Holy 
Spirit."22 The divine Spirit may guide some men toward 
the true church even before they are of the church. But 
the Kingdom of God is the holy church, and through it 
is the way to the fuller truth. 
If we acknowledge that all true individual good, real 
and redemptive social well-being, must be finally through 
the church, can we also maintain that there is spiritual 
growth in the church itself, a progressive divine revela-
tion, to be realized increasingly through the ages? Or 
is orthodoxy established providentially on foundations 
laid once for all, and is the true Christian authoritarianism 
necessarily retrospective? The Augustinian doctrine does 
not seem to give an unambiguous answer to this question. 
Augustine saw no hope of genuine progress through men's 
secular devices; only through the life in the church with 
divine grace could man hope to reach personal salvation 
and really availing social betterment. All this was clear 
to him. But could he also contemplate a future progress 
of the Christian truth itself and admit radical new doc-
trines of self-proclaimed church reformers? He kept 
resolutely to the reasonable middle road of Christian 
belief, between extremes which in his judgment led to 
heresies. Characteristic of his fundamental attitude are 
the words with which he condemned Pelagius and his 
teaching that man can be an active contributor to his 
own salvation, that he has the moral capacity by his own 
will to choose the good and eschew the evil: "Your 
doctrines are amazing; they are new; they are false."23 
The basic position here has ever been the issue between 
22 Augustine Ep. 166. Compare S. Radhakrishman, Recovery of Faith 
(New York, 1955), p. 190. 
23 Augustine Contra ]ulianum Pelagianum 3.3.9. 
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liberalism and strict orthodoxy. Does progressive revela-
tion mean only sound, fuller understanding of the eternal 
tmth once for all revealed by God in Jesus Christ through 
the apostles; or does it allow the possibility of advance 
in spiritual insight and vision, progress in revelation 
itself, basic religious growth? The dominant tradition 
of the church has emphasized the former alternative and 
has resisted and rejected the latter. The strict attitude 
is expressed in the self-declared motive of Scholasticism: 
Faith seeking to understand-Fides quaerens intellectum. 
Start with the tmths of Christian orthodoxy; by analysis 
and logical inference elicit, deduce, and organize them in 
the most rational system of doctrines, a summa theologica; 
but in your conclusions repossess and maintain firmly the 
very first tmths with which you started and no other. 
This is the prayer of Christian consecration of Saint 
Thomas Aquinas ( 1225-127 4) as he lay on his deathbed: 
"For love of Thee have I studied and kept vigil, toiled, 
preached, and taught. Never have I said word against 
Thee."24 
Unlike this orthodox procedure of the tme Schoolman 
and doctor of the church, we may note two other streams 
of religious experience. One of them has been regarded 
as possibly inspired and deserving the highest tributes of 
reverence, but also as liable to be spurious and so requir-
ing strict initial caution. This is the mystical strain in 
religion expressed by persons who have proclaimed their 
own direct communion with God. The utterances of some 
of these mystics have been luminous reaffirmations of 
orthodox tmth, and the church has accepted these as 
eternal tmth. But some of these so-called mystical seers 
have gone astray into sectarian extremes and errors; the 
church has been doubly resistant to the ardor of their 
utterances. So there are great mystical saints and there 
are heretics of mystical aberrations. 
24 Cit~d in M. C. D' Arcy, Thomas Aquinas (London, 1939), p. 48. 
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The other unorthodox stream of religious experience 
has been represented by the professed reformers of the 
church. They have been the radical insurgents against 
orthodoxy and authoritarianism. Beyond devout advocacy 
or commentaries or systematic analyses of divine truths, 
they have sought and proclaimed the new and higher 
verities of the more mature religion. Not all critical 
liberalism in religious belief has proceeded to explicit 
radical conclusions. \Vithin certain limits, not very ex-
tensive, the church has admitted critical reinterpretation, 
as, for instance, the literary-historical or higher criticism 
of the Bible. But explicit negation of established authority 
and basic shift of traditional direction have always met 
with firm resistance as heretical. This theological vigilance 
against straying from the one true way may express itself 
in general wariness of undogmatic thinking, scientific or 
philosophical. The Scholastic piety was on its guard 
against Abelard's brilliant dialectic and his theological 
reconstruction of the doctrines of sin and of the atone-
ment. It suspected Roger Bacon's spirit of experimental 
inquiry. Thus Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), himself a scientist 
and a philosopher, sought in his pious devotion to re-
possess the eternal and unchanging truth: "God of 
Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not of the philos-
ophers and the wise."25 
The opposite, prospective outlook, the conviction that 
God has revealed himself to men progressively in the 
past and will manifest his truth in the future still more 
fully, would seem to expand on a historical scale the 
familiar words of Saint Paul: "When I was a child, I 
spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a 
child; but when I became a man, I put away childish 
things" (I Cor. 13: 11). During the patristic period Mon-
tanus declared that the Holy Spirit was revealing to him 
25 The Thoughts of Blaise Pascal, trans. C. Kegan Paul (London, 1895), 
p. 2. 
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new truths beyond the truths of Jesus Christ in the 
Gospels. He carried his claim to inordinate extremes, 
and the church condemned him as an arrogant heretic, 
but the prospective outlook of Montanism attracted no 
less a person than Tertullian who spoke of infancy, youth, 
and maturity of divine revelation, as like the bud, the 
flower, and the full fruitage of a plant. In a similar vein 
John Scotus Erigena during the ninth century expounded 
a doctrine of three stages of spiritual understanding, from 
the obscure mysteries of the Old Testament law, through 
the clear light of the Christian gospel, to the perfect 
illumination of the life eternal in heaven. 
In the twelfth century Joachim of Floris taught that 
history proceeds through three stages corresponding to 
the three persons of the Trinity. In the first age men 
live according to the flesh; the second stage is inter-
mediate between the flesh and the spirit; in the third 
stage men live purely spiritual lives. Corresponding to 
this triple order of ages are three levels of human lives: 
the secular, the clerical, and the monastic. Men must 
prepare themselves for the future age of more perfect 
piety and fullness of understanding. Here was the urge 
toward new and deeper insight and more perfect realiza-
tion of true Christian life, in communities of mystical de-
votees which spread during the later Middle Ages. They 
were ready for new gospels of love and illumination. They 
would reach beyond the traditional doctrines of orthodoxy 
and interpret for themselves the higher truth of the 
Holy Spirit. For they regarded themselves as no longer 
dependent on orthodox dictation; the divine light, they 
felt convinced, was revealed to every one of them 
directly. 
This conviction was to find fuller expression in the 
Protestant doctrine of the priesthood of all believers. 
The condemnation of Joachim's movement by the church 
aroused his followers and other sectarians to counter-
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resistance. The pope was declared to be antichrist; Saint 
Francis of Assisi was proclaimed as the leader of the 
new truly Christian age, and the Second Coming of 
Christ was forecast for the year 1260. In the teaching of 
Joachim and his followers a spirit of radical opposition 
to strict and traditional authority combined with a revival 
of earlier millenarian expectations. Though these hopes 
were disappointed, they were never completely aban-
doned. Various groups even to our time have nourished 
this sectarian devotion. 
These believers were extremists in their advocacy of 
ideas and expectations which in some degree and form 
have found expressions throughout the course of Chris-
tian history. Even Saint Thomas Aquinas, in his Treatise 
on the Last Things, considered seriously the question 
whether on the day of resurrection all will rise and be 
of the same stature, and of the same sex, and more 
particularly, "whether the hair and nails will rise again 
in the human body?"26 Apparently the discussion of such 
problems still engaged the interest of the thirteenth-cen-
tury theologians, despite the Gospel verse that "in the 
resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage, 
but are like angels in heaven" (Matt. 22:30). 
There was a millenarian note in some of the movements 
of revolt against the Roman curia which issued in the 
Protestant Reformation. The pope was stigmatized as 
the antichrist; his downfall was forecast and along with 
it the return of Christ to inaugurate the new age. The 
Taborites and the Bohemian Brethren, the Anabaptists 
and their followers in the peasant rebellion of the sixteenth 
century, who sought to establish a sort of Christian com-
munist utopia, were followed by a succession of English 
and American sects (Shakers, Irvingites, Plymouth Breth-
ren, Millerites, "Millennia! Dawn") who in various tones 
have issued the same call of Christ's immediate return: 
26 Compare Summa theologica, 3 (Supplement), Qq. lxxxi, lxxx:2. 
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"Behold, the Bridegroom cometh. Go ye out to meet 
Him!"27 William Miller set the date of the Advent at 
1843, then moved it more precisely to October 1844. 
Was it Emerson who, when warned that the world would 
surely end on that day, calmly advised that we should 
endeavor to get along without the world? The vitality 
of contemporary Adventism, both at home and in the 
missionary field, is apparent. The millennia! hope in 
many forms has gained fervor in our days of world crisis. 
The Christian-Providential view of social progress 
should not ignore a fundamental belief of the Protestant 
reformers, which was expressed with especial thorough-
ness and conviction in Calvinism. It concerned the rela-
tion of the spiritual to the secular, of devout piety to 
daily practice. It faced the perennial Christian problem 
of the right way to man's salvation. The Protestant con-
viction was dual: our salvation is not assured through the 
traditional "hierarchical redemptive organization of the 
Church and its priesthood, and to the opus operandi of 
the sacraments,"28 not through any human intermediation 
or by any "works" but only and directly through Jesus 
Christ, by faith. Thus faith, however, is not wholly un-
related to our daily life; it finds expression in all our 
daily activities. 
Against the traditional ecclesiastical idea of a two-level 
sanctity, lay and clerical, Martin Luther maintained that 
the farmer at his plow and the housewife in her kitchen 
could serve the Lord as truly as the priest at the altar. 
The Protestant outlook was thus in a certain sense secular, 
but it was not worldly. Its vision of the blessed life was 
one that pervaded every part of human life to give it 
religious significance. It undertook to fuse secularism and 
spirituality. The Protestant reformers' conviction con-
27 S. J. Case, The Millennia! Hope (Chicago, 1918), p. 199; compare 
pp. 188 ff. 
28 Ernst Troeltsch, Protestantism and Progress. trans. W. Montgomery 
(Boston, 1958), p. 61. 
THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION 53 
cerned their historical outlook: does any human activity 
whatever have real and final worth unless it is somehow 
a step toward the one decisive hope, the salvation of 
man's soul? 
The bearing of the basic Protestant principle, rejecting 
the idea of human progress by man's own efforts, found 
emphatic expression in Calvinism. Calvin recognized only 
one supreme authority, the Bible, the word of God. He 
was guided in his interpretation and in the development 
of his doctrine by Saint Paul and Saint Augustine, to 
whom he continually referred. But he went beyond both 
of them. The fundamental issue concerns the efficacy of 
man's will: is man in any sense an active contributor to 
his salvation? Paul's view is remembered mainly by his 
word to the Philippians: "Work out your own salvation 
with fear and trembling; for God is at work in you both 
to will and to work for his pleasure" (2:12, 13). Calvin, 
with numerous citations, interpreted this Pauline doctrine 
to support his own conviction that salvation is only 
through God's grace, that it is neither merited nor earned 
by men's effort but is due only to God's election of his 
followers, chosen by his unaccountable will "ages ago" 
(2 Tim. 1:9). Augustine regarded God's will as active in 
the election of some to the blessings of salvation. The 
rest were to suffer justly the dire consequences of their 
sins. 
Augustine held, and Calvin quoted him, that "every 
good work in us is perforn1ed only by grace."29 The 
opposite view, held by Pelagius and his followers, that 
man's free will has the capacity to choose the good and 
to contribute actively to his salvation, was stigmatized 
by Augustine as false doctrine. Pelagianism, in strict or 
in attenuated forms of semi-Pelagianism, has persisted as 
an alternative interpretation of Christian doctrine. It has 
29 Augustine Ep. 105, quoted by Calvin, Institutes of the Christian 
Reli~ion, trans. Henry Beveridge (London, 1949 ), 2. 3. 13. 
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found its firmest resistance in Calvinism, which maintains 
that man's righteousness was due nowise to his own 
human choice but only to God's grace working in him; 
he held that God's will eternally determined both the 
election of some and the reprobation of others. 
Calvin would have agreed with Milton that man's first 
disobedience brought death into the world and all our 
woe; but he viewed it in the eternal perspective of God's 
omniscience. Left to himself, man is capable only of sin, 
totally depraved, and as far as his will goes, hopeless. 
"Man is so enslaved by the yoke of sin that he cannot 
of his own nature aim at good either in wish or in actual 
pursuit."30 Nothing that he does or does not do can 
contribute in the least to his salvation. That can be at-
tained only by the predestination of God's grace and his 
"mere generosity." "God of his mere good pleasure pre-
serves whom he will, and moreover ... pays no reward, 
since he can owe no one."31 Furthermore, just as God's 
grace is deserved or earned by no one but only bestowed, 
so "the grace offered by the Lord is not merely one which 
every individual has full liberty of choosing, to receive 
or reject, but a grace which produces in the heart both 
choice and will."32 Both the gift and the acceptance of 
it are God's work And even so is the chosen one's abiding 
humble devotion to righteousness, the gift of perseverance, 
donum perseverantiae, in Augustine's phrase. 
The other side of the argument about predestination 
was pursued by Calvin with the strictest logic. God's 
eternal election of some to grace and salvation also pre-
destines others to reprobation and to destruction. "Elec-
tion itself would not stand except as set over against 
reprobation .... Those whom God passes over, he 
condemns."33 
30 Institutes (trans. Beveridge) 2. 4. 1. 
31 Institutes, trans. F. L. Battles (London, 1960), 3. 21. 1. 
32 Institutes (trans. Beveridge) 2. 3. 13. 
33 Institutes (trans. Battles) 3. 23. 1. 
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In Calvin's doctrine, God's saving grace and his re-
probation proceed to their corresponding fruition in the 
daily lives of men. Left to their own wicked devices, the 
unregenerate sinners do not and cannot achieve any good. 
Their evil ways drive them to their everlasting ruin and 
damnation. But while God's grace is never earned by 
man's works, it does lead to good work and its fruition. 
Calvin not only portrayed these workings of God's grace 
in the lives of men of faith; he expected and exacted these 
evidences of righteousness in his devout followers, and 
first of all in himself. Imperatively he sought spiritual 
and also secular expression of Christian righteousness. 
This was to be achieved in his Christian theocracy of 
Geneva, or rather its "bibliocracy," as it has been called.34 
It manifested unbending courage and resolution just be-
cause the true Calvinist never put his trust in himself but 
always in God's will and God's election of him. Thus he 
was heroic in his humble piety. The consecrated bearers 
of God's charge undertook to refashion human life and 
build God's kingdom on earth. How could they turn 
back? Calvin assured them of God's irresistible grace. 
Their holy work was not only in the life of the spirit but 
in the daily secular pursuits and concerns. Mastering his 
own weakness and ailments, Calvin overcame great ob-
structions in his reforms in Geneva, in general welfare and 
security, in sanitary measures and hospital service, in 
public education, in industrial organization and advance. 
Beyond Geneva, the influence of Calvinism spread 
throughout Western Europe and across the Atlantic. Its 
vitality as a socially reforming power marked the history 
of French Huguenots, Scotch Presbyterians, and Puritans 
in England and America. 
The political and economic consequences of Calvinism 
have been important. John Knox in Scotland recognized 
34 Compare Troeltsch, op. cit., p. 70; Georgia Harkness, John Calvin: 
The Man and His Ethics (New York, 1931), p. 22. 
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and declared, despite traditional assumptions of ungodly 
authority, the divinely justified convictions of a Christian 
democracy. Calvinists were active in several revolutions 
or other movements of social-political reconstruction. In 
the economic field the course of Calvinist influence has 
been traced in directions disturbing to some minds. Calvin 
dignified the industry of good men in their daily tasks: 
with diligent industry, by God's favor and dispensation, 
men achieved success and even prosperity. If, like 
Luther's farmer and housewife, the industrialist and the 
merchant could serve the Lord in their business, would 
they not see in the growth of their business God's ap-
proval of them and then turn more directly to the pursuit 
of prosperity and economic mastery? Toward this sort 
of conclusion Max Weber proceeded in his work The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Weber 
has not lacked followers, but his thesis has also been 
subjected to critical revision. The rise of modern capital-
ism can scarcely be traced to Calvinist sources alone; the 
names of the Medicis, the Fuggers, and the Welsers mark 
its tributaries in the Renaissance. Calvin himself would 
have condemned any strictly secular-economic and selfish 
emphasis in men's lives. But the ideal of piety as expressed 
in productive daily industry could not evade the hazard 
of preoccupation with profits. 
The secular-historical applications of Calvinism found 
more wide-reaching expression in Puritanism, first in early 
American pioneering and then in the more settled estab-
lishment on New World shores. While it has been 
reckoned that a goodly third of the passengers on the 
Mayflower were a random lot in pursuit of some better 
chance in life overseas, the leading spirit of the men and 
women on that ship and on the many that followed it 
was that of a holy mission. Those voyagers were truly 
Pilgrims going to a Promised Land in which they were 
to carry out a divine charge of blessed transformation. A 
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preserved proclamation of a certain Captain Edward 
Johnson expresses this animating conviction: "Oh yes! 
Oh yes! Oh yes! All you people of Christ that are here 
Oppressed, Imprisoned and scurrilously derided, gather 
yourselves together. . . . Know this is the place where 
the Lord will create a new Heaven, and a new Earth in 
new Churches, and a new Commonwealth together."35 
Calvin's theology had proceeded from his conviction 
of election by God's grace of men of true faith toward 
insistence on unremitting industry as the daily fruition 
of true piety. For Calvin's Puritan followers in a savage 
land, unremitting labor was a stern condition of survival 
in which they could be sustained only by their faith and 
their conviction that they were the Lord's chosen laborers. 
Grueling daily toil gained both dignity and reassurance 
when seen as a mission in a holy perspective. Cotton 
Mather would have underscored Calvin's own admoni-
tion: "If the end of selection is holiness of life, it ought 
to arouse and stimulate us strenuously to aspire to it, 
instead of serving as a pretext to sloth."36 The Puritan 
aspiration to holiness in Massachusetts sought its spiritual 
but also its daily practical expression: "The God of 
Heaven had carried a nation into a wilderness upon the 
designs of a glorious reformation."37 
Cotton Mather ( 1663-1728) lived and wrote from the 
vantage point of many years of productive Puritan labors. 
He and his father were both graduates of Harvard Col-
lege, the establishment of which, within twenty years 
after the Pilgrims' landing on Plymouth Rock, was an 
outstanding expression of the Puritans' resolute devotion 
to what was to them a divine charge and also a historic 
mission. Nonetheless earnest in their holy aspiration, 
35 Compare H. W. Schneider, The Puritan Mind (New York, 1930), 
p. 8. 
36 Calvin Institutes 3.23.12, cited by Williston Walker, John Calvin 
(New York, 1909), p. 415. 
37 Cotton Mather, Magnalia, 3:1, cited by Schneider, op. cit., p. 31. 
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they could take a historical view of their New England 
wilderness that was no longer trackless but plowed and 
fruitful. Mather was concerned lest men's partial fulfill-
ment of God's purpose for them would make them yield 
to invading worldliness. The Puritan urged himself to 
be vigilant in unflagging devotion to his godly duty: he 
in his New England as Calvin in Geneva said: "Let us 
not cease so to act that we may make some unceasing 
progress in the way of the Lord. And let us not despair 
at the slightness of our success; for even though attain-
ment may not correspond to desire, when today outstrips 
yesterday the effort is not lost. ... It is this, indeed, which 
through the whole course of life we seek and follow."38 
In some ways the Puritans, in England as well as on 
American shores, were sterner in holy rigor than Calvin; 
in other ways, more accommodating to secular considera-
tions. Sabbath observance in Geneva was largely limited 
to imperative church attendance; but in Massachusetts 
all work had to end at three on Saturday afternoon, with 
penalties for walking or playing before Sunday night. 
In the economic field, however, Richard Baxter, in old 
England, not only allowed but dignified piously a man's 
honest pursuit of the better bargain: "If God show you a 
way in which you may lawfully get more than in another 
way (without wrong to your soul, or to any other), if you 
refuse this, and choose the less gainful way, you cross 
one of the ends of your Calling, and you refuse to be 
God's Steward."39 In the expansive range of American 
economic opportunity, this sort of godly reflection might 
naturally inspire the quasi-virtuous zeal in building up 
the business which led to larger and eventually to a 
vaster prosperity. 
In the course of the progressive secular development 
38 Calvin Institutes 3. 6. 5; compare A Calvin Treasury, ed. Wm. F. 
Keesecker (New York, 1961), p. 103. 
39 Compare Georgia Harkness, op. cit., pp. 118, 184 f. 
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of the colonies, the Puritan rigor did not abate so much 
in its pronounced edicts as in its actual conformity to 
them. From the outset New England had its unregen-
erates, and their number increased with the more secure 
colonization. To rekindle the ardor of its early piety and 
stir its relaxed conscience, Puritanism needed a Great 
Awakening, a rededication to the Lord, in which Jonathan 
Edwards ( 1703-1758) was a leading spirit. As stern a 
Calvinist as any Puritan, Edwards rejected any free will 
or human productive capacity. Yet, while holding in-
flexibly to divine election to grace and to reprobation, 
he admonished the unregenerates to repent or face an 
awesome doom. 
This brief statement of the tone of Edwards's sermons, 
such as "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God," would 
not do justice to his philosophical grasp and insight. 
Beyond the imprecations of his sermons was a systematic 
probing of the problem of ultimate teleology, the funda-
mental divine purpose in all creation. "As God delights 
in his own beauty, He must necessarily delight in the 
creature's holiness."40 Man's rise in virtue and godliness 
must be an advance from pious expediency, from thoughts 
of heaven and hell, toward pure disinterested love of 
God. In this spirit one may transcend the worldly out-
look; secular considerations, success and progress or 
tragedy would be seen in their eternal setting, as elements 
in the perfect divine order. For even our own salvation 
cannot be our concern, but God's. Our concern must 
always be to know God and to glorify Him. In his exalted 
contemplation the sternest of Calvinists may be seen as 
rising above the range of any secular tasks or achievements 
or progress. 
The rekindled ardor of piety in the Great Awakening 
faded erelong into cool worldly practicality, but some 
40 Jonathan Edwards, Works, Hickman's twelfth edition (London, 
1879), 1: 101. 
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deep spiritual convictions of the Puritan conscience proved 
vital and enduring. In their secular expressions they in-
fluenced the historical development of the American way 
of life. The Puritan's consciousness of his life as a divine 
mission fused humility of spirit with dignity in resolution. 
The course of history was seen as the ongoing reenactment 
of God's plan of salvation and reprobation. And the 
ways of divine Providence need not be man's ways. The 
conviction that God is not a respecter of persons might 
lead to some precarious or even sinister reflections, but 
it was also an admonition not to spurn the weary and the 
heavy laden, to whom the gospel was explicitly ad-
dressed. The pious concern for the least of these our 
brethren might-and in the course of Puritan history did-
find a secular expression in the democratic principle of 
the natural and inviolable rights and personal dignity of 
all men whatever, a principle essential to modern doctrines 
of political progress. Thus the Puritan "equalitarianism 
before God suited well the democratic conception of the 
equal title of all members of society to be its beneficiaries 
and the sources of its authority."41 
The historical role of religion in its cultural setting has 
its own secular aspects, which have significance in the 
growth of the belief in progress. The providential outlook 
in its Jewish and Christian expressions, however, does 
not recognize the possibility of true progress by man's 
own activity, nor secular historical advance. It sees 
human life, past and present, as under divine Providence, 
and it contemplates the full measure of God's judgment 
in some solemn finality. The unambiguous modern idea 
of human progress, expressing a far different view of 
nature and of human nature, has been called the modern 
man's secular religion. 
41 R. B. Perry, Puritanism and Democracy (New York, 1944), p. 194. 
CHAPTER THREE 
The Upsurge of the Idea of 
Progress during the Renaissance and 
the Seventeenth Century 
THE RENAISSANCE was marked by a shift in men's think-
ing: in the authority they recognized and in the direction 
and range of their prevailing interest. Men increasingly 
abandoned their submission to ecclesiastical authority. 
They rather relied on observation and experiment or on 
critical analysis and inference, both in seeking knowledge 
and in testing the truth of their ideas. Corresponding to 
this basic change of method was an equally radical 
change in outlook. The theological perspective was re-
placed by an insistently secular study of physical and 
human nature. 
The abandonment of religious authoritarianism left 
self-reliance as the only alternative for modern thinkers. 
But critical self-reliant thinking required a standard of 
validity to replace the earlier dependence on dogma, and 
this ground was contestable. After their dismissal of 
divine authority, where were men to find assured truth? 
One certainty at least the early modern mind possessed 
firmly: the conviction of a boundless range of knowledge 
and its applications. In the early stages of the turn from 
the medieval to modern culture, a philosophical cardinal, 
Nicholas of Cusa, had expressed this stirring sense of 
infinite mental prospect: "To be able to know more and 
more without end is the type of eternal wisdom."1 Know-
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ledge and the practical application of it are conceivably 
boundless, but are they within our reach? To what de-
gree are they attainable by our minds? And as it is with 
knowledge, pure or applied, so it is with the other values 
on which the worth of human life depends. Right here 
is the problem of progress in its modern setting. 
One strain of Renaissance thinking manifests both a 
departure from medieval reflection and a kinship to it. 
The disavowal of the medieval dependence on dogmatic 
authority and theological commitment signified a resolute 
pursuit of critical investigation with a secular outlook 
But it had not quite outgrown the medieval sense of 
spiritual indigence. The earlier conviction of sinfulness 
was replaced by the unnerving doubt of man's spiritual 
capacities. This skepticism also unsettled the world of 
values, but its invasion of the realm of knowledge was 
most disturbing. 
Modern naturalism itself posed the skeptical challenge. 
The medieval Schoolmen meant to proceed from eternal 
verities of faith to deductive analysis and systematic 
elaboration. That was the declared Scholastic program, 
fides quaerens intellectum, faith seeking to understand. 
Firm orthodox commitment allowed no lack of confidence 
that God-given reason could achieve a system of orthodox 
truth. Where reason could not ascend to the heights of 
orthodox certainty, faith would consummate the quest: 
beyond reason, yes, but not against reason. The secular 
thinkers of the Renaissance, on the other hand, meant to 
achieve their own entire statement of knowledge, but 
found, in their first steps, both their data and their 
premises questionable. The insistence on an exacting 
standard led many minds during the Renaissance to in-
decision and skeptical quandary. Montaigne's motto ex-
pressed both their demand and their wavering before it: 
"Que sr;ai-je?-What do I know?" 
1 Compare Progress and History, ed. F. S. Marvin (London, 1921 ), 
p.11. 
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Whether the demand or the wavering was more 
emphatic depended upon the mental temper. In the 
case of Montaigne ( 1533-1592) a genial temperament 
proceeded from a pervading sense of inconclusiveness 
to a dismissal of strict logical demands. He found no 
stability or reliable base, but did observe a most interest-
ing random variety; so he centered his attention on the 
passing show of himself and others. Montaigne' s Essays 
are prose lyrics of the protean nature of man: intellect, 
feeling, and will, all unstable and undependable, but 
nevertheless most interesting. He would avoid unwar-
ranted commitment and fanaticism of any sort. 
So had Erasmus ( 1466-1536) before Montaigne been 
wary of final espousal, wary of the pope's offer of a 
cardinal's hat and also of Melanchthon's Lutheran over-
tures. His Praise of Folly was a Renaissance recall of 
Nicholas of Cusa's docta ignorantia, instructed ignorance. 
The Erasmian virtue was tolerance, urbane recognition 
of our various pursuits of the truth, variously plausible, 
variously short of finality. But though not conclusive in 
the attainment of truth, our critical and tolerant search 
after it is of great worth, for it emancipates us from 
superstition and bigotry, and it realizes the degree of 
spiritual attainment that may well be within our reach. 
In this more positive tone of his thinking Erasmus must 
be distinguished from Montaigne. 
The unstable borderland between creative zeal and 
indecision thus became characteristic of the Renaissance. 
The modern issue between confidence and distrust deeply 
affected many theologians in their view of man's spiritual 
prospects, progress or frustration, but it was especially 
marked in some of the leading minds of the transitional 
period who came to the problem of progress from their 
reflection on science or philosophy or social and political 
principles. These men differed in the directions of their 
emphasis, but they agreed in their keen awareness of the 
contending issues. The mere mention of two of them 
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should suffice to illustrate this pendular movement of 
thought. 
Giordano Bruno ( 1548-1600) was the outstanding 
philosopher of the sixteenth-century Renaissance-ad-
venturous, critical, constructive. He rejected the geo-
centric astronomy and cosmology of the ecclesiastical 
Aristotelians; he pursued the new Copernican principles 
to their ultimate implications. He found the chief worth 
of man in his supreme devotion to infinite truth, but he 
also had a tragic conviction that men's minds are not 
equal to that noble quest. Is not man's life in pursuit of 
ideal perfection a life of actual ultimate frustration? 
In the next century Blaise Pascal ( 1623-1662) revived 
but also defied the skepticism of Montaigne. He recog-
nized man's basic ignorance but he refused to accept it. 
In his earlier reflections he had expressed some of the 
modern confidence in men's intellectual capacities, in their 
ability to learn from their own past experience and from 
the recorded knowledge of their forebears. "Men alto-
gether progress continually." He contemplated the his-
torical succession of men and nations as one man, ongoing 
and ever learning. 2 These Pascalian ideas are often 
quoted, but they were not Pascal's last word. He was 
not a believer in steady progress; he called attention to 
the narrow range of man's reliable knowledge. He asked 
after Montaigne: "What is it that I know?" and exposed 
the limits of man's mind. An infant prodigy and a 
most brilliant scientist of his day, Pascal both praised 
and questioned his geometrical method. It proves best 
what it undertakes to prove, but it does not give man 
the first principles of knowledge nor the final saving 
truths which his spirit needs: the assurance of God's 
existence, man's imperative principles of the godly life, 
man's immortal destiny under divine justice and grace. 
"Reason clamors in vain; it cannot fix the worth of 
2 Pascal, Oeuvres, ed. L. Brunschvicg and P. Boutroux (Paris, 1908 ), 
2: 139. 
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things .... Justice and truth are ... so subtle that our 
instruments are too dull to grasp them exactly."3 What 
would be more decisive in our thought or in our life than 
to be certain of God and his eternal judgment of us? But 
this certainty is beyond our reach. And what prospects 
of growth or advance can we regard as reasonable? Pascal 
drew a zigzag curve on his page as he contemplated the 
history of mankind. Like the tides of the sea, there is 
ever a going and a returning, forward and backward. 
The alleged progress is but a flow and an ebb: no assured 
conclusive achievement and advance. 4 
What are we to do, then? Pascal's way out of his 
quandary was through his "wager of faith." Stake your 
daily life on the possible alternative of God's eternal 
providence, which alone is of sovereign importance to you. 
Live and act as if you believed in God; go to mass, take 
holy water. So he urged himself; but his reason could 
not be silenced altogether, and his wager moved him to 
tragic irony: "Cela vous fera croire, et vous abetira-
That will make you believe, and will stultify you."5 
This decisive issue regarding man's spiritual capacities, 
to know the truth, to pursue and attain virtue, engaged 
not only scientists and philosophers but also the the-
ologians, who restated their old alternative views of 
Christian faith in terms of the problem of progress. This 
theological contrast of beliefs can be studied to good 
advantage in the controversy between George Hakewill 
and Bishop Goodman. Goodman's book The Fall of Man 
(1616) had maintained a doctrine of dismal piety, a dire 
judgment on mankind and on the whole world as tainted 
to the core and doomed to spreading decay. In the abuse 
of his reason, in his disobedience and sin, man is like a 
tumor of corruption, fouling all creation. "Now I have 
brought man to his grave. . . . I have cast heaven and 
3 Pascal, Pensees, ed. Brunschvicg (Paris, 1925), § 82. 
4 Compare Pensees, § 355. 
5 Op. cit., § 233. 
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earth upon him, and together with man entombed the 
whole world." The entire universe "shall stand in an up-
roar, the heavens with the elements, the elements with the 
heavens, and all together confounded."6 This degenera-
tion can have only one result: inevitable death and dis-
solution. But though man and his world are incapable 
of any sound growth and progress, their final decay and 
ruin will not be the ultimate result. God in his infinite 
providence will then bring forth his new creation, perfect 
and uncontaminated by any evil, which will endure for 
eternity. We may recall the Zoroastrian blessed finale 
after the utter rout of Ahriman and the ensuing world 
conflagration. 
Against Bishop Goodman's dismal judgment of our 
human nature and its capacities, George Hakewill in his 
Apologie maintained not only an assurance regarding 
God's final triumph over evil but also a conviction regard-
ing the upward course of creation. Despite the many 
lapses and bad turns, the record of history and our own 
experience justify not dismay but confidence in the future. 
Hakewill did not proceed from Goodman's extreme to 
the opposite. Between a steady advance and inevitable 
decay, he undertook to prove "that there is both in wits 
and arts, as in all things besides, a kind of circular progress 
as well in regard to places as times: . . . they have their 
birth, their growth, their flourishing, their failing, their 
fading, and within a while, after their resurrection, and 
their reflourishing again."7 This universal resilience of 
men and things is itself irrefutable evidence of the basic 
soundness of nature. The reasonable faith in Providence 
regards the corruptions which beset us as we view the 
fading and falling leaves of autumn. Winter does come, 
but after it comes the new life of spring. 
Hakewill is wary of undue complacency or Stoic-
6 Cited here from Victor Harris, All Coherence Gone (Chicago, 1949), 
pp. 26, 34. 
7 Hakewill, Apologie, 3d ed., two vols. in one (Oxford, 1635} 3.6.2. 
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Pelagian self-reliance that would ignore man's dependence 
on God's grace. But he searches the historical record to 
show that by the grace of God men have risen from low to 
high and then to still higher ground. Hakewill explores 
every field of human activity, and everywhere he notes 
the upbuilding powers of men, in insight, in efficient con-
struction, in artistic creation, in virtuous conduct, in 
worthy endurance. The later ages are a match for an-
tiquity in strength, in wit, in social order, in resistance 
to tyranny, in heroic martyrdom. 8 
Even Bishop Goodman's own strictures were turned to 
good account in the Apologie. The bishop held that 
"nature in all things degenerates, and therefore must be 
supplied by art. ... Almonds wanting good husbandry 
prove bitter, but the bitter will never recover their sweet-
ness."9 Hakewill might have replied that good husbandry 
is available in the orchard and likewise good training in 
the home and school. He observed that we still have 
good almonds, so the past with its alleged degeneration 
could hardly be regarded as without some power of main-
tenance and restoration. Whatever instances of ancient 
classical greatness Goodman might cite to humble our 
modern esteem, Hakewill replied that surely our forebears 
were better than their own ancestors, so the alleged de-
generation could not have been universal.10 His supple-
mentary volume, a tireless controversy in which he chal-
lenged the bishop's reasoning point by point, has been 
called "the greatest pitched battle of the two schools of 
thought," in which Hakewill "carried the day easily and 
almost by acclamation."11 
The long-pitched battle showed the tenacity of the 
two opposed positions. Hakewill's victory indicated a 
decisive turn in social outlook not only among the general 
8 Op. cit., 4.2.7, 9, 11. 
9 Compare Apologie 5: 98 f. 
10 Compare Apologie 5: 178. 
11 E. L. Tuveson, Millennium and Utopia (Berkeley, Calif., 1949), 
p. 72. 
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public but likewise among a considerable group of 
theologians. Numerous divines had been opposing the 
view that the world runs down like a clock, that the 
dregs and puddle of all ages are sweeping us down.12 
New voices now swelled the confidence in progress. The 
Cambridge Platonist Henry More ( 1614-1687) recognized 
a positive power for progressive goodness in man, a 
"boniform faculty."13 Thomas Burnet ( 1635-1715) re-
vealed man's progress not only in this life but eternally 
in the hereafter, "a doctrine of cosmic progressivism."14 
This spread of the belief in progress and the resistance 
to it, can be traced in the science, the social philosophy, 
and the general literature of the seventeenth century. 
Renaissance literature gave brilliant expression of the 
basic alternatives in Machiavelli ( 1469-1527) and Rabelais 
(1490-1553) who agree in their dismissal of the medieval 
tradition but differ in their estimate of men's character 
and capacity for progress and in their social and historical 
outlook. Machiavelli's Prince was a negative evaluation 
of human nature, a divorce of politics from morals, and 
emphasis on force as the decisive test of statecraft. Two 
convictions contended for dominance in Machiavelli's 
thought: his view of men as always driven by the same 
base desires and lusts, despite high professions, and his 
exaltation of classical antiquity as the apex of human 
achievement. These ideas held no hope for historical 
progress. Men are ever stirred by their passions; the 
amazing capacity for great achievement which reached 
fruition in classical antiquity was unprecedented and un-
approachable; it was inevitably followed by degeneration. 
So Machiavelli turned from the strange classical interlude 
of greatness to portray the usual run of men and nations as 
12 Compare Harris, All Coherence Gone, pp. 133, 154. 
13 Compare Henry More, Enchiridion Ethicum, trans. Edward South-
well ( 1690 ), 1.3; quoted here from the reprint of the Facsimile Society 
(New York, 1930). 
14 Compare Tuveson, Millennium and Utopia, p. 128. 
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base and ineffectual, mean tools for the strong hand of 
a despot. 
Some modern criticism has revised our generally held 
ideas of Machiavelli's motivation and of his basic views, 
but these revisions would not alter radically his meaning 
as understood by his age. Even more debatable would be 
any explicit formula of the uproarious book of Gargantua 
and Pantagruel by Fran<;ois Rabelais. Was it a specific 
satire in an allegorical version, or an obscure outpouring 
of derision for everything stodgy and respectable? What 
interests us here is Rabelais' s proposal to modern men 
to replace their discredited submission to dogmatic au-
thority. What he urged on his age was the rejection of 
all tradition whatever, of all scruples and inhibitions, 
the full release of men's energies, desires, curiosities, and 
fancies, the freest interplay of ideas and passions alike. 
His was the Book of the Great Unloosing. The motto of 
his "Abbey of Theleme" was the great word of his con-
fidence in man and of his hopes for men: "Do what you 
will, Fay ce que vouldras." Give the new age the fullest 
scope and chance. Men need this free release to try and 
taste whatever they will; only thus unhampered will they 
put forth their utmost and realize the new perfections of 
their nature, the new and deeper truths, the riper ex-
perience, the fuller and more intense joy of living, the 
more humane social order. 
Here were two brilliant masters of modern literature 
who each in his way elated the radicals and scandalized 
the respectable. 
A different sort of thinker and writer was Jean Bodin 
(1530-1596). His Republic: Six Books was perhaps the 
first systematic work which the modern age could put 
alongside the Politics of Aristotle. Bodin agreed with 
Aristotle in treating political order as the social expansion 
of the moral organization of values. The good state is 
as the good man's life, the normal development and 
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fruition of man's character. Government and laws should 
express concern for the people's welfare, and they are 
finally subject to social control. But all reform should 
be gradual and cautious. Do not lock the gates to 
further progress, but never remove the lock 
Here was a patient and moderate liberal, but un-
fortunately he was a diffuse and tedious writer. Even 
so, Bodin's pedestrian but most respectable exposition 
persuaded many whom Rabelais had only scandalized; 
and it was Bodin, not Machiavelli, who expressed the 
conviction of the new age. 
For our best understanding of Bodin's advocacy of 
the belief in progress we should look especially to a 
shorter work, the appeal in his Discourse to the Senate 
and the People of Toulouse on Education to Be Given 
to Young People in a Republic. This is a true manifesto 
of the Renaissance, a vista of the emerging modern world 
and the new life available to men, with directions for 
their advance to master it. Bodin urges men to look 
across the entire span of human experience: we cannot 
ever enumerate all the great works of the new age, its 
discoveries and inventions, its refinements of culture and 
political wisdom. Never before in history was so much 
knowledge and practical mastery available to young men 
through the right humanistic education. More than in 
any previous age, Bodin declares, we live in "an epoch 
in which, throughout Europe, the humanities flourish, 
talents abound, the sciences progress."15 Likewise in his 
work, The Method of History, Bodin repudiates the belief 
that mankind has degenerated. The lauded Golden Age 
of classical legend would be as iron if compared to the 
modern. Our knowledge and virtue vie with those of 
antiquity. Nature's treasure is inexhaustible, and our 
progress in possessing it can have no limits.16 But we 
15 Compare Oeuvres philosophiques de Jean Bodin, ed. Pierre Mesnard 
(Paris, 1951), vol. 5, pt. 3: 36, 62, 38. 
16 Op. cit., pp. 427, 429. 
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should not conclude that Bodin was a thorough liberal or 
that he had full mastery of the modern idea of progress. 
He retained many traditional superstitions, a crude belief 
in witchcraft, and a bigoted advocacy of persecution. 
The Renaissance proceeded from the humanist revival 
and exaltation of the ancient classics to its own productive 
achievements in every field of human endeavor. In this 
advance ancient authorities were upset by better evidence 
and more thorough logic, and modern thought was mov-
ing to higher and more solid ground. Already in 1543 
the works of Copernicus and Vesalius had marked the 
advance of scientific method in astronomy and anatomy-
and Harvey, Kepler, Galileo, and Newton were still to 
come. Vasco da Gama and Columbus were discovering 
new worlds, and after them a hundred minds were sailing 
the boundless seas of thought, charting new routes to 
those "Americas of the mind" with which Goethe was 
to inspire a later age. 
The new spirit in scientific research and in general 
social outlook was often cramped by persistent bigotry. 
In this strife of ideas, Francis Bacon ( 1561-1626) was 
less hampered than Bodin but not entirely free in his 
modern temper. He was critical of specialized research 
which was already achieving productive results. He did 
not appreciate the far-reaching importance of the work 
of Copernicus and Galileo, nor even that of Harvey, his 
personal physician. For all that, Bacon was dedicated 
to the promotion of "inductive" science and undertook to 
formulate the method and principles of its procedure. 
He boldly dismissed the traditional Aristotlelianism of the 
theologians and by contrast to the medieval syllogisms 
called his inductive logic the "Novum Organum." He 
repudiated dogmatic authoritarianism and the precon-
ceptions or "idols of the mind" which had caused science 
and general knowledge to stagnate for long ages. He 
urged his contemporaries to turn their minds from an-
tiquity to their own age and to its advancing future. We 
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are older than the ancients, he declared; we have had 
more experience; classical antiquity was but the youth of 
the worldY 
Bacon proclaimed a "Great Instauration" of productive 
thought, the exploration of nature and the possession of 
its resources for men's use and expanding mastery and 
happiness. His was a mind of boundless confidence in 
man's capacity to advance. "By far the greatest obstacle 
to the progress of science and to the undertaking of new 
tasks and provinces therein, is found in this-that men 
despair and think things impossible."18 Possible, and in 
fact surely within our reach, are not only specific achieve-
ments but also the complete reconstruction of society for 
the progress of mankind. The Renaissance was an age 
of utopias, visions, and outlines of the perfect state. 
Bacon's New Atlantis was a scientific-technological utopia, 
the socialized promotion of scientific research regarded 
as the main purpose of government, to investigate all 
fields of nature, to discover and formulate its laws, to 
utilize them for the betterment of human life and its 
progress in every direction. 
Seventeenth-century thought was moving toward more 
definite grasp and expression of a theory of progress, and 
the eighteenth gave systematic philosophical formula-
tions of it. This onward course of thought may be studied 
in the works of Descartes, recognized as the father of 
systematic modern philosophy. 
Three conditions required for a definite theory of 
progress have been recognized in the thought and method 
of Descartes ( 1596-1650): the unambiguous rejection of 
any deferential attitude toward classical antiquity as un-
approachable, the candidly secular evaluation of know-
ledge for mundane use and application, and the sure 
foundation of science on the principle of the uniformity 
17 Compare The Advancement of Learning, in The Philosophical Works 
of Francis Bacon, ed. J. M. Robertson (London, 1905), p. 58. 
18 Bacon Novum Organum 1. 92. 
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of nature and its invariable laws.19 We should note 
his philosophical self-reliance, which was not always firm, 
but note even more, the progressive, decisive tenor of 
his ideas. He may vow to make a pilgrimage to Notre 
Dame de Loretto in gratitude for his grasp of basic truth, 
but the truth which he was achieving was secular, a key 
that would unlock the secrets of mathematics and of 
physical science alike. When he was asked what au-
thorities he had read in his library for the exposition of 
his ideas, he pointed to his courtyard where a calf was 
being dissected: "There is my library ... now."20 The 
original title for his Discourse on Method had been 
"Project of a Universal Science Which Can Raise Our 
Nature to Its Highest Degree of Perfection."21 Cartesian-
ism combined reliance on rational analysis with emphasis 
on the uniform mechanics of nature. The progress of 
science was assured by this conviction of nature as a 
mechanical system subject to logical analysis and to re-
search and formulation of invariable laws. Men's sense 
of their spiritual indigence under divine Providence 
yielded to men's growing assurance of their progress in 
the mastery of the laws of nature. 
Of the two outstanding features of the Renaissance, 
the revival of the ancient classics and the rise of physical 
science, the latter was definitely in the ascendant, but the 
resistance of the classical humanists was still vigorous. 
The issue between the ancients and the moderns was 
contested along the entire front of cultural interests. On 
both sides, extreme partisans pressed their arguments 
beyond reasonable limits. Scholastic Aristotelianism still 
had its solemn protagonists in the universities; but Petrus 
Ramus ( 1515-1572) chose for his doctorate in Paris the 
thesis that "everything which Aristotle taught is false," 
19 Compare J. B. Bury, The Idea of Progress (N.Y., ed. of 1955), p. 66. 
20 Compare E. S. Haldane, Descartes: His Life and Times (London, 
1905), pp. 53, 280. 
21 Compare :E. Gilson, Rene Descartes: Discours de la methode (Paris, 
1930), p. xii. 
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and Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) spurned his Oxford 
learning as "Aristotelity" and dismissed Peter the Lombard 
and Duns Scotus as "egregious blockheads." On the 
literary side, Julius Caesar Scaliger ( 1484-1558) idolized 
"august Virgil, ... our divine man," as he called him. 
Against such classical devotion, Etienne Pasquier ( 1529-
1615), in his Recherches de la France, proudly proclaimed 
Pierre Ronsard as the incomparable poet, greater than 
any poet of classical Rome.22 In this debate two leaders 
of the modern idea of progress exercized great influence: 
Charles Perrault and Fontenelle. 
Perrault ( 1628-1703), who is remembered by French 
children for his fairy tales, devoted his old age to a 
systematic "Parallel of the Ancients and the Moderns." 
In his championship of the modern cause against the 
classical tradition, he was wary of going to unreasonable 
extremes. He did not defy the facts by portraying history 
as an undeviating advance of human achievement. He 
recognized that the great age of classical antiquity was 
followed by long centuries of undistinguished production 
and then by an eclipse of culture. But this in his judgment 
only shows that the course of history, as an individual's 
career, has its ascents and declines. There were the 
Dark Ages, but there is also the Renaissance, and both 
have their causes and reasons. What is important to 
recognize is that, despite periodic retrogressions, the 
creative mind of man regains lost ground and advances 
to higher levels. 
The seventeenth century need not look up to any 
previous age, Perrault declared: in one short generation 
French and English genius had made more discoveries 
and achieved greater mastery in physical science than 
the whole of antiquity ever attained. But this progressive 
note in the retrospective outlook is betrayed by its own 
enthusiasm; it tends to lapse into a new type of modern-
22 Compare Hubert Gillot, La querelle des anciens et des modemes 
en France (Paris, 1914), pp. 72, 115 f. 
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classical complacency. Perault saw his century as "ar-
rived in some sort of the highest perfection. . . . Very 
likely we have not many things for which to envy those 
who will come after us."23 The full conception of progress, 
of a future prospect of boundless advance, was not grasped 
by Perrault. 
Fontenelle's life (1657-1757) spanned the seventeenth 
and the eighteenth centuries, from the death of Descartes 
through the youth of Kant and the childhood of Goethe. 
He is not to be compared with those masters, but in his 
own way he expressed characteristics of thought which 
the great names recall to us: a conviction of the con-
summate productive power of reason, a readiness for 
thorough critical reconstruction of ideas, a serene view 
of nature and human nature as infinite in their range and 
significance. With a fine sense for epigram, he salutes his 
age in which "authority has ceased to have more weight 
than reason."24 No longer rigidly codified, ideas are in 
active interplay. Locke and Newton contend with 
Descartes in French minds, and with creative criticism, 
new conceptions expand men's outlook, infinitely diverse, 
and stimulating future progress. From London and Paris, 
scientific societies and academies multiply across Europe. 
The development of Fontenelle's thought in itself 
epitomizes a trend of ideas from the skepticism of Mon-
taigne to the systematic advocacy of progress during the 
Enlightenment. In his early work, Dialogues of the Dead, 
published in 1683, Fontenelle shows an ironical turn of 
mind not only in his style but in his outlook on history 
and on human life in general. The third of his "Dialogues 
of Ancient Dead with Modern," between Socrates and 
Montaigne, confronts Socratic irony with the "What do 
I know?" of Montaigne's Essays. The Frenchman tells 
the Athenian of his modern age, in every way changed 
23 Compare F. J. Teggart, The Idea of Progress: A Collection of Read-
ings, ed. G. H. Hildebrand (Berkeley, Calif., 1949), p. 194. 
24 Compare Gillot, op. cit., p. 555. 
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from the ancient, and all for the worse: quite different 
from the ancient probity and uprightness. Ironical 
Socrates, on the contrary, had expected that man at long 
last would have outgrown the vices and follies of his old 
days. It seems that mankind never learns and never 
forgets, but keeps to its same stupid and corrupt ways. 
Externals may alter, but the heart of man and the general 
order of nature remain constant. 
From this view of human life and the course of history 
Fontenelle turned later in his long career to an expansively 
forward-looking and progressive view of human affairs. 
He revived the vision of Pascal's pre-skeptical youth, of 
the history of mankind as the life of a man ever growing 
and learning. More positively than Pascal, he insisted 
that "this man of all ages will never be old"; again and 
again humanity renews its youth and its productive 
powers. The true understanding of the ancients is to 
see each period of history in its right perspective. Fon-
tenelle admired the classical masterpieces. (Like Scaliger, 
he preferred the Romans to the Greeks. ) What he con-
demned was the servile acceptance of them as final au-
thorities or models of perfection. French genius has 
surpassed the ancient, but it also is short of finality. We 
should not raise new idols nor "run after Descartes," as 
our ancestors ran after Aristotle.25 We should prize the 
great past, cherish the greater present, and be alert to the 
still greater demands and prospects of the future. Here 
was the conviction of unlimited progress. The systematic 
theory of it was being formulated in the closing years of 
Fontenelle's amazing and vigorous longevity, during the 
eighteenth century. 
Fontenelle's confidence in expanding progress was 
shared by many minds across the Channel. The advance-
25 Fontenelle, A Discourse concerning the Ancients and the Moderns, 
trans. Hughes, appended to Conversations with a Lady on the Plurality 
of Worlds, trans. Joseph Glanvill (London, 1719), p. 210; compare pp. 
202, 186. 
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ment of scientific investigation in all fields of nature, in 
which the Royal Society of London led the vanguard, was 
championed with documentation and eloquence by Joseph 
Glanvill ( 1636-1680) in his Plus Ultra, or the Progress and 
Advancement of Knowledge since the Days of Aristotle 
(1668). We should remember that Glanvill combined 
his advocacy of scientific research with some basic 
skeptical reservations and with superstitious "philosophical 
considerations" about witchcraft. In Plus Ultra he de-
clared confidently that the members of the Royal Society 
of London, established in 1662, had witnessed more 
scientific progress in six years than the Aristotelians could 
match in their eighteen centuries. Glanvill outlined two 
ways in which knowledge could be advanced: by enlarg-
ing, in Bacon's phrase, "the history of things," through 
detailed information about the various fields of nature, 
and by improving the communication of ideas. In a suc-
cession of chapters he gives a classified inventory of 
modern scientific advance in chemistry, anatomy, math-
ematics, astronomy, optics, geography, and other fields, 
and in the perfecting of scientific instruments. He ex-
pounds the efficient institutional organization of the Royal 
Society, its undogmatic pursuit of truth and its remark-
able achievements (in the reporting of which he gives 
special attention to the "illustrious Mr. Boyle"). He re-
gards it as absurd to make "Comparison between the 
advantages Aristotle had for Knowledge and those of 
later ages."26 
This conviction of endless advance was shared by 
many; it found expression in the promotion of scientific 
projects to improve civilization by ameliorating social 
conditions, from plans for international peace to proposals 
to abandon the celibacy of the clergy. Many of these 
projects were confused and ill advised; some were the 
notions of odd eccentrics; but others failed of success 
26 Joseph Glanvill, Plus Ultra, chapt. 15. 
PART ONE 
only because they were ill timed or premature. The 
discrediting, deserved or undeserved, of some of these 
proposals affected the reputation of their advocates whose 
basic ideas should have earned some of them more en-
during recognition. 
We have been tracing the upsurge and the spreading 
impact of the idea of progress in the seventeenth century. 
This idea clearly involves a more expansive view of the 
effective range of man's spiritual activity. Although the 
age was marked by the rise of secular thinking, with 
radical reconstruction and new and original ideas, the 
traditional theology with its providential judgment of 
history was not eclipsed entirely. Its most brilliant ad-
vocate, Bishop Bossuet ( 1627-1704), was a contemporary 
of John Locke but a spiritual brother of Saint Augustine. 
Like Augustine's City of God, Bossuefs View of Universal 
History interpreted the course of man's existence through 
the ages as under the direction of divine Providence. 
Bossuet' s charts of history under its epochs and periods 
are not of major importance to us. In the first part of his 
work he brings his historical survey to the Age of Charle-
magne and then devotes the remaining two thirds to a 
long review of the progress of religion and a much briefer 
discussion of the progress of empires. While continually 
expounding scripture in a somewhat patristic style and 
eloquence, he is also keenly conscious of the spiritual 
needs of his age. Modern skeptics and libertines need 
solemn admonition; they must hear again the verdict 
of God. Human life is not random, nor is history a mere 
interplay of blind forces. God reigns over all nations. 
"Let us talk no more of chance, or of fortune. . . . What 
is chance, in regard to our uncertain counsels, is a con-
certed design in a higher counsel."27 Growth, progress, 
decline, and fall, all are under God's decree. They that 
govern find themselves under that higher authority, and 
27 Bossuet, View of Universal History, trans. J. Elphinston (London, 
1778) 2: 280. 
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they that submit and obey, owe their ultimate loyalty to 
"the blessed and only Potentate, the King of kings, and 
Lord of lords."28 
The involvement of the idea of progress in the new 
cosmologies and social philosophies of the age may be 
studied in the impacts made by the theories of Thomas 
Hobbes and John Locke. No other English thinkers 
aroused such strong and far-reaching reactions not only 
in Britain but also in Europe. Locke's influence in France 
was especially noteworthy, for it turned the direction of 
eighteenth-century thought and defined important aspects 
of the French Enlightenment. The coupling of these two 
names nowise indicates any basic agreement of the two 
philosophers, but it is interesting to note, despite their 
radical disagreements, their respective bearing on the 
problem of progress. 
Hobbes ( 1588-1679) assumed a position of thorough 
going materialism. Nature, in his view, is mechanical 
system all the way through, and human nature likewise. 
Both physiology and psychology should be treated as 
chapters in physics. The heart is like a spring; the joints 
are so many wheels; our so-called mind and its ideas are 
mechanical processes determined by the ways in which 
the outside world impresses or strikes us-literally. Emo-
tion likewise is simply a kind of bodily motion. From 
this point of view Hobbes portrayed men in the state of 
nature as contending with each other for self-preservation, 
self-satisfaction, and prevailing power and mastery. Every 
man is to every other man a wolf or a lamb, and human 
life is a state of actual or threatened universal war. (Our 
present-day terms are shorter: hot or cold war.) This 
natural state of human affairs is insecure, with "continual 
fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, 
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."29 
28 Ibid. 
29 Hobbes, Leviathan, in English Works, ed. Molesworth (London, 
1839), 3: 113. 
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This portrayal of man in the state of nature was a 
materialistic pendant alongside of the traditional the-
ological account of man's sinful depravity. Hobbes, how-
ever, did not proceed to intone "There is no health in us" 
and to seek salvation by supernatural means, through 
divine grace. He did speak of God as the Creator and 
Final Judge, but only after a fashion, as a respectable 
gesture. Hobbes's salvation of men from their brutish 
lot in nature is again through nature. Men's natural desire 
for security leads them to organize themselves into a 
society, by each agreeing to subject his will to the will 
of the absolute Sovereign, Leviathan. In this political 
theory, the formation of the state is made possible by 
the mutual negation of all egoistic wills; but this suppres-
sion of selfish behavior is itself motivated by the natural 
self-seeking concern for security. 
This warlike account of human character aroused wide 
criticism. For a long century respectable moralists and 
social philosophers refuted Hobbism. But Hobbes's 
Leviathan, perverse as it appeared to his critics, provided 
in its own way an added argument for the belief in 
progress. Prior to Hobbes, the advocates of progress had 
been mostly optimists with a positive estimate of man's 
spiritual capacities. The Leviathan took a mechanistic 
view of men, low and dismal; yet it showed, even in 
men's insatiate selfishness, their natural motive that must 
lead them all to form a system of government. Even in 
the crassest view of men, they are still capable of social 
progress. 
Locke's contribution to the belief in progress is through 
his theory of the nature of men's minds and the processes 
of experience and knowledge. His Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding ( 1690) was the systematic treatise 
of British empiricism, and it directed in both Britain and 
France the new outlook on men and societies. This 
empiricism traced the origin of ideas to the processes of 
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sensation and reflection. All that we are, whatever we 
perceive, think, feel, or act, is derived and determined 
by the course of our experience. There are no innate 
ideas, nor is there any inborn and unalterable character 
of men and societies. The ongoing course of our ex-
perience shapes and modifies everyone; the historical 
course of events shapes and modifies the order of societies 
and governments. Political regimes are not set up once 
for all by divinely ordained principles. Governments 
must serve the people's needs; they depend upon the 
people's approval and are subject to reform or abolition 
at the people's demand. 
Here was a philosophical platform for liberal recon-
struction. But while it resisted any dogmatic conviction 
it also disavowed any expectation of certain knowledge 
or assured prospect in dealing with the factual course of 
experience. With his characteristic candor Locke avowed 
that our ideas of substances ("Somewhat I know not 
what") can yield only degrees of probability, likely sur-
mises, not factual certitude. By careful survey of our 
data we can record the actual details of our experience 
and can follow its likely trends, but we cannot ascertain 
necessary connections or definite prospects. 
While Locke's direction of thought provided no plat-
form or program of universal conviction, it did allow a 
range of probability in foresight sufficient for planning 
and pursuing reforms. Locke's Essay and his writings on 
education and government became the manuals of French 
radicals who looked beyond the ancient monarchical re-
gime toward some new order of advance in justice and 
liberty and social welfare. His works were read overseas in 
America not only by some of the Founding Fathers but 
also by thousands of people in the expanding Western 
land. Locke did not deal directly with the ideas of 
progress; the term scarcely appears on his pages. But 
his empiricist accounts of the mind's capacities and of 
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the processes of human life and institutions, as growing 
in complexity and maturity and as molded by changing 
circumstances and conditions, laid the grounds of the 
psychology of the Enlightenment. New and effective ap-
proaches were provided to the systematic theories of prog-
ress which were to engage eighteenth-century thinkers. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Philosophies of Progress 
in the Eighteenth Century 
THE IDEA OF PROGRESS was a dominant theme of eigh-
teenth-century thought, but in dramatic interplay and 
reversal. The vitality and perfectibility of social values 
was affirmed during the first half of that age with a 
confidence which proceeded in many cases to excessive 
optimism, both godly and secular. The succeeding period 
was marked by a wave of social and religious negations 
and by spreading skepticism. There were voices of dis-
content and dismay challenging the optimism of the 
early Enlightenment; on the other hand, the assured 
and boundless perfectibility of mankind was reaffirmed 
even in the darkest days of the revolution in France. 
The issues of skepticism which embroiled the Renais-
sance continued to disturb later thinkers. The abysmal 
problem of evil engrossed and bafHed both theologians 
and metaphysicians. Cosmology and social philosophy 
reflected contending theories of man and his place in 
nature. This running summary of tendencies in early 
modern thought may gain in definiteness by specific 
references. On the judgment of skepticism and theodicy-
the problems of knowledge and evil-the main issues were 
argued by Bayle, Leibniz, and Shaftesbury. The ideas 
as well as the lifetimes of these three span the turn of 
the eighteenth century. 
Pierre Bayle ( 1647-1706) was the master controversial-
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ist of the period. In his Historical and Critical Dictionary 
the various heresies of Christian tradition were reex-
amined, and the claims of orthodoxy were reappraised 
critically, with conclusions humiliating to faith and reason 
alike. Assuredly, reliable knowledge depends upon sound 
evidence and rational demonstration, but these are not 
available in the all-important matters of religion. Most 
vulnerable to searching criticism are the orthodox ex-
planations of the nature and origin of evil, committed 
as they are to recognize the deep-lying corruption of 
human nature and yet to regard it as nowise reflecting 
on the infinite perfection of the Creator of man. Despite 
all our quandaries, however, we must and shall hold fast 
the verities of faith; only, Bayle urged, let us not delude 
ourselves that they have any sound rational basis. 
The challenge to this skeptical dialectic was met in the 
Theodicy of Leibniz ( 1646-1716). This treatise appeared 
only several months after The Moralists ( 1709) of Shaftes-
bury. Both works were marked by a spirit of cosmic and 
social optimism which proved widely influential and which 
even set definite patterns and directions in the literature 
of the period. 
Leibniz was confident that the reliable method of 
rational demonstration, which he had followed in his 
systematic philosophy, could solve the problems of re-
ligion in sound theology. Rightly analyzed and under-
stood, evil is neither an ineradicable taint in man nor a 
blot on the Creator's infinite perfection. We need a 
clearer understanding of the right method required for 
dealing with our problem. Leibniz here appealed to the 
principle of the "compossibility" of God's attributes. It 
is not enough to ask whether our nature is evil because 
God either could not or would not create it perfect. This 
dilemma is due to inadequate reflection. We should 
recognize that the many evils in the world cast no blame 
on the Creator's infinite goodness nor on his omnipotence, 
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if we also take into account God's omniscience, his infinite 
insight into the nature of finite beings, which even our 
own rational analysis can disclose. Any created world 
is bound to have some imperfections characteristic of its 
finitude. Therein we differ and shall eternally differ from 
God. But we can be sure that, of all conceivable worlds, 
God's goodness has chosen, and God's omnipotence has 
created, the one least imperfect. This is Leibniz' s doc-
trine that ours is "the best of all possible worlds," a 
comforting thought to pious acquiescence, but with some 
dismal undertones which resounded later in the century. 
Leibniz' s application of his theodicy in his social 
philosophy expressed his forward-looking activism. This 
world of God's creation, in its very nature not absolutely 
perfect, is characteristically perfectible. Two ideas seemed 
to have contended for Leibniz's emphasis. One was the 
conclusion of his theodicy, that we live in the most perfect 
world possible. The other idea was the conviction of 
the inexhaustible resources of our spiritual activity. Finite 
in actuality, we are yet in a sense also infinite, that is, in 
our eternal prospect. "We must recognize a certain 
perpetual and very free progress of the whole universe, 
such that it is always going forward to greater improve-
ment. ... No end of progress is ever reached."1 Our 
chief merit must be in the fulfillment of our rational 
capacities. In this characteristic realization of ourselves 
as centers of intelligent activity, we progressively aspire 
to membership in the Republic of Minds, God's master-
piece on earth. 
The thought of Shaftes bury ( 1671-1713) was marked 
by a spirit of generous affability. The usual accounts of 
evil in human lives, be they sufferings or sins, did not 
seem to have disturbed him overmuch. His attitude was 
not quite the serene fortitude of the Stoic but rather the 
1 Leibniz, The Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings, trans. 
Robert Latta (Oxford, 1898), pp. 417, 350, 351. 
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placid conviction that basically and ultimately all was 
well. Any degree of pessimism seemed to him to be 
evidence of one-sided and unbalanced judgment of things, 
seen in the wrong perspective. When viewed truly in 
its proper place and role in the universal system, every-
thing manifests its characteristic perfection in its con-
tribution to the cosmic harmony. Shaftesbury was carried 
away by this complacent assurance: "When [Nature] 
seems most ignorant and perverse in her productions, I 
assert her even then as wise and provident as in her 
goodliest works .... 'Tis good which is predominant; and 
every corruptible and mortal nature by its mortality and 
corruption yields only to some better, and all in common to 
that best and highest nature, which is incorruptible and 
immortal."2 
The long-range career of these two optimistic doctrines 
in the history of ideas seems to have been one of diminish-
ing returns. It is commonly recognized that Leibniz' s 
philosophy is of increasing importance in contemporary 
thought. Even Spengler, in his dirge on the collapse of 
Western civilization, hailed Leibniz as "without doubt 
the greatest intellect in Western philosophy."3 But this 
superlative tribute must be despite the Theodicy and not 
because of it. Shaftesbury's temporary fame was followed 
by comparative oblivion, and it can hardly be said that 
his ideas command today more than historical interest. 
But for our study of the social outlook of the eighteenth 
century these two thinkers are very significant, for their 
influence is reflected in the religious and social thinking 
of the age, and even more strikingly in its literary ex-
pressions on both sides of the Channel. 
The most familiar poetry of this placid tenor is, of 
2 Shaftesbury, The Moralists, in Characteristics, ed. J. M. Robertson 
(London, 1900), 2: 22, 23. 
3 Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, trans. C. F. Atkinson 
(New York, 1930), 1: 42. 
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course, Alexander Pope's Essay on Man. With his marvel-
ous felicity for epigrams, Pope rhymed the current wisdom 
of world-laudation: 
All nature is but Art unknown to thee; 
All chance, direction which thou canst not see; 
All discord, harmony not understood; 
All partial evil, universal good: 
And spite of Pride, in erring Reason's spite, 
One truth is clear, Whatever is, is right.4 
This sort of complacency became epidemic, and in 
some cases it reached the limits of absurdity. Professed 
sages in verse and in prose joined in the cosmic rhapsody. 
So, for instance, Albrecht von Haller: "Perhaps this petty 
speck of error and of dole/ Swells the perfection of the 
universal Whole." So likewise Senator Brockes, in his 
eulogy of the goose, divinely designed in its entire anatomy 
to serve the needs of men: 
Goose-grease doth relieve consumption; goose-gall 
lotion, too, is good; 
Goose is good to eat; for dizzy spells we often use its blood; 
Skin and feathers likewise useful: doth not this bird radiate 
God's omnipotence, God's wisdom, and God's love for 
man's estate? 
And the psychologist David Hartley: "All individuals are 
actually and always infinitely happy."5 
The definite tum from this general laudation of cosmic 
and human conditions to the affirmation of their progress-
ive character is also notable in eighteenth-century writers. 
The superlative declaration of actual and universal per-
fection might have seemed to imply an optimistic denial 
of general and ultimate progress. A later poetic comment 
4 Pope, Essay on Man, 1: 289 ff. 
5 Compare R. A. Tsanoff, The Nature of Evil (New York, 1931, 1971), 
pp. 132 f., 119. 
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by Robert Browning comes to mind here: "Best being 
best now, change were for the worse."6 Shaftesbury might 
recognize progress in nature's happy use of partial dis-
cords to swell its larger harmonies. But other thinkers, 
less enthusiastic about actualities, were yet confident of 
the future advancement of humanity to ever higher 
levels of knowledge and general welfare. 
This trust in progress fired the zeal of men in many 
directions of radical reform. In France, the vast cam-
paign of the Encyclopedists, with Denis Diderot in the 
vanguard, expressed, through their resistance to social 
injustice and their scorn for dogmatic superstitution, their 
confidence in the power of spreading enlightenment to 
emancipate men and guide them to ever increasing prog-
ress in every direction. With similar confidence Bishop 
Sprat had written a century earlier in his History of the 
Royal Society: "While the old philosophy could only 
bestow on us some barren terms and notions, the new 
shall impart to us the uses of all the creatures and shall 
enrich us with all the benefits and fruitfulness and 
plenty."7 Adam Ferguson ( 1723-1816), in tracing the 
history of civil society, maintained "not only the individual 
advances from infancy to manhood, but the species itself 
from rudeness to civilization."8 With greater authority 
Edward Gibbon ( 1737-1794) declared: "Since the first 
discovery of the arts, war, commerce, and religious zeal 
have diffused among the savages of the Old and the New 
World, those inestimable gifts; they have been successively 
propagated; they can never be lost. We may therefore 
acquiesce in the pleasing conclusion that every age of 
the world has increased, and still increases, the real 
wealth, the happiness, the knowledge, and perhaps the 
6 Robert Browning, "The Sun." 
7 Cited here from G. M. Trevelyan, English Social History (New York, 
1942), p. 258. 
s Compare E. L. Tuveson, Millennium and Utopia (Berkeley, Calif., 
1940), pp. 195 f. 
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virtue, of the human race."9 But these comforting words 
come at the end of Gibbon's "General Observations on 
the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West," to express his 
confidence that our civilization need not fear another 
devastation by barbarian invaders. 
This boundless optimism and this belief in universal 
progress were shaken but not swamped by a wave of 
skepticism and denial of the vitality of social values. The 
course of historical events before and after the French 
Revolution and the contrary appraisals of them expressed 
both spreading pessimism and resistant buoyant faith. 
While the thinkers of the Enlightenment sought to de-
velop a systematic philosophy of progress, their century 
likewise expressed a negative evaluation of the historical 
course of events. Fontenelle had been content, while cit-
ing specific advances or backsliding of civilization, to 
regard its basic processes as more or less invariable and 
constant. But some of his younger contemporaries in the 
period of the Enlightenment questioned man's capacities 
for general progress. Advances in one field are gained at 
too heavy a cost in others. Knowledge and freedom prove 
too expensive. At any time we are liable to stray toward 
frustration and ruin. In that vaunted age of systematic 
philosophies of progress, L. A. de Caraccioli in 1759 
blasted civilization in violent diatribe: 
Already this century has run through more than half of 
its course, and we have nothing to offer our successors but 
insipid novels, miserable plays, impious philosophies, and 
extravagant opinions. How corrosive this generation has 
been! Since the beginning of the century fifty-eight years 
have passed, and each of them has been a step downward 
from the worth of our fathers. Our fathers occupied them-
selves in self-study while we dissipate, they sought only 
truth while we love only illusion; they drew their argu-
9 Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 
ed. J. B. Bury, 4th ed. (London and New York, 1911), 4: 168 :If. 
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ments from religion, while we persist in establishing 
systems which contradict that religion; they drew from 
original sources while our knowledge of the ancient 
authors derives only from citations; they questioned their 
souls while we are attentive only to our senses; they per-
mitted themselves recreation only as relaxation from 
arduous labor while we believe that one should live only 
to enjoy the most criminal pleasures. In a word, they 
meditated and we talk, they were profound and we are 
superficial, they reasoned and we wander aimlessly.10 
The contending historical valuations may be read in 
the two outstanding men in French literature and phi-
losophy of the eighteenth century, Voltaire and Rousseau. 
Voltaire (1694-1778) set out with the advocates of uni-
versal harmony. While he was never a friend of the 
ecclesiastics, he was convinced of a design in nature 
and relied on it for his belief in God and in the basic 
soundness and good prospects of mankind. Though he 
was pleased that Alexander Pope shared his ideas, he 
did not go the whole length with him or with Shaftes-
bury. He never glossed over the bigotries, vices, in-
justices, or sufferings which he noted on all sides. Still, 
his earlier reactions to those evils was that of Leibnizian 
lenience. Man is finite and imperfect, but still he has 
the capacity to advance toward his higher destiny. 
Voltaire's personal career, however, as well as the social 
and political course of events in his time, increasingly 
darkened his view of life. His initially confident theology 
was shocked by the Lisbon earthquake in 1755, and the 
remaining twenty-odd years of his life were marked by 
skepticism. While he remained "on speaking terms with 
God," as he put it, he could no longer profess any under-
standing of a divine design in nature or in human lives. 
What sort of teleology could find meaning in a Lisbon 
1o L. A. de Caraccioli, La iouissance de soi-meme ( 1759), pp. ix-x, 
cited here from Henry Vyverberg, Historical Pessimism in the French 
Enlightment (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), pp. 79 f. 
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disaster, or what Providence could justify the thousand 
foul corruptions and tyrannies of history? His persistent 
reflections multiplied his perplexities. "Alas!'' he ex-
claimed in his poem on the Lisbon disaster, "I am like 
a doctor: I do not know." 
An incomparable master of raillery, Voltaire turned his 
own early convictions to ridicule. Leibniz' s best of all 
possible worlds sounded to him like unintended irony. 
If this world is the best possible, what could the others 
be like? So he wrote his satire Candide, or Optimism, 
in which his hero, if one could so call his chief character, 
is on a quest of Eldorado but is driven from disaster to 
disaster. The providential design in nature and the uni-
versal order and harmony were exposed to a cynical 
parody: "Flies are born to be chewed by spiders, which 
in turn are eaten by swallows, and swallows by shrikes, 
and shrikes by eagles, and eagles are born to be killed 
by men, who in turn live to kill each other and to be 
consumed by worms, or by devils in a thousand cases to 
one." The same satirical tone marks the article "Tout 
est bien-All is well," in his Philosophical Dictionary, 
aimed at Shaftesbury, Bolingbroke, and Pope's "All partial 
evil, universal good": "An odd general good indeed, com-
posed of gall stones and gout, and all the crimes and 
sufferings, and death, and damnation."11 
In this world of unsettled values and precarious out-
look, Voltaire saw only one possible ray of hope: in the 
slow process of enlightenment. In the six volumes of his 
historical Essai sur les moeurs he does not apologize for 
his tireless chronicles of superstitions and tyrannies and 
crimes, but neither does he emphasize a final note of 
despair. Through all historical changes, he points out 
the abiding reality of certain basic values: "Virtue alone 
never changes. It is like the light of the sun." Despite 
all the bigotries and cruelties throughout history, "humane 
llVoltaire, Oeuvres, ed. Moland (Paris, 1877-1885), 17: 584, 585. 
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philosophy" has also been molding the lives of men. 
"Finally we should believe that reason and industry will 
always make new progress." The useful arts will advance, 
prejudices will be abandoned, and philosophy "will con-
sole somewhat for the calamities which it will endure 
in all ages."12 We ourselves must do our bit in the work 
of civilization. "Let us cultivate our garden." This con-
clusion of his Candide was not placid confidence but a 
somber ironic resolution. "There are always barbarians 
in the most civilized nations and in the most enlightened 
times."13 Around us are the jungles of evil; beyond are 
the seas of ignorance; our garden plot is small and weedy, 
and its crop uncertain. Let us keep on cultivating it. 
Beyond reassuring words like these, what does Voltaire 
finally have to say about the ongoing preservation and 
advance of social values? In his Philosophical Dictionary 
he discusses all conceivable topics-articles on Prayers, 
Prejudices, Pretensions, Priests, Privileges, Prophets, Prov-
idence-but there is no article on Progress. Nor is there 
an entry about Progress in the voluminous index to the 
ninety-five volumes of his Works. 
Jean Jacques Rousseau ( 1712-1778) judged about men's 
actual condition and of their prospects of improvement 
in direct opposition to Voltaire. Against Voltaire's grow-
ing skepticism, Rousseau refused to doubt the natural 
soundness of God's creation. The historical process of 
progressive enlightenment, in which Voltaire saw his 
single though precarious hope for any human advance, 
was in Rousseau's view a process of man's corruption. 
Prior to any program of human progress, and fundamental 
to any true reform, must be the exposure of the root of 
evil in men's lives. Rousseau did not glorify primitive 
man unreservedly. Call the savage a human animal if 
12 Voltaire, Oeuvres completes (Paris, 1827), 19: 288; (Paris, 1828), 
24: 383, 384. 
13 Op. cit., 24: 385. 
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you will; still it was a sound and healthy animal, without 
depravity and without artificial barriers to natural im-
provement, to growth and perfection. In the state of 
nature man had freedom to realize his capacities in in-
creasing measure, to perfect his natural intelligence, and 
to attain mastery in speech and in productive labor and 
a just and satisfactory common life. But the lure of 
private property, which promised to a small number of 
strong men the chance to exploit the labor of the many 
for their own aggrandisement, led to the establishment of 
governments, whose chief function has ever been the 
protection of the exploiting class. 
Thus the original natural freedom of man was replaced 
by a vastly organized system of human enslavement and 
oppression of the poor masses and by the luxury and 
corruption of the wealthy classes. Our historical past has 
been a dismal course of degeneration. Yet even in our 
civilized system of oppression and corruption, the natural 
soundness of human beings has not been utterly depraved. 
Can it ever be restored? Rousseau preached the gospel 
of return to the primitive bosom of nature, but in his 
romantic quest he could scarcely expect to retrace com-
pletely or to efface the historical past. The more realistic 
approach to his problem was in the program of reform 
proposed in his Social Contract. How must existing social-
political institutions be reconstructed so as to regain for 
man the most of his lost natural freedom and soundness? 
Rousseau's philosophy was a project of human emancipa-
tion, of bringing men again within reach of their early 
liberties, their rightful values, and at least some of their 
native capacities for healthy development. It was a 
program of radical social regeneration as a prerequisite 
to any genuine progress. 
Rousseau's romantic nostalgia for the original freedom 
of men accentuated the primitivism which had been a re-
curring theme in theology, philosophy, and literature, 
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sometimes dominant, sometimes contending with pro-
gressivism. As might be expected, there were extremists 
on both sides of this debate. Pope, with his assurance 
that "Whatever is, is right," had sung "Lo! the poor 
Indian," but the eulogy of the Red Indian or of the Hindu 
virtues did become a popular motif in a multitude of 
eighteenth-century novels. "Away with your refinements! 
enjoy the freedom and simplicity of nature. Be guiltless 
-Be an Indian!"14 Leibniz himself intended nothing sin-
ister or ironical by his doctrine that ours is the best of 
possible worlds; but the best English social historian 
records the negative undertone in the self-complacency of 
the mid-eighteenth-century Englishman to whom "Eng-
land appeared to be the best country possible in an 
imperfect world."15 Robert Louis Stevenson's later nursery 
rhyme comes to mind: 
Little Indian, Sioux or Crow, 
Little frosty Eskimo, 
Little Turk or Japanee, 
0, don't you wish that you were me! 
Conversely, universal optimistic commitment might be 
annoyed by evidences that the world of men fails to 
perform according to the placid expectations. So dour 
Dean Swift wrote to Alexander Pope: "I tell you after all, 
that I do not hate mankind: it is vous autres who hate 
them, because you would have them reasonable animals, 
and are angry for being disappointed."16 
Voltaire's blast at optimism in his poem on the Lisbon 
earthquake and in his Candide did not subdue all the 
advocates of historical progress. In England the belief 
14 This passage and others like it may be read in Lois Whitney, Prim-
itivism and the Idea of Progress in English Popular Literature of the 
Eighteenth Century (Baltimore, Md., 1934 ), pp. 121, 118 ff. 
15 Trevelyan, English Social History (New York, 1942), p. 840. 
16 Compare T. 0. Wedell's article, "On the Philosophical Background 
of Gulliver's Travels," in Studies in Philology (October 1926), 437. 
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in man's basic soundness and in his unlimited capacity 
for improvement was reaffirmed with confidence but also 
challenged skeptically. Richard Price ( 1723-1791) fought 
on many battlefronts in his resistance to bigotry and in-
justice and oppression, without faltering in his conviction 
of a better future: "Such are the natures of things that 
this progress must continue. During particular intervals 
it may be interrupted, but it cannot be destroyed."17 Like-
wise Charles Darwin's grandfather contemplated the 
eternal progress in nature: "It would appear, that all 
nature exists in a state of perpetual improvement by laws 
impressed on the atoms of matter by the great CAUSE OF 
CAUSES; and that the world may still be in its infancy, 
and continue to improve FOR EVER AND EVER."18 
The keenest British mind of the age, David Hume 
(1711-1776), found no basis for such cosmic or historical 
confidence. In his Treatise of Human Nature Hume 
pursued a method of radical empiricism. He rejected any 
doctrine of substances, corporeal or mental. We have 
only the course of our experience, a succession of ideas, 
and in dealing with any complex idea we should trace 
it to its initial sources, in immediate sense-impressions. 
Thus in considering the idea of the causal relation be-
tween two events Hume recognized their contiguity in 
space and their succession in time, and also their constant 
conjunction in the course of experience. But he explained 
our notion of their necessary connection as due to our 
association of ideas which leads us habitually to expect 
their continued future conjunction. 
Where no basis for assured objective certainty of causal 
relation was available, what empiricist ground for his-
torical confidence could be expected? Hume regarded 
any cosmic optimism with ironical disdain. The best of 
all possible worlds indeed! How many worlds have we 
17 Compare Whitney, op. cit., pp. 221 f. 
18 Erasmus Darwin, Zoonomia (London, 1801 ), 2: 318. 
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compared, to descant so complacently? One world at a 
time, he urged, our own, the only world we know, and 
that quite imperfectly. In this world we can trace no 
steady improvement but rather growth and decay, with-
out any ascertainable pattern of universal or prevailing 
trend one way or the other. To proclaim this sorry world 
as God's masterpiece would hardly be a tribute to the 
Creator. It might be more comforting to our piety to 
consider this cosmic togetherness as a rough sketch, 
headed for the wastebasket of the Almighty, like others 
that might have been botched and bungled. A better 
cosmic insight might be forthcoming; an improved trend 
in human affairs might be in prospect, but these may be 
only our fond surmises. We really do not know. Man's 
ways are at bottom as unaccountable as those of the 
universe. 
We noted the spreading influence of Leibniz's Theodicy 
in theological and poetic reaffirmation of the teleological 
argument for God's design in nature for man's increasing 
and perfect good. A whole shelf of theological treatises, 
now lost or dust-covered but in their own day notable, 
undertook to prove the perfection of divine Providence 
from the intelligent order manifested in the various fields 
of nature: from the world of fish, of trees, of stones: 
ichthyotheology, dendrotheology, petrotheologyl These 
were prose pendants to Senator Brockes's rhymes in pious 
eulogy of the goose and its manifold utility to man: "skin 
and feathers likewise useful." But the general ascendancy 
of German systematic thought after the middle of the 
eighteenth century manifested itself in theories of prog-
ress which were important alternatives of Leibniz's the-
odicy and not merely extravagant inflations of his optim-
ism. We can mention only two men, but they were in 
the front rank of German genius during that age: Lessing 
and Herder. 
Gotthold E. Lessing ( 1729-1781) was the elder states-
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man of the German Enlightenment, famous for his his-
torical and cultural criticism as well as for his literary 
masterpieces. His entire life was dominated by his liberal 
spirit, tolerant and forward-looking. No words could 
express better his philosophy of life than his declaration 
that if God should offer him the choice between the 
possession of all truth and the endless pursuit of it, he 
would humbly but unhesitatingly choose the quest.19 
Lessing's brief work The Education of Mankind expressed 
his theological and historical outlook He regarded the 
history of the world's religions as man's progressive spir-
itual education, as God's self-revelation to growing hu-
manity. In his idea that each of the great religious 
teachers has made a characteristic contribution to the 
spiritual growth of mankind, Lessing was also advancing 
a positive view of historical progress. He traced this 
advance likewise in the moral sphere. Men are ad-
monished to pursue righteousness lest they suffer punish-
ment here and now; then they would beware of 
wickedness for fear of eternal damnation but as they 
grow to moral maturity they come to feel loyalty to 
the moral law itself and they seek virtue for its own 
sake. And as more and more of this "everlasting gospel" 
comes to possess the will of men, history will register 
the higher rise of civilization to justice and peace and 
moral perfection. 
In various writings Lessing surveyed the vast historical 
span. At one end of it is the savage, prostrate before his 
idol trumperies; at the other end is enlightened humanity 
dedicated to spiritual ideals. And this vast progress in 
the moral and religious sphere is paralleled in other fields 
of human activity: in science, in the arts, in social and 
political institutions. This conviction of our expanding 
energies and capacities is itself a powerful dynamic in 
19 Lessing, Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts, section Iff., 32 85, 86, 
93£., in Gesammelte Werke (Miinchen, 1959), 1: 1009-32. 
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human progress. We do not remain mere spectators of 
the pageant of civilization; we step in line and join the 
march.20 
Lessing's outline of a philosophy of historical progress 
was developed in the great work of J. G. Herder ( 17 44-
1803), Ideas for the Philosophy of History of Mankind. 
We may call this work a historical version of the argument 
from design. Herder interpreted history as manifesting 
the progressive self-manifestation of God's purpose for 
man in nature. This manifestation is implicit in the very 
structure of nature, but man's historical life has expressed 
it most fully. The entire process is one of gradual un-
foldment. Herder opposed any dichotomy between 
nature and human nature. He would portray nature as 
the matrix of spirit. Organic structure was to be revealed 
as the framework of developing character. Man's erect 
posture and anatomical organization, his physiological 
adaptation to a great variety of external conditions, the 
sense organs which he shares with the animals, and his 
powers of reflection, of speech, and of cooperation with 
others-these are all indications of his naturally varied 
and unfolding social and historical destiny. So we may 
read the gradually manifested purport of the world 
process. 
From stardust to spirit the gradation is an unbroken 
rise, and it can have no assignable limit. "The general 
connectedness of powers and forms is neither retrogressive 
nor static but progressive."21 Social institutions and cul-
tures have issued in relation to suitable natural conditions; 
man's highest expression, religion, has been the full spir-
itual fruition of nature. This historical arrow of growing 
perfection has not been single; like rays of light it has 
spread in all directions, for nature is boundlessly fertile 
20 Compare Lessing, The Education of Mankind, sections 1 ff., 32, 85, 
86,93 f. 
21 Herder, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, various 
editions. 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 99 
and versatile. "Ever renewing its youth in its forms, the 
genius of humanity flourishes and comes to new expansive 
life in nations, generations, and races."22 The progressive 
unfoldment of humanity in the course of civilization was 
not merely affirmed or outlined by Herder; it was traced 
in detail throughout ancient and medieval cultures and 
up to modern times. 
In the divine epos of history, past and present are only 
beginning and preparation; the future will be ever a 
prospect of still greater advancement. This inexhaustible 
perfection is within man's powers; it is the natural self-
realization of man's spirit, which is God's purpose for 
humanity. Leibniz's ideal of the Republic of Minds, the 
divine masterpiece on earth, found its fuller exposition 
in Herder's philosophy of historical progress.23 
The reaction of the public to this philosophy of history 
varied with the temperament of the readers. The phrase 
divine epos expressed a main characteristic of Herder's 
portrayal of history. It was in its way a poetic vision and 
had both the merits and the defects of poetic insight. 
Herder's saga throbbed with the pulse of historical life 
through the ages. It appealed greatly to the more romantic 
of his readers, who prized lyrical eloquence above rea-
soned exposition, and it had unmistakably dramatic ele-
ments of truth. But it was not convincing to Herder's 
teacher Immanuel Kant, who demanded for the philosophy 
of history not poetic utterance but scientific statement: 
less feeling and more careful reasoning. 24 Herder resented 
Kant's criticism, for he felt that Kant had not done justice 
to the tme character of his work. It would be fair to 
say that the fuller truth was not on either side alone, nor 
even between the two; it was in each of them as com-
22 Ideen, 9: i. 
23 Compare E. Kiihnemann, Herder, 2d ed. (Miinchen, 1912), pp. 377, 
405 f. 
24 Compare Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, Prussian Academy ed. 
(Berlin, 1912), 8: 55. 
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pleted by the other. The best history must be marked 
not only by factual accuracy and scientific grasp but also 
by imaginative humane insight. 
Toward the close of the eighteenth century Kant him-
self wrote several essays bearing on the philosophy of 
history and the belief in progress. But Kant has been 
well described as the gate into nineteenth-century thought, 
and it seems advisable to consider his contribution to our 
problem later, in relation to his successors in the move-
ment of modem idealism. 
Two French thinkers of the period call for more direct 
attention to their systematic theories of historical progress 
in the realization of social values: Turgot and Condorcet. 
The continuity of thought in these two is evident, and it 
has been commonly recognized. But the general opinion 
of a reasoned advance from Turgot to Condorcet has been 
questioned by some critics who have regarded Condorcet's 
extensive work as at most an "oratorical amplification" 
of Turgot's fundamental conceptions.25 Without prejudg-
ing this issue of appraisal, we should rather consider the 
leading ideas in these two outlines of history. 
A distinguished biographer of great statesmen ranked 
A. R. J. Turgot (1727-1781) with the ten greatest men 
in the modem world, and yet judged him, by ordinary 
standards, as a failure. 26 His struggles to save France 
from its imminent economic and political disaster proved 
unavailing. As governor of Limoges (1761-1774), then a 
very poor district, he established agricultural and veter-
inary schools, planted potatoes and cotton, and started 
silk, paper, and tannery works. He brought prosperity to 
the entire region. He was appointed controller general 
of finances ( 1774-1776) and started a rigorous program. 
No more taxes, no loans, no insolvency but economy. His 
25 Compare E. Caro, Problemes de morale sociale (Paris, 1887), p. 270; 
J. B. Bury, The Idea of Progress (New York, 1955), p. 206. 
26 A. D. White, Seven Great Statesmen (New York, 1910), p. 165. 
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projects failed due to the opposition of the aristocratic 
classes whose vested interests were being endangered, 
and also due to the distrust of the populace. The church 
opposed him because of his proposed tolerance of the 
Protestants. But the failure of established institutions in 
his age did not lead him to social pessimism but rather 
confirmed him in his principles of the right historical 
course of assured progress, through emancipation from 
stubborn bigotries and the application of steady enlighten-
ment to practical human problems. Like a resolute 
surgeon, he urged the grave need of radical reforms in 
the social system, but he was confident of the basic 
soundness of man's constitution and of eventual welfare 
and advance. 
Turgot's works include long and detailed writings on 
political economy, taxation, agriculture, finances, budget-
ary reforms, but the reader would look in vain for an 
extensive treatment of the philosophy of history. Yet in 
his twenties he had planned to write a treatise on that 
subject. We do have an outline of his main principles 
and also two important lectures delivered at the Sorbonne, 
all three done in 1750, contemporary with the publication 
of Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws and Voltaire's his-
torical Essay. All these works were definitely secular in 
their historical outlook; unlike the providential determin-
ism of Bossuet, they traced the course of history as an 
enterprise of human effort with human capacities and 
limitations, in a social and physical environment. This 
was historical naturalism. In his distribution of emphasis 
Turgot stressed the importance of men's beliefs and moral 
attitudes as determinants of individual conduct and 
social policy. He was not unmindful of the natural con-
ditions of human living, but he studied with greater care 
man's own ways with nature, what his mind demands and 
exacts from his environment. 
The Sorbonne Lectures traced in bold outline the course 
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of progress in history. In the first, Turgot expounded 
"the advantages which the establishment of Christianity 
have yielded to humanity." This was not a theological 
or an ecclesiastical but a humanitarian eulogy of the 
Christian religion. The brilliant culture of classical an-
tiquity was a culture of the elite; it had no regard for the 
common people. Against this exclusiveness, the Christian 
gospel reached the weary and the heavy-laden. Despite 
repeated betrayals of its social ideals of brotherhood by 
corrupt tyrants, the Christian spirit has reformed the 
entire lives of men and nations, spreading justice and 
charity and goodwill. Between churchly bigotry and the 
airy unbelief which was so rife in his day, Turgot urged 
in his social philosophy of progress the high historical 
claims of Christian philanthropy. 
This spirit of constructive liberalism in religion was 
expressed also in the two "Letters on Tolerance," in 
which Turgot maintained that sound religion is the guar-
antee of human rights. An atheist can recognize only a 
mechanism of nature and human existence. In a godless 
world, contesting interests and claims could be adjudged 
only on a basis of prevailing force. Religion alone can 
replace this struggle of powers and demands by a truly 
moral issue of justice and injustice. Above the law of 
might it set the divine law of right. The oppressor, despite 
his superior force, is condemned for his defiance of God's 
law and order. But just because religion and morals are 
thus recognized as the basis of social justice and right 
government, religious tolerance becomes irrefutable. Re-
ligious worship cannot be subject to royal or governmental 
ordinance. Freedom to worship God according to one's 
conscience is the essence of true religion. The spirit of 
brotherly love has been the great gift of Christianity to 
the world. This spirit has been betrayed by high church-
men in the name of Jesus Christ; but against the horrors 
of the Holy Inquisition and Saint Bartholomew's Night 
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and lesser ecclesiastical oppressions, we should recognize 
the progressive achievement of a humane civilization by 
the Christian dynamic of justice and charity. 
Here was thorough conviction of progress and optimism, 
but not sanguine laudation. In his second Sorbonne 
Lecture, "On the Successive Advances of the Human 
Spirit," and in his planned discourses on "Universal His-
tory," Turgot traced the onward course of social institu-
tions, but he also exposed the superstitions and errors, 
the backslidings and frustrations which have obstructed 
and misdirected men's higher ideas and purposes. He 
sought progress, and everywhere he saw mostly errors. 27 
But optimistic confidence prevailed in his reflection that 
men can rise to higher ground from their very disorder 
and injustice. Societies and nations, like individuals, learn 
through trial and error. For despotism is the easy first 
plan, to force one's will on others who are in our power. 
It takes long years of oppression before men turn gradually 
to the harder but surer road of self-control and justice 
and fair play. 
Turgot was not content with general advocacy of the 
principles of progress. Even in his brief outlines he cited 
historical chapter and verse of specific humane achieve-
ments in enlightenment and in mastery over the rigors 
of nature and the hard and corrupt beastliness of men. 
From hunting to pastoral and to agricultural economy 
and then to expanding industry, men gained progressively 
more settled and reliable livelihood. From rude skills 
in devising weapons and tools and other practical crafts-
manship, men proceeded to knowledge of vaster range 
and deeper insight, and their skill and crafts matured to 
artistic power. The development of language perfected 
the intercommunication of minds, and the preservation of 
men's ideas in writing made possible the mental interplay 
of past, present, and future generations. Through the 
27 Compare Turgot, Oeuvres (Paris, 1844), 2: 600. 
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written word humanity achieved a consciously historical 
life. This progressive enlightenment has had its beneficial 
effects in every field of human activity: first of all in the 
more immediate and rudimentary provisions of food and 
clothing and shelter, and then in the larger economy of 
efficiency and comfort. As men were thus learning how 
to live more safely and more productively in their en-
vironment, they have also recognized both the problems 
and the opportunities of their own personal careers and 
their social-institutional milieu. 
Turgot did not overlook man's most immediate and 
intimate social institution, the family. His discussion of 
the gradual attainment of monogamy and the advance 
of women from a state of servitude to increasing freedom 
and social initiative was not only a liberal historical 
retrospect but also a forward glance to a later and more 
civilized day, which even now is still to come in many 
lands. All the way through, nature and man are engaged 
in productive activity. Turgot combined this dual aspect 
of men's lives, external-physical and inner-human, in his 
conception of political geography as a field of fruitful 
inquiry. 
This outline of universal history was meant to be more 
than a record of the past, of facts and events. It was to 
be a philosophy of history, interpreting the fundamental 
trends of the vast historical movements and formulating 
those trends as historical principles. In this projected 
world-historical theory, Turgot was a predecessor of Con-
dorcet and of Comte. The famous Law of the Three Stages 
of Thought, which Comte expounded in extensive detail, 
may be read substantially in Turgot's outline of "Universal 
History" and in his other "Thoughts and Fragments." In 
the progressive development of men's ideas he traced three 
important periods. Before learning the causal connected-
ness of processes in nature, men ascribed every condition 
and change in the world to imagined beings like them-
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selves, gods, goddesses and other spirits. Anthropo-
morphism marked both their religion and their substitute 
for science. When philosophical reflection disabused men 
of this traditional mythology, their next recourse was to 
cosmological speculation. They explained the course of 
nature in terms of various abstract essences and faculties. 
But beyond the belief in myths and metaphysical specula-
tion, historical progress led to the recognition and perfec-
tion of the scientific method by the direct study of the 
facts, the formation of hypotheses, the testing of proposed 
explanations by experimental control. 28 
While intellectual advance of mankind has not pro-
ceeded through these three stages in any field without 
deviation, nor has it ever moved full front, the overall 
record of history has been one of positive and varied 
development. The intellectual progress itself has been 
an outstanding aspect of the more general growth of 
humanity, for it has itself been a major factor in determin-
ing other forms of human advance from darkness and 
disorder to ever greater enlightenment and justice. "The 
total mass of mankind, by turns of calm and turmoil, good 
and evil, marches ever, however slowly, towards greater 
and greater perfection."29 These confident affirmations of 
historical progress were eloquent expressions of a young 
man's faith in the future of France, despite seemingly 
hopeless conditions. This faith was scorned by the course 
of events. Turgot' s career as an economic and political 
reformer was an initial local success followed by general 
failure which left no prospect for him and apparently 
none for his country. He died in 1781, on the eve of the 
Revolution which he had worked to avert. 
Even more impressive is the theory of progress of 
Marquis de Condorcet (1743-1794) because it was the 
proclaimed social gospel by a man writing during the 
28 Compare Turgot, Oeuvres, 2: 655 ff. 
29 Op. cit., 2: 598. 
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darkest days of the Terror, writing his book in garrets 
while in daily peril of his life, fleeing from the police who 
finally seized him. His own death in prison saved him 
from the guillotine. Condorcet championed the highest 
ideals of the French Revolution; he saw those ideals and 
principles betrayed by unprincipled and cruel men; but 
although his vision for mankind was being flouted by 
bloody actualities, he reaffirmed his historical conviction 
of progress and eventual advance, and he wrote with 
unwavering ardor. Those who did not pity his pathetic 
faith have admired his sublime serenity unto death. 
Condorcef s work A Historical Table au of the Progress 
of the Human Spirit was written by a fugitive without 
access to libraries. The insufficiency of detailed docu-
mentation cannot be charged fairly under those conditions. 
The amazing fact was that the book was written at all. 
Condorcet, to be sure, was not an unpracticed writer: 
precisely in the field of recording great men and great 
achievements he was a past master. A "perpetual secre-
tary" of the Academy of Sciences, he had written eloges 
of over sixty French academicians and also of other dis-
tinguished minds, including Pascal and Huyghens, Lin-
naeus and Franklin. He admired and wrote biographies 
of Voltaire and Turgot. He came to his principal work 
as an avowed biographer of humanity. He would record 
its meager beginnings, the principal stages of its develop-
ment, its continual expansion in range and intensity of 
achievement, the assured maturity of its powers, and its 
boundless future prospects. 
As a biographer of academicians, he recognized in-
dividual mastery, but he also acknowledged the genius of 
the race as a factor in progress. The invention of the 
arch, he wrote, must have been the creative act of some 
one person, but language was achieved by a whole 
society.30 In the vast historical span of Condorcefs work, 
so Compare Condorcet, Oeuvres completes (Paris, 1804), 8: 25; 
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the broad features of groups and races prevailed the book 
was a social history of mankind and outline of civilization: 
"to show by reason and by factual evidence that nature 
has set no limit to the perfection of human faculties; that 
man's perfectibility is really boundless."31 
It should be noted at the outset that Condorcet's idea 
of perfectibility was primarily intended to signify advance 
in enlightenment. This emphasis on intellectual progress, 
which he shared with Turgot, has been criticized as 
one-sided. Outrages in our modem world have been 
committed by the use of the most expert science and 
technology. Despite such shocking evidence, which his 
own day was providing in France and which was in-
volving his own destruction, Condorcet was unwavering 
in his basic conviction that scientific knowledge and its 
applications to human welfare assured the final overthrow 
of all barriers and the rise of a better society. Insufficient 
knowledge and dogmatic bigotry have checked progress, 
sometimes for long periods; the only hope has been in 
more thorough and more widespread understanding. 
Condorcet's history traced nine epochs in the advance 
of civilization. Within these nine are four important 
stages, three of them progressive and one a period of 
stagnation. 
During the first stage, comprising the three earliest 
epochs, men achieved the rudimentary conditions and 
forms of organized social life. The need of cooperation 
of large numbers to supply the necessities of life joined 
families and clans into larger groups. The social bond 
was strengthened by the increasing continuity of men's 
social economy. The men of the first epoch engaged in 
fishing and hunting expeditions: a nomadic existence of 
periodic alliance. More continuous was men's common 
Tableau historique des progres de l'esprit humain, ed. of 1900, p. 13. 
The latter more readily available edition is cited in the following notes. 
31 Tableau, pp. 2 f. 
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work as herdsmen, even though they were still nomads. 
But when the fishermen, hunters, and pastoral tribesmen 
turned to agriculture, settled tribal and national life was 
achieved. Attachment to the soil which men cultivated, 
to their granaries and homes, gave them a tradition, a 
lore, and a history. 
The development of language perfected the interplay 
of minds; the invention of writing enabled those early 
men to share their ideas more effectively and to transmit 
their gains to later generations. But uncontrolled desires 
and passions incited tribes and nations to war with each 
other, and their thinking and conduct were rife with 
confusion and superstitions. This stage of the first three 
epochs was also marked by men's beginnings in crafts-
manship and practical mastery, the invention of tools and 
perfected methods of operation. 
The second stage of human progress was that of classical 
antiquity. Greek genius flourished in a culture of free 
inquiry and creative activity. Dismissing traditional 
superstitions, the Greek sages undertook the exploration 
of the nature of things, perfecting speculative reason but 
also delaying scientific mastery of the facts by their search 
for some one first principle or law of cosmic order or the 
highest good. For all that, Greek minds also advanced 
positive science, geometry and astronomy, and the practice 
and theory of popular government. In the whole range 
of the arts, Greek genius set for mankind a standard of 
excellence. 
In the progress of civilization we survey the classical 
age by relating and also distinguishing Greek and Roman 
antiquity. Condorcet preferred another distinction. His 
point of transition, from Athens to Alexandria and to 
Rome, is marked by "the division of the sciences," that 
is, the advancement of knowledge by specialized investiga-
tion. He noted the Hellenistic progress in physics and 
mathematics, the work of Archimedes, Pliny's Natural 
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History, the perfection of agricultural methods, the Julian 
calendar, the jurisprudence of the later Roman Stoics. 
The destruction of classical culture marks the beginning 
of the third stage of history; it is Condorcefs sixth epoch, 
the medieval "Dark Ages." He regarded this period as 
one of decadence in science and in general enlightenment; 
in his view it was indeed a profound night: "Theological 
reveries, superstitious impostures are now the whole genius 
of men; religious intolerance is their only morality; and 
Europe, forced between priestly tyranny and military 
despotism, waits in blood and tears for the moment when 
new enlightenment will lead it to a new life of liberty, 
humanity, and virtue."32 The intensity and the thorough-
ness of this condemnation should suffice to express Con-
dorcet's profound animosity to the whole Catholic theo-
logical tradition. What the barbarian invaders did to 
the structure and body of the classical world, the priests 
did to its spirit. Needless to point out, this is a very 
one-sided appraisal. From the whole medieval world of 
Christian-Catholic eclipse of science and free productive 
inquiry, Condorcet turned toward the only rays of light 
and promise of progress, which in his view came from 
the Arabs. It was in fact the spread of the Arabian 
treasures of classical knowledge and Arabian sciences-
astronomy, optics, medicine-which aroused Western 
Europe from its theological sleep of a thousand years. 
The last stage of our civilization is seen by Condorcet 
as comprising three epochs, the seventh to the ninth in 
his tabulation, from the Scholastic learning of the Middle 
Ages and the Renaissance to his own day. The revival 
of scientific inquiry, first on Arabian models and then 
gradually in more independent Western thinking, af-
fected man's entire world-outlook. The introduction of 
Aristotle's works had a dual result. On the one hand, the 
doctors of the church used them in their own dogmatic 
a2 Ibid., p. 71. 
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systems, but on the other hand, Aristotle's methods de-
veloped and disciplined Scholastic reflection, even though 
adherence to some of his ideas also retarded the progress 
of the natural sciences. 
The close of the medieval period was marked by grow-
ing interest in ancient classical literature, both Latin 
and Greek, by a secular spirit no longer subservient to 
ecclesiastical authority and by a pronounced naturalism 
in thinking and in practice. The invention of printing 
multiplied the number of books and of readers, and the 
available new knowledge reached the whole range of 
society. As the leaders of modern thought were expand-
ing men's cosmic range, increasing multitudes were able 
to follow them in their modern outlook. Dismissing their 
traditional provincial mentality, modern minds were 
ready for the independence and the tolerance of critical 
thinking, both of them conditions of progress. From de-
manding and gaining autonomy of scientific thought, men 
proceeded to claim justice and freedom in liberal social 
and political institutions: a demand long resisted and 
slow in reaching even partial realization. The entrenched 
oppressors of the common people joined with the priestly 
bigots to repress men's struggle for a decent human liveli-
hood and for a more truly humane life. 
Condorcet signalized the advance to a more definite 
scientific and social mastery represented by the work of 
Francis Bacon, Galileo, and Descartes. In his judgment 
Descartes's thought inaugurated the last epoch of our 
civilization, which found its culmination in the revolu-
tionary establishment of the French Republic. But he 
also recognized the important influence of John Locke in 
fixing the proper sphere and limits of human inquiry by 
strict adherence to the actual course of experience. As 
the natural sciences have expanded and deepened their 
view of nature, so men's self-understanding has ruled out 
any final reliance on rigid social forms. Condorcet shared 
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with Jefferson the resistance to the "servile and absurd" 
commitment, once for all, to any inflexible constitution 
or system of laws. Always the better social insight will 
be critical of the old, always it must be ready for revision 
and reform. The American Revolution and the establish-
ment of the new Republic overseas, a federation of 
sovereign states, opened new vistas of future social ad-
vance. A great impulse was given to the spirit of radical 
reconstruction in Europe, and the French Revolution was 
the next step of human progress. Forty years after Con-
dorcet's death Alexis de Tocqueville pointed to the ac-
knowledgment and the gradual attainment of the principle 
of human equality in the United States as marking the 
true direction of historical advance. 
Condorcet' s emphasis on intellectual growth as a con-
dition of social progress was reaffirmed in his praise of 
the civilizing influence of Newtonian science, of Franklin's 
more special electrical researches, the greater mastery of 
chemical analysis, the advance in physiology and anatomy 
and their applications in medicine. Scientific method 
perfected in one field of inquiry extends its mastery to 
other related fields, and man's intelligence grasps better 
the system of nature and our own place and prospect in 
the world. "Thus all man's intellectual occupations ... 
tend toward the progress of human reason."33 
Under the title "tenth epoch" Condorcet draws his 
prospect of the future advance of civilization. He ex-
presses his hopes in the form of three questions, which 
indicate his conception of the progressive human welfare. 
"Finally, will the human species improve itself, either by 
new scientific discoveries in the sciences and the arts, and 
as a necessary consequence, in the means of individual 
well-being and the common prosperity; or by progress in 
the principles of conduct and in practical morality; or 
finally through the real perfection of the intellectual, 
ss Ibid., p. 156. 
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moral and physical faculties which may well follow, or 
through the improvement of instruments which heighten 
the intensity and direct the use of these faculties, or again, 
through the betterment of man's natural organization?"34 
He answers all these questions in the affirmative, quite 
convinced that nature has set no barriers to man's hopes. 
But his social optimism, while unlimited in its eventual 
prospect, is not offhand and sanguine. He points out the 
obstacles to further progress; they are chiefly in the still 
persisting inequalities of different social classes: in actual 
wealth, in heritable property assuring the economic 
stability of a family, and in educational provisions. So 
long as some men have to live on the bare edge of sub-
sistence and without opportunity for mental cultivation, 
society will still be far from its goal. Drastic reforms are 
required, even in the most advanced countries, to put 
an end to these inequities. 
The revolutionary age in which Condorcet lived ruled 
out any complacency; yet he never lost his firm confidence. 
He pointed out definite reforms and social gains in public 
education, both in the pure sciences and in technology. 
Progressive education should be more than instruction 
in abstract knowledge and in technical skills. By schooling 
and legislation and political-social order, society should 
cultivate in the individual citizen a sense of productive 
solidarity and concern for the common good. It should 
lead men to see their own highest welfare in an equitable 
life of cooperation with others, without envy and without 
exploitation. Condorcet looked forward to more perfect 
communication of ideas, more thorough and varied ap-
plication of scientific thought in every field of human 
activity. He contemplated the course of mankind in 
future ages, "marching with a firm and sure step on the 
road of truth, of virtue, and of happiness."35 This prospect 
34 Ibid., pp. 162 f. 
35 Ibid., p. 189. 
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should console thinking men for the errors, crimes, and 
injustices which still sully the earth. 
The most important work in social philosophy during 
the eighteenth century was Adam Smith's Inquiry into 
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Adam 
Smith ( 1723-1790) had neither the firm hope of Turgot 
nor the heroic confidence of Condorcet. In Adam Smith's 
optimistic view men needed not restriction or reform 
but only the freedom to realize their common welfare. 
Could his program be an economic version of Rabelais? 
It would surely be an odd surmise, considering the spot-
less respectability of the Scottish sage. The Wealth of 
Nations was intended as an outline of men's economic 
advance through the wise pursuit of their interests, with 
fair-minded regard for the interests of others. Men com-
pete with each other, but there is mutuality in their 
respective advantages, and their fundamental relations 
to each other are not hostile. They naturally serve each 
other to their common good. Rapacious selfishness is not 
good business; in manufacture as well as in trade men's 
own decent consideration for the other party in the con-
tract is a firm basis of sound prosperity in the long run. 
The natural relations of men are thus guarantees of 
their eventual increasing welfare. Only ignorant dis-
respect for them through blind selfish greed checks social 
progress. If masters and their workmen, merchants and 
their customers understood the mutuality of their inter-
ests, the domestic economy would move to greater pros-
perity. Likewise with world trade and the general welfare 
of mankind, if all realized the wisdom of international 
equity and collaboration. "Progress of opulence" is as-
sured by the release of artificial barriers to the natural 
economic processes, laissez faire. Men's growing enlight-
enment, as it teaches them fair play, will lead them on the 
course of expanding social welfare and progress. This 
sanguine outlook, at the beginning of the industrial revolu-
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tion, was in harmony with Adam Smith's view of human 
affairs. His work was published in 1776, but in it he 
referred placidly to "the late disturbances."36 So in good 
faith he was quite assured that men were bound to have 
always "the greatest possible quantity of happiness,"37-a 
pronouncement which, like Leibniz' s "best of all possible 
worlds," invites a sardonic comment. 
36 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, ed. Edwin Cannan, 2d ed. 
(London, 1920), 2: 79; compare the Editor's Introduction, 1: xiii. 
37 Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, Pt. 6, sect. 2, chapt. 3 
(London, 1892). 
CHAPTER FIVE 
The Problem of Progress 
in the Nineteenth Century 
IN VARIOUS WAYS the philosophy of Immanuel Kant ( 1724-
1804) marks and determines the intellectual transition 
from the eighteenth century to the nineteenth. The 
significance of Kant's reflections on the problem of his-
torical progress is not to be judged by the extent of his 
writings on the subject. Actually these writings are very 
fragmentary, not to be compared with his major Critiques. 
Five essays may be cited; the largest of these, on "Eternal 
Peace," runs to about sixty pages, and the shortest, 
specifically on "The Principle of Progress," is compressed 
to ten pages. On this topic Kant's terseness compares 
with Turgot's, and so does the importance of his ideas.1 
Three of the essays are of especial interest to us. 
In 1784, during the decade of the Critiques, Kant wrote 
a brief monograph titled "The Natural Principle of the 
Political Order, Considered in Connection with the Idea 
of a Universal Cosmopolitical History." Kant's exposition 
was ordered under nine theses. In them he developed 
his conviction of a natural unfolding of human capacities, 
in the individual's reason and more completely in the 
race. Men's attainments through the use of intelligence 
mark their perfection and happiness. Kant maintained, 
however, that this development is stimulated by men's 
mutual antagonism in society, an antagonism which at 
length leads to the establishment of order and law. The 
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organization of a civil society under law becomes man's 
greatest practical problem, the most difficult to solve. Men 
have perverse misdirections of their will which reason 
must overcome and correct. Our nature is not spontan-
eously inclined toward justice and peace and perfection. 
Men have to learn their higher destiny, and learn it the 
hard way: from ruinous strife they must rise to concord 
and cooperation. 
This arduous advance may be noted also in the inter-
national field. The higher social order depends upon the 
legal regulation of the external relations among states. 
History may be regarded as the realization of a hidden 
plan of nature to achieve a political order and constitution 
in which men's capacities can be developed fully. A 
philosophy of world-history which so interprets a perfect 
civil union as the goal of humanity may be viewed as 
forwarding the basic purpose, but not the easy course of 
nature. Kant speculates that nature may yet produce a 
Kepler or a Newton in the field of universal cosmopolitical 
history. He does not mention Herder, the first part of 
whose Ideen appeared in the same year as his own essay. 
Under the topic "The Principle of Progress" ( 1793) 
Kant examined the relation of theory to practice in 
international law. The issue between love of mankind 
and misanthropy would depend upon our view of man's 
range and prospect, whether humanity warrants hopes 
of a better and higher future. Here Kant stands with 
Lessing and against Moses Mendelssohn, who had a 
negative appraisal of historical progress. Kant expressed 
it as his firm moral conviction that "as the human race 
is continually advancing in civilization and culture as its 
natural purpose, so it is continually making progress for 
the better in relation to the moral end of its existence, 
. . . this progress, although it may be sometimes inter-
1 Compare the convenient edition of Kant's Etemal Peace and Other 
International Essays, ed. E. D. Mead (Boston, 1914). 
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rupted, will never be entirely broken off or stopped."2 
This conviction strengthens our dutiful commitment to 
virtue, and nothing short of the complete disproof of 
progress can affect it. Instances of past defeat and frustra-
tion cannot undermine it, for we are not justified in ad-
mitting the finality of any failure. Dismay at our evils 
may be due in great measure to our higher and more 
exacting standard of judgment; our harsh self-criticism 
may itself be a ground for hope. The skeptic who dis-
misses the thought of historical progress should remember 
that international relations expose the least amiable 
qualities of human nature. And precisely here men need, 
not the traditional reliance on balance of power, but "a 
system of international right founded upon public laws 
conjoined with power, to which every state must submit."3 
This is valid on rational ground as a theory; Kant upheld 
it as good also in practice. 
This proposal of an international legal and political 
system Kant developed in his essay "Perpetual Peace" 
(1795), which like his essay on progress was written 
during the terrible years of the French Revolution. Kant 
formulated the preliminary and the definitive articles of 
an eternal peace between states. The first requirement 
is that they should be articles of real peace, not of a 
provisional truce pending the next eventual war. The 
integrity of states should be respected: no state should 
intermeddle by force with the constitution or government 
of another state; no national debts should be contracted 
as a treasury for waging war. The maintenance of stand-
ing armies should be entirely abolished in the course of 
time; even in wartime there should be no dishonorable 
stratagems of hostility which could destroy mutual con-
fidence and the future possibility of an enduring peace. 
In order to assure more definitely these conditions of 
2 Op. cit., p. 59. 
a Op. cit., p. 65. 
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lasting international concord, Kant held that every state 
should have a republican civil constitution. The repre-
sentative governments thus formed should acknowledge 
a law of nations, as a federation of free states. In this 
international system the rights of men as citizens should 
be restricted to conditions of universal hospitality. 
Kant did not regard his theses and articles of peace as 
mere academic notions. Writing as he did in a time of 
political turmoil, he reaffirmed his fundamental conviction 
of future progress toward a cosmopolitical order of en-
during justice. "Perpetual peace is . . . no empty idea, 
but a practical thing which, through its gradual solution, 
is coming always nearer its final realization."4 
These conclusions in the philosophy of history may 
be regarded as involved in Kanf s ethical theory. The 
essence of morality, according to Kant, is in men's dutiful 
respect for principles of inherent worth, in their pursuit of 
the right, without ulterior considerations of expediency, 
just because it is the right. Without this essential integrity 
of spirit there can be no genuine moral conduct. The 
historical facts of men's advance from a contest and 
conflict of forces and advantages toward some recognition 
of fundamental rights and obligations provide real evi-
dence of men's moral capacities in gradual operation. 
The course of history may serve to reassure us that the 
ethics of unconditional dutiful obligation, or in Kant's 
phrase "the categorical imperative," is not merely a the-
oretical ideal but an expression of men's actual spiritual 
principles. As the historical record thus provides at least 
some factual premises of the ethical interpretation of 
human life, which Kant had developed in terms of prac-
tical reason, so his ethics in turn warrants a historical 
prospect of a gradual and arduous realization of human 
progress. This mutual involvement of ethics and the 
4 Op. cit., p. 127. 
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philosophy of history may be traced in Kant's thought. It 
was not worked out in his own brief treatment of the 
problem of progress, but it can be studied in the future 
development of modem idealism by some of Kant's 
successors. 
The romantic strain in Herder's epic of history, which 
Kant had criticized, was reaffirmed in the literature of 
the period, and it found also philosophical statement. 
Nature was envisioned as instinct with a divine urge 
toward perfection which manifested itself in a native 
and universal progress. Among the post-Kantian idealists 
we may note this direction of thought, especially in F. W. 
J. Schelling (1775-1854), a philosopher of poetic temper 
and brilliant but unsteady reflection. 
The sterner Kantian view of human nature as involving 
a tension of low inclinations and high principles, and of 
historical progress as strenuous, was developed in the 
ethical idealism of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814). 
Fichte's own character was an embodiment of the categor-
ical imperative of unconditional devotion to duty, the 
militant moral will. In personal life he championed an 
ethics of unyielding commitment to the challenge of duty, 
against any lure of inclination or inducement of expedi-
ency. We do not tend naturally toward the ideal; in-
stincts, desires, and impulses drive us astray; but against 
them all is the stem resolution of our moral reason. The 
moral law does not describe our usual behavior; it pre-
scribes our duty, and its edicts are sovereign in the 
spiritual life. Our dutiful respect for these ideal principles 
emancipates our will from servitude to impulses and in-
clinations. Morality is our achievement of spiritual free-
dom. This dutiful conviction is expressed in our con-
science, which is not any kind of inclination but the 
rational recognition of imperative high principles of 
action. To Fichte, this resolute upright will was the 
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characteristic spirit in truly moral conduct. "Act always 
in accordance with your best conviction of your duty; or, 
act according to your conscience."5 
The elaboration of this ethical idealism in a philosophy 
of history may be read in Fichte's lectures on The Char-
acteristics of the Present Age. Fichte interpreted the 
course of history as a contest of rational motives with 
instinctive drives and as the eventual but hard ascendency 
of reason over instinct. He traced five epochs of historical 
development. 6 The first period is that of instinctive rea-
sonableness: as in the age of innocence, men believe in 
accordance with reason, but without conscious rational 
conviction of the will. The second epoch is that of 
authoritarianism: the instinct of reason assumes a power-
ful form in some individuals and classes, and they impose 
their laws on the populace, with its blind belief and 
obedience, in the bondage of sin. The revolt against this 
servitude marks the third period, an age of insurgent 
freedom of instinct, but negative at the outset, acknowl-
edging no principle and no verity, rampant sinfulness. 
In and through this disorder, rationality comes to prevail 
in the fourth epoch, marked by men's conscious election 
of reason and its truths and principles, an age of enlighten-
ment, the dawn of social justification. The consummation 
of this rational art of living, in the fifth epoch, is in the 
ideal self-realization of humanity, the fullness of spiritual 
justification. 
In characterizing these five epochs we have deliberately 
used the present tense throughout. For it should be stated 
clearly that Fichte did not offer his outline as a tableau 
historique, like Condorcet's, as derived from the factual 
course of events in history. What he proposed was his 
5 Fichte, The Science of Ethics, Conclusion of Part 1; trans. A. E. 
Kroeger (London, ed. of 1907), p. 164. 
6 Compare Fichte, Siimtliche Werke (Berlin, 1846), vol. 1: Die 
Grundziige des gegenwiirtigen Zeitalters, pp. 11 f.; compare also Xavier 
Leon, Fichte et son temps (Paris, 1922), 2: 442 f. 
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philosophical analysis of the stages of man's rational self-
realization. 7 In this spirit of speculative philosophy of 
history, Fichte evaluated the characteristic features of his 
own age. He asked: to which one of these five epochs 
do we belong? His own answer varied. He saw his con-
temporaries in revolt against the servitude to external 
authority but without the thorough attainment of rational 
self-control and conviction of imperative principles. But 
somewhat later he also had a patriotic vision of the 
German spirit as beginning its rise to the higher stage of 
rationality. This note of Germanic exaltation marked 
Fichte's clarion call to his people during the Napoleonic 
crisis. More fundamental in his philosophy of history 
was his conception of the chief marks of the progress of 
civilization: the subordination of individual desires to 
humanitarian universal principles, and the boundless pros-
pect of man's ideal development. The latter is in full 
harmony with Fichte' s ethical idealism. Truly under-
stood, the ethical world-order is never an actual fact but 
always an ideal goal. It "never is, but eternally ought 
to be."8 
The idealistic view of the history of civilization was 
developed systematically by Georg W. F. Hegel ( 1770-
1831). The main outlines of his Philosophy of History 
were presented in the concluding sections of his ethical 
treatise, The Philosophy of Right. Hegel contemplated 
the history of mankind as the progressive realization of 
"Reason" or the "Idea" as the true essence or meaning of 
the world. In his absolute idealism both the dialectical 
process of thought and the historical course of human 
development lead to the same fundamental conviction of 
the spiritual character of the universe. As he declared it, 
the Rational is the Real, and the Real is the Rational. 
7 Compare Fichte, Grundzilge des gegenwiirtigen Zeitalters, pp. 131 f. 
8 Fichte, Reden an die deutscht Nation, in Siimmtliche W erke (Berlin, 
1846), 7: 297. 
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The philosophy of history and moral philosophy proceed 
from the self-recognition of a rational dynamic in Reality. 
Just as nature is not a mere togetherness in space but 
an intelligible cosmos, so history is not a mere succession 
in time but a progressive realization of values. As Hegel 
stated it, in a line from Schiller, "the history of the world 
... is the world's court of judgment."9 
Hegel viewed the historical revelation and self-realiza-
tion of rational spirit as man's attainment of freedom. 
But his conception of freedom is not one of indeterminate 
spontaneity. In different epochs and environments spirit 
achieves its various appropriate expressions. There is 
neither blind fatalism nor random arbitrariness in history, 
but developing emancipation of rational character. So 
at the beginning of his Philosophy of History Hegel de-
clared: "Reason is Thought conditioning itself with perfect 
freedom," and in this sense he maintained at the con-
clusion of his treatise that "the History of the world is 
nothing but the development of the Idea of Freedom. 
But," he added, "objective Freedom-the laws of real 
Freedom-demand the subjugation of the mere contingent 
Will."lO 
In this historical perspective Hegel expressed his con-
ception of progress. Historical progress signifies the grow-
ing realization of rational organization and freedom in 
human lives, "the thorough moulding and interpenetration 
of the constitution of society by it."11 The salient principle 
in universal history is the revelation of man's real capacity 
for betterment, his perfectibility, the advance from the 
imperfect to the more perfect, but also the manifestation, 
in the lower or imperfect stage, of the germ or capacity 
for more perfect attainment. Hegel acknowledged the 
9Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford, 1949), 
p. 216; compare p. 10; compare Schiller's poem "Resignation." 
10 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (Lon-
don, 1914), pp. 13, 19 £., 476. 
n Op. cit., p. 19. 
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kinship of his view with the Aristotelian realization of 
potentialities. Like Aristotle, Hegel admitted no essential 
dichotomy in nature. The dynamic process operates 
throughout; it is natural in the fullest sense of the term; 
and if, in a religious spirit, we exalt it as God's plan and 
purpose in nature, we are reaffirming its basic role in 
realityP 
Unlike Fichte, Hegel devoted the body of his treatise 
on the philosophy of history to detailed historical exposi-
tion, filling out the outline presented at the conclusion 
of his Philosophy of Right. In his survey the progress of 
civilization was presented as moving westward, from 
China and India to the kingdoms of the Middle East, 
to Greece and Rome, and then to Western Europe, or 
as Hegel preferred to call it, the Germanic World, die 
Germanische Welt. In this westward course of civiliza-
tion, he noted a progressive expansion of rational freedom 
in social and political order. In the Oriental empires, the 
people regarded only one man, the despot, as free, and 
yet because his unrestrained power of impulses and 
passions was not directed by reason, even he was not really 
free. The Greeks first experienced the spirit of freedom, 
but they, as also the Romans, limited their recognition 
of free rational self-expression only to the elite class. The 
acknowledgment of the fundamental and inalienable 
rights of man, of any man whatever, was attained through 
the influence of Christianity. The history of the Western 
world has realized progressively this Christian conviction 
that all men are by right free. 
Fichte had regarded his ethical ideal of historical prog-
ress as eternally pursued but never completely attained. 
Hegel not only described his historical era of acknowl-
edged universal freedom in Christian Europe as the Ger-
manic World but proclaimed that "the Germanic spirit 
is the spirit of the new world" and that "the destiny of 
12 Ibid., pp. 56, 59, 38. 
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the German peoples is to be the bearers of the Christian 
principle" and even hailed the Germanic World as already 
being in "the fourth phase of world-history," the Empire 
of Spirit in the full senseY 
German idealism developed in an age of political and 
social reconstruction. In his youth Hegel had been stirred 
by the spirit of the French Revolution and had sung the 
"Marseillaise" in a German translation made by his philo-
sophical friend Schelling. Fichte wrote inspiring appeals 
to the German nation during the Napoleonic wars. For 
a number of years Kant kept on his desk a portrait of 
Rousseau. The upsurge of romanticism which marked the 
turn of the century was more than a trend in literature; 
it swept throughout Europe in social thinking, religion, 
and philosophy. Revolution and romanticism were both 
rejections of established traditions and institutions; they 
were clarions of a new and better age. The new radical-
ism was not limited to France. Some of the early converts 
became conservatives in later years. The revision of ideals 
in French thought followed in several directions, the most 
important of which, for our study of progress, was that of 
Positivism. But the English reactions to the radical ideas 
and stirring events were also very significant. 
An interpretation of human life and history which 
negated not only any specific ancien regime but all forms 
of governments and institutional frameworks was ad-
vocated by William Godwin (1756-1836) in his Enquiry 
Concerning Political Justice, and Its Influence on General 
Virtue and Happiness, published, like Kant's Principle of 
Progress, in "the terrible year," 1793. Godwin's intellectual 
genealogy has been traced to Swift and Mandeville, to 
Hume and Rousseau, Helvetius and Halbach. He recog-
nized no innate and fixed major differences among men, 
but regarded them all as capable of unlimited develop-
ment, by experience and training. Existing governments 
13 Ibid., pp. 354, 115. 
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and other social institutions have corrupted and enslaved 
men. The aim of all true moral and social philosophy 
must be to free mankind of its shackles. In his program of 
philosophical anarchism Godwin himself disavowed any 
revolutionary aggression or violence. He would only urge 
and persuade, with full confidence in the eventual power 
of his truth. Freedom and enlightenment, he felt sure, 
were bound to release men's capacities and lead to prog-
ress in every field. "With what delight must every well-
informed friend of mankind look forward, to the auspicious 
period, the dissolution of political government, of that 
brute engine, which has been the only perennial cause of 
all the vices of mankind."14 
Godwin's influence on his younger contemporaries was 
strong but not always enduring. Especially notable are 
the various reactions which his doctrine aroused in the 
romantic poets. No one of them can be regarded as a 
mere disciple of Godwin, but his strong protest against 
the enslaving rigidity of social institutions was reflected 
in some of their poems. Shelley in particular viewed 
morality as realized in spontaneous acts of justice and 
benevolence, overcoming the individual's selfish impulses 
and free from the constraining bonds of institutional 
regime. Nature is not dull or inert but instinct with 
boundless spiritual potencies with which the emancipated 
spirit of man can commune. In the freer civilization which 
we should strive to achieve, men will wipe out injustice 
and misery and will progress to greater and greater 
perfection. 
Godwin's influence on Southey, Wordsworth, and 
Coleridge seems to have been that of accentuating some 
of their early romantic revolt, from which all three receded 
later in life. Young Wordsworth hailed the new era of 
human freedom and progress signalized by the French 
14 Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, 3d ed. (London, 
1798), 2: 212; compare pp. 546 f.; compare also the annotated edition 
by F. E. L. Priestley (Toronto, 1946). 
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Revolution and was even inclined to find excuses for the 
cruelties of the Terror. Coleridge and Southey pursued 
utopian dreams of establishing an ideal "pantisocracy" 
on American shores. In later years all three mellowed, 
or stiffened, in various degrees of conservative conformity. 
This was distressing to younger liberals like Robert Brown-
ing, who wrote the poem "The Lost Leader," when Words-
worth accepted his royal appointment as poet laureate: 
"Just for a handful of silver he left us,/ Just for a riband 
to stick in his coat." 
Coleridge turned conservative in his social-political 
alignment, but in his philosophical fundamentals he pur-
sued the course of liberal reconstruction. From romantic 
revolt against rigid forms and conventions in poetry and 
other institutional shackles, and from ventures in empirical 
psychology, he returned to the Platonic and Neoplatonic 
visions which had charmed him in his youth and which 
reassured his possession of the spiritual values of re-
ligion and the ideals of human progress and perfectibility. 
Robert Southey (1774-1843), poet laureate and honorary 
academician, turned from his early pantisocratic visions 
to contemplate the new machine age of industrial advance. 
His two volumes entitled Sir Thomas More, or Colloquies 
on the Progress and Prospects of Society, covered all im-
aginable topics, in a manner recalling the conversational 
luxuriance of Coleridge. The themes of progress and 
prospects of society are taken up especially in the second 
volume. In a meandering way, turning from the land-
scape beauties of the rivers Greta and Derwent, Southey 
calls attention to a cotton mill built on a fine site fit for 
a monastery, and so on to modern manufactures and the 
steam engine which "alone, without war, and without 
that increased taxation which war has rendered necessary, 
would have produced all the distress which our manu-
facturing population has experienced and is likely again 
and again to experience." Commercial prosperity rivals 
educational advance in corrupting the moral fiber of men. 
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In an epigram that might have come from Rousseau, a 
petty African king is cited who would send his sons to 
England that they might "learn to read book and be 
rogue." But that mood is not the settled temper of the 
elder Southey, who also sees the new technology as a 
great power for good as well as for evil. The upward turn 
in social development, however, must depend upon the 
right moral and social principles. Southey quotes Kant's 
theses for the establishment of a perfect constitution of 
society, and he adds his own Christian emphasis. Social 
perfection cannot be attained "till there be a system of 
Government, conducted in strict conformity to the prin-
ciples of the Gospel."15 
The ideal of unending historical progress was not only 
the goal of philosophical perfection but also the exalted 
vision of poets. In this respect the nineteenth century 
tends to repeat the eighteenth. In both of them we can 
trace the issue between optimistic and pessimistic evalua-
tions of the course of history. Before we tum to Comte 
and Spencer and Schopenhauer, several poets of the buoy-
ant spirit should claim our notice. 
The first of these is Fran<;ois Rene de Chateaubriand 
(1768-1848); although he did not write in verse, his tem-
perament is poetic; it combines aristocratic loftiness with 
humanitarian zeal. His Genius of Christianity was a ro-
mantic eulogy of the Christian religion. In rapturous 
prose Chateaubriand chanted the beauties of the historical 
pageant of Christianity in \Vestem civilization: its 
mysteries, sacraments, doctrines, homilies, its cathedrals, 
abbeys, sculptures, paintings, hymns; the entire Chris-
tian epic-Christian missions, Christian chivalry and 
charity, Christianity as the light of spiritual beauty in the 
progress of civilization. 
While we cannot overlook the rhetorical display of 
15 Southey, Sir Thomas More: or, Colloquies on the Progress and 
Prospects of Society (London, 1829), 2: 243, 249, 412; compare pp. 
408 ff. 
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Chateaubriand, it was a contagious rhetoric, magic in 
his sentences, which imparted, if not firm conviction, yet 
a wistful inclination akin to faith revived, a nostalgia of 
Christian piety. But though this romanticism might seek 
to regain in intense reaffirmation the blessed enchantment 
of the traditional faith, its orthodoxy was unreliable be-
cause both its thought and its sentiment were self-
centered. In chanting the glories of the old saintliness 
it was not really resuming the venerable themes but rather 
cherishing its memories as sources and motives of its new 
self-expression. It sought to bring the old altars to itself, 
not itself to the old altars. 
Two poets whose lives spanned the nineteenth century 
expressed a historical optimism, never docile but ever 
struggling with doubts and dire actualities, resolute 
thoughout. In the middle of the century Tennyson's In 
Memoriam, containing some of his best poetry, was a 
sustained spiritual utterance, tragically de profundis, ever 
aiming at the summit in heroic devotion: "And one far-off 
divine event/To which the whole creation moves." 
Almost a decade before In Memoriam Tennyson had 
declared, in "Locksley Hall," his firm confidence in the 
ongoing progress of mankind. That poem began with a 
story of frustrated love which leads the spurned lover 
to a gloomy view of civilization. But the poet returned 
to new and unfaltering confidence in progress: "Yet I 
doubt not thro' the ages one increasing purpose runs,/ 
And the thoughts of men are widen' d with the progress of 
the suns." Tennyson's prospect and vision are not limited 
to ever expanding knowledge but extend to physical 
mastery and social order and well-being and worldwide 
justice and concord: 
For I dipt into the future, far as human eye could see, 
Saw the vision of the world, and all the wonder that 
would be; 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 129 
Saw the heavens fill with commerce, argosies of magic sails, 
Pilots of the purple twilight, dropping down their 
costly bales; 
Heard the heavens fill with shouting, and there rained 
a ghastly dew 
From the nations' airy navies grappling in the 
central blue; . . . 
Till the war-drum throbb'd no longer, and the 
battle-flags were furl'd 
In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world. 
On a vaster all-cosmic span Victor Hugo, writing in 
exile, cast an all-encompassing view in time and space 
across the whole expanse of world history and portrayed 
the universal ascent of man from darkness and thralldom 
to light and liberty. In the preface to his epic of all 
creation, the Legend of the Ages, he outlined his immense 
design: "The expansion of mankind from age to age, man 
rising from gloom towards the ideal, the heavenly trans-
figuration of terrestrial hell, the slow but supreme dawn-
ing of freedom, right for this life and responsibility for 
the next; a sort of religious hymn of a thousand stanzas, 
springing from profound faith and with a lofty prayer at 
the summit." Neither our Western civilization nor our 
planet bound his contemplation: not only all the nations 
on earth but the entire cosmos will manifest the final 
consummation of the divine plan: 
The nations to each other brotherly will call; 
The dawn is near, the morn of liberty for all, 
Volcanic day when justice reigns; 
And men will penetrate through their encircling night, 
Will see their bondage change into victorious might, 
And jewels shining from their chains. 
Hugo envisioned mankind as sweeping through the 
heavens on an aerial ship, ever higher; 
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Where does it go, this ship? 
It soars to right and reason and fraternity, 
It seeks the saintly and religious verity, 
Without imposture and disguises; 
It cherishes the love that binds all men in duty, 
It serves the great, the good, the just, aspires to beauty; 
Lo, upward to the stars it rises!16 
Our comment on this poetic all-cosmic union should 
not overlook Hugo's more specific advocacy of an inter-
national federation which may still appear precarious of 
attainment, but to which yesterday's League of Nations 
and the United Nations of today are definite approaches. 
The expanding spiritual outlook of German idealism, 
the self-penetration and intimate expression of romantic 
poetry, and the liberalism of the post-revolutionary age 
which spread the new ideas in Western Europe were find-
ing a characteristic utterance in the Transcendentialism of 
New England. As the leading mind in that movement, 
Emerson ( 1803-1882), pointed out, its name derived from 
the use of it in Kant's philosophy/7 but its meaning in 
American thought outreached its Kantian connotation. 
"Transcendentalism" extended beyond prior ways of 
thought and conviction: beyond Puritan rigor and rigid 
doctrine, but also and mainly beyond the materialistic 
trends of the Enlightenment, especially in its French ex-
pression. Against dogmatic formalism in religion and the 
externalities of gross naturalism, the spreading American 
liberalism emphasized the reality of aspiring and expand-
ing spirit and the fuller realization of it in the inner free-
dom of a more humane commonwealth. 
The social outlook and program of Transcendentalism 
aimed at the attainment of more than political indepen-
16 Victor Hugo, "Tout Ie passe et tout l'avenir," and "Plein ciel," in 
La Legende des siecles (Paris, n.d.), vols. 3, 4. 
17 Compare Emerson's Works, Concord Edition (Cambridge, Mass., 
1903-1904), 1: 339 f. 
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dence, at the emancipation of America from colonial 
tutelage and traditional conformity. Two of its character-
istic trends were especially noteworthy. It ranged beyond 
its former Puritan-biblical bounds, toward the broad 
cultural-historical treasury of ideas and ideals, in all lands 
and ages. And, while thus universal in its responsiveness 
to a vaster past, its present concern was intently personal 
and forward-looking in searching spiritual pioneering. 
The Transcendentalists might have spoken the words of 
Tennyson's Ulysses: "'Tis not too late to seek a newer 
world," but to each of them the wide-ranging adventure 
was an intimate pilgrimage. 
These pilgrims of the liberal spirit shared a community 
of purpose, but each held to his own individual capacity 
and temperament. We need here to take a closer view 
of their best mind and leading spirit, Emerson, and of his 
rich treasury of wisdom, chiefly his progressive outlook, 
for his age and for America, for mankind and for human 
nature throughout history, and for the very nature of 
reality under God. 
The recognition of an upward dynamic at the very 
core of being must have been Emerson's early conviction. 
He set it down as the motto of his first published book, 
Nature: 
A subtle chain of countless rings 
The next unto the farthest brings; . . 
And, striving to be man, the worm 
Mounts through all the spires of form. 
Before Darwin's Origin of Species he responded positively 
to evolutionary ideas, but in his own spiritual ways. As 
he read Lamarck, he felt like hailing the caterpillar in a 
neighborly spirit: "How dost thou, brother? Please God, 
you shall yet be a philosopher."18 As for the caterpillar, so 
18 Compare Works, 1: xxix. 
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for his Transcendentalist hermits of aspmng ideals: he 
saw their thoughts as reaching upward, "to reorganize 
themselves in nature, to invest themselves anew in other, 
perhaps higher endowed and happier mixed clay than 
ours, in fuller union with the surrounding system."19 
Emerson's social-historical optimism was not unqualified 
or altogether docile. He noted that progress in civiliza-
tion is so gradual that it is not marked and, even worse, 
that the advances themselves are so liable to involve back-
wash and degradation, that man often has only "succeeded 
in making his sensuality more daintily luxurious, his 
crimes more ingeniously abominable."20 Repeatedly he 
observed that progress is attained only by individuals, 
that it is not realized in the social order. This view in-
clined him even to dismal comments: "When were not 
the majority wicked? or what progress was ever made by 
society?"21 But the prevailing tone of Emerson's thought 
is one of positive appraisal. The true aim in progressive 
activity is expansively human, "an infinite, not a special 
benefit." And it is not altogether exceptional: "There is 
a blessed necessity by which the interest of men is always 
driving them to the right." This conviction did sometimes 
proceed to a confidence which later events have scarcely 
justified. One can only quote without any marginal com-
ment: "War is on its last legs; and a universal peace is 
as sure as the prevalence of civilization over barbarism, 
of liberal government over feudal forms. The question 
for us is only How soon?"22 
This optimistic view of the course of history found 
especial confirmation in Emerson's survey of his con-
temporary scene. "The new conditions of mankind in 
America are really favorable to progress. . . . The mind 
19 Works, 1: 359. 
2o Emerson's Journals (Cambridge, Mass., 1961 ), 2: 77; compare p. 92. 
21 Journals ( 1965} 5: 194; compare p. 259; compare also Early Lec-
tures, 2: 173 f., 185. 
22 Works, 1: 214; 11: 147, 161. 
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is always better the more it is used, and here it is kept 
in practice."23 In his famous Phi Beta Kappa oration, 
"The American Scholar," he had expressed in his con-
clusion a hope that was also a challenge, "A nation of 
men will for the first time exist because each believes 
himself inspired by the Divine Soul which also inspires 
all men." 
So from the worm and the caterpillar up to man in 
America and to mankind in the cosmos, Emerson's view 
was centered on the universal pulse ever pointing upward. 
Who was ever more versatile in his repeated expression 
of this conviction?-"The voice of the Almighty saith, 
'Up and onward for evermore! ... That which is made 
instructs how to make a better .... There is no sleep, no 
pause, no preservation, but all things renew, germinate 
and spring. . . . Within every man's thought is a higher 
thought-within the character he exhibits today, a higher 
character. "24 
The utopian strain or background of the positivism of 
Auguste Comte ( 1798-1857), the outstanding social phi-
losophy in France during the nineteenth century, cannot 
be ignored, but it should not be overdrawn. Comte's 
relation to Claude Henri de Saint -Simon ( 1760-1825) in-
cluded a considerable community of ideas but a growing 
difference in temperament and an eventual alienation. 
Saint-Simon was an evangelist in thought and action, a 
promoter of grand projects like the Panama and Suez 
canals, an agitator of political and economic reconstruc-
tion, an apostle of a religion of social justice and coopera-
tion. He preached with fervor his "New Christianity" in 
which "the Man-God of the Christians" was to be replaced 
by himself, the "Man-People" "Earth, rejoice, Saint-Simon 
has appeared!"25 His firm faith in social progress rested 
23 Works, 11: 516. 
24 Works, 2: 126, 318, 319; 8: 348. 
25 Religion Saint-Simonienne, Recueil des predications (Paris, 1832), 
1: 597,303. 
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on his confidence in industrial advance and in economic 
reforms to assure the promotion of the general welfare 
of workingmen and to raise steadily the standard of 
living. Comte served as Saint-Simon's secretary and col-
laborator, but his own initial emphasis was on intellectual, 
scientific reform of ideas, and he distrusted Saint-Simon's 
apostolic spirit. The gospel note, however, was not absent 
in Comte's own philosophical program, and he had his 
own pontifical career in his later years. These two periods 
in the molding of positivism, the scientific and the de-
votional, were not incompatible, nor even independent; 
but the theory of progress in Comte's system of positive 
philosophy may be judged in secular terms, before turn-
ing from its philosophy of history to consider the "Re-
ligion of Humanity" to which it proceeded. 
The earlier modern advocates of the doctrine of progress 
had maintained in general terms the indefinite perfectibil-
ity of men and societies. Some of them, like Condorcet, 
had traced the intellectual factors in the course of his-
torical progress. Comte undertook to formulate the prin-
ciples of human advancement. While he realized the close 
relation of men's ways of thought to their emotions and 
to their activities and social institutions, he concen-
trated his attention on the development of intellectual 
processes. This approach to the social and historical prob-
lem was not due to Comte' s abstract conceptual bent. He 
regarded the social confusions of his revolutionary age 
as the practical results of confused thinking. He agreed 
with Hegel that Ideas govern the world. "The great 
political and moral crisis that societies are undergoing 
is shown by rigid analysis to arise out of intellectual 
anarchy."26 Before we could hope for social order, we 
must first reform our chaotic thinking. 
We can see, therefore, the central importance in Comte's 
26 Comte's Positive Philosophy, partly translated and edited by Harriet 
Martineau (London, 1896), 1: 15. 
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philosophy of his Law of the Three Stages of Thought, 
and of the scientific and social reform to which it points. 
There has been considerable dispute concerning Comte' s 
originality in the formulation and advocacy of this law. 
The reasonable view seems to be one which recognizes 
Comte's dependence on others for his general principle, 
but also acknowledges his distinct title as the one who 
interpreted the law thoroughly. Turgot wrote of the 
three stages in the development of human thought, but 
his brilliant paragraphs, though enlightening, do not 
express the full significance of his historical principle or 
its far-reaching implications. This mastery and thorough-
ness of interpretation is Comte' s achievement. 
The Law of the Three Stages of Thought is a portrayal 
of the intellectual childhood, adolescence, and maturity 
of men in their outlook on the world. Comte called the 
three stages the Theological, the Metaphysical, and the 
Positive Scientific. The first stage, at a low level of 
understanding, was the stage of superstitions and myths. 
The entire course of nature was viewed as the operation 
of so-called divine or semidivine agencies. In primitive 
fetishism, claws and sticks and pebbles seemed endowed 
with weird potencies. Polytheistic imagining felt every-
where the presence of gods and goddesses. Later theology 
sought beyond or above this pantheon the one supreme 
Deity whose providence was held to direct all creation. 
From this mythology of the theological stage, the de-
veloping mind proceeded to metaphysical speculation. 
Nature was now explained in terms of entities and con-
ceptual abstractions. Logos or N ous, Reason, replaced 
Zeus. So we were told that water rises in a pump because 
nature abhors a vacuum. 
This metaphysical stage was transitional. It was an 
advance from myth-making and theological creeds and 
dogmas to a demand for explanation. But this demand 
that eventually led to science was not yet scientific. It 
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mistook speculation for scientific inquiry. Before it could 
reach positive knowledge, the mind had to undertake 
specific investigation. The scientific revolution was funda-
mental. Instead of pursuing wholesale cosmic specula-
tion, the mature mind began to trace specific causal con-
nections. Instead of the universal questions, What? and 
Why? it asked its more particular question, How? By 
observation and experiment it discovered and formulated 
specific causal relations. Thus the mind in its progress 
reached the stage of positive science. 
·we have used the past tenses of historical review, but 
the processes which Comte examined may be observed in 
our own thinking here and now. The progress is not 
uniform or full-front. It is reached earlier in some fields 
of thought than in others. Even in our modern age we 
may note that, while the general public has reached the 
positive scientific stage in the explanation of some classes 
of events, many men are still speculating metaphysically 
about others, and they regard still others in strict con-
formity to their theological orthodoxies. Comte examined 
these various advances also in his survey of the history of 
the sciences. He noted that they reached the positive 
stage in the order of their generality: mathematics, astron-
omy, physics, chemistry, biology. 
This progress of the sciences of nature indicates its 
next important advance, the achievement of a positive 
science of man, man's knowledge of his own full nature. 
Comte did not include in his list psychology, the professed 
science of the mind, for he distrusted the French psychol-
ogy of his day, which used introspective methods without 
due account of the biological basis of mental activity. The 
positive scientific study of human nature must set out 
from a dual recognition: of man's physiological organiza-
tion, and then most importantly, of man's social relations 
and realization. The full meaning of the true character 
of man can be understood only in his social involvements 
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and activities. The positive science of man is social 
physics, or sociology, as Comte proposed to call it. 
The achievement of sociology was regarded by Comte 
as the next goal of progress and likewise as an indispens-
able condition of the further advance in civilization, be-
yond the modern revolutionary age with its confusions and 
crises. In calling the science of man sociology Comte 
indicated its first principle: the basic human reality is 
not the human individual but humanity. The term human 
means "social." This first principle must determine the 
true conception of the "humanities." Comte distinguished 
two sociological inquiries: social statics, the study of 
social order, and social dynamics, the study of human 
progress. This science of progress is not necessarily an 
account of invariable improvement; it is the scientific 
understanding of human life as a historical process of 
developing order regulated by laws. But as men thus 
come to know their social history, they can also recognize 
their social destiny, the ideal goal of their life as human 
beings. Our true fulfillment is in living a thoroughly 
socialized life. Comte called it "Vivre pour autrui." 
Comte's positivism based its doctrine of historical prog-
ress on intellectual grounds. According to the Law of the 
Three Stages of Thought, men were bound to advance, 
sooner or later and in one field of activity after another, 
from superstitions and speculations to scientific truths. 
The idea of progress itself might be considered in the light 
of Comte's Law. Does it not also express, in its historical 
development, first the restriction or even the exclusion of 
it by the belief in a divine Providence, then the general 
speculative advocacy of it, and finally the demand for a 
specific factual and historical evidence of its truth? This 
evidence would not be adequate scientifically unless it 
integrated man with the rest of nature, without any tradi-
tional notion of special creation or any speculative sub-
stitutes for it. If man's origin in nature could be traced 
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so as to show the rootage of historical progress in lower 
animal forms of life, then the belief in progress could gain 
scientific validity. In any case, the right method here 
required an investigation of the natural "descent of man." 
Trace man's parentage in nature as far as possible; then 
confirm or revise or reject the belief in progress as the 
available evidence may warrant. 
This turn in our basic problem was affected by the 
theory of evolution which became dominant in biology 
through the work of Charles Darwin ( 1809-1882). The 
fundamental significance of the evolutionary principle 
was that it ranged biology alongside the other physical 
sciences, by abandoning any speculative dogmas about a 
design in nature or special creation of each form of life, 
and by undertaking to explain the origin of species in 
nature as determined causally. 
In successive layers of the earth's crust, geology and 
palaeontology disclosed fossil remains of more and more 
complex organisms, justifying T. H. Huxley's account of 
the stream of life as a gradual change from relative uni-
formity to increasing complexity. The reports of animal 
and plant breeders showed the successful production of 
new varieties by effective selection. Darwin was in search 
of a causal determining factor of natural selection. It is 
interesting to note that he got it, by analogy, from a work 
in social theory, Malthus's Essay on the Principle of Pop-
ulation. Thomas Robert Mal thus ( 1766-1834) had rea-
soned that the growth in population rises with any in-
crease in the available resources of food and subsistence 
but is kept down by the natural limits of those resources. 
Darwin tells us in his autobiography that this idea gave 
him his principle of causal explanation. The limited 
supply of food and other conditions of survival involve all 
forms of life in a struggle for existence. In this struggle 
any species with a variation suitable to a certain environ-
ment, or to various environments, has an advantage over 
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other species. By this natural "survival of the fittest" new 
varieties are preserved and multiplied, and eventually 
new and more complex species originate. This in sum 
was Darwin's theory of evolution. Spencer formulated 
the evolutionary process as "a change from an indefinite 
incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heter-
ogeneity,"27 involving increasing differentiation and inte-
gration of structure and function. The entire range of 
life-forms, from amoebas to mammals, could thus be ex-
plained as a process that was not designed but occurred 
necessarily: the survival of the fittest in the struggle for 
existence. 
Since man is thus to be viewed as the human animal 
in the zoological procession, how are our traditional beliefs 
in human progress to be reinterpreted? Shall we hold 
firmly to a conviction of the historical facts of manifold 
development, and in view of man's newly discovered 
evolutionary ancestry, look for the beginnings and early 
forms of progressive activities in mammals and perhaps 
also in other animal species? Or contrariwise, shall we 
proceed from a strictly physical-causal account of bio-
logical processes and of man's origin and so interpret 
human character and activities as only more complicated 
varieties of animal behavior, ruling out any recognition 
of truly progressive development? 
The choice here would seem to depend upon the 
thoroughness with which our evolutionism rejects tele-
ology and evaluation in any form-not only in its initial 
scientific dismissal of providential design as a principle 
of explanation but also in its eventual interpretation of 
human and other forms of higher animal behavior. At 
this point we may only note that the writings of evolu-
tionists do not indicate any such unanimous dismissal of 
teleology and evaluation of any sort whatever. 
This unsteadiness in fundamental categories may be 
27 Spencer, First Principles (New York, 1896), p. 407. 
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disclosed by an examination of the diversity of ethical and 
social theories that have been influenced by the doctrine 
of evolution. We must concentrate our discussion on the 
particular issue of evolution and progress. Darwin him-
self, both in his treatises and in his correspondence, made 
it clear that his theory of the evolution of species was to 
be the very opposite of the traditional doctrine of a 
providential design in nature. And yet at the conclusion 
of his Origin of Species he expressed his belief that "as 
natural selection works solely by and for the good of each 
being, all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to 
progress towards perfection." This may perchance be a 
statement of fact, but on Darwin's own theory and in his 
text this sort of neo-providential natural selection sounds 
like a mythological slip. In strict Darwinism, the use of 
the terms good, progress, perfection in the above passage 
is scarcely warranted. Natural selection does not work 
"for the good of each being"; it operates causally in 
various environments to determine the survival or the 
perishing of organisms with certain variations. In a glacial 
flood, the surviving and thus the fittest species would 
be, not mammals, but maybe some microorganisms and 
lichens. That would be, then and there, the alleged prog-
ress toward perfection. 
This whole problem of ultimate interpretation was still 
further complicated when human intelligence and con-
duct were considered in the evolutionary perspective. 
Darwin acknowledged with unmistakable candor his dif-
ficulty in dealing with mental powers and the moral sense. 
In his Descent of Man the chapters dealing with these 
two topics were memorable pioneer work in animal psy-
chology and also in descriptive ethics. He explored the 
beginnings of morals in primitive societies, but more to 
the point, he considered the reactions in animal behavior 
that seemed to him to anticipate the more definitely moral 
motivation and action in human conduct. Can we not 
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trace moral evolution from animal gregariousness, herd 
instinct, and parental care, by group restriction and com-
pulsion, to a growing sense of sociality, to obligation and 
guilt or a clear conscience, to duty and concern for the 
common good? Perhaps we can. Peter Kropotkin ( 1842-
1921) pointed out and insisted that mutual aid is a major 
factor in evolution, to be recognized along with the 
struggle for existence. 
If we thus acknowledge both mutual aid and "nature, 
red in tooth and claw" as evolutionary determinants, what 
warrants our choice of the former as the strain of progress 
in the ongoing processes of life? Darwin, and Kropotkin 
more decisively, sought out and found instances of the 
growth of sociality and philanthropy in the course of 
evolution. But how could evolution itseH yield or validate 
their philanthropic ethics or their corollary view of prog-
gress? In dealing with this problem T. H. Huxley ( 1825-
1895) was more rigorous in his analysis and appraisal. 
He shared in the main Darwin's philanthropic ethics, but 
could find no evolutionary warrant for it. Gregarious 
instinct and parental care should not mislead us to under-
estimate the outstanding reality of the struggle for ex-
istence. The evolutionary jungle is not a garden plot of 
conscience and justice and benevolence. Morality is in 
fact a resistance to the evolutionary drives. "Its influence 
is directed, not so much to the survival of the fittest, as 
to the fitting of as many as possible to survive. . . . The 
ethical process of society depends, not on imitating the 
cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in 
combatting it."28 By thus pointing out the high ethical 
road of true human progress, Huxley did not mean to 
imply that he recognized it as the highway of history. 
His conclusion was quite the opposite. Political economy 
has been called "the dismal science," and dismal also 
28T. H. Huxley, Evolution and Ethics (London and New York, 1894), 
pp. 33, 34. 
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was Huxley's view of the historical record. He wrote that 
he knew of "no study which is so saddening as that of 
the evolution of humanity as it is set forth in the annals 
of history."29 
Here was Huxley's sharp contrast between his moral 
standard and his factual report of evolutionary biology, 
of which as a scientist he was an eminent advocate. But 
while the merit of his clear discrimination between evolu-
tion and ethics was important, he did not recognize suf-
ficiently the need of a more nearly ultimate view of nature 
and human nature which could account for philanthropic 
morals as well as for the evolutionary struggle for ex-
istence. His rejection of dogmatic theology as providing 
him with no convincing solution of his problem was under-
standable; but the agnosticism to which he then proceeded 
was a suspension, not a prosecution of the major inquiry. 
The fuller truth was, and still is, beyond Huxley. 
Darwin himself had recognized the contrast on which 
Huxley insisted, between moral-sympathetic activity and 
natural selection in the struggle for existence. Civilized 
nations build hospitals and mental institutions, nurse and 
preserve the lives of the infirm and imbecile. "The weak 
members of civilized societies propagate their kind. No 
one who has attended to the breeding of domestic animals 
will doubt that this must be highly injurious to the race 
of man."30 The ruthless inference from these observations, 
which was not drawn by Darwin, was proclaimed by 
Friedrich Nietzsche ( 1844-1900) in his gospel of Super-
man. The outstanding fact of the life-process, the struggle 
for existence, disclosed also its dominant principle, which 
Nietzsche called the Will-to-Power. On the hard ground 
of this principle he championed a "transvaluation of all 
values." Our ideas of moral values and of human progress 
should be revised radically. Instead of condemning and 
29Compare J. B. Bury, The Idea of Progress (New York, 1955), p. 344. 
so Darwin, The Descent of Man (New York, ed. of 1896), p. 134. 
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rejecting the dynamic forces of prevailing activity, we 
should espouse them heroically and should strive for their 
consummation. Against any sickly pity for the weak and 
any nursing of the ailing and needy, we should reaffirm 
the strength and the excellence which achieves mastery, 
which will eventually cross the limits of ordinary human 
nature and will rise to an order of life higher than man, 
as man is higher than the ape. In this heroic ascent, the 
laggard multitude should be of no concern. A people is 
only nature's roundabout way of producing half-a-dozen 
great men. That is nature's progress, and that is the 
meaning of history: from time to time to raise the summit 
of the human pyramid of achievement. 
A morally commendatory account of evolution and a 
full-blown theory of progress was advocated by Herbert 
Spencer (1820-1903). Darwin called him "our philos-
opher," and Spencer's works provided the most extensive 
interpretation of evolutionism. But his earlier writings, 
published before Darwin's Origin of Species, supported 
his claim that on his own he had advocated the funda-
mental principle of the evolutionary view of nature, which 
Darwin had reasoned out and formulated with great 
mastery and which Darwin's researches had supported 
with abundant evidence. 
Spencer's ethics may be called evolutionary hedonism: 
man's basic good is happiness, and this chief value of life 
is realized progressively in history. As social evolution 
makes the lives of men increasingly complex, ruthless 
conflict becomes less advantageous than cooperation; men 
learn the survival value of justice and benevolence. "Con-
duct gains ethical sanction in proportion as the activities, 
becoming less and less militant and more and more in-
dustrial, are such as do not necessitate mutual injury 
and hindrance, but consist with, and are furthered by, 
cooperation and mutual aid."31 
31 Spencer, The Principles of Ethics (New York, 1897), 1: 20. 
144 PART ONE 
In one of his :6rst important books, Social Statics, 
Spencer maintained his belief in progress and "the 
evanescence of evil." By progress he meant not merely 
improvement but advancement toward ultimate perfec-
tion. "All evil results from non-adaptation of constitution 
to conditions," and this maladjustment is bound to be 
rectified. Progressive adaptability, through physical and 
mental modification, is regarded by Spencer as a universal 
law, and from it he infers that "the ultimate development 
of the ideal man is logically certain."32 This fundamental 
conviction was not the expression of docile optimism about 
existing social conditions. In chapter after chapter 
Spencer exposed the gross injustices, inequities, and cor-
ruptions rampant in various institutions, but while he 
stigmatized particular evils he seemed unwavering in his 
confidence that human nature is self-reforming. 
In his historical outlook Spencer surveyed the course 
of civilization as "a progress towards the constitution of 
man and society required for the manifestation of every 
man's individuality." And this advancement is essential 
and natural to every man. "Progress, therefore, is not an 
accident but a necessity."33 In his essay "Progress," pub-
lished just before Darwin's Origin of Species, Spencer 
developed a similar thesis. Starting with his basic account 
of life as organic "change from the homogeneous to the 
heterogeneous," he proposed to show that the same law 
applies to all progress. For it is a law that every process 
involves a multiplicity of changes; in the course of nature 
there has been an ever growing complication of things-
increasing differentiation and increasing integration, in-
creasing order. From the evolution of the solar system to 
the evolution of all living forms and to the development 
of men and societies, the same fundamental principle 
applies. Progress is the law of nature, and it is historically 
necessary. 
32 Spencer, Social Statics (London, 1851), pp. 59, 64. 
33 Op. cit., p. 65. 
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Spencer's conception of progress as man's adaptation 
to his environment led him in the development of his 
ideas to the conviction that man's environment evolved 
progressively from conflict to cooperation and mutual aid. 
In his earlier views of evolution, however, as has been 
pointed out by Kropotkin and others, "he had concentrated 
his attention on the 'struggle for existence,' and interpreted 
it in its application to animals as well as to men, as the 
struggle of each against all for the means of subsistence."34 
Other evolutionists held firmly to this concentration on 
the struggle for survival, regarded it as unabating, and 
proceeded to view conflict and competition as the dy-
namics of progress. Benjamin Kidd ( 1858-1916), who ad-
vanced this view in his Social Evolution, did not proceed 
to advocate a Nietzschean ethics of the Will-to-Power. 
He was content to expand the common saying "Competi-
tion is the life of trade" into a basic statement not only of 
human affairs but also of nature generally. Wherever we 
look we see contending activities serving as spurs to 
superior development and prevailing capacity. Grasses, 
trees, animals, men, all vie with each other. "The law of 
life has been always the same from the beginning-cease-
less and inevitable struggle and competition, ceaseless 
and inevitable selection and rejection, ceaseless and in-
evitable progress."35 This tension and contention alter 
only by the changing of levels: as we rise from lower to 
higher forms of life, "the rivalry is keener, the stress 
severer, the pace quicker, than ever before." To be sure, 
Kidd does not glorify this unending struggle; he insists 
on it as an unavoidable fact. These are the stem realities 
of human life and progress, which we cannot ignore. In 
this ceaseless contest, the weaker and the less capable 
succumb and must succumb; but the contest also stirs 
those of superior capacities to achieve greater and greater 
34 Prince Kropotkin, Ethics: Origin and Development, trans. L. S. 
Friedland and J. H. Piroshnikoff (New York, 1924), p. 289. 
35 B. Kidd, Social Evolution (New York and London, 1894), p. 39. 
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mastery. Without competition there would be no progress 
in realizing the fullest possibilities of life. 36 
Kidd' s view of progress expresses in a striking way the 
problem of developing a convincing philosophy of life 
on strictly evolutionistic principles. The dismissal of 
teleology, an advantage which made it possible for Darwin 
to range biology alongside of the other physical sciences, 
proved also an obstacle to using evolutionism as a basis 
for a reevaluation of human purposes and achievements. 
Without the recognition of a hierarchy of values, a theory 
of progress becomes ambiguous or even irrelevant. This 
perplexity in ultimate interpretation is evidenced in sev-
eral varieties of evolutionary theory. The acknowledg-
ment of the need for a thorough reinterpretation led to 
some radical alternative doctrines in our century. The 
conception of progress in two of them, emergent evolution 
and creative evolution, will be examined in our next 
chapter. 
The assurance of progress as the result of competition 
and rivalry was not limited to evolutionary speculation. 
It was advocated also in the "Hegelianism of the Left" 
which restated the counteraction of alternatives in 
a doctrine of social mechanics. This was the dialectical 
materialism of Karl Marx ( 1818-1883) and Friedrich 
Engels ( 1820-1895) and the "scientific socialism" of the 
Communists. They shared the conviction of an inevitable 
advance from conflict of opposite principles or rather 
forces to a new position which transcends both of the 
contending alternatives. 
The issue here was between the prevailing emphasis on 
basic ideas and on forces. Marx's firm choice of the latter 
described also his systematic alignment. He applied the 
Hegelian dialectic to a materialistic cosmology. His phi-
losophy was a fusion of Hegel and Halbach. Human life, 
individual and social, must be seen as a mechanism of 
36 Op. cit., pp. 55, 58. 
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conflicting reactions. Man's fundamental reality is not 
Spirit; ideas and ideologies are themselves effects or by-
products of material, mainly economic conditions. Change 
the conditions, and your alleged "spirit" also changes. 
Ludwig Feuerbach ( 1804-1872), the pioneer in this radical 
shift of Hegelian doctrine, had said that he had been 
compelled to turn over the Hegelian pyramid, from its 
precarious balancing on its idealistic peak to its solid 
material base. Marx wrote to the same effect: Hegel's 
dialectic "stands on its head. It should be turned over . 
. . . My dialectical method is not only different from the 
Hegelian but is fundamentally its direct opposite .... I 
regard the ideal as nothing else than the material reality, 
transposed and translated in the human head."37 
History, then, is not God's march in the world, nor 
is it the realization of the Idea of Freedom. History is 
the vast interplay of men in their material environment, 
in which their ways of life and social order have been 
determined by the mechanics of their economic environ-
ment, and in which men and societies themselves have 
changed as their material conditions have altered. This 
was Marx's materialistic interpretation of history and it 
dictated his conception of progress and his social-revolu-
tionary program. So he read the historical record of the 
radical changes in the social economy, from the ancient 
production of goods by slave labor to the relations of 
feudal lords and vassals and serfs in the medieval system 
and to the modern capitalistic economy of mass pro-
duction. 
In each of these social transitions, an economic system, 
which had been outgrown by the operation of new ma-
terial conditions, had been replaced with mechanical 
necessity by another system more adaptable to the new 
environment. In each case the master classes of society 
37 Karl Marx, Das Kapital, ed. Karl Kautsky (Berlin, 1928), 1: xlviii, 
xlvii. 
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might hold fast to their traditional vested rights, but the 
new forces must irresistibly sweep them away. The old 
system eventually produces the forces which disrupt and 
then swamp it. So modern capitalism, pursuing its max-
imum profits by methods of mass production, requires an 
increasingly large class of proletarian workers. This grow-
ing contest of a small minority of exploiters with a vast 
majority of workingmen, individually helpless but in their 
organization as a class finally invincible, set inevitably 
both the conditions and the outcome of the social conflict. 
This contradiction in the capitalistic system of mass pro-
duction must necessarily progress toward the ultimate 
victory of the exploited masses and the establishment of 
a communistic society. 
The messianic strain in Marxism may be regarded as 
a providential determinism in reverse. It was a proclama-
tion of the inevitable consummation of the proletarian 
dictatorship and a revolutionary propaganda to speed the 
coming of the day of social regeneration. But what could 
be the tnre meaning or the justification of a radical pro-
gram of reform in the perspective of dialectical material-
ism? If men are merely the products of material con-
ditions and if their relations to each other were determined 
only by the mechanics of economic processes, just as 
any other things in nature, why was the exploitation of 
them, in slavery or feudal serfdom or capitalist employ-
ment not only wasteful but also iniquitous? Marxism might 
uphold its conviction of the inevitable change from a 
capitalistic to a communist economy, but how could it 
evaluate this revolutionary change as right and good and 
as worthy of men's devotion? What meaning could 
"progress" have for a thoroughly consistent dialectical 
materialist? 
This chapter on the problem of progress in the nine-
teenth century should include at least a brief mention of 
the wave of pessimism which swept through philosophy 
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and literature, in sharp opposition to the generally and 
in various ways optimistic social-historical evaluation. The 
mere citing of some of the poets in the chorus of negation 
-Leopardi and Vigny, Byron and Lenau and James Thom-
son-should suggest its volume and temper. Here we 
should consider two systematic philosophers of pessimism, 
Arthur Schopenhauer ( 1788-1860) and Eduard von 
Hartmann ( 1842-1906). 
It is significant that Schopenhauer had very few specific 
comments about historical progress. The term itself 
scarcely ever appears in his writings: as if he did not 
regard it as having any meaning in his philosophy of 
life. The fundamental reality in all things, according to 
him, is a ceaseless drive and insatiate craving which he 
called the Will-to-Live. In human nature it manifests 
itself as desire. Unsatisfied, it is painful want; occasionally 
gratified, it is temporary pleasure; not seeing or realizing 
its aim, it is deadly boredom. This will-driven life is selfish 
in its usual incentives, often wicked in its ruthless abuse 
of others, and wretched altogether in its eventual out-
come. The only good it could possibly realize must be 
through self-forgetting compassion for the woes of others 
and in saintly ascetic self-effacement. But such saints are 
rare and even a cosmic miracle, denying the universal 
reality of the Will-to-Live. 
What basis could there be for a belief in progress in 
such a dismal world? Schopenhauer described human 
society as a hospital for incurables, and he denounced 
optimism as an insult to hopeless humanity. The chron-
icles of mankind "find nothing else to record but wars 
and rebellions; the years of peace are only short pauses," 
like the blank half-pages between long horrible chapters.38 
Schopenhauer's most distinguished successor, Eduard 
von Hartmann, cannot be called a pessimist without quali-
38 Schopenhauer, Siimtliche Werke, ed. Paul Deussen (Miinchen, 1913), 
5: 318. 
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fication. He regarded Schopenhauer's Will-to-Live and 
Hegel's cosmic Rationality as the two fundamental aspects 
of ultimate reality. The major task of philosophy, he 
mtaintained, must be to recognize them both and to 
achieve their synthesis. As with his cosmology, so with 
his philosophy of life. Hartmann described himself as an 
eudemonological pessimist and an evolutionistic optimist. 
In other words, he portrayed human life as offering scope 
for the development and realization of some genuine 
values, but still he saw no prospect of real enduring 
happiness within our reach. 
Hartmann's evolutionistic optimism had considerable 
limitations. He did not recognize our capacity to attain 
fulfillment of positive values; he did admit genuine sig-
nificance in our pursuit of worthy aims, even though 
that pursuit involved final frustration. Our intellectual 
striving is never conclusive, yet we can seek and find real 
truth, even if it is often dismal. Moral and aesthetic 
values likewise engage our resolute endeavor and realize 
genuine worth, but they lack finality or enduring satis-
faction. So in broad prospect, trust in evolutionistic 
optimism is a belief in some available advance toward 
significant goals: not utter failure, yet no conclusiveness 
or consummation. 
Even this limited advance was regarded by Hartmann 
as illusory, if our basic valuation is in terms of happiness. 
With this hedonistic outlook he shared Schopenhauer's 
estimate of life as a losing enterprise. He called the quest 
of happiness the great illusion of mankind. As a pessi-
mistic pendant to Comte's Law of the Three Stages of 
Thought, Hartmann traced Three Stages of Illusion, the 
illusion of attainable happiness. Classical antiquity re-
garded happiness as being within men's reach here and 
now. Ancient civilization records men's increasing dis-
illusion regarding the satisfactions of the present life. 
The conversion of the classical world to Christianity was 
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in fact a transition to the second stage of the great illusion. 
Men turned to the hope of happiness after death, in the 
life eternal promised by the Gospels. This hope dominated 
medieval culture; but it also was dimmed and extinguished 
for modern critical minds by the advance of science and 
philosophy. Modern humanity then proceeded to a third 
stage of its illusion: happiness had been contemplated as 
attainable socially in the future progress of civilization. 
This belief has been called the modern man's religion. 
Hartmann undertook to expose the deceptive character 
of this belief in the future fulfillment of men's hopes. 
Across the entire span of existence he surveyed our 
activities and found them all self-defeating and frustrat-
ing in their final and irremediable infelicity. Even our 
best gestures-compassion, benevolence-prove to be 
finally unavailing. We are back with Schopenhauer in 
the hospital for incurables. We may try to alleviate the 
patient's wretchedness, but his case is really hopeless. 
Though we amputate one limb after another, the deep-
seated disease would still creep closer and closer. Be it 
private almsgiving or public charity, it is, after all, like 
cutting off a dog's tail kindly, inch by inch. 
During the nineteenth century these turbid under-
currents of negation disturbed the more generally even 
flow of the prevailing course of thought and feeling. In 
our own century the prophets of doom that we hear 
predominantly today have driven many persons to despair 
of the prospects of civilization. 
CHAPTER SIX 
Contemporary Criticism 
BAFFLED MINDS may describe the twentieth century as 
the age of frustration. Two world wars of unprecedented 
destruction, and a third most ruinous war threatening, 
have flouted modern man's confidence in assured ongoing 
progress. The very conditions of modern life on which 
men have relied for the avoidance of war and for peace-
ful social advance have become incitements to conflict. 
Herbert Spencer had with unwitting irony used the term 
industrial to describe the higher stage of evolving civiliza-
tion, when cooperation would replace strife. At the third 
decade of the century economic experts were reasoning 
that the advance in industry had brought the nations into 
such close relations as to reduce the threat of war on a 
large scale. Modern science and technology have con-
structed engines of destruction so terrible that common 
and uncommon judgment have regarded them as reliable 
deterrents to war. Twice already has the vanity of this 
hope been exposed, and for a third time our age still 
persists in it. 
Despite this half-century of ruination, our social outlook 
is not utterly drear. The course of events has disabused 
us of our former conviction of inevitable eventual prog-
ress, but it has not turned us all, or altogether, to the 
other extreme of utter negation. If we could only commit 
ourselves to the right choice of values, if we could at 
least temper the strife of ideologies and the struggle for 
domination, if we could reach some reasonable under-
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standing between the conflicting groups of powers, our 
newly attained atomic technology would yield us in-
credible exploitation of the resources of nature and lead 
us to a higher civilization. Or, resisting both dark nega-
tion and stubborn optimism, prophets of redemption in 
our time have admonished us to cast aside our secular 
illusions of self-reliance and to tread the penitent path of 
grace. 
In the previous chapter we noted several different 
versions of evolutionism in its application to human and 
social-historical perspectives. The merit of Darwin's 
theory in biology was in its explanation of the origin 
and evolution of species in causal terms, without any 
reference to design or teleology. But firm adherence to 
this view involved difficulties in dealing with what Darwin 
called "mental powers" and "the moral sense," in doing 
full justice to human historical life. In occasional passages 
Darwin spoke of a trend in nature toward progress and 
perfection, but his theory did not provide sufficient basis 
for such high prospects. T. H. Huxley, a strong champion 
of Darwinian biology, rejected any ethically commenda-
tory versions of the struggle for existence and declared 
that moral conduct and progress depend on our resistance 
to the evolutionary drive. But he did not indicate in his 
cosmology any adequate ground or source of spiritual 
character or moral value. 
Does evolutionism admit of a reinterpretation which, 
while providing at one end a thoroughly justified biological 
account of living processes, would also be marked at the 
other end by a recognition of truly purposive and intelli-
gent development, in individual life and in historical 
progress? We shall consider briefly two contemporary 
cosmologies of radical evolutionary reinterpretation: the 
emergent evolution of Lloyd Morgan ( 1852-1936) and 
Samuel Alexander ( 1859-1938), and the creative evolution 
of Henri Bergson ( 1859-1941). Both of them may be 
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regarded as involving a proposed cosmology of progress. 
The theory of emergent evolution resists any proposal 
to explain life and mind as merely complex varieties of 
mechanical processes. Lloyd Morgan described himseH 
as a thoroughgoing naturalist, but by thoroughness he 
understood avoidance of oversimplification. The frame-
work of explanation in physics and chemistry cannot do 
justice to the characteristic nature of life, nor can mind, 
thinking activity, be interpreted as mere physical and 
chemical or physiological process. Mechanics, life, mind 
are all in and of nature, but not on the same level. They 
represent stages in the cosmic advance of organization. 
Life and mind are not mere resultants; they are emergents. 
At a certain level of cosmic activity, life emerges; at a 
certain level of organismic activity, living beings rise to 
a higher emergent character of mental and rational 
powers.1 
The question arises as to how deeply this cosmic 
emergence reaches in the nature of reality. Lloyd Morgan 
avowed his "concern ... with integral advance in evolu-
tionary process ... with a rational order of progress." 
But his basic view is that of advance in reality rather than 
advance of reality. The entire process of progressive 
emergence was envisioned by him as manifesting the 
eternal nature of Mind capitalized, of Spirit or God active 
but not growing, above the possibility of advance. 2 
The further implications of emergent evolution were 
developed in the realistic metaphysics of Samuel Alex-
ander, to whom Morgan continually refers and often, but 
not always, defers. Alexander's evolutionism found early 
expression in his Moral Order and Progress ( 1889), in 
which he used the basic idea of development to advocate 
1 Compare C. Lloyd Morgan, The Emergence of Novelty (London, 
1933), pp. 7, 64; Life, Mind, and Spirit (London, 1925), p. 1. 
2 Compare C. Lloyd Morgan, Life, Mind, and Spirit, p. 288; Mind at 
the Crossways (London, 1929), pp. 242 ff. 
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an ethics of mainly utilitarian-philanthropic slant. He 
recognized a progressive tendency toward sociality in 
the historical process and also an expanding range of 
versatility in the higher organization of men's lives. The 
influence of Spencer but also of idealistic Oxford was 
apparent in Alexander's views, and the eventual direction 
and choice were still in prospect. 
The mature exposition of Alexander's progressive real-
ism was presented in his Space, Time, and Deity ( 1920). 
Although he did not often use the term emergence, he 
contemplated the world-process as involving the periodic 
rise to new and higher levels of activity. Life and mind 
were regarded as continuous with mechanical processes, 
but the continuity was viewed as an expansive manifesta-
tion of nature. Nature all the way through is a surging, 
rising, emerging process. Unlike Lloyd Morgan's theistic 
view, Alexander's cosmology recognized no capitalized 
Divine Perfection at the origin of things. Deity is not the 
creative First: it is at every level or stage of existence 
the Higher Next. Alexander did not believe in a God. 
"God" for him signified "the whole universe, with a nisus 
to deity."3 In his philosophy, the principle of progress is 
not merely one of historical connotation; it is used meta-
physically to express the fundamental character of reality. 
For Alexander, in the beginning and all the way through 
was and is the verb, and the verb is progress. 
Bergson's philosophy is an emphatic activism: "There 
are no things, there are only actions."4 Against any ab-
stract and schematic views of nature as a system of 
substances in space, he concentrated his attention on 
processes in time. And he began by demanding the recog-
nition of time as real duration, duree reelle: not clock 
or calendar time, not discrete ticks or minutes or hours 
3 Samuel Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity (London, 1920), 2: 362. 
4 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (London, 
1928), p. 261. 
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or days or ages, shorter or longer extents of time, but a 
real flowing change and course of direction; not a series 
of drops but a stream. As with time so with life, so with 
the whole evolutionary process. So likewise it is with 
human activity. Listen to the living flow of the melody; 
if you "cut it up into distinct notes," you will lose both the 
melody and its supposed parts, for you get the notes truly 
only in the melody.5 
The concrete reality is not the succession of discrete 
biological forms but the living process itself. Bergson 
viewed it as a creative flood, pulsing and pressing forward, 
on the one hand evolving definite forms, as it were, canals 
for its ongoing currents; on the other hand, ever over-
flowing its banks into new directions. With his genius for 
fertile metaphor and felicitous phrasing, Bergson called 
the process the elan vital, the vital urge. No abstract 
causal-mechanical description could ever do justice to it: 
here Bergson challenged the Darwinists. The evolutionary 
flood of life is unpredictable in its directions, creatively 
ongoing throughout; it does not cause but produces, 
sprouts, germinates, generates; it has, not effects, but 
offsprings. 
The theory of creative evolution is not confronted 
with the problem of somehow bridging the chasm between 
nature and spirit: it denies that there is any such chasm. 
Life at any stage, even at its low levels, always manifests 
the vital urge which has in it something analogous to 
conscious effort. Matter and mechanics are stiffened 
molds or by-products of the living flood, like tidal sand-
curves on the seashore or like the bark of trees which 
the rising sap is ever cracking with new leaf buds. More 
primitive in nature than the mechanics of matter and 
more elemental still is the urge somehow akin to con-
5 Bergson, The Creative Mind, trans. M. L. Andison (New York, 1946), 
p. 176. 
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sciousness. We might call it the soul in the life, flowing 
where it wills. 
In the ongoing course of his creative evolution Bergson 
distinguished two currents: intelligence and instinct. In-
telligence marks especially the higher mammals and man. 
It is schematic, abstractly constructive, forming concepts 
and patterns, systematic and general. Instinct, which 
reaches its perfection in insect life, perceives without 
understanding, unreflective but unerring in its directness, 
hitting its mark at which it does not deliberately aim. 
In human experience instinct manifests itself in various 
forms of intuition. In his last major work, The Two 
Sources of Morality and Religion, Bergson examined the 
highest manifestation of the instinctive strain, mystical 
insight. 
From such a view of living nature, the inference of 
progress seems patent. Progress in the distinctive his-
torical sense is an outstanding instance of a germinal 
characteristic in all reality. Our actions depend upon our 
character, but our character is being continually re-
created by our every choice and action. In living processes 
"the essential thing is the continuous progress indefinitely 
pursued."6 The progress is not to be defined in abstract 
terms as a progress of this or that sort. Bergson's teleology 
is not a teleology of ends but of strivings and pursuits 
and of the vital urge. He advocated finalism but not 
finality. The progress of justice is not to be regarded as 
a gradual approach toward some absolute standard. It 
is an advance in the standard as well as in the practical 
realization of it. Ideals are moving targets. 7 The ideal 
character or principle is in the ongoing and creative 
dynamism itself. "All the living hold together, and all 
6 Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 28; compare p. 7. 
7 Compare Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, trans. 
Audra, Brereton, and Carter (London, 1935), pp. 57 f., 63. 
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yield to the same tremendous push (formidable poussee). 
The animal takes its stand on the plant, man bestrides 
animality, and the whole of humanity, in space and in 
time, is one immense army galloping before and behind 
each of us in an overwhelming charge."8 
This account of the creative vital urge which has at-
tained the level of man's spiritual energies moved Berg-
son to lofty religious contemplation. Could we say that 
nature has justified itself and its existence in achieving 
human spirits? Bergson cites it as the unanimous witness 
of the mystics that "God needs us just as much as we 
need God. . . . God undertaking to create creators, that 
he may have, beside himself, beings worthy of his love." 
Beyond biological evolution, beyond human culture and 
historical progress, Bergson envisioned an ascent to bound-
less perfection: "Men do not realize that their future is 
in their own hands. Theirs is the task of determining first 
of all whether they want to go on living or not. Theirs 
the responsibility, then, for deciding if they want merely 
to live, or intend to make just the extra effort required for 
fulfilling, even on their refractory planet, the essential 
function of the universe, which is a machine for the mak-
ing of gods."9 
Pragmatism, as a theory of knowledge and as a phi-
losophy of life, emphasized instrumental principles of 
fulfilled prediction and realization of purposes in action. 
A leading advocate of it, William James ( 1842-1910), 
opposed any view of a set and wound-up universe and 
urged unambiguous recognition of ongoing activity and 
novelty throughout the world process. Intellectual values 
are not abstractly inherent attributes but qualities 
achieved or frustrated in our course of active experience. 
This is the process of veri-fication, as James liked to write 
that term: ideas made true in our venture with them. 
s Creative Evolution, pp. 285 f. 
9 The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, pp. 218, 275. 
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Likewise with the other values: they are not essentially 
constitutive but always instrumental and impending on 
our use of them. In all human affairs, personal or his-
torical, we must steer resolutely between the two errors 
of dark fatalism and idle complacency. This was James's 
proposed strategy in dealing with the baffling problem of 
evil. The moral struggle is not futile, but neither is it 
superfluous. There is something really wild in the uni-
verse, but it is not hopelessly our fate to be its thralls. 
The struggle with it is our moral career, and on a historical 
plane it marks the high road of progress. Between docile 
optimism and pessimism, James advocated meliorism, 
the conviction that though the best is never realized and 
even the good is not a foregone conclusion, the better is 
ours to pursue and to achieve in some measure, though 
never completely. The higher goal is ours to approach 
but not to possess altogether. And well it is so. "The 
great use of a life is to spend it for something that will 
outlast it." This philosophy of heroic endeavor had a 
religious meaning for James. "Let us cheerfully settle into 
our interminable task. Everywhere it is the same struggle 
under various names-light against darkness, right against 
might, love against hate. The Lord of Life is with us, 
and we cannot permanently fail."10 
John Dewey (1859-1952) preferred to call his prag-
matic philosophy "instrumentalism." In his development 
of its principles evolutionistic ideas were influential, and 
his later statements had a positivistic emphasis on social 
processes and factors in thought and behavior. Philosophy 
as Dewey used it was a program of action, of education, 
of social reform. No other philosopher of his day stood 
out more convincingly than he on the frontline of con-
structive liberal advance. An essay titled "Progress," pub-
lished during the First World War, presents in brief 
10 Compare R. B. Perry, The Thought and Character of William James 
(Boston, 1935), 2: 289, 313. 
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but clear terms his view of progress, not as an abstract 
idea but as men's real alternative in the historical process. 
Progress, in his view, is not mere change, although it 
does require as a condition a certain "ease of social 
change." It depends upon the direction which men give 
to changes in the social process. 
Modern history has registered increasingly greater pos-
sibilities of progress through the scientific mastery of the 
resources of nature for man's use. This has been the great 
war and conquest of humanity, but whether this victory 
is to become assured would depend upon men's choice 
and resolution. Progress, Dewey maintained, must be 
viewed "as a responsibility and not as an endowment." 
The means to great human advance are within our reach, 
but we need critical intelligence to recognize our greatest 
needs and to provide the social order an implementation 
that would best satisfy those needs. Dewey was not con-
tent with a general statement of his principle. As he 
put it, progress is "a retail job," and he proceeded to a 
detailed outline of specific high priorities in his social 
program of progress.11 
Pessimism has often been induced from, and by, per-
sonal misadventure or social adversity. Critics of the 
doctrine have regarded it as affiiction or rancor dignified 
into a philosophy. They have reminded us of Vigny's 
"vulture of Prometheus" (cancer of the stomach), of 
Leopardi's catalog of ailments, lampooned sometimes with 
cruel irony ("I am a hunchback, therefore there is no 
God!"). Schopenhauer's pessimism met with dismissal or 
indifference during the placid quarter of the nineteenth 
century, after Europe had squared her accounts with 
Napoleon. But when the revolutions of 1848 had been 
smashed and had been followed by a wave of social dis-
11 John Dewey, Characters and Events, ed. Joseph Ratner (New York, 
1929 ), 2: 820 ff., 824, 830. 
CONTEMPORARY CRITICISM 
trust and depression, Schopenhauer' s philosophy of world 
denial came to the fore. 
This sort of critique exposes a plaintive and even a 
peevish strain in some pessimistic reasoning, but itself 
fails to take due account of the conditions which provoke 
the vehement reactions. Job was not aroused to his tragic 
quandaries about divine justice until he had been laid 
low by his many disasters; but does this fact dispose of 
the real question: What sort of divine Providence dumps 
a man like Job on the trash-heap? 
The Roman adage "Vae victis!-Woe to the vanquished!" 
has its overtones of meanings. It is the vanquished that 
cry Woe! but the inference that their defeat or their woe 
warrants any basic pessimism would depend upon our 
estimate of them. To the Free World, the final defeat of 
Napoleon or of Hitler has sustained rather than upset 
confidence in some sort of cosmic or historical justice. To 
Napoleon's marshals and grenadiers or to Hitler's de-
votees, the inference was bound to be radically different. 
We have heard of the "Impartial History of the Civil War, 
from a Southern Standpoint." 
These aspects of some contemporary historical works 
may be noted in the two massive volumes The Decline 
of the West by Oswald Spengler ( 1880-1936). His writings 
do reflect a certain German state of mind as it varied 
with the changes of our tragic half-century. There is the 
depression or even the skeptical strain in the historical 
relativism which he unfolded in that main work, com-
pleted toward the close of the First World 'Var. There 
is the upsurge of imperialist will-to-power in his Years of 
Decision, just before Hitler's rise to power. There are 
also bitter unpublished pages of scorn for the Nazis and 
their un-German, "Asiatic ... invasion of Tartar will into 
the Western world."12 But Spengler's worth is in his 
12 Compare Oswald Spengler, Jahre der Entscheidung (Miinchen, 1933), 
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systematic inferences. He explored the central character 
of historical processes and the sort of knowledge and 
likely prediction which they warrant. We may here 
readily pay tribute to his incredibly vast erudition in all 
fields of history, and we may defer to competent historians 
in their exposure not only of his frequent errors in details 
but also of his more general misdirections. What interests 
us in our present inquiry is Spengler's conception of his-
torical judgment and his outlook on the course of history. 
Spengler contrasts history and science as two ways of 
looking at the world and at human life. Science deals with 
the world as nature, conceived as a causal mechanism of 
things and processes, necessarily determined, calculable, 
measurable, formulable. History, on the other hand, sees 
men in the world as organic, living agents, not merely 
existing but pursuing goals, having careers of achievement 
or frustration. The contrasting principles of Causality 
and Destiny mark the different world-outlooks of science 
and history. Only confusion results if we import either 
one of them into our interpretation of the other. Scientific 
explanation must rule out purposiveness, "design in 
nature," as rigorously as historical interpretation must 
exclude mechanism. Within science, teleology is the 
"nonsense of nonsense"; but likewise "the materialistic 
interpretation of history . . . kills all that is organic and 
fateful."13 
In rejecting causal mechanism as a category of historical 
accounting Spengler does not reject determinism. The 
connotation of his principle of Destiny scarcely inclines 
toward free initiative or spontaneity; it has rather some 
overtones of fatalism. The life of mankind is living nature; 
it has its rootage, its budding and blossoming and fruition, 
Pt. 1, pp. 14, 165; H. J. Schoeps, Vorliiufer Spenglers (Lei den, 1955), 
p. 97. 
13 Compare Spengler, The Decline of the West, trans. C. F. Atkinson 
(New York, 1929), 1: 120, 121. 
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and then its decline and decay. It has its seasons or 
cultural epochs, each of them evincing a distinctive char-
acter and career: a heroic springtime of creative urge, a 
summer high tide of dominance and achievement, an 
autumnal decline and withering of productive energies, 
and then a bleak wintertime of sterile practicality or 
futile dogmatism, with a freezing of the creative powers 
of man. 
Spengler distinguishes strictly two terms which are 
often used synonymously: culture and civilization. By 
culture he understands the living character, texture and 
design of a certain epoch or field of history, manifested 
in all its aspects and activities-language, folklore, art, 
and tradition as well as social-institutional order. Cultures 
are the historical varieties of human living. So we may 
note the varying patterns of mankind: Egyptian, Arabian, 
Indian, Chinese, Classical, Western European. These prin-
cipal currents of historical life may be explored in each 
of the characteristic fields of human activity, and a major 
part of Spengler's work is devoted to this exploration. 
In the course of history Spengler distinguishes three 
patterns which he names Apollinian, Faustian, and 
Magian. The Appolinian soul, manifested in classical 
culture, "recognized as actual only that which was im-
mediately present in time and place." The Faustian soul 
"strove through all sensuous barriers towards infinity." 
The Magian soul "felt all happening as an expression of 
mysterious powers that filled the world cavern with their 
spiritual substance."14 We may trace in the history of our 
Christian world the contending interplay of Faustian and 
Magian motives. 
Every culture in its historical course, like every living 
thing, sprouts and grows and matures and eventually 
reaches its finis, its goal and its end. The "inevitable 
destiny" of a culture is to become what Spengler calls a 
14 The Decline of the West, 1: 247. 
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civilization. "Civilizations are the most external and 
artificial states of which a species of developed humanity 
is capable, . . . a conclusion, the thing-become succeed-
ing the things-becoming, death following life, rigidity 
following expansion."15 Irrevocably and repeatedly the 
course of history has brought human societies by different 
directions and turns to the end of their road. Our own 
Western culture, according to Spengler, like those before 
it, has come to its end in the civilization of the nineteenth 
century. This, indeed, is "the decline of the West" in 
our modern life, a life of metropolitan concentration, 
materialistic rigidity, spiritual wilderness, impending con-
fusion: a civilization of money not of men, of goods and 
gold not of good, of having not of being: a senile dead end 
of the road of personal creative upsurge.16 A civilization 
like ours, which no longer has a future, will before long 
lack a real present: "In a few centuries from now there 
will no longer be a Western culture, no more be German, 
English, or French than there were Romans in the days 
of Justinian. Not that the sequence of human generations 
failed; it was the inner form of people . . . that was no 
longer there."17 
The contemporary collapse of so many foundations of 
our civilization has discredited any suave optimism and 
has stiffened the thinking of our age in a skeptical phi-
losophy of history, of which Spengler's work is a dour 
expression. But this swing of the pendulum of historical 
valuation, from complacent assurance to barren distrust 
or even cynicism, has not proved convincing to steadier 
thinking. Unlike Condorcet, who even during the years 
of the Terror in the French Revolution remained unshaken 
in his conviction of the ever forward march of mankind, 
we have been forced to recognize the false premises of 
15 Op. cit., 1: 31. 
16 Op. cit., 2: 485 f. 
17 Op. cit., 1: 167. 
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the lofty doctrine of straight line progress. "But does this 
admission compel us to accept the Doctrine of Doom?"18 
This question is raised and answered negatively in the 
most impressive interpretation of the entire course of 
civilization undertaken in our day, the treatise in ten 
volumes, A Study of History, by Arnold Toynbee. 
Between bland optimism and skeptical dismissal, Toyn-
bee's philosophy of history is marked by a spirit of heroic 
resilience, a rebound in adversity. He finds nothing in 
man's racial endowment or in historical environment that 
either guarantees his uninterrupted progress or condemns 
him to inevitable frustration and futility. Our every ex-
perience is an urge or a check; we rise by surmounting 
our barriers, but we also succumb. Dominion or disaster 
depends upon what confronts us and how we confront it. 
The course of history, in this perspective, is marked by a 
periodic series of challenges and responses. 
Is this the proverbial wisdom that gold is tried by fire? 
We are reminded of a saying attributed by Herodotus to 
Cyrus, that "soft countries invariably breed soft men."19 
We recall the concluding words of Spinoza's Ethics: "All 
excellent things are as difficult as they are rare." But 
can we say, the harder the trial, the better the outcome? 
Hardly so, for while a challenge may be too weak or in-
cidental to arouse an energetic forward reaction, it may 
also be overwhelming and beyond our competence and 
capacities to resist. The bright pages of progress in history 
have been marked by "the most stimulating challenge, 
. . . one of mean degree between an excess of severity 
and a deficiency of it."20 This sort of golden mean in the 
historical life of mankind must also have a propulsive 
factor. "The real optimum challenge is . . . one which 
18 Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History, abridgment by D. C. Somerwell 
(New York and London, 1957), 2: 311. 
19 Toynbee, A Study of History, unabridged edition (London, 1934), 
2: 21. 
20 Toynbee-Somerwell, A Study of History (1947), 1: 187. 
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not only stimulates the challenged party to achieve a 
single successful response but also stimulates him to ac-
quire a momentum that carries him on a step farther: 
from achievement to a fresh struggle, from the solution 
of one problem to the presentation of another, from 
momentary rest to reiterated movement."21 This is the 
progressive rhythm that marks the march of history. 
This ascending pendular or spiral rhythm which can 
be traced in the course of history is evident also in the 
lives of "creative personalities when they are taking the 
mystic path which is their highest spiritual level, . . . 
passing first out of action into ecstasy and then out of 
ecstasy into action again ... in a new capacity and with 
new powers."22 While on the one hand Toynbee compares 
historical process and individual experience and is ever 
ready to turn from the broadest historical surveys to 
specific episodes or biographical comments, his main con-
cern is with the larger pattern, for it is by appeal to the 
whole that he seeks to understand the parts. We cannot 
comprehend the history of any particular country or epoch 
by itself; we must see it in its all-historical context or 
pattern. A Study of History is a most erudite inventory 
of historical details of all lands and ages, but the decisive 
purpose of the inventory throughout is the hope of under-
standing the nature and the prospects of the human 
enterprise. 
In interpreting the course of civilization Toynbee 
distinguishes and also undertakes to relate a singular and 
a plural use of the term: civilization and civilizations. Of 
civilizations he distinguishes over a score; some of them 
can be combined and others redistinguished. Most of 
them are now entirely or largely past history; they are 
either dead and gone or have become arrested. Only 
five survive as ongoing civilized societies: our modern 
21 Toynbee, A Study of History ( 1934 ), 3: 119. 
22 Ibid., p. 248. 
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Western civilization, Russia and Southeastern Europe, 
which Toynbee calls the Orthodox Christian society, the 
Islamic civilization, the Hindu, and the Far Eastern 
civilizations (Chinese and Japanese). 
In studying the nature and growth of civilizations 
Toynbee also examines and diagnoses the breakdown of 
so many of them. Breakdowns are not all of one kind; 
some societies collapse into disintegration; others stiffen 
into petrifaction, fossilize. We cannot undertake here any 
review of Toynbee's varied, detailed, and richly emdite 
analysis of the external and internal conditions which lead 
to the dismption and dissolution of civilizations. Some of 
these conditions have been overstressed by other histor-
ians; some have not received due emphasis. Our attention 
is called to the dangerous failure of self-determination, 
but also to the "nemesis of creativity": in idolizing its 
great pioneers a civilization may become complacent and, 
worshiping its past, may find itself without a future. 
Militarism may prove suicidal; in surfeit of power and 
consequent outrageous behavior, a society may sweep 
itself into destmction. Civilizations decline and fall 
through loss of integrity, through schisms and inner 
dismption. 
On the constmctive side, the principal forms of in-
stitutional order are examined in their role in the ongoing 
life of civilizations. We may note especially the estimate 
of religion, a stubborn shell of superstitions and a drag 
on progress, but in its loftier function, a vision of a higher 
order of society. Toynbee's philosophy of history proceeds 
unmistakably toward a religious-spiritual conclusion, for 
religion has two ground notes, one tragic and the other 
a note of undying hope. Religion is ever de profundis, but 
from its dark depths it aspires toward the luminous heights 
of divine perfection. Despite doctrinal conflicts, the 
higher religions seem to point to the same City of God, 
the spiritual ideal of civilization. In the light of this ideal, 
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the law of progress is proclaimed as the divine law; the 
world is seen as "a province of the Kingdom of God."23 
Here the skeptic may rejoin: you have shown so many 
civilizations, and their religions with them; they decay 
and disintegrate, pass away: what reasonable hope can 
you entertain for ours? Toynbee is not a docile optimist 
here, but he refuses any supine surrender of his reliance 
on our higher values. What really matters is that we 
recognize clearly the directions of the higher life for man 
and the conditions of our advancing toward it: "Progress 
in the improvement of our social heritage in terms of the 
spiritual life of mankind, . . . the one thing of manifest 
and abiding values in a world in which all other things 
are vanity."24 
A very disturbing aspect of our age of crisis has been 
the unsettlement of intellectual assurance. We have ex-
posed the unsoundness of earlier proposed solutions, but 
the critical problems still engross us and despite our 
incertitude require of us decisions. These decisions can-
not be abstract logical conclusions. They must come out 
of a self-penetrating conviction of our total commitment. 
To meet the issues which confront us in an existential 
crisis, no rational doctrines or principles are of final avail; 
we can only yield ourselves in faith and consecration. This 
sort of resolution-in-uncertainty marked the Pensees of 
Blaise Pascal ( 1623-1662), and two centuries later it found 
expression in the writings of S!6ren Kierkegaard ( 1813-
1855). Largely neglected in his day, Kierkegaard has 
gained prominence in our times of unsettled beliefs. A 
very significant aspect of his existential dialectic may be 
seen in the different directions in which his influence has 
proceeded in our time: to unyielding theological dog-
matism on one side and to atheistic moral negation on 
the other. 
23 Toynbee, Civilization on Trial (New York, 1948), p. 260. 
24 Op. cit., pp. 262, 263. 
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According to Karl Jaspers, no scientific description or 
explanation of human nature can do full justice to the 
concrete immediate reality of ourselves. A self is truly 
recognized as a unique commitment to certain values. 
"As I value, so am I, and so shall I become."25 My true 
self is in my ongoing career, in what I am to become and 
what I ought to be. This personal prospect is a task and 
an obligation, and it involves me in communion and 
participation with other selves. My self-realization is a 
social experience. I am immersed in a historical process, 
of which, as of myself, I am bound to ask the questions, 
whence, whither, and to what purport? These are ques-
tions about our origin, our goal, and our significance. 
In his work The Origin and Goal of History, Jaspers 
explicitly proceeds on "an article of faith: that mankind 
has one single origin and one goal." Confessedly sym-
bolical in his account, he contemplates the life of humanity 
as a growth in lucid consciousness, the consummation of 
which will lead men to mutual love and understanding 
as "members of a single realm of everlasting spirits." 
But, to repeat in his own words, "all these are symbols, 
not realities."26 Reviewing the actual historical record, 
Jaspers finds that four times in the past mankind has 
taken a new start. From rude prehistory, men began 
with the devising and use of tools, the discovery of fire, 
and the attainment of language. Then they established 
the ancient civilizations. Then their spiritual potentialities 
unfolded. Finally, in our civilization, the mastery of 
science and technology has been achieved. This series of 
four periods does not represent a straight line of develop-
ment but a succession of "leaps," a self-thrusting forward 
and upward to fuller self-realization. 
If we try to explain the specific direction and reach of 
25 Karl Jaspers, Philosophie, 3d ed. (Berlin, 1956), 3: 84. 
26 Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History, trans. Michael Bullock 
(New Haven, Conn., 1953), p. xv. 
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each leap, we may realize that the historical process does 
not admit of adequate abstract formulation. Thus, Jaspers 
asks, why did science and technology come to fruition in 
our Western civilization and not elsewhere? He is pre-
pared to cite a number of predisposing conditions but 
can claim no scientific adequacy for his explanation. Nor 
does he regard the fourth historical stage, of our scientific 
and technological mastery, as a stage of unqualified prog-
ress. His basic principle should apply here: we are and 
we become as we value. Science and technology are 
neither good nor bad ultimately. They are only means; 
their worth depends upon what we make of them. Prog-
ress of science and technics does not necessarily signify 
mankind's progress through them. Nor are we assured 
of progressive historical stability or satisfactory humane 
existence. Repeatedly in the past "cultures were destroyed 
by barbarians." Our conclusion is not bound to be one 
of despair, but easy confidence is also ruled out. We can 
only put our hope in a growing unity of understanding. 
Even this hope is not enough. "For understanding only 
links understanding as a whole, not men. It brings no 
genuine communication and no solidarity."27 As at one 
end Jaspers finds the scientific account of men abstract 
and inadequate, so at the other end his historical prospect 
is dubious and precarious. In the symbolic speech of faith 
he contemplates a sublime consummation, but in actual 
existence he sees imminent crises. 
The belief in historical progress has been called the 
modern man's religion. Like other forms of religion, its 
hold on men's minds has been unsteady, and skeptical 
renunciation has been tinged with regret. But is the 
conviction of future social progress, as a justification for 
so much past and present evils, itself justifiable? In rais-
ing this question, the Russian philosopher Nicolas 
27 The Origin and Goal of History, pp. 252, 253; compare p. 125. 
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Berdyaev ( 187 4-1948) undertook a radical criticism alike 
of philosophy of religion and philosophy of history. 
Unlike the usual historians of the belief in social prog-
ress, who regard it as a modern alternative to Christian 
medieval doctrines, Berdyaev considers the idea of prog-
ress as Christian in its origin. He calls it "a secularized 
form of the Christian idea of movement towards the 
Kingdom of God as the basic theme of world history."28 
Divorced from its Christian faith in life eternal, that is, 
in its secularized form, the belief in progress is not only 
illusory but tragically unworthy. We are asked to believe 
that countless generations of men and women would have 
perished in irretrievable gloom, to prepare the way for 
some lucky people in some unspecified future age. "Some-
where on the peak of historical destiny, on the ruins of 
preceding generations, there shall appear the fortunate 
race of men reserved for the bliss and perfection of integral 
life."29 What is lacking here is the Christian conviction 
of the unique and irreplaceable worth of the least of these 
our brethren. Without the vision of the Kingdom of God, 
the course of history loses significance and spiritual 
direction. 
Messianism is thus essential to a meaningful philosophy 
of history, but it must be a messianic expectation that 
can be realized neither within history itself nor altogether 
outside of history. It must not be a change in this world 
but a change of this world, a living consummation of 
eternity over the events of time.30 The drama of true 
progress is not the secular historical play of men's projects 
and achievements in specific periods of time. We need 
an eternal outlook and prospect in which past, present, 
28 Nicolas Berdyaev, The Divine and the Human, trans. R. M. French 
(London, 1949), p. 170. 
29 Berdyaev, The Meaning of History, trans. George Heavey (London, 
1936), p. 189. 
30 The Divine and the Human, pp. 181 f. 
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and future are caught in one divine glance, in "the true 
era of eternity." History as a mere factual series of events, 
as a succession in time, is meaningless. "History has 
positive significance only when it has a culmination."31 
But this means that it is not endless, that it transcends 
itself in its superhistorical goal and consummation. So in 
the fullness of time, time itself is fulfilled in eternity. 
The existential note has become definitely pronounced 
in some directions of present day religious thought, 
owing to the strong influence of the contemporary theo-
logian Karl Barth. His conception of history is resolutely 
providential. He recognizes a history of mankind only 
when we consider human life as more than a mere process 
in nature. The idea of history has a realized significance 
only when we recognize that something transcendent en-
counters and enters human life. History consists just in 
this divine providential activity, God-in-us.32 Deep with-
in and also beyond all our histories of secular outlook is 
the one true history, the history of salvation: not a history 
of men's progress or failure but of God's grace. 
In Barth's judgment this emphasis on divine Providence, 
on salvation and grace, is all-important and must direct 
all our other valuations. He is not unresponsive to secular 
needs or problems. He regarded unwavering resistance 
to Hitler as a religious duty. His socialistic bias has been 
interpreted by some of his critics as accounting for his 
rather ambiguous reaction toward Communist totalitar-
ianism. Basically Barth resists any social-reformatory con-
ception of the Christian faith. The tendency to secularize 
the Christ is regarded by him as hateful, a betrayal of 
the Saviour. 33 The gospel of our Lord cannot be for him 
31 The Meaning of History, pp. 195, 204 f. 
32 Compare Karl Barth, Kirchliche Dogmatik (Zurich, 1948), val. 3, 
pt. 2, p. 189. 
33 Compare Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, trans. 
Douglas Horton (London, 1928), p. 277. 
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a sort of "Christian Marshall Plan."34 Ethics and social 
philosophy alike must be rethought in truly Christian 
terms. Christian ethics is not simply the ethics of a 
particular period or type of society in our Western tradi-
tion. Christian ethics is the very negation of common 
secular ethics. Morality, as Barth sees it, is in truth 
obedience to God, and this obedience is not man's work 
but the working of God's grace in man. For grace is not 
grace if it is in any way attainable by man himself. 
In such an unyieldingly salvational view of human life, 
the idea of social progress loses meaning. Our plans and 
systems, successes and defeats are in and of their time. 
They do not advance us toward our true goal, for that goa] 
is not really ours. It is God's goal for us, and it is not 
in any specific time and place of ours. It is "the summation 
of the history of God in history .... The synthesis we 
seek is in God alone, and in God alone can we find it."35 
Existentialism had its earlier intense expressions in the 
intellectual quandaries of deeply religious spirits-Pascal 
and Kierkegaard. But the conviction of commitment 
despite incertitude has possessed also minds of decidedly 
irreligious attitude. Atheistic existentialism, in its bearings 
on the problem of social progress, may be studied in the 
works of Jean-Paul Sartre, contemporary philosopher, 
novelist, playwright. He has declared explicitly that ex-
istenialism expresses for him the full conclusions from 
thoroughgoing atheism. There is no God who made me 
and on whom I can rely; so I must start with myself alone. 
I am what I choose to make myself, in utter and unavoid-
able freedom. In this free choice and action is my being, 
but my freely chosen being is also the ground of noth-
ingness, for my free choice, undetermined by anything 
else, might have been different. There is no real reason 
34 Barth, Niebuhr, Danielou, Gespriiche nach Amsterdam (Zurich, 
1949 ), p. 13. 
35 Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, p. 322. 
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for my being what I am not or for my not being what 
I am. This final, inexplicable fact or act of existence-
insipid but also anguishing and nauseating actuality-
what meaning, what value and prospect of personal 
achievement and social progress does this view of reality 
afford? 
Sartre avows genuine social regard; in the great national 
crisis he manifested it in action. Each man's responsibility 
for his free choice "concerns mankind as a whole."36 What 
I choose to act and to be is my "commitment on behaH of 
all mankind. . . . In fashioning myself I fashion man." 
Sartre writes almost in Kantian terms of legislating for 
all mankind. 37 But he cannot proceed far that way, for 
there is no standard to which he would appeal. He 
recalls Kierkegaard's "anguish of Abraham," committed 
despite all reason to obey God's command. How could he 
know that it was really the command of God? How can 
I be really convinced about my right commitment? Wasn't 
that also Hamlet's perplexity after his encounter with 
the Ghost? Perhaps it was only the devil's lure. 
Sartre has grasped firmly the truth of the unique quality 
in each person's values, but their other aspect, social and 
universal, eludes him. Where only the bare actuality of 
utterly free choice can be recognized, what judgment can 
there be of growth or decay of men and societies, of a 
historical career and a direction of progress? Sartre does 
not believe in progress, for progress involves amelioration, 
betterment; ''but man is always the same, facing a situa-
tion which is always changing, and choice remains always 
a choice in the situation."38 Surely, we say, a man should 
not act in bad faith. But why not, if that is the way he 
chooses to act? We may call him a coward or a stinker, 
but on what ultimate ground are we warranted in con-
36 J. P. Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, trans. Philip Mairet 
(London, ed. of 1952), p. 29. 
37 Op. cit., pp. 30 f. 
38 Op. cit., p. 50, 
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demning him? Actually Sartre sees little prospect that 
social life can be ordered on a reliably sound basis. There 
is in us a sense of fellowship; there is also a resentful or 
hateful sense of others being in our way. Sartre's play 
No Exit (Huit Clos) portrays a chamber in hell, the hell 
of one's being permanently locked up with others. 
A radical approach to what have been called the dis-
contents in civilization has been that of the psychoanalytic 
movement in contemporary thought, represented by its 
pioneer and leader, Sigmund Freud ( 1856-1939). His 
psychopathological inquiries led him to conclude that 
cases of hysteria were due to deep-lying emotional dis-
turbances which had been repressed in the unconscious. 
His psychoanalytical method was aimed at rousing the 
patient to recall the submerged emotional data which, 
once brought up to the level of consciousness, would ease 
and cure the hysteria. 
Freud's probing of the repressed emotional disturbances 
convinced him that they were mainly sexual in character, 
and this conviction directed his thought to far-flung 
speculations. Only some of them can be mentioned here. 
He advanced a theory of the so-called Oedipus complex 
in infantile sexuality, regarding the child as erotically 
attached to its parent of the opposite sex, with animosity 
toward its other parent. Furthermore, he saw human 
personality as in a tension between two instinctual 
counterimpulses, one of them aggressive and destructive, 
the other sexual, loving, and constructive. Man's life, ac-
cording to Freud, is in a contention between the id of 
instinctual dynamics, only partly allayed in his ego by the 
daily course and relations of his experience and the guid-
ance and judgment of its higher mentor, the superego. 
The startling character of Freud's psychoanalytical 
theories, which aroused wide popular interest but also 
emphatic and even bitter professional resistance, was his 
preoccupation with the basically sexual dynamic in mental 
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life, especially at subconscious levels, what he called "the 
sexual etiology of the neuroses."39 The stimulating effect 
of his speculations on sexuality may be noted in their 
widespread influence on literary and social contemporary 
trends. In professional psychology and psychiatry the 
enduring power of his ideas has been questioned by his 
critics on both sides of the Atlantic. According to a report 
of a specialist in one of our large medical schools, the 
number of psychiatry students concentrating on Freudian 
psychoanalysis during the past fifteen years has dropped 
from almost one half to about 10 percent. 
From this necessarily very brief statement of Freud's 
general theories we should turn to consider his contribu-
tion to our special inquiry regarding the relation of the 
course of civilization to human progress. He pointed out 
two aspects of civilization: "on the one hand all the 
knowledge and capacity that men have acquired in order 
to control the forces of nature and extract its wealth for 
the satisfaction of human needs, and, on the other hand, 
all the regulations necessary in order to adjust the rela-
tions of men to one another and especially the distribution 
of the available wealth."40 We may recognize directly 
the inevitable counteractions in civilized life with which 
Freud is concerned. They are expressions in a social-
historical perspective of the deep-lying tension between 
men's aggressive-destructive and their erotic-constructive 
drives. "Little as men are able to live in isolation, they ... 
nevertheless feel as a heavy burden the sacrifices which 
civilization expects of them in order to make a communal 
life possible. Thus civilization has to be defended against 
the individual, and its regulations, institutions and com-
mands are directed to that task."41 The achievement of 
39 "The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement," in The Basic Writ-
ings of Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. A. A. Brill (New York, 1938), 
p. 936. 
40 The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. James Strachey (London, 1961), 21: 6. 
41 Loc. cit. 
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civilization requires coercion and renunciation of in-
stinct."42 Man needs civilized life for his fulfillment, yet 
while it expands his range of activity it also cramps his 
instinctual urges; man is thus hostile to that on which he 
depends for his complete humanity. 
According to Freud, man's chief purpose in life is the 
attainment of happiness, but "its programme is at logger-
heads with the whole world."43 The experience of pleasure 
is "episodic" and unreliable. Far more commonly, distress 
threatens us from many directions in the various human 
relationships in which we are involved, yet self-isolation 
is no cure, for so many of our satisfactions require social 
cooperation. In a historical outlook we may note on the 
one hand the extraordinary recent advance in science and 
technology which has tightened man's control over nature 
and unlocked its formerly unimaginable resources for 
human use; but on the other hand we have to admit that 
all this progress in externals has not made men's lives 
really happier. Scientific and technical advances seem to 
involve us in new evils or to aggravate older ones. Modern 
medicine and sanitation have reduced greatly infant 
mortality, and the resulting population explosion threatens 
mankind with mass starvation. 
Along with the greatly increased control of nature Freud 
notes other gains due to civilization: a deeper sense of or 
for beauty, personal cleanliness, a more settled order in 
daily aHairs; above these he calls attention to a growing 
"esteem and encouragement of man's higher mental ac-
tivities"44 and, furthermore, a more reliable social organ-
ization which largely replaces the earlier unregulated 
individual demands by communal restriction of willful 
indulgence. In this last respect man has lost many of his 
early freedoms but has gained more reliable assurance 
of others. Yet while the assurance of greater security is 
42 Op. cit., p. 7. 
43 Ibid., p. 76. 
44 Ibid., pp. 93, 94. 
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enjoyed, men chafe under the cramping and the impedi-
ments of civilization, and the conflict is in some areas 
irreconcilable. Freud's preoccupation with sexuality gives 
him here an interesting turn of argument. Women, whose 
need of protection for themselves and their children "laid 
the foundations of civilization by the claims of their love" 
in their concern for "the interests of the family and of 
sexual life," find their mates and providers compelled by 
the complexities of civilized existence to find their active 
lives away from home. 'Woman finds herseH forced into 
the background by the claims of civilization, and she 
adopts a hostile attitude towards it."45 
Freud shows great reluctance about expressing an opin-
ion upon the value of human civilization: whether "the 
whole effort is not worth the trouble." As he states 
candidly, "my impartiality is made all the easier to me 
by my knowing very little about all these things." But 
he centers his attention on the basic problem. "The 
fateful question for the human species seems to me to be 
whether and to what extent their cultural development 
will succeed in mastering the disturbance of their com-
munal life by the human instinct of aggression and self-
destruction. . . . Men have gained control over the 
forces of nature to such an extent that with their help 
they would have no difficulty in exterminating one an-
other to the last man. They know this, and hence comes 
a large part of their current unrest, their unhappiness 
and their mood of anxiety."46 This concluding passage 
of Freud's work Civilization and Its Discontents was 
written some fifteen years before the bombing of 
Hiroshima. 
In closing our review of the idea of progress in Western 
thought from classical antiquity to our times, we may 
note the approach to the problem by two contemporary 
45 Ibid., pp. 103, 104. 
46 Ibid., p. 145. 
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thinkers who combine grasp of modern scientific ideas 
and historical scholarship with spiritual-religious insight. 
In his work God and the Common Life, Robert L. 
Calhoun has pursued a path of theological reflection which 
would avoid both easy assurance and drear skepticism. 
He finds in the rough "unfinishedness" of nature at every 
stage, and likewise in our human ongoing career, evidence 
of an ever emerging progressive trend-a revelation of 
an infinitely higher, divine guidance. 
A major part of Calhoun's discussion of the limits but 
also of the prospects of religious faith is concerned with 
the interpretation of man's work at its different levels 
and grades of significance. Martin Luther taught that 
the husbandman at his plow and the housewife with her 
looms or kitchen pots could serve God as truly as the 
priest at his altar. So Calhoun explores the problem of 
the moral-spiritual significance and achievement of men's 
work. He resists both the smug secularism which would 
trace the progressive attainment of the better and higher 
life through men's own insight and effort and activity, and 
on the opposite side the theological "nullification of every-
day human concerns" as altogether unavailing, and of 
our daily work as of no intrinsic importance for moral-
spiritual advance. Against optimists and pessimists and 
skeptics, Calhoun's "religious realism undertakes to crit-
icize and endeavors to change the actual, in the conviction 
that it ought to be and, in principle, can become better 
than at any specifiable moment it is."47 Productive work, 
evidence of progressive activity, may be recognized in 
various perspectives. It reforms situations so as to make 
them more satisfactory not only in supplying elementary 
needs but also in perfecting patterns and designs, in more 
enlightened workmanship, in opening vaster and higher 
outlooks. Labor involves cooperation; in the common life 
47 Robert L. Calhoun, God and the Common Life (Hamden, Conn., 
ed. of 1954), p. 75; compare p. 49. 
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men may gain mutual understanding of minds. But all 
the way through, in all men's work, there is no final ac-
complishment. Their aims are self-projecting, their con-
clusions raise further problems. Calhoun's reflections on 
this ever unfinished character of activities leads him to 
wide-ranging inquiries in the physical and the biological 
sciences, which incline him toward the theory of emergent 
evolution. Repeatedly he is led to his view of an un-
finished universe. There is here a kinship with Aristotle's 
doctrine that every actuality discloses a potentiality of a 
higher realization. 
In this expanding cosmic prospect man may be con-
sidered as a product of the world process but also as 
critic, creator, and worshiper. His felt present inadequacy 
may distress him, but it may stir him to a deep awareness 
of the reality of a greater good revealed in the ever higher 
prospect beyond all particular attainments. Himself al-
ways active, how could he regard the ideal perfection as 
static? The words in the Gospel should ring true to his 
spirit: "My Father is working still, and I am working" 
(John 5:17). Calhoun's cosmic and human-historical re-
flections thus proceed toward religious conviction: "The 
world is not yet fully made nor wholly good; and now at 
least, however it may have been in the unimaginable 
beginning, other factors than God are at work in it too. But 
God is primary, central, and sovereign in them all."48 
John Baillie's historical review of the various doctrines 
of progress serves to fortify his guiding conviction that, 
far from being explicitly secular, the idea of progress is 
religious and more definitely Christian in its source and 
motivation. He quotes Gilbert Murray's declaration that 
progress is "a truth that lies somewhere near the roots of 
our religion," and also Dean Inge' s conclusion that "no 
other religion before Christianity ever erected hope into 
a moral value."49 So, Baillie maintains, progressivism 
48 Calhoun, op. cit., p. 179; compare pp. 241 f. 
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grows in Christian soil. "If any man is in Christ, he is a 
new creation; the old has passed away, behold the new 
has come" (2 Cor. 5:17). But one may persist in asking, 
is progress certain and inevitable, by nature or by divine 
dispensation, or is it fully assured "only if the race 
takes reasonable advantage of the opportunities at its 
command?" Here firm or wavering conviction would 
both have a religious motivation. Even when it may be 
considered to be false, the doctrine of progress would be 
"a Christian heresy."50 On this basic ground of interpreta-
tion Baillie proceeds to further critical inquiry. There is 
no strictly naturalistic assurance of progress. With regard 
to the argument from evolution, he is not impressed by 
the optimistic note in the well-known penultimate para-
graph in Darwin's Origin of Species and inclines rather 
to T. H. Huxley's resistance to a morally commendatory 
view of the evolutionary process. While he would not 
dismiss men's own efforts and achievements as entirely 
pointless, he regards them as finally unavailing. Moreover, 
Baillie agrees with Berdyaev in seeing a disturbing or a 
morally callous view in the secular reliance on future 
social progress: in the "willingness to sacrifice the earlier 
to the later generations." "We can take final comfort 
neither from a history that is never consummated nor 
from any consummation that earthly history itself could 
conceivably contain."51 Sound conviction of progress re-
quires an advance from a secular-earthly to an eternal-
heavenly outlook. And it is the Christian faith that offers 
us "a very confident hope for the future course of terrestrial 
history." This hope can only be in "the progressive em-
bodiment in the life of humanity of the mind that was 
in Christ."52 
49John Baillie, The Belief in Progress (New York, 1951), pp. 210, 
39, 71. 
50 Baillie, op. cit., pp. 89, 95. 
51 Ibid., pp. 183, 184. 
52 Ibid., pp. 220, 235. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
Utopian Visions of 
the Perfect Society 
IN APPRAISING OUR COURSE of action, our judgment as to 
whether we are advancing or lagging or going astray 
would depend upon our view of the goal, where we are 
aiming to arrive. Actuality is evaluated in the perspective 
of ideals. So our belief or disbelief in social progress may 
be tested by considering men's visions of the ideal society. 
In the history of thought these visions have sometimes 
expressed optimistically the consummation or fulfillment 
of men's positive achievements; but more often they have 
been seen as in tragic contrast to the sorry actualities of 
human lives. Sir Thomas More's term utopia had this 
double connotation of "the blessed land" or "no land." 
The authors of the principal utopias expressed their 
different visions of the perfect society according to their 
choice of the ideal values. In this respect they may be 
studied in their revealing character; they bespeak the 
various achievements or satisfactions which have dom-
inated men's minds and hearts during certain eras in the 
course of history. 
Our study in this field has required a gradual and then 
a severe restriction of choice. More than one hundred 
utopian works line the shelves of our libraries-and most 
of them have been written during the last hundred years. 
From this mass of blueprints for the land of the heart's 
desire a small number stand out as expressions of men's 
UTOPIAN VISIONS 
social ideals during principal epochs in the history of 
civilization; classical antiquity, medieval-Christian culture, 
the Renaissance, the expanding modem world, and our 
own times. 
The Renaissance gave us the term utopia, but the word 
is of Greek derivation; classical Greek likewise is the 
first and in many respects the greatest of all utopias, 
the Republic of Plato ( 427-347). Plato's ideal state was 
intended to express a social realization of the basic 
principle of his philosophy, which may be stated as 
aristocratic rationalism. Plato was convinced that the 
source, the test, and the ideal of knowledge and of 
perfection should be sought in our rational activity. The 
reliance on the data of sense perception was in his judg-
ment misleading, for the senses give us only shifting 
impressions of phenomena, appearances not realities. The 
real world is not a random togetherness of greens and 
blues, hots and colds, wets and dries; it is a cosmos of 
what Plato called Ideas, that is, a system of forms, laws, 
principles, types of structures and relations, and these are 
disclosed only to rational inquiry and analysis. We may 
take an example from geometry. The theorem which we 
are proving is not valid of the triangle which we have 
drawn on the blackboard, for no one has ever drawn or 
could draw a triangle or a straight line. The triangle of 
the Pythagorean theorem is an Idea of rational definition, 
and of this Idea alone is the conclusion valid. So likewise 
in other fields of knowledge. All of us experience the 
particulars of sense perception, but we proceed to know-
ledge and can attain it only as we rise to rational con-
templation of the Ideas of the cosmic order. 
Plato viewed the rational world of Ideas as a hierarchy. 
The various types of Ideas manifest the structure of nature 
at different levels of realization. The highest of all Ideas 
in the hierarchy of nature, according to Plato, is the Idea 
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of Good, or as we may translate it, the Principle of Value 
or Dominant Perfection. The most important knowledge 
that we can attain is insight into relative worth. For 
Plato the most decisive question about anything is this: 
"Is it for the best?" Thus regarding value judgments as 
the highest expressions of reason-in logic, in aesthetics, 
in ethics, in social philosophy-Plato sometimes gave his 
Idea of Good a religious version, to signify God or the 
Principle of Divine Perfection. 
Plato's rationalism was aristocratic in its outlook on 
nature. It was aristocratic also in its practical directive, 
and that is centrally important for our purpose. The 
perfection of life, its wisdom and fulfillment, demand our 
recognition of the relative worth and rank of human 
capacities and activities and the achieved dominance of 
the highest and best of them. In Plato's philosophy, 
psychology, ethics, and social-political theory sustained 
each other. His analysis of human nature showed its 
tripartite character. We are creatures of appetites and 
desires. We are driven to action by a dynamic power in 
us, will-energy or "mettle." But we also have a rational 
faculty of insight and judgment. If we let our sensual 
nature have its way uncontrolled, our desires and ap-
petites would lead us to corrupt and ruinous excesses. The 
impulsive drive to action, if not wisely directed, may 
sweep us away to disaster. We must acknowledge the 
rightful rule of our highest faculty, reason, which alone 
can guide us according to principles of wisdom and justice. 
It can allow our appetites and desires their temperate 
satisfaction, but by proper control avoid their evil in-
dulgence. It can direct our will-energy in the right course 
to the right kind and degree of activity, without im-
petuous abandon. In every situation we can give each 
side of our nature its due expression, and in this practical 
expression of all-round "justice" we can realize the virtues 
of our harmonious fulfillment or self-satisfaction. 
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This principle of aristocracy, or rule of the best prin-
ciple, which is central in Plato's rationalism, is decisive 
in his social philosophy. It dominates his Idea of the 
perfect state. We can understand Plato's Republc better 
if we keep in mind the intended contrast between the 
heavenly pattern of his utopia and the various actually 
existent forms of government. Their defectiveness or de-
generate corruption is due to the usurpation of authority 
by the lower faculties of human nature. In each case 
Plato portrays a type of individual or social degradation, 
low in itself and dragging the soul to still lower levels. 
Thus timocracy is a rule by generals and strong men; 
it exalts honor, martial drive, and renown as the highest 
values of human life. But renown and valor are apt to 
seek material evidence in external possessions; the strong 
men tend to become men of substance and property. This 
is the political course toward oligarchy, a state where men 
are rated by what they have rather than by what they are. 
This oligarchy, rule by wealthy men, however, is pre-
carious, for the rich are indeed the oligoi, the few. The 
many, poor but not powerless, may well seize their chance 
to overthrow and dispossess their masters and establish 
the rule of the masses, the demos, democracy as Plato used 
the term in a derogatory sense. This is the state without 
any standards of higher or lower, in which the prevailing 
numbers are dominant. It is most unreliable, for where 
principles are lacking, any demagogue who can catch the 
ear of the populace may lead the multitude to do his 
bidding. Thus the state sinks to its lowest level, tyranny. 
The variety of Greek city-states provided examples of 
all these three stages of political corruption, and it is 
against this exposure of actualities that we should con-
sider Plato's portrayal of the ideal society. It was to be 
a realization of his principle of aristocracy, the rule of the 
highest principle of human nature, reason. In it a class 
of artisans-farmers, mechanics, tradesmen-are engaged 
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in the production and distribution of material goods. We 
may call them the provisioners of society. Plato recog-
nized their service to the state in making available men's 
needed food, clothing, shelter, and the other commodities 
required in the social economy. But while the class of 
artisans have a great variety of accumulated skills, astute-
ness in amassing goods, and always a keen eye for profit, 
they lack insight or right judgment of relative values; 
they have no vision of men's highest reach and destiny. 
By no means should political dominance or the direction 
of state policy be entrusted to them. 
The state that should be well provided with material 
goods by its artisans must also be assured of security 
from domestic riot or foreign aggression. It needs a 
second class, warriors or soldiers. This class, the strong 
arm of the state, must be the embodiment of disciplined 
valor. While it must be ever ready to carry out the orders 
of the government in any public emergency, it must 
never assume or usurp the authority of ordering state 
policy. It must execute public decisions, not make them. 
The commands that proceed from generals to lieutenants 
to the troops must conform to the initially decisive prin-
ciples of those in supreme authority. The state needs 
defensive and aggressive power but it must be power 
directed by rational statesmanship. 
It is clear, therefore, that the highest and in fact the 
prime need of the state is reliable rational direction. 
Plato's ideal republic must have a class of guardians or 
judges, rationally enlightened men and agents of en-
lightenment. They should be men marked by preeminent 
intelligence and sound judgment, whose native endow-
ment has been perfected by long training and tested 
through a progressively more responsible and important 
public service. 
The effectiveness of rational statesmanship requires the 
assurance of its continued stability. Without any menace 
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of upset or revolution, it must maintain its rational course, 
generation after generation. In order to safeguard this 
stable and continued dominance in the state, his principle 
of aristocracy, Plato was ready for radical measures and 
proposed a plan of life for his ruling guardian class which 
has aroused severe criticism. His guardians and states-
men, despite their rational power, were liable to have their 
human limitations and frailties. The state should therefore 
remove from them any temptation of private gain, and 
it must protect itself against any misjudgment of theirs 
due to private family favoritism. If they are to exercise 
chief authority in the state, their entire mind and heart 
must be devoted to the public good. So Plato proposed 
economic and family communism for his guardian class. 
Those who control the entire course of the social economy 
should have no property of their own. And the children 
that are to be born to them must not be known as their 
own sons or daughters. They should be brought up in 
public nurseries and educated as children of the state. 
The process of public education of the youth of the 
guardian class is regarded by Plato as a condition and 
guarantee of the stable rational aristocracy. The school 
program itself is definitely aristocratic. By a schedule of 
progressive training of the higher and still higher faculties 
of the mind, Plato seeks to discover superior rational 
power, to elicit and perfect it, and to give it effectual 
expression in reflection and in action and eventually in 
public service. The entire training must aim to lift the 
soul ever upward. The pupils begin with gymnastics and 
music; this early instruction in harmony of body and soul 
is to prepare them for the higher harmonies and principles 
of intelligence. The intellectual education is to proceed 
from arithmetic to geometry and astronomy, and thus 
upward toward dialectic, the science of ultimate truth, 
insight into first principles. 
The students who show rational excellence in these 
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studies are assigned to various civil and military service. 
Those who demonstrate preeminence in their offices are 
then chosen to succeed their guardian teachers and 
masters. Like them they are to give the state rational 
direction and to educate the youth of their own genera-
tion of the republic. Their closing years are to be devoted 
to consultation when they are needed and to philosophical 
contemplation. 
Plato portrays his ideal state as a heavenly pattern of 
perfection and also as a crucial standard by which all 
forms of government are to be judged. Without the 
effective supremacy of reason there can be no hope of 
reliable social order and welfare. "Until philosophers are 
kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the 
spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness 
and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures 
who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are com-
pelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their 
evils-no, nor the human race, as I believe-and then only 
will this our State have a possibility of life and behold 
the light of day."1 
Plato's Republic was a philosopher's utopia. His de-
cisive concern was to attain and preserve his aristocratic 
principle of the dominance of rational intelligence in in-
dividual lives and in the social order. This imperative 
concern led him to neglect the importance of avoiding 
maldistribution of emphasis. His proposed communism of 
the guardian class has been condemned as in effect deny-
ing to his best and most mature citizens the full range of 
personal experience and activity. Plato's utopia has been 
criticized as advocating a stratified hierarchy of classes 
and values. In our day fascists have denounced Plato's 
communistic policies, while communists have branded 
him as the first philosopher of a fascist ideology. 
As in the social-political aspects of his perfect state, 
1 Plato Republic 5. 473, trans. Jowett (Oxford, 1892). 
UTOPIAN VISIONS 
so likewise in his aesthetic outlook, in his treatment of 
art, of music and poetry, Plato has been judged as con-
stricting unduly the life of the creative imagination. He 
was himself a supreme artist of philosophical utterance, 
and he grasped the great power of the arts. But that 
great power which could ennoble man's spirit could also 
corrupt him, if misdirected to low sensual ends. So Plato 
proposed strict censorship of all the arts to assure their 
conformity to ideal truth, to the demands and standards 
of rational intelligence. 
In the critique of Plato's treatment of the arts, we 
should keep in mind the supreme rational values which 
he was resolved to preserve, and we should not overlook 
the actual artistic corruptions which he was denouncing. 
In his severe criticism Plato would expurgate the polluted 
strains not only in the arts of his day but even in the 
greatest masters. The old epics misrepresented the ideal 
realities. Homer "told lies about the gods." Can there be 
anything more disastrous than to have false and unworthy 
views of the highest realities? Corrupt art and super-
stitious religion must both be reformed, if our lives and 
our social order and institutions are to realize harmoniously 
their highest aims and capacities. 
The transition of Western civilization from the medieval 
to the modern period was marked by a radical shift in 
world outlook and in social philosophy of life. Men 
became keenly aware of themselves and of their daily 
experience, of their needs and opportunities and prospects. 
The revolt against ecclesiastical authoritarianism during 
the Renaissance expressed itself initially in a classical 
revival. But the Humanists did not remain content with 
Platonic wisdom and Ciceronian Latinity. Their zeal for 
Greek and Roman antiquity inspired them to face their 
own problems with classical freedom of inquiry, self-
reliant and forward-looking. 
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The release of men's minds from the rule of ecclesiastical 
authority, which marked the Renaissance and which ex-
pressed itself in the classical revival and in the secularism 
and naturalism of scientific inquiry, led to a spirit of un-
trammeled worldliness and to a demand for entirely un-
hampered freedom of thought and action. This was the 
age of the great unloosing, and its visions of the perfect 
society may be read in the uproarious book of Franc;ois 
Rabelais ( 1495-1553), Gargantua and Pantagruel. Its 
enormous popularity-sixty editions before 1600-was no 
doubt largely due to its earthy obscenity and its inex-
haustible comedy, but also to what it derided and what 
it championed. Against stodgy, pedantic, and sanctimon-
ious conformity of any sort, Rabelais glorified the utter 
release of all inhibitions and b·aditional scruples, the 
unconstrained and unshackled elan of men's thought and 
passion and will. 
Rabelais's utopian Abbey of Theleme expressed his 
spirit of jolly freedom in its motto, "Do what thou wilt, 
Fay ce que vouldras."2 It was to be without walls. Free 
to enter and free to leave, men and women could join it 
and abide at their pleasure together, without any vows of 
chastity, poverty, and obedience. Youth was the only 
condition of admission, and fine looks and a joyous spirit 
the terms of preference. Gargantua planned for his 
Thelemites an abbey of delight. Its close to ten thousand 
chambers were designed for ease and comfort. The 
apparel, the diet, the daily round of activities of these 
fine young men and women were to bespeak not their 
withdrawal from worldliness but their thorough and ex-
pert enjoyment of life. No stern rules were to govern 
their conduct; rather they were to have a spirit of com-
plete relaxation. Rabelais was convinced that such a 
program of utter freedom would evoke the full expression 
2 Rabelais, Gargantua and Pantagruel, Book 1, chapt. 57, trans. Thomas 
prq.uhart (London, ed. of 1901). 
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of men's and women's energies and talents and eventually 
would bring out the best in them. "Men that are free, 
well-born, well-bred, and conversant in honest companies, 
have naturally an instinct and spur that prompt them 
unto virtuous action."3 
Against Rabelais' s worldly blast at priestly and monkish 
repression, we should note the tragic utopian admonition 
of the monastic reformer Girolamo Savonarola ( 1452-
1498), who tried to establish a Christian theocracy in 
Florence. His pulpit eloquence had gained him the devo-
tion of the populace, and he resolved to use his influence 
in rebuilding the city of the Medicis on a gospel plan, 
a government of Christ. The immediate results of this 
citywide conversion were astounding. Moneylenders re-
turned their usurious profits to their victims; gamblers 
and idlers earned their bread in honest labor; highborn 
ladies discarded their fine apparel and jewelry and served 
the Lord in plain dress and frugal living; luxury and 
penury disappeared together, and the destitute sick were 
fed and nursed in public hospitals; lewd books and 
pictures were thrown to the flames; austere living and 
penitent worship replaced the former drunken and 
profligate revels of the Florentines. While Savonarola 
was thus translating his Christian visions into daily prac-
tice, he also defied and denounced the worldliness and 
corruption of the ecclesiastical hierarchy and of Pope 
Alexander VI. 
The theocratic utopia of contrite piety proved too stern 
for Florentine practice. A reaction set in, and it grew in 
force and violence. The populace itself whom Savonarola 
had nursed like a good Samaritan turned against him and 
abandoned him to his enemies. The prior-reformer of 
San Marco was burned at the stake, and the Florentines 
returned to their erstwhile ways of life. 
The Protestant Reformation expressed in its own de-
a Ibid. 
192 PART ONE 
velopment the immediate self-concern of men. The radical 
stand against the papal hierarchy sought to bring the lay-
man's soul directly to God's throne, without the inter-
mediation of priest or bishop. In this more intimately 
personal Christian communion of faith, as the traditional 
gulf between clergy and laity was spanned, the godly life 
no longer found its perfection in monastic withdrawal 
but affected all men whatever in their daily activities: 
not only the monk in his cell or the priest at the altar, 
but also the farmer at his plough and the housewife in 
her kitchen. The reformation, in its advocacy of a more 
directly personal and weekday religion, was undertaking 
to infuse spirituality into the modern secularism. But the 
secular spirit was seeking also its own individual and 
social outlets. Within the church, or outside of it, though 
not always in conflict with it, men were drafting their 
programs of social reform. Three outstanding examples of 
these early versions of the perfect society claim our 
attention. 
The earliest of these three, Sir Thomas More's Utopia 
(1516), was the work of a famous humanist who was also 
a devout Catholic. His resistance to the Anglican revolt 
against the pope led by Henry VIII ended in his martyr-
dom. In our century Rome has canonized him. The 
complex interplay of motives in the personality of More-
a friend and colleague of Erasmus, a devotee of ascetic 
austerities, a severe critic of the existing social systems, 
an eminent lawyer, a statesman of heroic integrity-this 
versatile mental activity was itself an expression of the 
crosscurrents which marked the Renaissance. 
While it may be debated whether More intended his 
Utopia explicitly as a program of radical social reform 
or merely as an idealistic and ironical speculation on a 
Platonist pattern, the work itself was an exposure of 
rampant evils and a portrayal of a proposed blessed 
society. Perhaps More drew his ideal chart first and then 
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surveyed in disdain the actual conditions in Europe and 
more particularly in England. In his published work the 
exposure comes before the revelation. Inequity and cor-
ruption blight the lives of people, and the laws and 
courts that should have protected men in their natural 
rights seem rather to flout them and to work injustice. The 
ruling powers protect the rich in their affluence and scorn 
the poor in their struggle to earn a pittance. Soldiers 
returning from the fields of battle find no fields of peace 
in which they can make an honest livelihood and so they 
turn to beggary or robbery. The death penalty for theft 
does not deter desperate men from stealing but only 
tempts them to avoid detection by murdering their victims. 
The laws tread hard on the delinquent poor instead of 
giving them a chance of gaining their subsistence. Amidst 
all this misery of common folk, opulence and luxury, 
gambling and garish profligacy stain the lives of the lords 
of earth, both laymen and clergy. Baron and bishop 
revel together with tyrannous royalty, despising a beggarly 
people. 
This wretched and iniquitous state of society can never 
be ended so long as its fundamental cause remains, 
namely, the institution of private property, which incites 
men's oppressive greed and defeats social justice. So 
More's Utopia is premised on his first principle of eco-
nomic communism. Where there is no longer any chance 
of private gain, citizens will tend to concern themselves 
with the general welfare, and society will become a true 
commonwealth. In a state of public cooperation, where 
money, the handling of it, usury, and theft would be of 
no further avail, the energies of all people would be en-
gaged fairly in the common work of society, without 
grinding labor and without idleness. More's blessed island 
of Utopia prospers on a six-hour working day. Add eight 
hours for sleep, and all men still have ten hours of the 
twenty-four for relaxation and culture. Public enter-
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tainments as well as public education are recognized 
functions of the state. The schools impart manual training 
as well as intellectual discipline; the cultivation of the 
arts is aimed at perfecting the general taste rather than at 
mere popular amusement. Economy and convenience are 
secured by public refectories, and dinners become also 
social gatherings. While thus easing the daily drudgery 
of household work, the utopian state is directly concerned 
with safeguarding homelife by strict regulation of mar-
riages to prevent contamination of the race or unsuitable 
matches. Socialized medicine, preventive and curative, 
protects the health of young and old. 
For the political order of his ideal society More ad-
vocated a government of elective monarchy. The people 
are to exercize control by choosing their king and by 
reserving the right to depose him if he abuses his authority; 
but while each city governs itself, there is no direct 
popular rule in the state. In its relation to other govern-
ments Utopia, having no thought of aggression or con-
quest, always prefers negotiation to the use of force; 
yet it keeps itself ready for untoward hostilities. The 
devotion of the citizens to their country is a strong 
bulwark, but the Utopians prefer to engage mercenaries 
to fight their battles rather than to spill the blood of their 
own young men. Even the hiring of assassins is not ex-
cluded from their strategy. 
The economic and social equality of the citizens of 
Utopia would not be compatible with requiring any of 
them to do the scavenger's or other similarly low and 
menial labor, which nevertheless must be included in the 
order of the day. For these services More demanded a 
class of slaves, and he would make his demand serve two 
purposes by enacting enslavement as the penalty for 
crimes. In cases of adultery, for instance, the innocent 
party may remarry, but not the guilty one, who is con-
demned to slave labor. 
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In view of More's own strict religious devotion, his 
treatment of faith and worship is significant. Utopia 
practices religious tolerance, for without the imposition 
of conformity men would have a better chance of reach-
ing true belief and worship. The Utopians frown on 
bigots and on zealots. In religion as in all secular pursuits, 
men's lives on the blessed island are to be guided by 
fair-minded concern for the general welfare and happiness. 
Tommaso Campanella ( 1568-1639), like Bernardino 
Telesio and Giordano Bruno, was an Italian of the South. 
He studied under Telesio and, like Bruno, entered the 
Dominican order and early showed resistance to estab-
lished authority, theological and social. A stalwart cham-
pion of freedom, he aroused the hostility of the Spanish 
despots in Naples. His chosen motto was "Nunquam 
tacebo, I will never keep silent," and he paid for his 
radical speech by some thirty years in jail. The beginning 
lines of one of his sonnets describes his life: "To fight 
three mighty evils I was born: /Tyranny, sophistry, hy-
pocrisy." Only during the closing years of his life, when 
as a refugee from Spanish rule he gained the protection 
of Richelieu in Paris, did Campanella enjoy freedom and 
recognition. 
In his defense of the new methods of research, in 
physiology and more especially in the astronomy of his 
great contemporary Galileo, whom he championed in a 
treatise, Campanella took his stand in looking to modern 
science as the guide to progress. Even more important 
in his view was the need of complete reconstruction of 
existing social institutions. His utopian program was 
presented in the work by which he is best known, The 
City of the Sun. 
Campanella's ideal society shares main features with 
Plato's and More's and is more radical than either of 
these. Like Plato he would enthrone reason and calls 
his chief ruler Metaphysicus. This metaphysical mon-
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arch governs through three deputies, whose names 
indicate Campanella's principal hopes for a just and pro-
gressive society: Power, Wisdom, and Love. In the 
portrayal of his ideal government, he is not satisfied with 
generalities but punctuates his demanded reforms in 
detail. First and foremost for him, as for More, is the 
outlawing of private property not only for the ruling 
guardian class, as in Plato's Republic, but for all without 
exception. But unlike More, Campanella would not have 
a class of slaves in his state. Every man and woman in 
his solar city does his work whatever it be, without 
partiality or prejudice, and by avoiding any superfluous 
production of luxuries and by encouraging perfection of 
skills the working day is reduced to four hours. Thus 
energetic but not overworked, in frugal living with simple 
natural diet, young and old grow in health and strength. 
Their way of life prevents most ailments, and proper care 
checks any exceptional disease. 
Plato had advocated family communism for his guardian 
class chiefly in order to prevent the succession of worthy 
rulers by their unworthy sons through parental favoritism. 
More's own patriarchal household exemplified his high 
regard for the social dignity of homelife in the perfection 
of human values. But monastic Campanella regarded the 
family institution as cramping and unsocial. His citizens 
"deny . . . that it is natural to man to recognize his 
offspring and to educate them, and to use his wife and 
house and children as his own."4 
We should expect from our Dominican a more sig-
nificant religious view than that presented in his book. 
The Solarian worship includes an elaborate system of 
confessions of sins and absolutions, volunteered but never 
executed human sacrifices, for "God does not require 
death." We read of perpetual prayers and supplications, 
psalmody, and dancing rituals. The articles of the Solarian 
4 Ideal Commonwealths, by Henry Morley (New York, 1901), p. 156. 
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creed include belief in God "under the image of the Sun," 
and "beyond question" the immortality of the soul. Cam-
panella's speculations are a strange blend of scientific 
altertness with astrological muddle, and they affect his 
religious visions. 5 
Campanella is quite expert and even amusingly de-
tailed in his utopian imagination: in the variety of im-
provements and new appliances produced by inventive 
genius and by the more general training in science and 
technology. He describes the skillful tactics of his Solarians 
in waging war and their practical efficiency in all their 
daily occupations: farming, clothing, public eating places, 
schools. Men plough and sow, harvest and thresh and 
press their vintage; women milk the cows and make 
cheese, spin and weave, barber and sew, and fiddle and 
pipe at the public concerts, but not blow the horn or 
beat the drum. Both sexes wear the same garments, but 
men's togas reach above the knees, and women's, below. 
The borders of their undergarments are fastened with 
globular buttons and caught up here and there with 
chains. The common public dining rooms are like 
monastic refectories. Men and women sit at the same 
tables but on opposite sides, and there must be no noisy 
talk during meals; instead, they all listen to a young man 
reading a book from a high platform, "intoning distinctly 
and sonorously."6 All this was duly envisioned by the 
Renaissance radical monk in his prison cell. 
These sundry details are parts of Campanella's utopia, 
but they should not divert our attention from his main 
reform purpose. He would design a new social order in 
which men's minds would be freed from the fetters of 
bigotry, in which economic exploitation and oppression 
of the common people would be abolished, and men and 
women would enjoy together the fruits of universal labor 
5 Op. cit., pp. 175, 178, 179. 
6 Ibid., p. 154. 
198 PART ONE 
in healthy, vigorous, and simple livelihood. He does not 
recognize the personal values of intimate homelife which 
were evident to More; neither of them considers the 
alternative of a social reform that would correct the 
abuses of economic exploitation and inequity while pre-
serving the worth of productive initiative and material 
satisfaction in private ownership and operation. 
Francis Bacon ( 1561-1626) outlined a complete re-
organization of intellectual productive activity to under-
stand the laws of nature, utilize its resources for man's 
advantage, and achieve a new and expansive civilization. 
He called his vast encyclopedic project "The Great 
Instauration," under six heads; it included mainly four 
undertakings. First, he exposed the stagnation of knowl-
edge through the long medieval centuries, as due to the 
use of dogmatic syllogistic reasoning about nature instead 
of direct examination of its structure and processes. We 
must recognize the main misleading preconceptions-as 
he called them, the Idols of the Mind-which obstruct 
scienti£c advance: common prejudices, individual biases, 
confused use of words impeding scientific communication, 
and varieties of professional and traditional dogmatism. 
We should rid ourselves of these as completely as possible; 
we should come to nature with a clean slate, ready to 
learn, not to debate. The outline of a new method of 
investigation, inductive logic, was Bacon's second main 
proposal. After extensive observation, without any initial 
commitment and speculation, the inquiring mind which 
has noted certain repeated events and forms of behavior 
in nature should probe more carefully to discover some 
one factor that accounts for the behavior. It then ob-
serves or experiments to see if the absence of that factor 
eliminates the behavior, or if the variation of that factor 
increases or decreases the phenomenon. This sort of ob-
servation or experimental inquiry Bacon proposed to apply 
throughout nature. A third grand project, requiring a 
large staff of scientific workers, was to yield some 130 
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"histories" of as many fields of nature. On the basis of 
this immense variety of investigations he could foresee 
the progressive achievement of a scientific philosophy of 
nature, the fourth and crowning achievement of his in-
tellectual reform of civilization. 
All the way through, Bacon combined in his encyclo-
pedic prospect pure and applied science. Mastery of 
nature requires understanding of nature's laws, but this 
understanding and mastery is most rewarding in its 
practical results. Knowledge is power. More important 
and more fruitful than any question of government must 
be the organized promotion of scientific research. In this 
conviction Bacon portrayed his ideal society, the New 
Atlantis. The preeminent department of this utopia, the 
"Salomon's House," was praised by Bacon as "the noblest 
foundation . . . that ever was upon the earth, and the 
lanthorn of this kingdom." We can recognize in it a 
vastly expanded form of our research institutes and foun-
dations. Its purpose is stated concisely, but the implemen-
tation of it is extensively ramified. "The End of our 
Foundation is the knowledge of Causes, and secret motions 
of things; and the enlarging of the bounds of Human 
Empire, to the effecting of all things possible."7 
The program of state-supported researches indicates 
the vast range of Bacon's utopian prospect. Even a brief 
summary will suggest its boundless scope. New Atlantis 
has extensive and deep excavations, even to six hundred 
fathoms, in which men study "all coagulations, indura-
tions, refrigerations and conservations of bodies"; it builds 
towers up to half a mile in height set upon mountains, 
likewise used for "insulation, refrigeration, conservation," 
but also for weather observation and reports of winds, rain, 
snow, hail, and fiery meteors. There are artificial wells 
and lakes, both fresh and salt, used for fisheries, mineral 
springs and baths "tincted upon vitriol, sulphur, steel, 
7 Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon, ed. J. M. Robertson (London, 
1905), pp. 721, 727. 
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lead, brass, nitre, and other minerals," where various 
medicinal researches are pursued. In botanical gardens 
and biological laboratories, plant and animal breeders 
seek to produce new and better stocks. Large chemical 
plants are devoted to the discovery of new metals and 
the production of better alloys and also to the compound-
ing of drugs for the cure of sundry diseases. Machine 
shops of all sorts, furnaces of great diversity, some of 
them producing heats in imitation of the sun, laboratories 
of research in the varieties of light, institutes of tool and 
instrument manufacture of great precision and delicacy: 
there seems to be no end to the ramification of the projects 
of Salomon's House. All this work is organized on a 
statewide plan; the workers in the various fields of in-
vestigation report to the central office; experts edit their 
materials, appraise their likely practical applications, pro-
pose further inquiries. Traveling fellows inspect any 
promising lines of research pursued in other lands, for 
testing and use in the New Atlantis. 8 
Bacon's work was left unfinished; but fragmentary as 
it is, it expresses his spirit as the champion of scientific 
investigation that was to achieve a new civilization 
through mastery and use of the resources of nature. 
Bacon was a promoter of science rather than a productive 
scientist. He was deficient in his appreciation of the 
scientific works of his contemporaries; he failed to do 
justice to Harvey or to Galileo. Nevertheless his spur to 
organized research may be traced in his influence on the 
establishment of the Royal Society of London, the Paris 
Academy of Sciences, and similar institutions in Berlin, 
Bologna, and elsewhere. 
Utopian plans of the perfect society have expressed the 
self-outreaching spirit of confidence in periods of intellec-
tual and social revival and advance and also the resolute 
sOp. cit., pp. 727 ff. 
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persistence of men in times of revolution and unsettlement. 
So during the Renaissance the awakening of European 
minds to the vast prospects of humanism and naturalism 
stirred the men whom we have been considering to much 
vaster outlooks of social realization. They expressed the 
pioneering zeal of early modern thinkers in various direc-
tions of progress: intellectual, political, economic, re-
ligious. Alongside of the liberals and radicals, there were 
also conservative visionaries who would refashion the new 
social order in conformity with old patterns to which 
they were accustomed. 
The early modern age was itself providing instances of 
new worlds and new ways of life overseas. On American 
shores, the Pilgrim Fathers aimed to establish God's king-
dom on earth: "Know this is the place where the Lord 
will create a new Heaven, and a new Earth in new 
Churches, and a new Commonwealth together."9 The 
European utopians looked westward across the Atlantic: 
the narrator in More's Utopia was a voyager with Amerigo 
Vespucci; Bacon's New Atlantis was a remote island "be-
yond the Old World and the New": Campanella's City 
of the Sun, in Taprobana, was also vaguely and distantly 
overseas. 
While Europe was embroiled in political and religious 
conflicts-the Thirty Years War in Germany, the struggle 
between king and Parliament in England, the civil war 
in Holland, the exploitation and oppression of the common 
people by the centralized monarchical regime in France-
the American colonists were building new ways of life 
and before long were to plan for still fuller initiative and 
complete independence. The release of the European 
mind during the Enlightenment, especially in France, 
stirred the demand for political and social-economic 
emancipation. The philosophes of the Encyclopedie were 
9 From Capt. Edward Johnson's History of New England, or Wonder-
working Providence of Sion' s Saviour ( 1654), quoted here from H. W. 
Schneider's work, The Puritan Mind (New York, 1930), p. 8. 
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doing more spreading abroad the new knowledge. They 
have been rightly named "the fathers of the Revolution." 
The achievement of American independence, in which 
French sympathy and assistance played a role, had its 
prompt repercussions in France: the Fourth of July was 
followed by the Fourteenth. 
These two revolutions, beyond their actual results, 
stirred men's dreams of more extensive realization of 
human life as it should be lived. The post-revolutionary 
age, in Britain as well as in France and America, bred 
many utopias, some of them only plans on paper, others 
actually tried out. The increased tempo of contemporary 
life and its continual transformations inside and out, with 
boundless prospects but also dire threats challenging men's 
minds, have aroused both heralds of incredible progress 
and prophets of doom. More than any other period of 
history, our atomic age is an age of utopia indeed, but in 
its double meaning of incertitude: "the blessed place" 
and "no place at all." 
The great multitude of contemporary utopias precludes 
any detailed review. Even a brief catalog description of 
them could scarcely be attempted. If a widely sampling 
reader's judgment may be trusted, the neglect of many 
of them would matter little. But it is of interest to con-
sider some characteristic purposes and ideals which have 
found expression in these utopian writings, for they serve 
to accentuate the values and also the problems which 
engross contemporary social thought. 
The principal modern utopian projects of reform, as 
might be expected, concern the main social institutions. 
First and most extensively considered is the economic and 
political reconstitution of society. Many modern utopias 
manifest a communistic trend, which we noted already 
in More and in Campanella. The root of social evil is 
exposed as the maldistribution of property. Some utopias 
have followed the proposal of James Harrington in Oceana 
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(1656) in urging the "agrarian balance" in land ownership 
and general equalization of property. But other utopians 
have denounced the institution of private property as 
inherently evil and have traced the high road to human 
betterment in various forms of communistic economy. On 
the eve of the French Revolution Rousseau stigmatized 
as the founder of corrupt society (or author of inequality) 
the man who first enclosed a piece of ground to call it 
his own and found people deluded enough to believe 
him. During the Revolution Babeuf urged the abolition 
of all ranks and inequalities, the complete social and 
economic leveling of all citizens. Etienne Cabet, in his 
Voyage to Icarie ( 1840), would put all persons and all 
types of work on a par, scientists and scavengers.. Every-
one was to do his share of the work in the social economy 
and receive from the state warehouses whatever he 
needed, on the same terms with everyone else. Across 
the Channel, Robert Owen (1771-1858), both by his pro-
posals and by his actual trials of them in Scotland and 
in America, inspired a series of utopian ventures. He 
was a pioneer in the modem cooperative movement, but 
beyond this elimination of middleman profits, he would 
abolish all exploitation by organizing small social colonies 
on a basis of community of labor and of its fruits, without 
the evils or the miseries of inequality. 
The emancipation of men from economic servitude, 
which was the basic purpose of the utopian abolition of 
inequality, promised still further realization of freedom. 
The motto of Rabelais's Abbey of Theleme, "Do as you 
will!" was shared by many modern visions of the ideal 
society. An outstanding protagonist of the release of men 
in all directions, very contagious in its day, was Charles 
Fourier ( 1772-1837). The first article of his creed seems 
to have been Rabelaisian: the root of all evil in human 
life is repression. Break the institutional shackles which 
hamper the free release of men's ideas and energies and 
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passions alike. Replace social control by free social com-
munion in all respects; replace exploitation or competition 
by free cooperation, and men will find their fulfillment. 
To realize this ideal, Fourier proposed the establishment 
of small phalanges, communities of some 1,600 or 1,800 
persons who would live together in unrestrained spon-
taneity, like butterflies, papillons, enjoying continuity or 
else change in their programs of life as they might prefer: 
different work, different mates, without any restriction. 
Fourier was prepared to practice what he preached, with-
out any concessions to traditional scruples or inhibitions. 
Pending the establishment of his Eden of free work, free 
play, free love, his societies of propaganda tried it out 
as far as they could, within or without the law, and in 
some of their excesses matched in practice the license 
which sullies some of Fourier's pages. 
Despite the mixture of the maudlin and the prurient 
in Fourier's gospel of unrestraint, his influence may be 
traced in the establishment and in the understandably 
brief histories of several utopian communities. The most 
noteworthy of them on American shores, Brook Farm, 
was not started as a Fourierist phalange but as a settle-
ment of Christian cooperation, led by the liberal clergy-
man George Ripley. The advocacy of Fourier's ideas by 
Albert Brisbane affected Brook Farm vitally but also 
aroused the opposition of some of its best members-
Hawthorne, Charles Dana, Bronson Alcott-and sorely 
disturbed its founder who had firm trust in common honest 
work without exploitation and in Christian brotherly love 
and who cherished pure family loyalty and loathed 
license. In the end Brook Farm collapsed, although Haw-
thorne, its most distinguished member, declared that it 
had "struck on what ought to be a truth."10 The wisest 
man of the Brook Farm days, Emerson, visited the pro-
1o Compare Katherine Burton, Paradise Planters: The Story of Brook 
Farm (London and New York, 1939), title page. 
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jected ideal society but would not join it. He could not 
visualize true emancipation by the simple course of moving 
to another community. Freedom must be won in one's 
own inner life. "I wish to break all prisons. I have not 
yet conquered my own house."11 Mrs. Browning agreed 
with Emerson: 
. . . Ah. your Fouriers failed 
Because not poets enough to understand 
That life develops from within.12 
The dissolution of monogamous family life, which was 
the most radical and objectionable article in Fourier's 
creed of human liberation, has been advocated by other 
utopians, though by none more flagrantly than by him. 
There has been widespread criticism of the rigid enforce-
ment of the bond, especially in Roman Catholic lands, 
without the relief of divorce, even in cases of family chaos 
intolerable to the parents and ruinous to the morale of 
children. In more extreme opposition, family communism 
has been advocated as a replacement of the tight home 
unit, with its stiff bourgeois conformity to customary ideas 
and institutions, by a looser cohesion that would allow 
the freer and unbound attachment of individuals in new 
and better social relations. 
Closely related to utopian criticism of traditional home-
life have been various eugenic projects for the improve-
ment of the human race. Plato first of all advocated 
selective mating in the guardian class of his Republic to 
assure the bearing of the best and most gifted children. 
With a similar purpose Sir Thomas More insisted on the 
most thorough physical examination of all who planned 
to marry. Campanella put all family unions under the 
strict control of state officials. Modern utopias have shown 
11 Emerson, Journals (Boston and New York, Oct. 17, 1840). 
12 Cited from Harry Emerson Fosdick, Christianity and Progress (New 
York and Chicago, 1922), p. 90. 
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similar concern for the successful breeding of an improved 
human race by eugenic regulations. It may be noted that 
some of these utopian projects have urged not release and 
free range of individual inclination, but on the contrary 
stringent control in the interest of future generations and 
the destiny of the race. 
The utopian provisions for the upbringing of children 
concern the problem of public education. A number of 
modern utopias have followed Plato's proposal to remove 
children from the liable hazard of prejudicial influences 
of their own parents by bringing them together under the 
care and guidance of mentors selected by the state. By 
sharing a similar well-chosen bodily and mental diet, 
pupils can show fairly their aptitudes or special capacities. 
They will thus be given the right opportunities not only 
to follow their characteristic bent but also to serve society 
to the best advantage. By the right course of training of 
its youth, men can avoid the two vices of idleness and 
drudgery. Utopians have been assured that, in an educa-
tional system thoroughly organized for social service, 
science and technology will flourish and resources of 
nature will be used to the increasing advantage and pros-
perity of the state. Actually modern technical advance 
has repeatedly outstripped the dreams of Bacon or the 
modern utopians. In 1892 Ignatius Donnelly prophesied 
the day when aerial vessels would fly between New York 
and London in thirty-six hours. The fundamental ideal of 
a society directed by expert technicians has been proposed 
in our time as a definite plan for immediate social reform. 
It is not easy to draw a sharp borderline between the 
utopian visions of the perfect society and what have been 
called the "pseudo-utopias," that is, definite plans of 
specific social reconstruction fortified by severe exposures 
of existing injustice and corruption. Along this indefinite 
margin may be noted two modern schemes of the better 
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life, the "Freeland" of the Austrian economist Theodor 
Hertzka and the American Edward Bellamy's Looking 
Backward. 
Hertzka brought to his proposed reconstruction of 
society the reputation of mastery in his science of eco-
nomics. The title of his main work, Freeland: A Social 
Anticipation ( 1890), was meant to express his conviction 
that he was drawing the picture of an actually realizable 
future. He proceeded to direct promotion of his project. 
About one thousand societies were formed for the estab-
lishment of the new colony. Suitable land was made 
available for the settlers in British East Africa, near Mount 
Kenya, but difficulties complicated the initial start and 
finally the plan had to be abandoned. 
"Freeland" shared with Brook Farm the same optimistic 
conviction that men and women will readily undertake 
the hard work of collaboration in building a new social 
order. The African jungle and the equatorial humid heat 
were not the only obstacles to the persistent strenuous 
labor of the Freelanders. The ideal ''basis of perfect 
liberty and economic justice," recognizing "no exclusive 
right to property" but securing to each worker "the full 
and uncurtailed enjoyment of the fruits of his labor" was 
announced on the first page, but the realization of it in 
the sequel was another matter. Hertzka appealed candidly 
to the normal self-interest of his prospective citizens, but 
he could not be assured of their loyal cooperation when 
the finances of his proclaimed "Eden Vale" became 
straitened and men could no longer see their own way 
to any likely advantage. 
Bellamy's Looking Backward: 2000-1887 was published 
only two years before Hertzka's Freeland. As indicated 
on its title page, its purported viewpoint forecast a century 
of social progress. As Bellamy reports the future Boston 
of the year 2000, the American social order will have been 
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reformed inside and out. Perhaps this feature of im-
mediately realizable social transformation accounts for 
the great popularity of the work 
The chief feature of the new life, in Bellamy's utopia, 
is a system of universal labor, operating without exception, 
but in each case in a field freely chosen by the individual. 
Bellamy's America of the year 2000 may be described as 
a land of industrial militarism. By abolishing all private 
industry or business of whatever sort, all private buying 
and selling, the utopian state has become the universal 
and the only employer of all labor and supplier of any 
goods. Service to the state, then, has become an inevitable 
condition of survival. Boys and girls receive their prepara-
tion for life and enjoy their youth until they reach the 
age of twenty-one; men and women past the age of forty-
five are "honorably mustered out" to retirement and 
leisure. During the intermediate twenty-four active years 
each person must choose freely his own line of work To 
insure the doing of the less congenial and even disagree-
able labor in the social economy, the government officials 
reduce the hours of labor in it to attract the needed 
volunteers. Bellamy is prepared for extreme measures in 
this matter. "If any particular occupation is in itself 
so arduous or so oppressive that, in order to induce 
volunteers, the day's work in it had to be reduced to ten 
minutes, it would be done. If even then, no man was 
willing to do it, it would remain undone."13 
In Bellamy's Boston of the year 2000 money has been 
removed from circulation; the state's payment for all work 
is in the form of labor credit cards, which each person 
may use to procure whatever goods he needs or desires 
from the government supply stores. The state provides 
not only agricultural and industrial products but also 
books, works of art, entertainment, music. Bellamy's 
13 Edward Bellamy, Looking Backward: 2000-1887 (Boston and New 
York, ed. of 1889), p. 68. 
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cultural anticipations include many appliances and ser-
vices which we already have: broadcast musical programs 
and other forms of mass cultivation or diversion. The de-
tailed planning of this social economy and the effective 
operation of the system of universal labor require a highly 
trained body of public officials, and Bellamy has elaborate 
plans to serve these ends. His work inspired a number of 
more-or-less similar schemes, but it also evoked much 
criticism of his sublime confidence in the social panacea 
of universal labor army discipline. 
An outstanding characteristic of our twentieth century 
has been the contrast between its incredible advance in 
scientific-technical mastery and its lagging moral develop-
ment, especially in international and interracial relations. 
We have already swept far beyond the fondest utopian 
dreams of the past in probing and exploiting the forces 
and resources of nature, but so much of our social life 
is still barbarian in thought and action. We have split 
the atoms but cannot unite men to live together in justice 
and peace. Catalogs of twentieth-century utopias list over 
three score titles; some of them are diagnoses of present 
corruption rather than visions of future perfection. The 
appalling waste of humanity in two world wars, the dismal 
eruption of excesses and atrocities among the presumably 
advanced and cultured nations, the spread of ideologies 
promoted by men disdainful of the most elementary 
human rights and expert in most vicious propaganda: all 
these have shaken people's confidence in the soundness 
of our civilization and men's hopes of any likely restoration 
and advance toward social sanity. 
Our age has produced even "utopias in reverse," ex-
posures of further alarming spread of social cancers that 
threaten the very life of civilization, and not at some 
remote time but at a menacingly near date. Against 
Bellamy's Looking Backward: 2000-1887, we may read 
George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, published in 1949, 
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some of whose forecasts sound like present-day journal-
istic reporting. Even those optimists of our day, who 
portray tomorrow's marvels of atoms-for-peace, are aghast 
at the threats of the book and wonder if we shall have 
any civilized tomorrow, or any tomorrow, to record. It 
is not a perverse pessimistic choice but the looming dark-
ness of our age which forces this utopian chapter to end 
on a dismal note. Nevertheless our choice is still open, 
between catastrophic downfall and the upward advance 
toward incredibly greater fulfillment of personal and 
social values. We shall try to explore the various cross-
roads of history on which this basic choice of destiny 
has confronted men in the past, and which still confronts 
them. 
PART TWO 
Social Confidence 
and the Despair of Progress: 
Alternative Judgments of Civilization 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
The Evolution of the Family and 
the Emancipation of Women 
IN THIS SECTION of our work we return to the consideration 
in our introductory chapter of the agelong controversy 
between optimism and pessimism in their contrasting ac-
counts of the human enterprise. Each of these counter-
appraisals is impressive in its own way, with considerable 
historical evidence to support it, but neither one is really 
convincing in final judgment. An alternative view, pro-
posed in our introductory chapter as a more adequate 
interpretation of the historical process, has for its basis 
the idea that the history of civilization is marked by an 
increasing range of human capacities for good or for evil. 
The historical process cannot be described tmly as an 
upward curve of progress or by a downward curve of 
degradation, nor yet by a random line of meaningless 
activity. The entire scale of values is spread on an ever 
widening range. The course of civilization shows how 
much higher men can rise-or how much lower they might 
sink Both fulfillment and fmstration depend upon their 
right or wrong choice between contending values. 
The following chapters undertake to test this proposed 
interpretation of civilization and progress by an explora-
tion of the various fields of social activity both in the 
past and in the immediate situation of our own days of 
crisis. The present century illustrates most strikingly 
our basic principle. Atomic science and its technical 
applications have made available for us hitherto unim-
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aginably vast resources of nature, the wise peaceful use 
of which can enable us to achieve unprecedented cultural 
perfection. But these atomic energies are also engines of 
destruction, and we are on the verge of blowing our 
whole civilization to extinction. 
Our proposed view of the problem of progress in the 
history of civilization may be tested most directly and 
intimately by examining the evolution of the family. No 
other institution concerns individuals so vitally for good 
or for ill; no other touches so closely the relation of basic 
human groups, men and women, children and adults; no 
other bond of union affects so thoroughly the social texture 
of more and more humane living. It is not a matter of 
accident that family kinships have provided the symbols 
or ideals of right order and spiritual perfection. The 
example of religion may suffice, with its apotheosis of 
family bonds: Father Dyaus or Zeus and Mother Earth, 
Magna Deum Mater, Our Father in Heaven, the brother-
hood of man. If our proposed interpretation of the rela-
tion of civilization and progress is right, the evolution of 
the family should yield evidence of historical advance 
in the realization of high values but also of corrupting 
strains on expanding fields of social complexity. The 
related problem of the emancipation of women is of 
imperative importance; it concerns half of the human race. 
Fair inquiry here has been helped by the extensive 
modern studies of the history of marriage and family in-
stitutions at all levels of social development throughout 
the world. The available knowledge of the facts should 
warn us to avoid offhand generalities about primitive 
universal promiscuity.1 We can also understand better 
the motivation of many cruel or even unspeakable savage 
practices.2 At the other end of the historical scale, we 
1 Darwin, The Descent of Man (New York, ed. of 1897), pp. 590 f.; 
compare Edw. Westermarck, The Future of Marriage in Western Civiliza-
tion (New York, 1937), p. 16. 
2 L. T. Hobhouse, Morals in Evolution (New York, 1915 ed.), pp. 340 f. 
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should recognize the high attainment and the still higher 
prospects of modern monogamy, but also the confusions 
in which it has become embroiled by the very complex 
social order which has made its attainment possible. So 
our inquiry should seek a reasonable course between 
romantic idealizing and unwarranted scorn of primitive 
societies, and likewise between complacent domestic 
modernism and woeful dirges on the decay of Western 
family life. 
The basic role which marriage and family life played 
in the structure of tribal societies had economic involve-
ments. Tribal marriage was more than sexual mating. 
Through its expected offspring it was a source of power 
for labor and for war. It bound together families and clans, 
but it also aroused contests for priority and possession. 
One settlement of this issue was in the so-called group 
marriage, which should not be confused with promiscuity. 
In this form of family life all the men of a certain family 
group are recognized as husbands of all the women in 
another family group, often with converse relation, in 
what thus becomes a marital alliance of two clans. Less 
elaborate variations of this form of family sometimes 
indicate economic motivation. The eldest brother in a 
family may gain a bride by purchase or service or strat-
agem or with the help of his brothers. He is then her 
chief or principal husband, but his brothers are also 
admitted to her as auxiliary mates and are thus provided 
with a wife that they could not otherwise obtain or 
afford. 
The marital aspects in the relations of clans and tribes 
determine the individual's range of choice, which is 
definitely limited for the groom and scarcely or not at 
all available for the bride. Inquiries into these marital-
tribal relations disclose deep-lying horror of incest which 
find expression in religious beliefs. Two types of primitive 
marriage have been distinguished, marrying-in and marry-
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ing-out, endogamy and exogamy. In endogamy the pre-
vailing motive is that of tribal cohesion. Families form 
new kinship bonds but always within the tribe, to 
strengthen the tribal solidarity. Marrying an alien is not 
allowed. Within the tribe there are kinships of con-
sanguinity which may not be violated by intermarriage. 
Even endogamous tribes loathe incest. 
The revulsion to incest has been interpreted variously. 
The doctrine of Freudian psychology, of filial-parental 
hostility owing to a son's incestuous love for his mother 
and of a daughter for her father, has met strong opposition 
from some sociologists who have collected their mass of 
evidence from all races and ages. Edward Westermarck 
considered filial-parental frictions, but saw "no evidence 
whatever to attribute them to sexual jealousy." In our 
day Pitirim Sorokin sharply dismisses this and other re-
lated Freudian theories as "pseudoscientific fantastic non-
sense."3 Some investigators have regarded the horror of 
incest as an intense expression of normal emotional reac-
tions. We are told that familiarity breeds contempt; at 
any rate we may add that familiarity leads to indifference. 
Brothers and sisters or other close kin in the family circle 
who have played and fought together since earliest child-
hood are not so likely to arouse each other when they 
reach adolescence. They take each other for granted. 
We should note in earlier societies the definite restric-
tion of individual initiative and final choice in marriage 
unions. This restriction exercises effective control on the 
young men, but it generally involves the utter subjection 
of women. A tribesman's daughter is his to dispose of as 
he wills. A woman is not a person; she is the property of 
her father or, after him, of her eldest brother. She may 
love some youth and elope with him, or despite her re-
sistance she may be acquired by rape or capture. In 
3 Westermarck, op. cit., p. 97; Pitirim Sorokin, The Reconstruction of 
Humanity (Boston, 1948), p. 147; compare p. 146. 
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either case her menfolks, resenting the violation of their 
property rights, would demand compensation. If in more 
regular and tribally decent manner she is obtained by 
purchase or by the young man's service to his bride's 
family, the transfer is a transfer of possession. Petruchio's 
boast in Shakespeare's Taming of the Shrew will be 
recalled: 
I will be master of what is mine own. 
She is my goods, my chattels; she is my house, 
My household stuff, my field, my barn, 
My horse, my ox, my ass, my anything: 
And here she stands, touch her whoever dare. 
These dark chapters of history recording the subjection 
of women are not relieved by the institution of the so-
called mother-right family. There is clearly a distinction 
between "mother-right" and "father-right." It is not the 
same as the distinction between a matriarchal and a patri-
archal social order. In a father-right family system, the 
bridegroom took his bride to his hut in his tribe, and the 
children that were born to them belonged to his tribe. 
In a mother-right society, the bride remained with her 
tribe, and her husband through the years had access to 
her, but their children belonged to her tribe. Mother-right, 
however, did not signify the right or freedom of the 
women. In both types of society woman was subjected to 
male control: in father-right families she was ruled by 
her husband and his menfolk; in mother-right families, 
she was subject to her father's or her brother's rule. 
The emancipation of women, which is a major part in 
the attainment of progress in family life, has been a slow 
process, and its long story is not quite told even in our 
day. Here also are some striking variations due either to 
changing social customs even in early societies, or else 
to the exceptional capacities of some women to win and 
to hold their ground by dint of charm or guile or by 
218 PART TWO 
superior strength of character. In some societies the 
mother's practical direction of her household and her 
authority over her children and her hold on her husband 
have been so dominant as to justify the descriptive term 
matriarchy. More generally, however, the historical ten-
dency has been toward a father-right family order and 
then toward a definitely patriarchal system. The mother-
right family order lacked many elements of permanence. 
Man, generally master over women, demanded mastery 
in his own house. This demand could not be resisted ef-
fectively by the brothers of his mother-right wife, who 
like him sought mastery over their own wives. This 
growing ascendancy of husbands in family control had 
important consequences in affecting the structure and 
the relative permanence of the family. 
We have been considering so far some features of a 
primitive monogamy which is fairly general but often so 
crude as scarcely to warrant the name. It was vague 
and unreliable just because it lacked the essential respect 
for the personal dignity in the marriage relation. For 
where a woman was her husband's acquired property 
and the producer of still more property through her 
children, it was natural that men of means should proceed 
to polygamy or concubinage. The chief, the lord of the 
manor, could afford a number of women to glut his passion 
or expand his family of servitors. 
The term polygamy is used here in its common mean-
ing, but it is not quite accurate and needs revision. In 
opposition to monogamy, polygamy signifies a family 
system in which a person has more than one spouse. But 
that person may be a man or a woman, so clearly two 
types of polygamy have been distinguished, with a plural-
ity of wives or a plurality of husbands. Sociologists speak 
of a family where one husband has several wives as 
polygyny, and of a family where one wife has several 
husbands as polyandry. 
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Polyandry is not common. It is due to the paucity of 
women or to the extreme poverty of men, or to both 
conditions. Where girls are killed or sold in slavery, or 
where life is barely sustained, a man who managed to 
enter a marriage might admit others to share in its satis-
factions and obligations; or several men might venture to 
live together with one wife. The plural husbands are apt 
to be brothers, and usually one of them has a preferred 
status as elder and chief, the others being auxiliary. Of 
this type of family it may be said, just as of the mother-
right family, that it is not necessarily matriarchal. The 
one wife is still usually subjected to the will of her several 
husbands. But there are also forms of polyandry in which 
the one wife directs the common household, including 
the men. 
While polyandry is found mainly among low primitive 
tribes, there are evidences of it among more evolved 
societies, among the Tibetans and some Arabs. In early 
India it stirred even epical imagination. An episode in 
the Mahabharatta tells of an incomparable celestial 
maiden who prays five times to the god Mahadeva to 
grant her a husband possessed of every accomplishment. 
Mahadeva promises her that in a future rebirth she 
would have a literal fulfillment of her fivefold plea. So 
as Draupadi she is finally married to the five valiant 
Pandava brothers, with their golden crowns and heavenly 
garlands. 
The story of polygyny, or polygamy in its more common 
meaning, is much longer. It has ramified through many 
societies and periods of history, and it still persists as a 
recognized type of family life outside of Western civiliza-
tion. Closely related to polygyny and often hard to 
distinguish from it is concubinage. The difference in rank 
of a plurality of recognized wives, where priority of mar-
riage but also a husband's preference may set one wife as 
chief and superior to the others, becomes in concubinage 
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a basic difference in status. The concubine is a mate but 
not a spouse; she may be the recipient of favors but does 
not have a claim to rights of estate or inheritance. 
While there are no instances of recognized polygyny in 
our modern civilization, except the temporary Mormon 
aberration, and while bigamy is criminal under Western 
laws, European tradition does record plurality of wives 
or concubines on the royal or aristocratic level. The first 
instance is from the Iliad, beginning in its opening lines 
with the wrath of Achilles, whose beloved captive Briseis 
had been taken from him. The Germanic races provided 
divided evidence on polygyny. The common tribesmen 
were generally monogamous, but not the Gauls. The 
chiefs had several wives, and this practice continued 
even after their conversion to Christianity. The Meroving-
ian kings indulged in it; Charlemagne had two wives and 
two concubines, the same number as the Irish king 
Diarmet. Charlemagne's example seems to have been 
followed by some of his clergy. Peter the Great ( 1672-
1725) distributed among his boyars the women captives 
in his campaigns.4 
Plurality of wives as a recognized institution is mainly 
Oriental. In biblical tradition Abraham and David may 
be mentioned, but the outstanding polygamous prac-
titioner was, of course, Solomon, with his swarming harem. 
The social program of the Koran turned largely upon 
Mohammed's establishment of polygamy as a reform of 
the loose domestic disorder of Arabian life. Plurality of 
wives could be maintained only among the mighty and 
wealthy. Modern evidence indicates that in Iran and 
Pakistan scarcely more than 2 percent of the families 
are polygamous. Similar accounts of traditional Chinese 
polygamy and concubinage likewise seem to limit them 
to the ruling and rich classes. In general survey harems 
have been luxuries of those who could afford them. 
4 Compare Westermarck, op. cit., pp. 172 f. 
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A flagrant feature of early marriage and family relations 
has been the general disregard for personal freedom and 
dignity. This disregard, on primitive levels, subjects both 
husband and wife to tribal restrictions. One's mate is not 
chosen but assigned; the initiative belongs to the family 
elders who themselves follow tribal customs of exogamy or 
endogamy or whatever group tradition may dictate. But 
even more settled and seemingly hopeless is the subjec-
tion of woman. In whatever way she may be obtained by 
her future lord, there is no recognition of her personal 
rights. These distressing conditions are not limited to 
primitive and barbarian societies. The emancipation of 
women is a story of very slow development. Prior to the 
Reformation English marriage customs included shocking 
practices. We read of the case of Elizabeth Paston who, 
"when she hesitated to marry a battered and ugly widower 
of fifty, was for nearly three months on end beaten once 
in the week or twice, sometimes twice in one day, and 
her head broken in two or three places."5 
He who acquired a wife acquired property of which 
he might dispose as he wished. He could order her labor 
and enjoy the fruits of it. Even if he did not multiply 
wives or concubines, he could be as profligate as his fancy 
or his funds might carry him, but adultery on her part 
was a crime of which he was judge and executioner alike. 
He might return her to her family or even kill her and 
her lover in flagrante delicto. Should she prove childless, 
her husband, as an alternative to casting her away, might 
order her to bear him a child by another man. And should 
he die childless, both the Manu law in India and the 
Mosaic code required her to yield herself to his brother 
so as to provide an heir to her dead husband. In polygam-
ous families the eldest son might inherit his dead father's 
entire harem except his own mother. 
5 G. M. Trevelyan, English Social History (London and New York, 
1942), p. 65. 
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Whenever he willed a man could offer his wife's body 
to a guest. This grand gesture of hospitality is customary 
among African savages and elsewhere, but it is disturb-
ing to find Greek and Roman examples of it. Plutarch 
related Cato's extended loan of his wife Marcia, pregnant, 
to his friend Hortensius, with the approval of her father. 
Socrates lent his not so dear wife Xanthippe to his young 
friend Alcibiades. 6 And we may come nearer home and 
remember that the plot of Thomas Hardy's novel The 
Mayor of Casterbridge turns upon the sale of an English 
wife. 
The thralldom of wives did not entirely preclude at-
tachment. Customs and individual temperaments vary, 
and even low primitive family life has always afforded 
instances of considerate regard in family relations. Eskimo 
natives on Baffin Island have been described as showing 
not only devotion and patient goodwill to their children 
but also conjugal love and loyalty. But most of the 
evidence points the other way throughout the world as 
far as the servitude of wives is concerned. The Chinese 
Book of Songs, Shi-Ching, is very frank on the subject: 
How do we proceed in taking a wife? .. ./Why do you 
still indulge her desires? We are told that on the day of 
her wedding a Chinese girl's father would order a 
palanquin, lock his daughter in it, and hand the key to 
her bridegroom. A woman's servitude was not limited to 
her immediate relatives by birth or marriage. Like other 
valuable property, she was under the strong hand of the 
liege. The king's or the lord's power over his subjects was 
especially strong in ordering or prohibiting the disposal 
of a maiden. At our weddings we hear the traditional 
formula: "Who gives this woman away?"-but it was no 
mere formula in earlier days. English peasants had to 
pay their lord a fine or a tax, merchet, for permission to 
6 Compare Plutarch's Lives, "Cato the Younger"; Letourneau, Evolu-
tion of Marriage (New York, 1891 ), pp. 53, 201 f. 
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marry. Louis XII of France compelled Alain d'Albret 
to have his daughter marry Cesare Borgia, to reward the 
latter for bringing him Pope Alexander Vf s bull annuling 
the marriage of Louis to Jeanne of France, so that he 
could marry Anne of Britanny.7 
The proprietary view of wives was manifest on every 
occasion. A woman was living property and the producer 
of more living possessions. An adulteress cheated her 
owner of his rights, but she might also add to his estate. 
He might kill her and her lover, but he might also accept 
compensation and eventually keep the bastard addition 
to his increasing labor force. In other ways also there 
was no recognition of woman's personal rights. A wife 
was not admitted as a witness or a claimant in court. 
She had no individual rights of grievance against her 
husband. A shiftless drunkard, whose children were sup-
ported by his abandoned wife's toil, could go to her 
employer and legally collect and drink up her wages. Not 
until the late nineteenth century was an Englishwoman 
protected in this regard, and in some parts of the United 
States the remedial legislation was even later. 
In our day, though a woman may be admitted to 
employment, she still receives on the average lower com-
pensation. These very days our news media report demon-
strations in our cities by thousands of women who are 
protesting against this wide and increasing pay gap be-
tween women and men. Despite the spread of coeducation 
in our colleges and graduate and professional schools, we 
are told that "few women have been able to enter the 
professions. Only 1 percent of federal judges, appointed 
by the President of the U.S., are women. Only 1 percent 
of engineers, 3 percent of lawyers, 7 percent of physicians, 
and 9 percent of scientists are women. . . . Even in the 
teaching field ... the gap seems to be widening."8 In 
7 Compare Hobhouse, op. cit., pp. 194, 216. 
8 U.S. News and World Report (April13, 1970), p. 36. 
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business or industry, available statistics indicate various 
obstacles to women's rise above subordinate employment 
and gross inequality in their compensation for comparable 
work The present "women's rebellion" is a widely or-
ganized resistance to these various discriminations. On 
many fronts American women are banded against their 
present economic disadvantages. 
The historical record of women's agelong servitude 
exposes the double standard in judging licit and illicit 
sexual relations. In Greece and Rome the adulteress faced 
rigorous conviction, but her husband's profligacies, even 
when flagrant and censured, were not regarded as crimes 
from which she had any right of redress. As late as 1930 
the laws of Italy distinguished between a wife's adulterio, 
always criminal, and a husband's concubinatio, punishable 
only if notorious or if he brought his mistress into his 
family domicile. Likewise in Spain; in France the adulter-
ous husband had to reckon only with a liable fine. 9 In 
British and American legislation we may note a slow but 
eventually plain recognition of wives as claimants to re-
lease from their adulterous husbands. Protestant influence 
has been on the woman's side, but its effect has been slow. 
Only in 1923 did English law finally acknowledge the 
equality of men and women in domestic suits. 
The servitude of married women has been a major 
expression of the general derogation of the female sex. 
Folklore abounds in praises of wives who bear their 
husbands sons, not daughters. Ask a Turkish peasant how 
many children he has, and he is likely to answer: "Four, 
and two girls." This sharp partiality for male offspring is 
not altogether extinct even in our society, and its defenders 
are not slow to cite reasons. A family established in solid 
substance, in business or profession, cannot continue 
through daughters who depart when they get married. 
9 Compare Edw. Westermarck, Evolution of Marriage in Western 
Civilization (New York, 1937), pp. 62 f., 68. 
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Only sons can preserve and advance the family name. 
Is it owing to some regard for this condition that Span-
iards retain in their names their maternal as well as their 
paternal lineage? In Czechoslovakia, when Thomas 
Masaryk married he adopted as a part of his own name 
that of his bride, Charlotte Garrigue. 
Islamic tradition praises marriage and the abundance 
of offspring. Among the great prophets Jesus was excep-
tional in remaining single; but we are told on good Muslim 
authority that when he returns at the end of days he will 
marry and have children. Islam has few good words for 
women: "Most of them are in hell." Still there is a way 
upward even in servitude. Woman's one virtue is her 
submission. A good wife is one who, when her husband 
utters a foolish oath, fulfills it so as to defend his honor. 
A wife's submission, which is her status, becomes a virtue 
when it is loyal. In India this ideal of unwavering wifely 
devotion found expression in the heroine Sita of the epic 
Ramayana. Boccaccio used the same theme with varia-
tions in his Decameron, in the familiar story of patient 
Griselda. The laudation of wifely loyalty was bound to 
affect the whole estimate of womankind. When in Greek 
legend Alcestis laid down her life to save that of her 
lord, King Admetus of Thessaly, Hercules brought the 
heroine back from Hades. Undying loyalty evokes un-
dying love. Without heroics Confucian canon stipulated 
that husbands should be devoted and wives affectionate. 
Mutual personal attachment becomes less and less excep-
tional, and it finds expression and portraiture in lyric 
and dramatic poetry. 
The emancipation of women in history has been gradual, 
occasional, and not always permanent. The Roman matron 
of the imperial period, in contrast to her earlier subjection, 
gained explicit recognition of her rights in law and in 
fact: unprecedented and unmatched by later epochs until 
our own. She could not be married without her own 
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consent. She could hold private property and dispose of 
it; she could be a plaintiff in court. She had become like 
her husband a legally acknowledged person. This great 
gain in freedom, however, became also a release of license. 
Women could freely go their own way, and they did, 
through the abuse of easy separation and through flagrant 
profligacy. Seneca referred ironically to women who kept 
track of past events not by referring to the consuls in 
power but to their own various husbands.10 
In its estimate of womankind, the Christian tradition 
marked both a recession and an advance. The Gospels 
spiritualized the old commandments; the Sermon on the 
Mount is the classic of the most initimate personal re-
ligion. This worship of God in spirit and in truth, as it 
subordinated all externalities and all worldliness, con-
demned carnal indulgence. It did not exalt marriage but 
admitted it as a concession to man's frailty. It had an 
ascetic trend and naturally sought the higher perfections 
of the godly life in monastic withdrawal, with its three-
fold vow of chastity, poverty, and obedience. This view 
of life regarded woman as the unclean vessel of sex. 
Tertullian stigmatized all womankind: "You are the devil's 
gateway!" A sixth-century bishop even questioned 
whether women were really human.11 The church con-
demned the surrender of the spirit to the flesh. In its 
judgment the great lovers of popular lore were polluted 
sinners.12 But just because it branded lust as a mortal sin, 
the church held both men and women under heavy judg-
ment. There was high promise in that stern verdict. If 
marriage was regarded only as a concession to human 
frailty, and carnal union justified only by childbearing, 
then that relation must be a sacrament for both man and 
10 Compare Hobhouse, op. cit., p. 211. 
11 Compare Westermarck, The Origin and Development of the Moral 
Ideas (London, 1906), 2: 663. 
12 Compare R. B. Perry, Realms of Value (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), 
p. 368. 
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women, both of them sinners in need of salvation and 
both of them children of God. The judgment that had 
condemned woman, the temptress of men, exalted the 
wife, the mother of men, even as it adored the Mother of 
the Savior of men. The spiritual emphasis of Christianity 
had a dual expression, first in monastic asceticism not 
only of men but also of women in nunneries; and then in 
moral elevation of family life, with gradual and very 
slow emancipation for women and respect for their moral 
worth in the sight of God. 
When lust is stigmatized and sex admitted only as a 
medium of propagation, when the body is viewed as a 
temple of the Lord, bodily life itself, as a vehicle of the 
soul, may gain in dignity that must not be violated. Im-
memorial practices such as infanticide and abortion were 
rejected as heathen abominations. It should be noted that 
in savage societies infanticide was commonly due to the 
economic stringency of people ever on the verge of 
starvation, utterly unable to feed any more hungry mouths. 
The killing of the crippled and the aged was likewise 
often an emergency measure; they had to be abandoned 
by the wayside on the long nomadic marches so as not 
to endanger the survival of all. In the gradual advance 
beyond savage indigence, as the killing of infants and 
the abandonment or disposal of the infirm and the old 
could no longer be regarded as imperative, both practices 
were censured and then condemned as criminal. Christian 
condemnation of infanticide has been traditionally most 
severe. Legal codes in Western Europe have sustained 
popular judgment. While the dire penalties-burial alive 
or burning at the stake-have been discontinued, in-
fanticide is still adjudged as murder. 
Abortion and castration have been other ways in which 
distraught savages have tried to ward off the threat to 
their survival. By the use of dangerous drugs or by un-
speakable mutilations they might risk health and life to 
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thwart the results of passion which they could not control. 
Under civilized conditions of medical advance these two 
practices have been subjected to a twofold change. They 
have tended to yield to safer and more widely spread 
means of birth control, by the use of contraceptives. 
With the perfection of surgical treatment, abortion and 
vasectomy have generally become legalized procedures. 
The problem of birth control cannot be settled by off-
hand condemnation or advocacy. It confronts us as we 
study the statistical curves of population increases during 
the past century, especially in countries like India or 
China or Latin America. The very advances of modern 
civilization in checking or eliminating certain plagues, in 
sanitation or improved child care, which have reduced 
infant mortality and lengthened the span of human life, 
have been multiplying children beyond any available or 
prospective means of subsistence even in our modern 
greatly improved economy. Even in the days of the 
Roman Empire, when the world's population has been 
estimated to have doubled once in a thousand years, the 
church father Tertullian, in the third century, viewed 
the existing situation with alarm: "We find in the records 
of the Antiquities of Man that the human race has pro-
gressed with a gradual growth of population. . . . What 
most frequently meets our view is our teeming popula-
tion; our numbers are burdensome to the world, which 
can hardly supply us from its natural elements; our wants 
grow more and more keen, and our complaints more bitter 
in all mouths, whilst nature fails in affording us her usual 
sustenance. In very deed, pestilence, and famine, and 
wars, and earthquakes have to be regarded as a remedy for 
nations, as a means of pruning the luxuriance of the 
human race."13 
At the end of the eighteenth century Thomas R. Malthus 
13 Quoted in Population in Perspective, ed. Louise B. Young (New 
York, 1968), p. 3. 
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(1766-1834), in his Essay on the Principles of Population, 
pointed out that population growth runs ahead of the food 
supply and jeopardizes human welfare. As is well known, 
Malthusian researches suggested to Darwin his basic 
evolutionary principle of the survival of the fittest in 
the struggle for existence. The dire social implications 
of Mal thus's Essay did not assume the priority in nine-
teenth-century thinking which they have today. William 
Godwin ( 1756-1836) tended to dismiss the problem: 
"Three fourths of the habitable globe are now unculti-
vated. The parts already cultivated are capable of im-
measurable improvement. Myriads of centuries of still 
increasing population may pass away and the earth be 
still found sufficient for the subsistence of its inhab-
itants."14 Godwin's myriads of centuries have already 
proved to be far short, and the view of the population 
explosion in our time is radically different. 
This problem of exploding populations has thrust it-
self into the midst of any discussion of modern family life 
with a shock of frightful emergency that brooks no post-
ponement or delay. In public concern it shares top 
priority with only two or three other problems in our 
social system, and in the judgment of many competent 
social critics it is more alarming than any other, for it 
confronts everyone; it menaces mankind with imminent 
famine and possible extinction. These dire forecasts have 
been supported with extensive detailed statistics, but their 
meaning can be made unmistakable by a bare terse state-
ment of the awesome facts. 
Charts of world population growths record a steady 
and then a more and more furious rate of increase. At 
the beginning of our Christian era mankind included some 
one hundred million souls, and it did not reach a total 
of six hundred million until 1700. But during the follow-
14 William Godwin, quoted by J. B. Bury, The Idea of Progress (New 
York, 1932), p. 228. 
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ing century and a half the world population doubled, and 
then more than doubled during the next hundred years, 
and now it numbers over three billion, an increase in a 
single century equal to that of all previous ascertainable 
time. Even more alarming, it threatens to double again 
during the next generation.15 
Confronted with these staggering facts, expert students 
differ only in the degree of their forecasts of universal 
doom. Some of them seek hope of staving off famine and 
mass starvation by greatly increased agricultural produc-
tion of food, or else by the comforting news that people, 
many people, do not really require so many calories. But 
other competent judges, and not at all in minority, with 
Paul Ehrlich in the vanguard, see no ground for any 
future but total disaster, unless the present rate of human 
fertility is altered drastically. There is no possibility of 
feeding the ever sweeping glut of hungry mouths. India, 
whose famine is today being partly allayed by American 
mass-shipments of food, promises a great rise in her pro-
duction of crops, but how can that added supply nourish 
its inconceivable human crop which will tomorrow be 
hurdling over the half-billion mark? 
Even beyond the inevitable threat of mass starvation, 
the population explosion statistics shock us with the dire 
forecast of the congestion of the hungry multitudes which 
the surface of the earth literally could not contain. A 
distinguished witness before a subcommittee of the United 
States Senate cited "a long-range projection by the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences . . . that in about 650 years 
there will be one person per square foot throughout the 
United States."16 This dire projection calls our attention 
to a dismal aspect of the population problem. In the not 
very distant future we are menaced with literal starved 
15 Compare Stanley Johnson, "All about Food" in Vista, the magazine 
of the United Nations (March-April 1970 ), p. 28. 
16 Compare Population Crisis: United States Senate Subcommittee 
Hearings, Washington, D.C. (January 26, 1966), Pt. 1, p. 156. 
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extinction; but in the immediate future we are drifting 
toward conditions of life which are less and less humanly 
tolerable. The disaster which confronts civilization is not 
only how many billions can literally survive on earth, but 
how many more can live a really human life.17 
In more immediate projection and in less catastrophic 
terms, birth control, a problem of the gravest emergency 
in Asia and Latin America, is important also in our West-
ern civilization of the North Atlantic regions. It is clear 
that as of this day we in the United States at least face 
no threat of starvation. Our productive capacity far 
exceeds our present demands and should meet any im-
mediate needs as our population increases. In fact, our 
present problem has for some time been that of over-
production of food; it is a problem to our farmers which 
the government has tried to meet, and also America's op-
portunity to feed starving millions overseas. But even if 
our agricultural rate of production could be matched the 
world over, it still could not check the crisis of the ever 
inundating glut and plethora of hungry mouths. In 1965 
thirty-five American scientists, all of them Nobel prize 
winners, sent a petition to Pope Paul VI, asking him to 
reconsider the Roman Catholic Church's ban on artificial 
birth control. And according to a Gallup poll that sum-
mer, 61 percent of American Catholics believed that their 
church would eventually approve some method of birth 
control; more than half of them expected such an approval 
within five years,18 an expectation that has not been 
realized. There is a general and unmistakably growing 
demand for education in planned parenthood. Along with 
its provisions for birth control and with proper medical 
advice and direction, we require social reforms to provide 
better assurance of adequate hospital care to the indigent 
17 Compare Joseph Wood Krutch, "A Naturalist Looks at Overpopula-
tion," in Our Crowded Planet, ed. Fairfield Osborn (Garden City, N.Y., 
1962), pp. 211 ff. 
18 Compare Population Crisis, op. cit., Pt. 1, p. 18; Pt. 2, p. 456. 
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and protection of working mothers before and after 
childbirth. 
There are other sides to the problem of population and 
planned parenthood. Fair judgment should recognize a 
spreading social evil in our so-called higher classes: well-
to-do and educated men and women who have the means 
to bring up fine children to expand our cultured popula-
tion but who, though by no means ascetic, spurn the cares 
and the responsibilities of parenthood. This resulting re-
duced self-repopulation of our cultured classes cannot 
be regarded as very recent or as due to the present loosen-
ing of traditional moral values and induced by the per-
fected and more readily available use of contraceptives. 
According to a sociologist's record of 1941, over 40 percent 
of American families were childless or had only one child.19 
Our civilization raises contrary population problems for 
opposite social groups; birth control calls for different 
judgments in dealing with different personal and group 
conditions. The good and the evil are not the same at the 
two sides of the scale, and the needed reforms must vary 
appropriately. 
It is important to recognize that some of the most 
distressing conditions in modern family life are to be 
found among our "best people" and that they have been 
the result of the very advance in the emancipation of the 
modern woman. This emancipation which has made possi-
ble manifold fulfillment of personality in all the various 
relations of homelife has also released irresponsible self-
indulgence and license. The basic probem is that of 
individualism, which may be morally productive but also 
unprincipled and corrupt. 
The old traditional family was not an autonomous 
union of a man and his wife and their children. It was a 
link in the chain of tribal solidarity, tribally ordered and 
11! Compare Pitirim Sorokin, The Crisis of Our Age (New York, 1941), 
p. 188. 
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controlled. Within the range of group control a man 
acquired his wife, sometimes by capture but more com-
monly by purchase. On barbarian levels this plain 
business transaction still persists. There was also re-
sitance to it, due to family pride and also to a gradually 
developing parental devotion. This growing sense of 
personal regard finds expression in customary sanctions 
and in legislation. The Manu code in India prohibited 
marriage by purchase, and the Mahabharatta condemned 
it sternly: "He who sells his daughter goes to hell."20 
Early Greek tradition sanctioned marriage by purchase 
and, even after it was forbidden by Solon's laws it still 
persisted as late as the age of Demosthenes and Aristotle. 
Gradually, however, the purchase ceased to be a sale. 
A father would expect some solid evidence of the value 
which a suitor for his daughter set on her, but on receiving 
the proffered sum or goods he gave them to his daughter 
as a dower. The former purchase price became a part of 
the bride's estate. The father even added to it, as a gesture 
of ample provision to assure the girl's maintenance of her 
accustomed way of living in her new home. This available 
ample provision for one's daughter made her more desir-
able and more likely to win a fine husband. So by a 
reversal of economic considerations the purchase price 
which bought a good wife was replaced by the dower 
which attracted a good husband. 
It is interesting to note in this evolution of marriage 
customs a growing regard for the personal welfare of 
one's marriageable daughters, but also a calculating view 
of family interests which settles the eventual choice and 
to which the young woman's own preference was re-
garded as quite subordinate. Even in our Western civiliza-
tion the conventional marriage in established families of 
substance did not consult primarily the preferences of 
20 Alexander Sutherland, The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct 
(London, 1898), 1: 217. 
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individuals, and scarcely at all those of the prospective 
bride, but rather sought a satisfactory alliance of solid 
names and estates. This professed substantial good sense 
was not limited to the aristocracy. The opening lines of 
Tennyson's "Northern Farmer: New Style" come to mind: 
Dosn't thou 'ear my 'erse's legs as they canter away? 
Proputty, proputty, proputty-that's what I 'ears 
'em saay .... 
Thou'lt not marry for munny-thou's sweet upo' 
parson's lass-
Noa-tho'lt marry for luvv-an' we boath on us thinks 
tha an ass. 
What marks the modern marriage is its release from 
any family or group dictation, its individualism in pro-
fession and in practice. Our young people may not be 
unresponsive to economic motives; a young man may 
aspire to marry the boss's daughter, and a girl may hope 
to marry into a good solid family. But most of them 
regard their marriage as their own concern, their own 
choice in marrying and their own decision if they separate 
or are divorced. And fundamentally they are right: it is 
their business; but it should be a stable business, not 
precarious and bankrupt. 
We should do better justice to the contemporary family 
if we note carefully some features of its threatened dis-
integration. Our American record is certainly dismal. For 
years on end we have had an increasing divorce rate; in 
1956, one divorce for every four marriages. The average 
duration of the marriages before divorce has been 
reckoned as a little over six years. A study of divorce 
statistics shows that there are today five times as many 
cases of broken marriages annually as a hundred years 
ago. Lamentable as this condition is on the face of it, 
even more distressing is our gradual change of attitude 
toward divorce. We have accepted it as a matter of course. 
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Young people of prudent foresight may even provide for 
their eventual separation by agreeing in advance on the 
acceptable terms of settlement, so as to avoid later un-
pleasant disputes. 
The problem of divorce exposes the conditions for good 
but also for evil in the greater individual freedom allowed 
by modern civilization. Rigid prohibition of divorce will 
not cure the evil. There are families in hopeless discord 
of body and soul, where husband and wife and children 
face only misery and moral chaos. All of us know people 
who have made every effort of patience and goodwill to 
save their home, yet in the end found it wrecked beyond 
recall. But all of us in fairness should admit that the 
usual divorce calls for a different description. Families 
break up mainly owing to wayward self-indulgence, selfish 
stubbornness, and irresponsibility, without patience or a 
sense of duty or a reasonable temper. Modern freedom 
has released this selfish license, but modern freedom is 
likewise the essential condition of the moral fulfillment 
of personality in productive interplay and interpenetration 
of lives, conjugal, parental, filial. 
Our modern society, with its shocking divorce rate and 
its corruption of human lives, is also a society in which 
the moral values of lifelong monogamy are being realized 
in millions of homes. The economic emancipation of 
modern women has made it possible for their choice of 
marriage to be a real and free choice. Women's political 
enfranchisement required long hardship of pioneer work 
in Great Britain and the United States; its success there 
has been followed by adoption of it with less resistance 
in other lands. Electoral rights have enabled women to 
take their stand effectively in the various activities and 
measures aiming at a better democratic future. It cannot 
be said that women have had a faultless record in the 
democratic process, but it has been remarked significantly 
that the League of Women Voters has become probably 
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the most alert and best informed body of responsible 
citizens in our country. The opening of all the avenues of 
higher education to women has raised professional stand-
ards and has improved the care of children, provisions for 
public health, and general social welfare. Over against 
the loose free love in our time, we should recognize the 
far more common free responsible marriage in uncounted 
millions of homes where husband and wife live in harmony 
and mutual respect, where parents and children work and 
play and plan together for a fuller life. 
CHAPTER NINE 
Household Economy and 
Bodily Well-Being 
OUR PREVIOUS CHAPTER was concerned with the historical 
evolution of the home; it naturally leads us to consider 
the physical setting of homelife. Our first topic here is 
that of housing, men's long journey from caves to huts to 
cottages or mansions. Primitive men's early dwellings 
were shelters of refuge from inclement weather and 
safety from predatory beasts or enemies. The savage 
imitated the animals in seeking some shade from the day's 
heat and at night burrowing or crouching in some cave 
where he felt protected from attack. He expanded the 
rude housing which nature provided him; he explored 
the deeper recesses of his cave or scooped out the tuff 
or rubble inside, to stretch out more comfortably; he 
piled up rocks at his entrance to obstruct any untoward 
intrusion. He sought out less accessible and safer dwell-
ing. Tribes then stepped out to open ground, circling 
their chosen site with walls, and against them built their 
rude houses on the inside. Nomadic herdsmen needed 
mobile shelters and gradually mastered the craftsmanship 
of tepee and wigwam and yurt. 
With the use of tools and skill in using wood and stone 
and adobe and later fired bricks, men proceeded to more 
ambitious building. Chimneys and windows replaced the 
holes in the roof and the small openings in the walls. 
Ladders became stairways; the roof of the hut became the 
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floor of the second story, and cellars were dug for the 
storage of foods and other supplies. As the outward 
house thus grew in size and shape, the interior planning 
disclosed a more highly developed household economy. 
Bed and board and cooking pot that had huddled to-
gether in the cave or hut now had their separate rooms, 
with all the resourcefulness of design and building in 
seemingly boundless prospect. And even at this level of 
progress in building we have scarcely traversed the bar-
barian stage in housing development. 
As men advanced to multiple housing, some of the 
acute modern difficulties confronted the builders. From 
the Great House of Indian cliff dwellings to the apartment 
skyscrapers of our metropolitan canyons, as from the 
oriental caravanserai to the mammoth hotels of our day, 
or from the chains of huts of older days to the widely 
ramified suburban development on different economic and 
architectural levels, the span is stupendous and the range 
of problems is as varied. Urban crowding of workmen's 
families in dingy tenements, which was one of the results 
of the industrial revolution, has not yet been corrected, 
but automobile transportation has made possible resi-
dential expansion in suburban areas of green lawns and 
woodland. This cultural sweep brings likewise radical 
changes in the household economy and in the programs of 
daily living. 
In appraising residential progress, comparisons of pres-
ent dwellings with those of bygone ages, even of earlier 
modern days, may be made on more than one standard. 
In terms of structural size and majesty, the royal 
palaces or lordly manors of old may rival our modern 
magnificence. The ancient Tibetan monastery of Lhasa 
housed 7,500 lamas. The front fa<;ade of Versailles 
stretches to almost a quarter of a mile. As for the living, 
so for the dead: what modern mausolea reach the 
magnitude of the Pyramid of Cheops or the beauty of 
Taj Mahal? 
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If we turn to the other side of the evidence, a com-
parison of modern with ancient hovels would not be so 
informing as the contrast of the household equipment of 
the modern home not only to ancient dwellings of the 
corresponding social level but also to the castles and 
palaces of bygone lords and kings. We find examples in 
the Western world. Look at the old kitchens of noble 
castles and colleges; visualize the daily household pro-
gram of Holyrood. When Peter the Great visited the old 
Hanseatic city of Danzig in 1711, the citizen deemed 
most worthy to entertain him was Schopenhauer's great-
grandfather. The weather turned very cold; the pros-
perous banker-merchant warmed his guest chamber by 
burning bottles of brandy on the stone floor. At the 
chateau of Malmaison, the bathroom provisions included 
a tank full of water above the tub, which was heated 
when required. 
The mention of kitchens and bathtubs raises the whole 
problem of plumbing and household sanitation. In struc-
ture and in equipment alike peasant houses and stables 
were joined in common filth and stench. But nobility and 
even royalty were not much cleaner or more sanitary. 
Lord and lady were perfumed but seldom bathed. To 
be sure, hot springs had always drawn invalids in search 
of a cure, and the Baths of Caracalla still recall the 
magnificance of Roman public bathing as a social institu-
tion. Despite isolated instances like Japan or Finland, 
the usual program of mankind until very recent days did 
not include provisions for daily personal cleanliness. 
Tolstoy describes the elaborate preparations for a grand 
ball, when a particularly fussy princess washed not only 
her face and ears but also her feet. 
The related topic of latrines and toilets taxes the re-
sources of decent exposition. The peasant might step 
into his stable or outdoors to relieve himself, even as the 
highborn lord did behind the gate of the courtyard or 
castle or palace. When servants were slow in bringing 
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chamber pots, the Dauphin of France used the corner of 
his room. Slops were emptied through the windows onto 
the street with no concern for the heads of passersby. 
Great cities as well as small hamlets reeked with filth. 
Measures of sanitary reform sometimes ran open sewers 
in the middle of the street. These pestilential conditions 
may still be observed when one crosses the borders of 
modern civilization. But even in our lands memories still 
reach beyond the days of modern plumbing. Tourists 
visiting ancient manors or monasteries are doubly im-
pressed by their outward majesty and by their unsanitary 
equipment. In the early years of this century a German 
crown princess refused to live in her appointed palace 
which lacked the decent provisions of the common modern 
apartment. 
As to kitchen equipment, gray-haired housewives may 
recite the progress from open fire cooking to kitchen wood 
or coal stove and to the modern gas or electric range. It 
would be trite to point out the complete transformation of 
cooking made possible by our present-day appliances of 
reliable, controlled, and clean heat. Equally or even more 
important is modern refrigeration which has not only 
prevented spoilage of foods but has preserved for use at 
all seasons the greatest variety of foodstuffs in the com-
mon household. Sociologists remind us that we civilized 
Westerners have discovered scarcely any of our basic 
foods; we owe them to primitive folk or to Orientals: 
corn, rice, sugar, and so many meats and vegetables and 
fruits. What we have learned is how to preserve and 
use them at any time. 
While modern kitchen appliances and food provisions 
have increased beyond comparison our bill of fare, applied 
science and the progress of medical knowledge have pro-
vided us with expert advice on diets for the various needs 
of health and bodily welfare. Food chemistry serves 
preventive medicine; the better understanding of the 
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alimentary properties of fats, proteins, and carbohydrates, 
and more recently of vitamins, has enabled millions of 
those whose knowledge can influence their practice to 
stay healthy. 
Scarcely any other exhibit in the chart of historical 
progress is more impressive than the statistics of the 
greatly improved public health and lengthened life-span 
in the modern Western world. Better medical care and 
greatly improved sanitary conditions have not only de-
creased the frightful infant mortality but have also con-
tributed to the general extension of the average life-
expectancy. These radical changes have been the achieve-
ment mainly of the past hundred years. It was reckoned 
in 1833 that four-fifths of the children born on the island 
of Saint Kilda did not survive beyond their first fortnight, 
largely due to the storing of manure in the peasant huts, 
causing tetanus. Detailed unspeakable and scarcely read-
able accounts of noisome British workmen's tenements, 
as late as 1840, are matched by a foul page in a letter by 
Erasmus describing some better-class houses during the 
Renaissance. Without such accounts we could not grasp 
the full meaning of the differences between the early 
modern and the more recent mortality tables. According 
to the records of the city of Geneva, the average length of 
life prior to 1600 was eight years, and even as late as 
1700 it was twenty-seven. The figures for England rose 
in one hundred years, 1840-1940, from forty-five to sixty-
three. In less than a century England reduced her death 
rate by half, France by almost a half, and Italy by two-
thirds. Our American death rate in 1901 was 15.7 and in 
1949, 9.7 per thousand. Our Western span of life has been 
twice as long as in India/ but during twenty years the 
average length of Hindu life also has increased by one-
fourth. 
1 Compare F. Sherwood Taylor, Science and Scientific Thought (New 
York, ed. of 1963 ), pp. 191, 200 ff. 
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Exceptional longevity can be noted in every land and 
age. Chinese tradition honored the ancient wisdom of 
Lao-Tsze, "the old Sage," so highly that legend described 
him as being seventy years old at birth. History also 
records the almost centenarian Sophocles completing his 
Oedipus trilogy, and during the Renaissance Titian still 
painting in his nineties. The Old Testament reckoned 
the years of man as three score and ten. But these in-
stances do not affect the wholly contrary general statistics. 
Pope Innocent III in the twelfth century remarked in his 
book on the misery of human life that few in his age 
lived past their thirties. 2 
Studies of these vital statistics impress on our minds 
the astonishing progress in medicine and surgery, both 
theory and practice. Medical research, in discovering the 
causes of numerous diseases and curative agents and 
methods, has lessened the gravity of many former banes 
of young and old and has virtually eliminated some of 
them. As late as 1847 one half of amputation surgery 
patients died from septicemia. In 1865 Lister began 
designing his technique for aseptic surgery, and within 
two years was almost entirely successful in preventing 
the fatal results. Not only cure but prevention of disease 
may be cited from British statistics of deaths from typhoid 
fever, which decreased during 1871-1941 from 400 to 
less than 10 per million. 
In the forefront of achievements in this general field 
has been the gradual wiping out of malaria and yellow 
fever, not only in temperate zones but also in the tropical 
regions. When a noted parasitologist was asked about 
recent United States malaria statistics, he replied simply 
that there were none to record. The history of plagues 
which had ravaged whole countries both East and West is 
2 Innocent III, De Contemptu mundi, sive de miseria conditionis 
humanae, cited from Migne, Patrologia latina, vol. 217 (Paris, 1855), 
1: 10. 
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a dismal record of "the black death." Athens during the 
Peloponnesian War, Jerusalem and Rome at the beginning 
of our era, Constantinople in the reign of Justinian, and 
epidemically across the map of Europe during the Middle 
Ages, in England during the fourteenth and fifteenth cen-
turies and again most violently in the seventeenth century, 
when one-seventh of the population of London perished-
these are the most disastrous instances. In the Orient, 
especially in India, the plague is still a deadly menace, 
but the discovery of its causes and modern preventive 
measures have banned the scourge from countries with 
modern sanitary provisions and controls. Within our own 
memory diseases like diabetes, diphtheria, and mastoiditis 
have yielded to medical treatment; the check of polio-
myelitis is still a headline newspaper item. The timely 
discovery of potent drugs saved Winston Churchill's life 
from pneumonia in faraway Cairo during the Second 
World War. A number of great killers, tubercular or 
cancerous, though still unsubdued, are strongly besieged. 
And without further reference to specific diseases, the 
general standard of hygienic hospital care, especially in 
the Western world, is in amazing contrast to the pestifer-
ous lazarettos of earlier days. 
But the very progress along many lines in our house-
hold economy and in our conditions of public health has 
had also its counteraspect in the deleterious effects of the 
modern ways of living. Uncontrolled appetites can be 
more readily indulged in our days of boundless varieties 
of food and drink, and multitudes are ruined by intemper-
ance. We are just now seriously grappling with the pollu-
tion of our air and water supply. How are we to advance 
the very industry that furnishes our modern conveniences 
and yet cope with its destructive smog and sludge? While 
the health benefits of suburban living are steadily extend-
ing to manual and white-collar workers, uncounted 
millions are still packed in the slum districts of our cities. 
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The suburban idyll itself has not come up to its advertised 
perfection. The commuter's daily schedule has often re-
duced to a minimum the intimate contact of fathers and 
children. For millions it has produced a new kind of drab 
routine existence. 
Despite the marvelous advances of medical science, 
the strains and corruptions of modern life are overtaxing 
our hospital provisions. Even more distressing is our 
record of mental breakdowns. The widespread and rising 
standards of our psychiatric services have their obverse 
and depressing aspect in the increasingly grave need of 
multitudes for restoration of normal behavior. 
A specific and very grievous instance of this problem 
is the spreading use of narcotics and other drugs, some 
of them extremely noxious. This alarming abuse has not 
been limited to delinquents and street gangs; it has in-
vaded colleges and universities and even our public 
schools, upsetting normal responsible conduct and releas-
ing morbid and lawless excesses. It is spreading appall-
ingly among juveniles. The number of arrests in New 
York for drug-related offenses by young people aged 
eighteen or less increased 1,860 percent in eight years. 
According to a reported interview with the director of 
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, during 1969 almost 
1,000 persons in New York died due to heroin-related 
causes, a number "greater than those caused by any other 
factor among people between the ages of 18 and 35. . . . 
Incredible as that may seem, it is true."3 
Heroin is reportedly the terminal and most destructive 
of a long list of drugs on the addict's line, which usually 
begins with marijuana and proceeds to LSD and other 
synthetic products. A derivative from opium, heroin has 
its chief source in the poppy fields of Turkey; the refining 
of it is being done in illicit French laboratories; its trans-
portation across the Atlantic and its distribution in Amer-
a Compare U.S. News and World Report (May 25, 1970), p. 38. 
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ica is a most ramified international operation. It is a 
feeder of crime in two ways. It is so fantastically profitable 
that trafficking in it has become a main concern of criminal 
syndicates. And the far-gone heroin addict turns to 
burglary or worse in order to procure the money for 
the highly priced drug. 
Abuse of drugs in some form has been traced back to 
very primitive social levels, as in the present use of peyote 
by Indian tribes in Mexico and in our Southwest. But 
modern chemistry has multiplied the variety of toxic 
products; the tensions and also the inducements of modern 
life have spread the drug distribution throughout our 
social system, deleterious in different ways to our social 
welfare. At one end of our social scale, the drug use is 
menacing the normal development of reportedly 15 to 20 
percent of our college and university students and is 
seeping down into the public schools, thus imperiling 
the intelligent leadership essential to our future welfare. 
At the other end, heroin traffic and addiction, in the entire 
process of production, distribution, and use is so closely 
bound up with organized crime in the underworld that 
the suppression of it is a major factor in assuring any 
real progress in personal security and social well-being. 
The most shocking aspect of this whole modern problem 
is the pollution of our natural environment, most flagrant 
in the leading industrial countries but not at all limited 
to them. "For the first time in the history of mankind, 
there is arising a crisis of worldwide proportions involving 
developed and developing countries alike-the crisis of 
human environment. . . . It is becoming apparent that 
if current trends continue, the future of life on earth 
could be endangered."4 The daily news media, panel dis-
cussions, and more extended surveys by experts are piling 
up the woeful evidence: of our foul air, tainted by smog 
4 George F. Kennan, "To Prevent a World Wasteland: A Proposal," in 
Foreign Affairs (April 1970), 401, quoting U.N. Secretary-General 
U Thant. 
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and noxious gases, of rivers and lakes and seas contam-
inated by sewage and industrial refuse, of land eroded 
and devastated and turned into junk heaps, of the mass 
destruction of fishes and birds by toxic effiuents and 
pesticides-the list seems endless. We read of a tuna fleet 
working off some coastal refineries near Marseilles and 
having to dump its catch which reeked of crude oil. The 
air polluted by the industrial plants in the Ruhr Valley of 
Germany is blown northeastward and falls down as "black 
snow" over the Scandinavian countryside. In faraway 
Siberia limnologists are warning the government author-
ities of the threatened befouling of Lake Baikal, the 
deepest body of fresh water in the world, by the dis-
charged refuse from cellulose plants. The Soviet conserva-
tionists would save Lake Baikal from the pollution which 
has already contaminated the Volga River, poisoning 
sturgeon life, the source of caviar. 
Nowhere in the world is the problem of environmental 
pollution more flagrant than in the United States. We are 
the foremost industrial nation in the world, foremost in 
our extraction and use of the resources of nature-and 
also in the abuse of our environment. This "galloping 
consumption" has gripped our minds these latter days 
with a sense of immediate and utter disaster. The sources 
and areas of pollution are various and they complicate the 
proposed methods of control. The mass production and 
distribution of insecticides and pesticides has helped our 
farmers to save their crops. But the indiscriminate use 
of many of those highly toxic chemicals has spread their 
deadly effects at large, poisoning our land areas and the 
rainwater that washes the deadly sprays and powders into 
the rivers. Rachel Carson was among the first to arouse 
us to a sense of our peril by exposing the resultant whole-
sale destruction of fish and bird life and of lasting danger 
in our use of tainted plant and animal food supply. 
Every year some hundred and fifty million tons of 
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smoke and fumes are discharged into the air that we 
Americans have to breathe. Seven million automobiles 
are junked annually over our countryside; twenty or thirty 
million tons of paper trash and more than seventy billion 
cans or jars or bottles. Our coasts and waterways, lakes 
and rivers are being contaminated, some of them seem-
ingly past reclamation. We read that Cleveland's Cuya-
hoga River has a thick top layer of oil waste which burst 
into flames recently and burned two bridges, and that "to 
restore Lake Erie to its purity of twenty-five years ago 
will require 40 billion dollars and 50 to 500 years, pro-
vided all pollution is stopped now."5 But a writer in 
Houston should not merely cite examples from Ohio when 
a television broadcast from New York tells him that Buffalo 
Bayou in his Texas metropolis is rated as among the 
filthiest rivers in the country. 
Our threatened environmental disaster is not limited 
to the land surface and to its waters and air cover. We 
are fouling the oceans east and west of us and the Gulf to 
the south. Oil drillers off the California coast have re-
leased uncounted tons of their black discharge onto the 
beautiful beaches of Santa Barbara. Inadequate valve 
protection on oil well pipes is menacing the coastal strips 
of Louisiana with the black flood, deadly to marine life 
and to the subtropical beauty of the South. 
The contamination of our waterways and air by dis-
charged sewage and industrial waste and by smog and 
toxic fumes is not the only kind of our environmental 
pollution. The enormous power plants which generate 
the electric supply needed for our expanding industry 
and private use suck in the cooling flow of our rivers 
through their pipes, to discharge it hot and destructive 
to fishes at the other end. Some two hundred jet planes 
cross the Atlantic every twenty-four hours, each of them 
5 Robert Humphries, "The Imperiled Environment," in Vista (March-
April1970), p. 17; compare p. 18. 
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blowing off a hundred tons of carbon dioxide over the 
ocean. The effect of this inordinate discharge threatens 
to disturb the entire heat balance of the earth. But these 
warnings by our scientists are confronted by counter-
protests: What then? Shall we stop producing the needed 
electric power, and shall we reduce our aviation services? 
These counterprotests surely do not close the discussion of 
the pollution emergency problem, but even this brief 
survey points out the truth that advancing civilization 
in the course of history manifests the expansion of human 
activities, for good or for ill, with better and higher 
prospects but also with graver perils. 
CHAPTER TEN 
Economic Values, Technology, 
and Human Progress 
OUR PRECEDING CHAPTER was concerned with shelter, 
nourishment, health, and general vitality. These aspects 
of men's well-being are themselves largely affected by 
or even the result of their material welfare. They depend 
upon the degree to which men can utilize the economic 
means to effective and satisfactory activity. The expres-
sion "economic means" is appropriate, for economic values 
are distinctively means to the realization of the other 
values in which human life finds effective expression. 
Ethical analysis has distinguished two kinds or rather 
aspects of values: intrinsic and contributory. All values 
have a contributory or instrumental aspect: they affect or 
enable us to realize other values. While in this way all 
values reach or point beyond themselves, most values have 
also intrinsic worth; we cherish them for themselves. 
Whereas all values are contributory and most values are 
also intrinsic, economic values are exceptional in this 
respect: they are only contributory or instrumental; they 
have no intrinsic worth. To be sure, we do value them, 
as conditions for the realization of other values. 
Economic values are only means. Mistaking them for 
ends and making the mere accumulation of them the goal 
of human activity is the folly of the miser's or the pluto-
crat's crass materialism. But we should not err in the 
opposite way, as much traditional religion has done, and 
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glorify holy poverty. The economic values are not only 
important; they are often indispensable means to the 
realization of the other values. Material resources are 
required for the fulfillment of men's and women's capac-
ities in a satisfactory homelife: for the education of chil-
dren, for intellectual and aesthetic cultivation, for security, 
for long-range planning, and for the other individual 
and social goods of humane living. Reasonable balance 
of judgment is needed here to recognize the right place 
of economic values in the integral and harmonious self-
fulfillment of men's lives. That recognition should enable 
us to acknowledge the moral basis of the demand for 
social-economic justice and to trace the historical lines of 
economic progress. 
The idea of property or ownership involves the social 
recognition of a person's rightful claim to the exclusive 
possession or use of certain things. Regarding the ground 
of proprietary claims, opinions have varied. Referring 
strictly to fact, men have reasoned that possession is nine-
tenths of the law. Wordsworth's ironical lines come to 
mind: 
... The good old rule 
Su:fficeth them, the simple plan, 
That they should take, who have the power, 
And they should keep who can.1 
Against this sort of disposal, men have sought just ground 
for upholding, but also for resisting individual claims to 
exclusive ownership and use of various commodities. 
Labor has been regarded as the source and basis of 
property, but in ways, not always clear, which would 
disqualify the probably hard working robber or extortioner 
or pirate. Some utopias have condemned private property 
as the root of social injustice and misery. Ownership has 
1 Wordsworth, "Rob Roy's Grave," II. 37 ff. 
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also been viewed as essential to man's self-realization. Ap-
propriation, that is, acquiring possession and use of things, 
was judged by Hegel as a step in the expansion and fruition 
of human personality.2 Social justice and welfare, then, 
would seem to demand not the abolition of private prop-
erty but the extension of its personal benefits to as many 
persons as possible. We may thus see at the outset the 
various issues of the social-economic problem which en-
gross our present discussion. 
The firm conviction of ownership has been regarded 
as having its roots deep in human consciousness. Some 
psychologists have even traced it back to analogous re-
actions in animal life. A fox protects its burrow; a mock-
ing bird defends against invasion not only its nest but 
also the area around the tree on which it has settled. 
Sociologists in their studies of primitive tribes have noted 
the claim and the recognition of ownership, but they 
have noted also a certain disregard or even unawareness 
of exclusive possession. Both individual property and 
the absence of it reflect the organization of primitive life. 
Nomadic tribes obviously cannot have our ideas of real 
estate. Hunting or fishing or herding were traditionally 
communal activities. The Eskimo's whale, or in other 
tribes the lesser catch, could not be preserved and were 
available only for immediate consumption, tribally. Sun-
dry personal belongings were one's own, likewise one's 
ax or spear, paddle or fishing net; still, if they were not 
in actual use, another member of the tribe might be free 
to use them if needed. The man who killed the bear 
would have first claim to the fur, but if he had killed a 
deer, another hunter coming upon it might well help 
himself to the game, leaving the rest of the carcass for 
the returning hunter's use. 
Among pastoral tribes proprietary rights are not very 
2 Compare Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. S. W. Dyde (London, 
1896), 1: i. 
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definite. A choice pasture may be occupied by the same 
herdsman season after season, yet the unfenced range was 
at the disposal of the firstcomer. Should he have ventured 
too far afield in quest of lush herbage and found himself 
on land commonly used by strangers, he would find his 
holding precarious. Within different limits of territory, 
land ownership in primitive societies is not uniformly 
stable. The tribesman cultivates fields that are tradition-
ally tribal. Custom may grant him or his family or clan 
continued access to certain tracts, or the elders may 
periodically redistribute the tribal land for individual 
cultivation. This unsteady character of land tenure marks 
also the produce of land cultivation. Neither of them 
was reliably individual initially; both were communal in 
disposal. Planted and harvested and gathered, corn and 
beans or rice would be heaped together for tribal dis-
tribution, and one would get not one's own produce but 
what was tribally judged to be one's need and share. 
Division was likely to be uneven. The weak tiller might 
get a meager portion, and a leader of a stout clan would 
grab and hold far more than his fellows. 
Kings and chiefs have maintained overall possession, 
allowing grants to their selected vassals and treating the 
common workers of the soil as their slaves and serfs. 
This black tale of slavery concerns more than property 
rights. The slave could hold nothing as his own, for in no 
sense was he his own but altogether another's. Even if 
they were not downright slaves, the common run of 
tribesmen owned or cultivated land by the king's grant: 
his the initial consent and his the eventual tribute. 
The primitive emphasis in tribal property rights is 
reflected in the various ways in which ownership has 
been respected or flouted. Insight into the typical tribes-
man's attitude should enable us to clear up conflicting 
views of savage honesty or thievery. Neither of them, in 
our sense of the terms, was characteristic to any extent. 
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The property rights which a savage is apt to respect are 
rights sanctioned by his tribe, his fellow tribesman's rights. 
His "domestic" honesty is a part of his general tribal 
conformity. The tribe chastizes its thieves as it punishes 
any other transgression of tribal mores. Theft is punished 
the more severely the higher the owner's rank. Stealing 
from a chief or priest is fatal. 
Not only tribal control and punishment deters one 
from stealing, but also religious fear. Magic and taboo 
doom the thief. In a violent thunderstorm the Bechuana 
savages spit on the ground and vow that they have not 
robbed any of their neighbors. In old Tonga the king's 
property was regarded as taboo. Stealing the king's 
property was believed to cause scrofula, which could be 
cured only by the thief's kissing the king' s heel. (The old 
English name for scrofula was "the king' s evil"; kings of 
England were touched by sufferers of the bane, in a heal-
ing ritual attended by Christian chaplains.) Of course, 
primitive behavior includes much indiscriminate thieving 
as well as some honesty. 
The record of general practice, as it enforces respect 
for tribally sanctioned ownership, might allow common 
or even complete disregard for the property of aliens. 
A stranger is a likely enemy-hostis, hostile-and in any 
case he has no rights and may be stripped of his goods. 
Robbing an enemy tribe might endanger one's own people, 
and if it failed it would be condemned, but if it was 
successful it was praised. Not only among Arabs was the 
word robber a personal boast. The straying traveler, 
especially if he rode alone, was risking peril at every 
turn of the highway: a state of affairs that the word 
highwayman should recall to us. Despoiling the stranger 
was the order of the day, unless he were alert and 
fortunate enough to reach the tribesman's threshold with 
a rightful claim to hospitality. Then he would have a 
welcome and the protection due to a guest. He could 
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sleep in peace without any worry about his belongings, 
and his host, who would have plundered him on the road, 
would defend him and his goods under his hospitable 
roof. Aside from hospitality, the dread of a tribesman's 
taboo may protect the stranger from theft. On stopping 
at some Polynesian island without intent to trade there, 
New England ship captains used to invite the king or 
chief to come aboard and, for value received, to touch the 
deck or the top of the ladder. The whole ship then 
became taboo to the islanders and so safe from pilfering. 
For long primitive ages a man's wife was his property, 
at his disposal. Was this virtual enslavement of women 
general, implying that they never had any ownership 
whatever? This has been commonly held but has also 
been disputed by leading sociologists. Among peoples of 
higher culture, in Jerusalem and Rome and much later 
in London, a married woman was partly or altogether 
the economic ward of her husband. The European record 
is that of the very slow recovery of women's proprietary 
rights. 
Where mothers had no recognized ownership, children 
obviously failed to qualify. If fathers had the right to 
do away with children judged to be infirm, or more often 
with too many girls, any consideration of children's prop-
erty rights would be out of the question, with the excep-
tion, not very clear, of their claim to their own earnings. 
Children's proprietary claims come into clearer focus in 
considering' inheritance customs and regulations, and 
these have varied greatly.3 Among very low savages, 
where there is little that could be called private property, 
the question of inheritance could scarcely arise. Some-
what higher up the scale, a dying man would leave his 
goods and his wife and children to the care of his nearest 
kin. The widow's share of inheritance is not reliably 
hers, and the children's lot is often very precarious. Tribal 
a compare Henry Maine, Ancient Law (London, ed. of 1913), p. 117. 
ECONOMIC VALUES 255 
custom is hard on bastards unless legitimated by later 
marriage. Orphan daughters in China and in ancient Israel 
could inherit only in the absence of sons. In Babylonia, 
in Rome, and in India the status of daughters improved 
in the course of time, but Scandinavian and even very 
late English law did not recognize clearly a daughter's 
rights. The succession of a princess to the throne would 
be unquestioned, and in the inheritance of large aristo-
cratic domains, as matters of dynastic order, traditional 
customs have been strict, but they vary. Laws of primo-
geniture which keep the noble family estate and title in 
the line of the eldest son are familiar, but there are also 
laws of ultimogeniture, where the youngest son of the 
family inherits all. 4 Russian traditional practice in Tsarist 
days distributed titles and estates among all the children: 
thus a great many princes of some ancient names would 
be living at the same time. 
Many of the conditions described here have been largely 
discarded in our modern days; the survival of some of 
them in recent Western culture should remind us of the 
short historical span of machine-age industry and agri-
culture. Despite the impact of our economy on the rest 
of the world, a large part of mankind lives still under 
primitive or barbarian conditions. The changes in the 
social-economic structure have been amazingly rapid in 
many countries partly modernized under colonial regimes 
and now bursting forth in newfound nationalism. The 
student of economic values in their historical development 
may trace the many changes across the several thousand 
years of Western civilization; but he is bound to note the 
real progress and also the sudden perils of the quick 
shift to modern economic processes in many regions of 
4 Compare Edw. Westermarck, Origin and Development of the Moral 
Ideas (London, 1912), 2: 44 ff.; compare also S. A. Cook, The Laws of 
Moses and the Law of Hammurabi (London, 1903), pp. 144 ff.; Fustel 
de Coulanges, The Ancient City, trans. Willard Small, 12th ed. (Boston, 
1901 ), pp. 108 ff. 
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Asia and Africa. Their recent chronicles impress us as 
an epitome of Western social history, or as a cartoon of 
it. We should note the characteristic patterns of the 
economic development as it discloses in its expanding 
scope a growing achievement of social values, but also 
widespread hardships and much confusion. 
The economic problem is impressed on our minds 
today as the issue between capital and labor. In terms 
of basic social processes it involves mainly agriculture, 
industry, and trade. Agriculture comes naturally first on 
our list, for man's first and major property is that of land, 
real estate, land on which he lives, which he tills and from 
which he gets his food and subsistence. Society rises above 
the primitive levels of fishing, hunting, and foraging to 
to the agricultural stage of settled cultivation of land. 
Anthropologists have recognized this transition as mark-
ing the advance from the food-gathering stage of savagery 
to the food-producing stage of barbarism. It is also the 
transition from a largely nomadic to more settled existence, 
attachment to the tribal land and eventually to one's 
own home and field. 5 We should keep in mind the his-
torical development from the earliest periods of agri-
cultural life: tribal possession of the soil, with periodic 
redistribution for individual cultivation, and for the shar-
ing of the produce, the later royal control and exploitation, 
and then the slow emergence of men's private ownership 
of their strips of land and the produce of their own work. 
If the political curve of progress marks men's rise 
from slavery to citizenship, the economic road points from 
serfdom to yeoman freeholding and to farming indepen-
dence. The earlier stages of this latter road are dismal, 
and they still darken the lives of hundreds of millions 
today in many parts of the world. On Egyptian monu-
ments we may see stripped bodies bending under the 
5 Compare V. Gordon Childe, What Happened in History (New York, 
1954), pp. 23 f. 
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whips of overseers, ploughing and reaping the crops of 
king or lord or priest. And are the fellaheen of today 
much better off, despite the repeated promises they hear 
of land apportionment? In his travels across the Middle 
East, Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas relates 
a story, indeed a boast, of a Persian absentee landlord, 
that his estates covered a territory larger than all of 
Switzerland. 6 Reforms undertaken by the present shah 
of Iran, however, have been carried out despite the stub-
born opposition of the large landowners. Starting with 
a distribution of extensive crown lands to the tillers of 
the soil, he has succeeded in initiating legislation which 
has made more than fourteen million of his peasants 
owners of the fields which they cultivate. In Mexico the 
people have been rising steadily from peon serfdom to 
some considerable degree of farm ownership. Turgenev's 
Sportsman's Sketches portrayed the dismal servitude of 
the Russian peasants, tied to the soil from which they 
drew abundance for their masters but the barest pittance 
for themselves. When Tsar Alexander II emancipated the 
millions of serfs in the nineteenth century, he began a 
work of great progressive range. The expectations of 
those hard-working masses were not fully satisfied, nor 
have they been realized adequately by the social up-
heavals which in so many ways have split the world into 
two warring camps. The success of both the Bolshevik 
and the Chinese revolutions hinged on the promise of 
giving to the toiling peasants the lands which they tilled. 
In both cases, after his initial access to the soil, the plow-
man found himself restrained and then shackled by a 
new sort of serfdom under the name of collective farming. 
In China his home has disappeared along with his farm, 
and he has been herded in barracks under rigid control 
of his daily work and food and entire program of life. 
In the Western world, we may note the English record 
6 William 0. Douglas, Strange Lands and Friendly People (New York, 
ed. of 1952), p. 87. 
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since Roman and Saxon days; more interesting is the story 
of the last five or six centuries since Chaucer. In the 
early English or Anglo-Saxon system, village communities 
had common unfenced fields from which small strips of 
an acre or less were allotted to each family. Men had 
barely enough land to provide their daily bread. With 
the rise of the feudal system and the growing power of 
lord, baron, or bishop and abbot, more and more of the 
land passed into the hands of the mighty, with two im-
portant restraints on the common people's freedom. The 
villager was now a villein, bound to the soil. He could 
not leave his strip of land to try to better his fortune 
elsewhere. He had to work certain days on his lord's 
land as the bailiff ordered him. His com must be ground 
at the master's mill, and master's consent was required 
for any peasant marriage. Great wealth was produced 
in England, rich harvests and the best wool in Europe 
for which the weavers in Italy and the Low Countries 
competed. But the peasant farmers and shepherds led 
destitute lives which poets like the author of Piers Plow-
man described in bitter verse. 
So long as they had abundant labor, lords and abbots 
could dictate their own terms. In the middle of the 
fourteenth century, however, the entire social situation 
was altered by the plague, the Black Death in which more 
than a third of the population perished. As farmhands 
became scarce they could secure better bargains, for they 
were in demand everywhere. Serfs and villeins earned 
and bought their land and their freedom; the English 
yeoman class grew in numbers and substance. Parlia-
mentary laws to check increase of wages had some im-
mediate effects, but they also replaced local manorial 
customs by national legislation; they stirred a nationwide 
consciousness of common needs and common action. 
Within a generation after the Black Death came the up-
rising of 1381, the Wat Tyler rebellion which spilled 
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aristocratic blood all over England and led young King 
Richard II to grant the rebels' demands. While the 
pendulum swung back to reaction and Parliament re-
pealed Richard's concessions, the steps forward from 
villeinage to free land-ownership had been taken. The 
steps were slow; they mark the advance, very gradual, in 
the access of English farmhands to land of their own. 
When the English social historian cites much later statis-
tics to show that farmer-owned land in England had 
increased by two million acres in a century one is im-
pressed both by the social gain and by its very slow 
coming. 
A generation before Wat Tyler's uprising, the Jacquerie 
rebellion in France had run its bloody course, with 
murders of landed gentry at the outset and wholesale 
massacre of the rebels at the end. The French social 
gains were scarcely apparent even in promise. Three 
centuries after the J acquerie, the French peasants were 
seemingly as hopeless drudges as ever. La Bruyere's 
description of them sears the memory: "One sees certain 
wild animals, male and female, scattered over the country, 
black, livid, and sunburnt, lashed to the soil which they 
dig and turn over with unyielding stubbornness. They 
have something like an articulate voice, and when they 
stand up they disclose a human face, and in fact they are 
human. At night they retire to their dens, where they 
live on black bread, water, and roots. They spare other 
men the need of sowing, tilling, and harvesting in order 
to live, and so deserve not to be deprived of the bread 
which they have sown."7 Black clouds spread over this 
landscape, and in the distance one can hear the rumbling 
thunder of revolution. 
As we turn from foreign lands to our own, we start at 
another stage of land tenure. The American farmer was 
fortunate in beginning as a freeman. Exceptions can be 
7 La Bruyere, Oeuvres, Grands ~crivains ed. (Paris, 1912), 2: 61. 
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cited: in Virginia, Maryland, and elsewhere transplanted 
cavaliers held vast tracts by royal grants. New York and 
New England had their land barons that barred the 
common farmhands from possession of the soil. There as 
in old England the economic struggle claimed its victims, 
for there were resolute Wat Tylers among the Green 
Mountain Boys of Vermont. But the usual story of the 
American farm has been quite different. With the opening 
of new frontiers, the Western Reserve and then the 
boundless Far West, men moved to new homesteads on 
virgin soil and peppered the land with farmhouses and 
barns, which are the characteristic features of the Amer-
ican countryside. From the Ohio to the Pacific this social 
system of independent farms has set the tone of traditional 
American life. 
From the outset this abundance of available land re-
flected itself in the large size of individual farms. Father 
and son reached out for their sections and quarter sections 
and planned to acquire still more. These expanses of 
farmland could not be cultivated by the old methods. 
The ox- or horse-driven plow had to be replaced by 
machinery, and one of the earliest and most needed ap-
plications of industrial engineering has been in moderniz-
ing agriculture. On old Scottish hillsides half a dozen 
men with their oxen might plow through a long day a 
meager acre or less. On a modern farm in Montana, as 
we are told, "two men with a 75 h.p. tractor and ten 
fourteen inch plows can plow an acre, six inches deep, 
in sixteen minutes."8 This statement and others like it 
signify the triumph of American farming, but also some 
of its difficult problems. 
Modern agriculture has been called 90 percent engi-
neering. Not only plowing but also the entire farming 
process-harvesting, threshing, disposal of crops-has been 
8 Thomas D. Campbell, Toward Civilization, ed. Charles A. Beard 
(London and New York, 1930), p. 166. 
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mechanized. Labor-saving machinery has made it possible 
for fewer and fewer men to cultivate more and more land, 
but by the same token it has been sending millions of 
farm boys, no longer needed on the farm, to the cities, to 
industry or trade. Agricultural education and the research 
of experimental stations have perfected farming processes 
and increased both the size and the quality of the crops. 
Industrial chemistry has pointed out ways of using the 
former waste products of farming, turning cobs and straw 
into profitable materials. But this sort of agricultural 
chemistry cannot be undertaken advantageously on a small 
scale. It involves enormously expensive equipment and 
operation, and its further development has pointed toward 
heavily capitalized farming corporations on vast tracts of 
land. Those who champion this line of progress are re-
luctant to consider its inevitable consequences, in bypass-
ing or quite stunting the traditional farm homelife that 
has been regarded as the backbone of our American 
democracy. Meanwhile the high productivity, overpro-
duction of modern agriculture has left the American 
farmer at an economic disadvantage. He has to buy his 
machinery and other needed goods at high prices in an 
industrial market and must sell his crops on terms that 
do not yield him a satisfactory living. The government 
has had to intervene, support prices, and store surpluses. 
Farm policy has become a controversial political topic. 
We may recall again the radical views of Sir Thomas 
More and other utopians that private property is the 
root of social injustice and misery. Less sweeping judg-
ment has been applied more specifically to private land-
tenure. In an expanding society, so we have been told, 
private possession of land enables the owner to extort a 
high rent from those who labor on it or otherwise use it 
and make it productive. Even when leaving his property 
uncultivated or unimproved, a proprietor can see it 
increase greatly in value by the general social improve-
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ment of the surrounding land. These two problems, of 
landlord's rents and the so-called unearned increment, 
have been treated by radical critics as two varieties of 
economic injustice. The profits and in some cases the 
immense fortunes of landed gentry and real estate spec-
ulators have penalized the productive worker and have 
in large measure denied to society its due share in the 
increased values of land. 
A drastic proposal to correct these inequities was Henry 
George's "single tax." In his Progress and Poverty George 
(1839-1897) urged the abolition of all taxes on productive 
labor and the replacement of them by a tax on landed 
estates equal to their rent values. He would not con-
fiscate land or property, but he would tax those who 
hold it without cultivating or improving it. If the land-
lord, by extorting high rents, taxes the men who would 
cultivate or improve his estates, the state should secure 
these taxes for its needs and thus relieve the productive 
laboring class of any additional taxes. This single tax 
system, George declared, would correct the unequal 
distribution of wealth and power which has destroyed 
so many civilizations in the past. Instead of endowing 
idle landlords, it would sustain and encourage productive 
work and contribute to expanding progress.9 
Anthropologists have traced the long story of man's 
pioneering in industry as well as in agriculture. From 
toilsome dragging of heavy loads men proceeded to log-
rolling, as the ancient builders erected the monoliths of 
Stonehenge and Avebury; then still further speeding their 
labor, they used end-discs of larger diameter, and then 
by a stroke of invention, wheels for locomotion. While in 
these ways the ancient workers were extending the range 
of their strength, they tamed and harnessed beasts of 
9 Compare Henry George, Progress and Poverty, 25th ed. (Garden City, 
N.Y., 1923), pp. 403 f., 525. 
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burden to do their heavy work This domestication, and 
also the discovery and cultivation of new foodstuffs were 
improving agriculture, while the devising and the ramified 
use of tools were perfecting industrial skills. The follow-
ing list has been compiled to indicate the various advances 
made prior to or about 3000 B.c.-"artificial irrigation 
using canals and ditches; the plough; the harnessing of 
animal motive power; the sailing boat; wheeled vehicles; 
orchard-husbandry; fermentation; the production and use 
of copper; bricks; the arch; glazing; the seal; ... a solar 
calendar, writing, numeral notation, and bronze.10 
In our civilization, one basic characteristic of the various 
crafts prior to the industrial revolution resulted in the 
age of mass production. The earlier industry was largely 
individual, and it was carried on in homes or in small 
shops. One more difference: no sharp separation existed 
between industry and trade. We read the historian's 
accounts of medieval crafts, and we can see many of them 
clearly even in this country, at certain Indian villages like 
San Ildefonso or Chimayo, near Santa Fe. There we can 
see pottery being shaped and displayed in the front room 
which serves also as a shop, or rugs woven on looms and 
hung on the walls in the large room. Or we can drive 
across the Ozarks and see pots and vases and hooked rugs 
and rustic furniture spread out for sale on the front porch. 
We can readily picture to ourselves the scene of med-
ieval and early modem home industry. Families spe-
cialized in certain traditional crafts, or whole villages 
specialized, like the Taxco silver designer in Mexico. 
Early trade was likewise an individual or communal 
barter, a trading of goods among producers. So long 
as craftsmanship and industry were thus simple and on 
a small scale, they could preserve their handicraft char-
acter. But economic complexity was in prospect. The 
excellence of some product, which spread the fame of a 
lOV. Gordon Childe, Man Makes Himself (London, 1941 ed.), p. 227. 
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certain master or of his town, the very success in the 
disposal of some goods, as it expanded the business, 
demanded a more efficient organization of it, of industry 
and trade alike. The entire social order of a certain com-
munity would be centered on the production and sale 
of its choice commodity. Where several industries shared 
in the prosperity of a large town or city, a number of 
organizations would direct the various enterprises. These 
were the guilds of medieval society. Their success might 
depend largely upon their exclusive and tightly guarded 
use of some special process which sealed the superiority 
of their product. "If the absolute monarch could say 
L'Etat, c' est moi, the successful inventor could in effect 
say: 'The Guild-that's me.' "11 
Perhaps even before the craftsmen themselves had thus 
organized the industry, they combined for their more 
effective trading. These guilds, like our modern pro-
fessions, had their codes of training and operation-their 
apprentices, journeymen, masters-controlling the pro-
cesses of production and maintaining standards of work-
manship. In manufacture and trade alike, this communal 
and guild character has been preserved by tradition in 
names some of which are of historical interest and others 
still identify definite distinguished products: Delft china, 
Kerman or Kashan rugs, Damascene or Toledo blades, 
Venetian or Bohemian glass, Scottish tweeds. 
In the expansion of trade, certain ports rose to prom-
inence, and entire countries vied in navigation. Before 
the days of Columbus and Vasco da Gama and Magellan, 
the Italian cities, notably Genoa and Venice, led in the 
Oriental trade overland. Later Portuguese mariners well-
nigh controlled commerce with India and China, to be 
followed by the ship-merchants of Amsterdam and Ant-
werp, and then definitely by the English with their East 
India Company and their Indian Empire. By the opposite 
11 Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (New York, 1934), p. 132. 
ECONOMIC VALUES 
route, Salem sent its China clippers across the Pacific, 
and the whaling trade sealed the fame and the fortunes 
of American captains. 
These names all mark the age of overseas discoveries 
and also the early spread of the colonial system. We 
should not overlook the radical change in the industrial 
and trade relations of Orient and Occident which was 
produced by the industrial revolution, at the turn from 
the eighteenth to the nineteenth century. The earlier 
competition had been for the rare products which Europe 
wanted from overseas: silk and spices and porcelain, 
china, or ivory from Africa and gold from Peru. But the 
later largely colonial trade sought the large Eastern 
markets for the increasing abundance of European goods 
produced by the machines of the industrial revolution. 
An outstanding characteristic of both the economic and 
the political history of the last two centuries has been 
the change in the social life of the Western nations, and 
also in the relations of the Western powers to the nations 
of the Orient, both due to the replacement of handicraft 
economy and guild trade by mass production and inter-
national trade, both results of the industrial revolution. 
All this took place during comparatively recent history. 
The last third of the eighteenth century had seen the 
invention of the steam engine. This was followed by the 
spinning jenny and the power loom and the cotton gin. 
Before long railroads and steamers ushered in a new era 
in transportation, and the modern advances in physics 
and chemistry tapped the boundless resources of nature 
for industrial use. This progress in the spread of knowl-
edge and in its applications has proceeded with increasing 
speed, never so amazingly fast as since the onset of the 
atomic age a short generation ago. Within less than two 
centuries we can chronicle three stages of industrial history 
as important as any in preceding time: steam power, 
electric current, atomic energy. 
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The advantages of power manufacture can be realized 
only through an immense volume of output. The initial 
equipment, installation and operation of the machine 
plant are so enormous that only very large scale produc-
tion can make them profitable. Power manufacture re-
quired, as it also effected, the elimination of the small 
craftsman shop. The guild masters had to close their 
shops and enter the large factory. Competition was now 
among mass producers, and the industrial enterprises had 
to expand and even aim at monopoly or risk being 
swamped in the struggle. 
All this is familiar, and the triumphs of the machine 
age are incontestable. Incontestable likewise has been 
the human cost of this boasted industrial advance. The 
plight of laboring men, as well as women and children, 
in the early years of the industrial revolution was in many 
ways deplorable, but handcraft production also had not 
been free from drudgery. The traditional exploitation of 
drudges has not been limited to modern capitalism. 
In turning to the story of modern industrial labor, we 
should recognize its main successive chapters: harsh driv-
ing and destitution at the outset; gradual reform of un-
sanitary and intolerable conditions of work, due to an 
aroused social conscience and factory legislation; shorter 
hours and higher wages exacted by the growing power 
of trade and labor unions, slowly legalized and exerting 
their pressure through strikes; and then the contest be-
tween labor and capital on more and more nearly equal 
terms but often at the expense of the consumers. Today 
the consumer has no lack of opportunity to observe how 
well organized labor has learned its lesson of hard bargain-
ing, in which only capitalists were supposed to be experts. 
Greed is not the monopoly of any one social class. But 
it should temper our judgment to recall the earlier trials 
of the laboring classes, before the pendulum began to 
swing the other way. 
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The large factory which ran the handcraftsman out of 
business could employ him on its own terms, and those 
terms were harsh. This harshness was not always due 
to the employer's callousness. The initial cost of the 
factory enterprise required cutting costs at every turn; 
in self-protection the owner seemed compelled to exploit 
his men. Low wages and long hours were the rule. The 
first textile plants in England roused almost an insurrec-
tion by the handloom weavers, and the owners preferred 
to locate in new territory to avoid trouble. Schopenhauer 
wrote bitter words about those early textile factories: "At 
the age of five years to enter a spinning or other factory, 
and from that time forth to sit there daily, first ten, then 
twelve, and ultimately fourteen hours, performing the 
same mechanical labor, is to purchase dearly the satis-
faction of drawing breath."12 The machine needed coal, 
and English women drudged in the bowels of the earth 
sixteen hours daily. Even more shocking was the treat-
ment of native labor in overseas colonies. The scandalous 
abuse of Congo Negroes by King Leopold's men stirred 
worldwide indignation. In the gold mines of South Africa 
from half to three quarters of the workers suffered from 
lung diseases.13 Similar though less flagrant conditions in 
various industries throughout the world have been matters 
of common knowledge. Upton Sinclair's exposure of the 
Chicago stockyards, in The Jungle, shocked Theodore 
Roosevelt and led to some congressional reform legisla-
tion. The evils of unsanitary conditions were not limited 
to the working population in the plants themselves or in 
the adjoining reeking tenements. The chemical industry 
poisoned the air of whole countrysides; waste products 
polluted the water courses; both of these conditions have 
raised one of the most acute problems of our national 
12 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, trans. R. B. Haldane 
and J. Kemp, 6th ed. (London, 1907), 3: 389. 
13 Compare Western Races and the World, ed. F. S. Marvin (London 
and New York, 1922), p. 216. 
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economy. In packed slum warrens-they could not be 
called homes-all comfort, privacy, and plain decency were 
out of the question. There are two sides to population 
statistics. We are told that in less than a hundred and 
fifty years the inhabitants of Lancashire, England, multi-
plied almost thirtyfold. 
Two stubborn evils which still resist reform in many 
lands are those of women's drudgery and child labor. 
Even a brief word should suffice to brand the socially 
disastrous effects of the employment of mothers on the 
morale and morals of their homes. These miseries are 
compounded when the neglected children are themselves 
shoved prematurely into labor which not only deprives 
them of the opportunities of education and training but 
also robs them of their youth and stunts them in body 
and soul. The worst of these evils have been considerably 
mitigated in our country, but it took long years of seem-
ingly futile struggle for child labor legislation to overcome 
the opposition of shortsighted or callous employers with 
their pleas of freedom of contract. 
The two sides of the industrial picture can be seen 
strikingly in some comparative statistics. Despite the 
tremendous increase in overall production in the industrial 
countries, there is still great human destitution; but for 
all that, the general standard of living in the Western 
countries is steadily rising. The crucial question of social 
criticism, however, is this: Is the standard of living rising 
as fast as it should-and as generally? If one could venture 
a fair answer to this question, it should be one which 
avoids both despair and complacency. We are told that 
the per capita wealth of the Western industrial nations 
varies according to their developed horsepower rate of 
energy. The impressive increase in the worker's income 
has been accompanied by steady improvement in the 
technical and sanitary factory conditions under which he 
has to do his work The manifold modernization of plant, 
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equipment, and methods, and the overall expansion of 
the entire industrial enterprise has greatly enhanced pro-
duction. Our present annual income is said to match our 
total national weath of scarcely a generation ago: the 
statistics get more and more impressive, but they are 
disturbed by critical analysis of the social distribution of 
all our vast resources.14 
A fair judgment of the economic problem cannot be 
limited to employers and employees, capital and labor. 
We cannot neglect the large consuming public, and this 
means that we cannot consider industry alone but in-
dustry and trade, the quality and the prices of the in-
dustrial products. This aspect of the problem is a main 
concern of society; it affects labor itself, for the laboring 
class is a large part of the consuming public, and wages 
are worth no more than what they can purchase. The 
Marxists harp on the exploitation of the workers, but 
the terms of trade may and too often do involve the 
exploitation of the consuming public, which includes the 
laborers. A strike may enforce a rise in wages, but as it 
results also in increase of prices, the eventual outcome 
may be an added and menacing spiral of inflation. An 
even worse threat to our social economy is the seeming 
collusion of management and labor in certain industries 
to increase both wages and profits at the expense of the 
consumer. The entire field of repair and service charges 
in our day provides examples of this fleecing, many of 
them flagrant. 
Our inquiry at this point clearly affects the basic ap-
praisal of trade, the role of the middleman in our social 
economy-and not only or even primarily the role of the 
retailing trade but also of the wholesaler and jobber who 
stand between the producer and the consumer. Everyone 
who has built a house remembers that for much of his 
14 Compare D. S. Kimball, Toward Civilization, ed. Charles A. Beard 
(London and New York, 1930), p. 141. 
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equipment he had to visit and make his choice from the 
display rooms of the various manufacturers, who then 
delivered the chosen goods on his building site, but only 
via some wholesale dealers who never even saw the 
products but just collected their profits on the sale. 
The cooperative store movement has been a reform 
project aiming to protect society from this sort of ex-
ploitation. Its beginning was in Lancashire, and the 
success of these English "Rochdale Pioneers" has been 
duplicated throughout Great Britain, in Scandinavia, and 
other European countries. With millions of shareholders, 
and operations not limited to store distribution of goods 
but extending into manufacturing fields, into agriculture, 
textile mills and clothing factories, machinery, auto-
mobiles, and even mining, shipping, banking, and insur-
ance, these cooperatives represent an organization of the 
consuming public to produce and to distribute its needed 
goods with fair salaries to the operating managers and 
clerks but without the excessive profits involved in whole-
sale and retail trade. In the United States the cooperative 
movement has made no general headway, except in the 
field of agriculture, where it has attained considerable 
success. 
A related problem confronts industry and trade in the 
international field, and it is becoming increasingly grave. 
Three main results of the Second World War were the 
threatening economic collapse of Western Europe and 
Japan, the Communist subjugation of the satellites of 
Soviet Russia and of China, and the crying need of great 
and small nations all over the world for help in their 
industrial program and other economic projects. The 
tremendous American help has led to the rebuilding of 
the economic structure of Western Europe and Japan, 
but other non-Communist countries are still the arena of 
the worldwide struggle between democratic order and 
dictatorship. 
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The powers behind the iron curtain operate on the 
basis of a rigidly controlled industry and trade. The demo-
cratic nations have been laboring under the obstacle of 
trade and tariff barriers. In order to present a united 
political front to their common peril, they require eco-
nomic collaboration. Both in Europe and in Latin America 
nations are combining on the policy of free trade. Out-
standingly important are the European Common Market 
and the European Free Trade Association, engaging to-
gether thirteen countries. Despite obstructive complica-
tions by still aggressive nationalism, they mark a real 
advance in civilization. Similar economic collaboration in 
Latin America indicates the beginning of a wider spread 
of the basic idea. The major power in industry and inter-
national trade, the United States, has not yet entered 
decisively in this free trade movement. Those who oppose 
our change of traditional tariff policy urge the need of 
protecting our American economy and the standard of 
living of American labor from the deluge of foreign im-
ports produced by cheap labor. Against these advocates 
of our so-called protective tariff are the champions of a 
united front by the free nations of the world, which alone 
can save from Communist incursion the teeming millions 
of underdeveloped peoples who produce most of the 
materials which we and the other industrial nations re-
quire. These underdeveloped nations can be helped by 
freer and more liberal trading to rise in the economic 
scale and gradually to become self-reliant and more re-
liable fellow members of a worldwide democratic society, 
capable of resisting the menace of political and social 
oppression. 
We cannot describe accurately the economic trend in 
American society by any wholesale statement about hours 
and wages of labor in general, beyond the broad recogni-
tion of improved conditions. The increasingly tighter 
organization of labor unions has perfected their bargain-
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ing capacities and has raised the income in certain trades 
to professional levels. All along the line, hours and wages 
and conditions of labor are more and more favorable to 
skilled workmen. But long dismal lines of unemployment 
and indigence spread even in our land of abundance. A 
worthy democratic society cannot be reconciled to a placid 
acceptance of an irreducible minimum of unemployable 
and destitute masses. 
Alongside the high pinnacle of exceptional achievement 
by the dominant classes in our country, we should rather 
watch the lower levels: how large and how deeply sunk 
are our still submerged masses? We must judge and be 
judged by this, our tolerated minimum. In the words of 
the elder Lord Asquith, "the test of every civilization is 
the point below which the weakest and the most un-
fortunate are allowed to fall."15 This truth is implied 
in the agelong wisdom noblesse oblige. A society does 
well to raise its summits of aim and achievement, to honor 
its geniuses and champions; but all these evidences of 
superior mastery impose a responsibility to uplift "the 
least of these our brethren." This humane philanthropic 
regard is not only good religion but also the essence of 
sound social intelligence. Ever since classical antiquity 
democracy has been charged with not caring enough about 
standards or about waste. In an economy of abundance 
we are ill advised to be careless about material waste, 
but we should resist the far more blameworthy careless-
ness about the human waste of our submerged multitudes. 
The genuine solution of this social problem, without 
which any notion of modern historical progress must be 
regarded as questionable, cannot be realized by a merely 
external change of the economic framework. The primary 
and decisive need is moral. \Ve require a humane regard 
for men's needs and for their personal dignity that should 
make it impossible for us to tolerate human degradation. 
15 Cited from Theories of Social Progress, by A. J. Todd (New York, 
1919), p. 125. 
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Some sociologist ventured the estimate that the invention 
of the steam engine made available productive power 
equal to that of a billion men. How immensely must this 
estimate be increased when we add the productive power 
of electrical, and vastly more, of atomic energy. This 
must be reckoned with in considering our so-called labor 
saving machinery. How can it be made not labor-dumping 
but really labor-saving, using the forces of nature to im-
prove the conditions and expand the opportunities of 
men's lives? 
This problem is brought into sharp focus in our highly 
advanced but also greatly mechanized industrial system. 
The incomparable progress in technological mastery, 
which is an outstanding characteristic of our age, has 
stimulated the demand to enable men to get the most 
uninterrupted productive work out of the available ma-
chinery and also to devise machines that would do more 
and more of the work that has been done by men. These 
two demands are related but also distinguishable in our 
two industrial processes of mass production and auto-
mation. 
The system of mass production has found its fullest 
operation on the automobile assembly line; no one has 
outlined its details or urged its merits more effectively than 
Henry Ford. In his judgment, mass production is "not 
merely quantity production, . . . nor is it merely machine 
production. . . . Mass production is the focussing upon 
a manufacturing process of the principles of power, ac-
curacy, economy, system, continuity, speed and repeti-
tion. . . . The normal result is a productive organization 
that delivers in continuous quantities a useful commodity 
of standard material, workmanship and design at minimum 
cost."16 
This method requires the uninterrupted concentration 
16 Henry Ford, "Mass Production"; compare Modem Technology and 
Civilization, ed. Charles R. Walker, assisted by Adelaide G. Walker (New 
York, 1962), p. 62. 
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of each workman upon one specific operation, the pro-
duction of one specific part of the eventual automobile. 
Each kind of these parts is then delivered to its appropri-
ate place on the assembly line, where one workman after 
another puts these various parts into their appropriate 
places. It is an immensely complicated system of sep-
arately simple operations, all working and fitting together 
like clockwork 
The advocates of mass production methods maintain 
with abundant evidence that this system, vastly com-
plicated in its most elaborate planning, is simplicity itself 
in its efficient operation. It secures maximum uninter-
rupted use of each piece of its multitude of machines and 
also gets from each operator most efficient performance 
of his particular work Mass production carries the prin-
ciple of division of labor to its logical conclusion, and it 
makes possible the corresponding mass consumption of 
its standardized product at a marketable cost. It also 
makes feasible the increasingly high scale of wages paid 
in the mass production industry. 
But numerous expert investigations at a variety of 
industrial plants and interviews with men at the assembly 
lines have reported widespread dissatisfaction. The op-
eratives protest that they are made specific little cogs in 
the machinery of operation, each one repeating the same 
little bit hour after hour, every day and month and year, 
without any sense of design or activity in the work as a 
whole. How could they endure spending their life in 
inserting a bolt in a set of leaves of a spring and not 
even having the time to glance at the next workman down 
the line who is to put the nut on the bolt and tighten it? 
The old handcraft system, they say, was far less efficient, 
more tiring, but not so boring, and humanly more 
satisfying. 
The quandary of this issue concerns more than the 
workman at the assembly line, for mass production de-
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pends upon, but is also a condition of mass consumption. 
From the point of view of the consumer, the advantages 
of the new system in reducing production costs, in in-
creasing the quantity and the precision of the products 
are too obvious to need any discussion. Imagine the 
likely cost or precision of a handmade paper of pins. 
Industrial production by the old methods could never 
have made available the universal distribution in our 
society of the countless machines and appliances which 
have transformed our household economy and our daily 
lives. The workmen at the assembly lines are also con-
sumers. By their tedious repetitious labors they are 
making possible the modern equipment of their own 
homes. It is a tangled problem, how to adjust the counter-
playing values in the industrial process, where so many 
provisions for the improved general welfare are procured 
at so grievous human-personal cost. 
Closely related to the problems of mass production, and 
one way of meeting some, not all, of the workmen's ob-
jections to it, are the highly technical industrial methods 
of automation. It has been described as "the most striking 
and important creation of the new scientifically based 
technology," including "streamlined production and as-
sembly lines, integrated control systems for the operation 
of process plants, tape and other control devices to direct 
operation of machines, and complex electronic data-
processing and retrieval systems known as computers."17 
The new technology is producing and is to produce 
still more complicated machines that can be controlled 
and programmed to operate themselves, to turn out their 
own products, requiring the minimum of routine work-
men's labor but direction of their complex operation by 
skilled technicians. Its supervision by highly trained 
operators is the very reverse of routine performance; it 
17 The New Technology and Human Values, ed. John G. Burke 
(Belmont, Calif., 1966), p. 105. 
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engages all their resources of skill and analysis and execu-
tion of a great variety of technical processes. But by its 
very nature automated machinery would replace the 
fourteen workmen on Henry Ford's line assembling an 
automobile spring by perhaps one or two expert tech-
nicians. The plain inferences from this fact have been 
very alarming to the industrial workers, who are disturbed 
about their future employment. This concern has been 
shared by some industrial executives who, persistently con-
fident that in the long run technological progress will 
overcome its labor difficulties, do not fail to acknowledge 
its likely serious immediate hardships. Social thinkers 
intent chiefly on the human factor in our industrial system 
have shared the judgment of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt that 
"we have reached a point today where labor-saving 
devices are good only if they do not throw the worker 
out of a job." President Kennedy called the problem of 
automation "the major domestic challenge of the 1960s."18 
Do the 1970s promise any lessening of this challenge? 
A change merely in the economic system, without a 
moral dynamic in public policies, may only transform 
social inequities, not remedy and end them. From the 
Elbe and the Adriatic to the China Sea, the Communist 
regimes are providing tragic instances of this misdirected 
social reconstruction. Their basic failure is not merely 
that they have not given the working masses their 
promised full share of material resources, or that they 
have not corrected the great disparity between the in-
comes of the managing minority and those of the rank 
and file. The persisting and disastrous evil is that of the 
ruthless drive of the laboring millions who have only 
exchanged masters, commissars instead of overseers and 
bosses. Under the earlier system the workers still had 
a certain latitude of choice; by organization of labor 
unions they could hope for better conditions of employ-
IS Op. cit., pp. 163, 172. 
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ment, either through the compulsion of strikes or through 
legislation secured by their political power as voters. But 
in the Communist system the ruling classes unite eco-
nomic and political power, industry and trade and gov-
ernment, and the working masses have no recourse. The 
Communist bureaucratic concentration on educational and 
technical mastery to provide aggressive and defensive 
armament equal to any challenge not only presents a 
mortal threat to the free world but also perpetuates the 
thralldom of its own masses. 
Just as the spreading Communist power is a world-
wide menace to free institutions, so the economic problems 
of democratic societies can no longer be treated in merely 
regional terms; they demand an international outlook 
and implementation. The entrance of modern industry 
into the lives of countless multitudes overseas fired in 
them economic and social aspirations of nationalism which 
eventually flamed in anticolonial revolutions, first in India 
and Southeast Asia and then in the whole of Africa. We 
who won our own freedom from colonial rule do generally 
sympathize with the national hopes of remote peoples 
overseas. On principle the spread of national indepen-
dence can only be welcomed as progressive. But after 
the right principle comes the effective practice, and that 
has been hard and precarious. Leadership is ambitious, 
sometimes honest, often unscrupulous; the ignorant masses 
are incapable of meeting the political and economic de-
mands of their new status. We are told that Congo started 
as an independent nation with scarcely any native uni-
versity graduates. The new countries need the sympathy 
and guidance of their former masters whom they have 
disowned and whom they distrust. 
Especially in the reorganization of their social economy, 
the dark-skinned multitudes lack the skills for effective 
long-range planning and are handicapped by their still 
primitive hand-to-mouth improvidence. Aside from their 
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minimal resources, they have neither the resolute thrift 
nor the equipped ambition needed for industrial success. 
In the North African campaign during the Second World 
War the American army required immediate speed in 
constructing its necessary installations. But native labor 
was accustomed to its slow drudgery. When the high 
command tried stimulating a burst of energy by paying 
much higher wages, the immediate result was that the 
African workmen, finding their pockets full, took time 
off to empty them. What confronts those newly formed 
officially free nations is their inability to meet their heavy 
responsibilities by initial competent organization. There 
is a limit to the ability of the Western nations to help 
them, and in their desperate need those native rulers are 
quite ready to listen to the Communist powers. Their 
very rise to the level of an independent national economy, 
as it presents to them some immediate opportunities and 
much greater though distant prospects of a more abundant 
life, likewise embroils them in instability and confusion 
and threatened collapse. Their new freedom is like our 
atomic energy: a marvelous promise but also a dire 
hazard. 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
Social Order and 
Personal Freedom 
ARISTOTLE DESCRffiED MAN not only as a rational animal 
but also as a political animal, a social being, the perfection 
of whose capacities is realized in the life of the state. In 
both of these essential qualities of man's character, the 
rational and the political, there is a duality involving a 
contest, but also a harmony through and beyond the 
contest. Reason, the intelligent direction of thought and 
activity, is a stern discipline, a control and curb of re-
sistant wayward mind, but it is also the way of the 
mind's reliable self-expression, realization of truth. So 
in the political range: social order is attainable only in 
a system of established laws which are intended to re-
strain insubordinate wills; yet only within the range of 
secure law is it possible for the individual to pursue and 
to attain true freedom, a personal career of social fruition. 
In this chapter we should undertake to trace the direction 
and degree of freedom which history records in this 
interplay of law and liberty. 
In the progress of Western self-government a gradual 
emphasis on four constructive principles has been noted: 
rationality, justice, compassion, and freedom. 1 The real-
ization of each of these four has been impeded by deep-
rooted recalcitrant passions which even our boasted 
modern democracies have not outgrown. As we trace 
the historical rise from primitive to civilized social order 
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and institutions, we are repeatedly shocked to recognize 
traits and impulses characteristic of savage mentality, 
which are still stirring in us, perhaps submerged and 
disowned, but persisting to embroil our higher purposes. 
Against this confession, however, we may also find that 
some of our better social values are deeply ingrained in 
human experience, with early dim promise in very prim-
itive societies. Go back as far as we may, the darkness 
is never altogether black; reach upward to whatever 
height, the light is never perfect. Social progress would 
then be marked not by a finality of attainment but by a 
more steadily assured upward direction. 
The state is a system of social order; its fruition is to 
provide the right and reliable conditions for men's pro-
ductive activities in a social medium of mutual limitation 
and cooperation. The vitality of social order needs the 
dynamic of individual initiative and "the ambition of 
power."2 The state cannot suppress these spurs to ac-
tivity, but they must be directed and disciplined so as 
to safeguard the common peace and to allow fair initiative 
to one· s fellowmen. 
Man's gradual rise to reasonable citizenship and to a 
social order of justice and political freedom may be studied 
in the historical evolution of systems of laws. Primitive 
societies had no distinctively personal responsibility for 
an individuars actions, nor yet a personal recognition of 
a socially authoritative system of rights and wrongs. The 
savage was not free as an individual: without acknowledg-
ment or even awareness of formulated laws, he was 
entirely controlled, but also protected, by tribal custom. 
Not yet a fully conscious person, he was first and last a 
tribesman. Tribal traditions and mores governed his 
1 Compare John Bowie, Politics and Opinion in the Nineteenth Century 
(London, ed. of 1954), p. 9. 
2 R. M. Mciver, The Modem State (Oxford, 1928), p. 46. 
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entire conduct, his relations to his fellow-clansmen and 
also to aliens. A bloody quarrel with a stranger embroiled 
forthwith two tribes. The victim, alive or dead, required 
tribal vengeance or compensation, with which other tribes 
of the larger society were not directly concerned. In-
dividual retaliation or tribal feud did not involve a recog-
nized respect for general basic rights or for the conditions 
of common peace. 
A tribesman's actions, however, might hurt more than 
one alien, might stir more than a feud between two 
tribes. The felon's own tribe, even while custom-bound 
to defend him, might find him unmanageable, and other 
tribes might feel umbrage or sound an alarm. Beyond 
the immediate tribal embroilment, a sense was developing 
of the needed preservation of the larger social order. A 
flagrant outrage might bring other clans to support the 
victim's tribal demand for punishment. Not only a felon 
but any other dangerous disturber of the social order, a 
rebel or even a reformer, might thus arouse a general 
resistance. When Mohammed, in the name of Allah, de-
nounced the customs of the Arab tribes in ways which 
threatened the traditional worship centered around 
Mecca, his own tribe, the Koreish, whose prosperity de-
pended upon its direction of the Meccan fairs and festivals, 
abhorred him personally and yet was tribally bound to 
defend him. Thereupon, it is reported, a plan was de-
vised that an alliance of men from many tribes should 
assail Mohammed. His Koreish fellow-tribesmen could 
then, without disgrace, evade the customary duty of 
defending him. So Mohammed felt well advised to seek 
safety in flight, his hegira. 
On very primitive levels, where tribes lived largely 
within their own borders and the alien was a rare in-
truder, the tribal outlook would prevail over any real 
recognition either of individual personality or of the 
larger intertribal social order. But in the course of his-
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torical development, with increasing mobility and rami-
fied contact of various tribes, the actions of each individual 
became the object of more and more general concern. 
The expansion of centralized political power, in the transi-
tion from primitive to barbarian societies, served to super-
impose the ideas of law and legal punishment over those 
of tribal injury and restitution by vengeance or compensa-
tion. The murderer had struck and mutilated his victim's 
tribe, but beyond this, he had outraged the chiefs and 
the king's peace. Just as the royal power prevailed more 
and more over tribal control, exacting tribute and enforc-
ing submission, so the royal authority came to assume the 
final decision, alike in satisfying individual and tribal 
claims and in imposing the larger social verdict. 
The ascendancy of royal power in the evolution of 
laws was bound to include much arbitrary enforcement, 
but the king's will was not altogether capricious. The 
authoritativeness of laws was bound to depend upon their 
recognized traditional sanction. Be it in India or Israel 
or Greece or Rome, as people had laws, they believed 
them to express immemorial social custom, even religious 
authority. The code of Manu in India, however dubious 
its ancient authenticity, was commonly revered as dictated 
by God, and so were the Decalogue and the priestly 
Mosaic code in Israel. Themis, whose scales of justice 
top the domes of our courthouses, was a Greek goddess, 
and not only Themis but likewise Zeus and Apollo were 
worshiped as the primal lawgivers. In Rome also law, 
the legal sanction, was religious in its origins.3 
Thus in two ways tribal feuds were subordinated to the 
larger social power. The king's will imposed its verdicts 
in the punishment of crimes, and royal judicature sus-
tained its force and authority by its appeal to revered 
customary and religious sanctions. The increasing ex-
3 Compare Sir Henry Maine, Ancient Law (New York, 1888), chapt. 7; 
Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City (Boston, 187 4), Bk. 3, chapt. 11. 
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pansion of the scope of operative law, spanning over 
tribal boundaries, did not directly surmount the primitive 
dismissal of the alien as having no valid rights against 
the tribesman. In many ways the alien was still an outlaw, 
literally, without recognized claims in court. 
The slow advance beyond these primitive survivals 
may be traced in the judicial codes and practices of 
various countries. Roman jurisprudence provides probably 
the most notable instance of this legislative expansion. 
The earlier Roman law was explicitly law for Romans, 
for the patrician citizens of the Roman realm: civil law, 
jus civile. Its aegis and also its control must have sufficed 
for the original state of Rome and during the early stages 
of the spreading Roman power. But as the republic and 
then the imperium reached over land and sea to encircle 
the entire ancient world in its dominion, the regulating 
of trade between Roman citizens and foreign merchants 
and the administration of order among alien multitudes 
in Rome and in the far-flung provinces of the empire 
required, alongside of the old patrician code of civil law, 
legislation of more expansive and ramified scope. The 
gradual institution of the so-called jus gentium, law of 
nations, had far-reaching implications. As the city of 
Rome became the Eternal City, and its banners pro-
claimed the universal empire, so Roman law and Roman 
peace, Pax Romana, came to signalize universal principles 
of order and law, justice natural and fundamental. The 
meaning of the jus gentium, law of nations, was expanded 
to signify natural right, jus naturale. In the thought of the 
Roman jurists, some of them Stoic sages, this idea led to 
the conviction of the basic rights of all men whatever, 
a principle of all-human justice and equality before the 
law. So Ulpian declared in the third century of our era: 
"All men, according to natural right, are born free and 
equal." 
This instance of the developing ideas in Roman juris-
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prudence expresses significantly some characteristic trends 
in the progressive conception of social order. In the early 
system of Roman civil law legal protection was limited 
to the Roman patrician citizens. The law of nations in-
dicated a change of practical expediency in dealing with 
the growing multitudes of aliens in Rome and the 
provinces rather than an abandonment of the traditional 
principle of the superior and exclusive character of the 
Roman patricians. But in the expansion of the law of 
nations to signify natural right, Roman jurisprudence was 
moving toward a deeper recognition of the basic rights 
of all men, beyond actually operative legislation. Large 
classes of men might not be able to gain effective recogni-
tion of these rights, but the rights themselves, they felt, 
were essentially theirs; by inherent principle they ought 
to prevail. They did not prevail in Rome, nor have they 
prevailed fully anywhere at any time. The persistent 
declaration of them may be derided by cynics as hypo-
critical lip service. More truly, or at any rate at its best, 
exalted professions of this sort express insistence of the 
maturing social conscience on high imperatives toward 
which the historical processes are ascending, although too 
slowly. 
The system of laws that protects the peaceful neighbor 
and citizen also restrains and stands ready to punish the 
delinquent. Social progress is marked alike by the more 
assured safeguarding of the acknowledged rights of law-
abiding people and also by the less ruthless and more 
reasonable treatment of the lawless. The history of crime 
and punishment provides significant expression of this 
twofold advance. If we inquire into the ground of punish-
ment, what motivates and what justifies it, the alternative 
answers find formulated statement in the principal pen-
ological theories. 'Vhy should the criminal be punished? 
Because he is guilty, and his crime demands retribution. 
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Because society must be protected and the criminal and 
others must be deterred from further crimes. Because 
the criminal must be disciplined, reformed, and reclaimed 
for law-abiding life. The emphasized terms distinguish 
the three main directions of thought in penology. In broad 
outline we may say that men's judgment has proceeded 
from a confusion of retributive and deterrent motives 
toward some view of reclamation and reform. 
Deeply rooted passions of resentment or primitive im-
pulses of retaliation, prior to any acknowledgment of law, 
seek rational justification in the doctrines of retribution, 
and subtle legalism may give them solemn philosophical 
formulation. If the retributive demand expressed only 
vindictiveness, it would fail of moral justification. Hegel 
reasoned that retribution was the revindication of the 
system of law which the criminal had defied and violated. 
Retributive punishment restores and reconstitutes the 
sovereignty of law. Judge and jury dare not fail to impose 
their verdict; the criminal's lawlessness must be solemnly 
refuted. Thus, as it might be said, the murderer has still 
a right-the right to be hanged. 
Unlike retribution which in plain or in abstruse terms 
would "even the score," the doctrine of deterrence takes 
a practical forward-looking approach. Society must be 
protected, the lawbreaker must be punished to prevent 
him from further offenses and to check criminal impulses 
in others. 
In actual operation the inflicting of punishment through 
the ages has expressed both retribution and deterrence. 
If deterrence and prevention were the explicit aims, 
penalties might be more severe for offenses of common 
frequency and very light for the rarest crimes. The shop-
lifter in our society might then fare worse than the 
murderer. But it is argued, the law metes its severity of 
punishment according to the gravity of the criminal 
violation which the social order suffers and which it is 
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resolved to deter and prevent. There seems to be a 
retributive strain in this mainly deterrent reasoning. And 
neither of these doctrines nor both together would quite 
suffice to explain, let alone justify, the penal barbarities 
of tradition. 
Lest we mistakenly comfort ourselves by thinking that 
only primitive and barbarian races were ruthless in pun-
ishment, we should recall that as late as modern times 
not only burglary and horse-stealing but theft of some 
shillings were capital crimes under English law. Counter-
feiters were burned after being garroted. "In the Bishop 
of Ely's prison the gaoler prevented escapes by chaining 
his prisoners on their backs on the floor, and fastening 
a spiked iron collar about their necks."4 
Against the black record of legal inhumanity, the 
modern history of prison reform manifests a slow but 
growing sense of reasonableness in the treatment of 
criminals. The increasing use of the term reformatories 
indicates the trend toward social reclamation in prison 
methods. The felon is still recognized as an enemy of the 
social order, but society that judges and punishes him 
is now also endeavoring to understand him. What con-
ditions of individuality, upbringing, and milieu warped 
his social outlook, turned impulses and will into a criminal 
career? How should prison life be ordered for him, to 
reform him if at all possible, to reclaim him for law-
abiding citizenship? These are hard questions, and no 
responsible prison warden would claim to know the 
specific answers in all individual cases. Personality eludes 
routine classification, and even in wholesale statistical 
terms we are still short of meeting adequately many glar-
ing problems and avoiding misdirection. First offenders 
and young delinquents are still liable to be lumped with 
hardened felons where they become not reformed but 
4 L. T. Hobhouse, Morals in Evolution, 3d ed. (New York, 1915), 
p. 124. 
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more likely stiffened in criminal mentality. Against this 
persistent evil may be cited encouraging reports of multi-
tudes of reclaimed criminals for whom prison discipline 
and training have resulted in a return to decent life. 
Here again are hard obstacles in the ingrained attitudes of 
society. The reformed criminal may leave his prison cell, 
ready to return to honest work, but will society accept 
him? Even the most sincere advocates of prison reform 
may be reluctant to welcome him to responsible tasks. 
The brand of Cain is never quite effaced; society urges 
itself to forgive, but it is not able to forget. Is this due to 
understandable insecurity and caution, or is it a case of 
deep-lying rancor, a righteous indignation which no actual 
change in the criminal's character can quite extinguish? 
The fair-minded reader may be trusted to share the 
general tenor of the preceding discussion, insofar as it 
deals with the criminal individual. But he would be 
critical of our system of law enforcement which, in its 
justified respect for the accused citizen's constitutional 
rights, actually allows criminals and their lawyers to take 
advantage of the numerous loopholes in court procedure 
and either escape conviction altogether or postpone its 
actual consequences by going free on bail pending long-
protracted appeals. And more emphatically our law-
abiding public has been shocked by the failure of our 
law enforcement agencies to deal effectively with organ-
ized crime. Most notorious in its field as the giant criminal 
corporation in America is the Mafia, which has quite out-
grown its Sicilian parentage and is operating in this 
country under the name of La Cos a N ostra, "Our Thing." 
From its main headquarters in the New York area the 
Cosa Nostra reaches out with its thousands of members 
and their henchmen into many cities throughout the 
land. It is either doing its share or actually controlling 
a wide variety of shady and criminal activities: gambling, 
narcotics traffic, loan sharking and other forms of swin-
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dling and extortion, burglary, larceny, murder, bribing of 
public and business and labor union officials-with nefar-
ious versatility and baffiing skill in evading the firm hand 
of the law. The revenues of this far-flung criminal empire 
run reportedly into astronomical figures. 
Senator John McClellan, chairman of the Criminal 
Laws and Prosecution Subcommittee, has cited in a re-
cently published article a list of cases in which a "dis-
heartening failure" of justice is "due in significant part 
to shocking judicial leniency in sentencing convicted 
mafiosi." He quotes President Nixon's words to Congress 
summing up the distressing facts: "We have not sub-
stantially impeded the growth and power of organized 
criminal syndicates. Not a single one of the 24 Cosa 
Nostra families has been destroyed. They are more firmly 
entrenched than ever before."5 
The highly complex organizational mastery which 
characterizes our legitimate corporations in business, in-
dustry, and finance has found its parallel in the field of 
organized crime in which the Cosa Nostra is the chief 
but not the only expert. This heinous threat to our na-
tional security demands more determined and effective 
resistance by our law enforcement agencies. The promise 
of more stringent legislation is a hopeful sign. 
The problems of crime and punishment and prison 
reform lead us directly into the related one of prisoners 
by capture, in war or in primitive manhunts, and so to 
slavery. Anthropologists and social historians may point 
out a paradox here. Our initial judgment of slavery would 
be analogous to our view of Muhammadan polygamy. 
Morally degrading as it has proved to be in its persistence 
through later and higher stages of family morals, polygamy 
was actually, in its first institution by Mohammed, a 
reform of the previous general looseness in Arabian re-
5 Compare Senator John McClellan's article ''Weak Link in Our War 
on the Mafia," in Reader's Digest (March 1970), pp. 56 ff. 
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lations of the sexes. Slavery likewise became common and 
institutionalized during the transition from primitive to 
barbarian societies. The savage on the warpath did not 
take or keep prisoners. He killed those whom he defeated 
in war, often killed and cooked them, and between battles 
he went on cannibal hunts. It was mainly after he moved 
from fishing and hunting to tilling the soil and to relatively 
stable labor that, needing more hands to toil and bring 
him profit, he changed from massacre to enslavement. 
The victors wanted to have free but also reliable service. 
Captive women's toil involved less hazards than that of 
men who might take vengeance despite every precaution 
of master or overseer. Children trained for a life of 
servitude promised least risk. Some American Indians 
made the children of their slain war prisoners drink the 
blood and eat the brains of their parents, believing that 
this would stifle filial affection and attach them to their 
new life with their masters. Whether they were children 
or adults, male or female, slaves were valuable property 
requiring care and prudent treatment. There is perhaps 
unwitting irony in observing that slaves were often treated 
as members of the family: sons and slaves were both 
servitors profitable to their lord. Enslaved children might 
be adopted and reared with the born boys and girls. A 
skillful or very reliable slave, as he earned the respect and 
trust of his master, enjoyed also his hospitality. He could 
even sit at a chief's table or take a puff at his pipe or 
give advice in the management of the estate. 
At this level of social morality there were no ideas of 
personal dignity or individual rights. The master's ex-
ploitation of the slaves' labor and also his care for their 
well-being were both directed by a sense of good manage-
ment. The toil of slaves gave their lord leisure and the 
comforts of it. Servant girls and women tended to the 
needs and whims of their mistresses. A society of slave-
owners, freed from the need of drudgery, came to regard 
all manual labor as beneath the dignity of freemen and 
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turned to more genteel manners and to culture. In their 
own ways, slaves also had some prospects. As beasts 
of burden were domesticated, thralls were released from 
yoke and halter; with the perfection of tools and utensils, 
and later of rudimentary machinery, slaves' labor could 
be turned to more profitable uses. But always the basic 
motivation prevailed: feeling no guilt of oppression or 
exploitation, the slaveowners sought ease for themselves 
by the toil of others in their power. 6 
In the advance from barbarian toward civilized so-
cieties, the slave, bondman, serf, or plebeian manifest in 
the evolution of their social status the progressive re-
organization of states, both political and economic. Even 
in barbarian countries a favorite slave might be freed by 
his master or might earn and purchase his freedom. In 
Babylonia marriage of a slave with a free woman was 
admissible, and while a slave was still regarded as so 
much property, he could look forward to owning himself 
eventually. So the master's brand on a slave's body could 
not be impressed indelibly; it could be altered; it could 
be erased altogether.7 
Throughout antiquity the primitive origin of slavery 
in the thralldom of war prisoners may be traced. The 
war captives were the foreigners, or they were the sub-
jugated natives held in bondage by the invading and 
established victors. Tradition and even religious cult and 
authority may reinforce the exploiting motive, to keep the 
master race and class dominant. The old social system of 
India not only distinguished the several castes but ex-
cluded millions as untouchables. A Parsee high priest of 
Karachi denounced this system with its hopeless outcasts 
as far worse than the usual slavery. 8 
6 Compare W. G. Sumner, Folkways (Boston, 1907), p. 261, citing Sir 
Henry Maine, Ancient Law. 
7 Compare S. A. Cook, The Laws of Moses and the Code of Hammurabi 
(London, 1903), pp. 159 ff. 
8 Compare Maneckji Musservanji Dhalla, Our Perfecting World (New 
York, 1930 ), p. 211. 
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The Egyptians had organized enslaving expeditions; 
they swooped upon neighboring peoples and dragged 
them captive to toil in the fields or in the building of 
temples and pyramids. The slaves had no personal rights 
whatever in Egypt, but their very number allowed them 
some prospects. As even uncounted thousands of captive 
thralls did not suffice for the stupendous public works of 
the Pharaohs, native laborers were impressed to meet 
the demand. So foreign slaves worked alongside of 
Egyptian peasants; intermarriage in the course of time 
mixed them all as a lower populace of serfs. They are the 
ancestors of the modern fellaheen. Like their fellow 
drudges across the Red Sea or countless multitudes of 
natives in the vast black continent to the west and south 
of the Nile, they are developing a keen desire for decent 
subsistence and independence. But as they gain some 
self-rule, agelong ignorance and inexperience often plunge 
their new social order into chaos. Only years of hard 
trial, with some success and much failure, and much 
understanding help by the civilized world, can prepare 
them for a productive and reliable life of free, responsible 
citizenship. 
Slavery in the Western world has had two phases. The 
first concerns classical Greece and more extensively Rome. 
The second, in Christian Europe, led to the modern slave 
traffic overseas, European and American, a dark blot on 
our civilization. 
In ancient Greece as in other lands, slavery had early 
origins in the enforced servitude of war captives, in the 
subjugation of native races by the invading Hellenes, 
and in the contempt of classical Greeks for all alien bar-
barians. The spread of slavery and serfdom was a phase 
of the expanding social economy which exploited the toil 
of landless men without rights. Cruelty to war prisoners 
was immemorial custom. Harshness and insult recognized 
no differences of rank or dignity in conquered aliens. In 
the Iliad Andromache bewails her dreaded capture, should 
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her lord Hector be defeated and Troy be ravaged by 
the Greeks. Mter the combat Achilles drags Hector's 
corpse tied to his chariot. In Sparta the conquering 
Achaian race, the Spartiates, held the native tribes whom 
they had subjugated in state-controlled servitude. These 
so-called helots were farmed out to Spartan citizens to 
work the land. Helots had no rights of citizenship; any 
resistance on their part was suppressed ruthlessly. 
If any justification for slavery and serfdom was needed, 
Hellenic reflection supplied it by its sharp distinction 
between Greek citizens and barbarians. The alien had 
no inherent human rights against a Hellene. Plato and 
Aristotle took this low view of slaves. While recognizing 
some criticisms of slavery, Aristotle called slaves animated 
tools and distinguished them from other animals. 9 Yet 
the actual ability and intelligence of many slaves earned 
them individual recognition despite their formal degrad-
ing status. The practice was sometimes better than the 
theory. The youth of many a proud Greek house were 
educated by their slave pedagogues, and in Plato's di-
alogue Meno Socrates elicits the inborn mathematical 
intelligence of a slave boy. The lofty theory rested largely 
on prevailing power. Although on principle no Greek 
citizen could be enslaved, wars between Greek states led 
to cruel treatment of captives, of which Athens herself 
was guilty. Contrariwise, Greeks, Athenians, ran risks of 
enslavement when voyaging overseas. Plato himself was 
captured by pirates and was saved from enslavement only 
by ransom. 
The history of slavery and serfdom in ancient Rome 
is a representative feature of the several stages of Roman 
history. The introduction of slave labor into the Roman 
economy on an increasingly large scale was made possible 
by the spreading Roman conquests, first of their adjacent 
Italian territories and then of land after land until the 
9 Compare Aristotle Politics 1253b, 12,54b. 
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Romans became the masters of the ancient world. In 
earlier days before the Empire few citizens had slaves, 
and even a high patrician's estate might include scarcely 
a dozen. During the imperial period both Rome and the 
provinces became crowded with slaves. The influence of 
abundant slave labor on Roman life and morals was 
various. Slaves of exceptional ability and high personal 
character gained the esteem of their masters; as freedmen 
some even rose to acknowledged high dignity. Epictetus 
was the outstanding example. Some of the captives who 
were marched after the chariots in triumphal processions 
brought to Rome their cults and rituals, gained Roman 
converts to their faiths, and eventually turned the capital 
into a museum of religions. But many more found it 
profitable to pander to the indolence and lusts of their 
masters and became factors of moral corruption and 
degeneration. 
In the Roman treatment of slaves may be noted prudent 
exploitation rather than humane regard, also shocking 
cruelty, some of which persisted during the later period 
of gradual admission of slaves and plebeians to the pro-
tection and rights of Roman law. Of atrocities there was 
a horrible surfeit which discourages citation. We read 
that Roman ladies at their primping used their slave-
maids' backs as pincushions. The fish in Vedius Pollio's 
ponds were fed on slave-meat. Caesar Augustus sentenced 
a slave to crucifixion for having killed and eaten one of 
his favorite quails.10 On the opposite side of the record 
is a growing condemnation not only of inhuman excesses 
but in the imperial period also of the whole institution 
of slavery. Legislative reform in this field was motivated 
both by realistic statesmanship and by the higher moral 
outlook of Roman philosophers and jurists, notably Stoics. 
The safety of Rome demanded an integration of slaves 
1o Compare W. E. H. Lecky, History of European Morals from Au-
gustus to Charlemagne (London, ed. of 1913), 1: 303. 
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and plebeians into the body politic of the Imperium. 
Legal philosophers also reasoned that the emancipation 
was morally imperative. Even while slavery still per-
sisted it was condemned as against the law of nature. 
The chronicles of slavery in Hebrew, Islamic, and early 
Christian societies do not allow of unambiguous appraisal. 
They record pity for the victims of slavery rather than 
condemnation of the institution; or they express high 
precepts in contrast to harsh and even heartless practices; 
or they indicate slow measures of mitigating evil con-
ditions. Mohammed found slavery deeply entrenched 
in Arab social economy and sought to correct its more 
flagrant abuses, but he did not or could not abolish it. 
Freeing a slave was a merit in Islam, but keeping slaves 
was not denounced; only excesses of cruelty were con-
demned and were regarded as a just ground for freeing 
the victims. No Muslim could be enslaved, and a slave's 
conversion to Islam by right earned his freedom. Moral 
abuse of a bondwoman by her master was stigmatized. 
In general, Islam's treatment of slavery combined good 
professions and partial reforms with much evasion and 
ruthless practices. 
Hebrew customs, in strict application, limited slavery 
only to Canaanites and other Gentiles; by right no Israelite 
could hold a fellow countryman in servitude. Actually 
there were many Hebrew slaves, and the law was con-
cerned to lessen their misery. A debtor could not be 
enslaved permanently; he was bound in servitude only 
for a stipulated period; slaves were to be freed in the 
seventh year of service. The record appears disturbingly 
twofold. An Israelite father could sell his own sons into 
bondage, and likewise his daughters into concubinage. 
But a slave could not be slain by his master and had 
certain implicit rights, might even acquire property of 
his own and purchase his freedom. Some of the earlier 
abuses were reformed by the Deuteronomic code, and 
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the later prophetic and priestly thinking pointed toward 
radical improvement though it scarcely achieved it. The 
unevenness of the Old Testament view of slavery may 
be judged by the readiness with which modern defenders 
of the institution have assembled biblical texts in support 
of their position. 
While the New Testament could not be regarded as 
decidedly abolitionist, the basic emphasis on Christian 
love and the universal outlook of the gospel pointed 
toward humanitarianism of all-Christian fellowship. As 
the apostle Paul wrote, "by one Spirit we were all 
baptized into one body-Jews or Greeks, slaves or free" 
(I Cor. 12:13). Actually there was no initial unqualified 
rejection of bondage. Paul appealed to Philemon to treat 
his runaway slave Onesimus as a beloved brother, but 
he still sent the slave back to his master, even though 
he declared that he thus sent his very heart. The patristic 
chronicles of slavery pointed toward reform. Like the 
Roman philosophers, especially the Stoics, the fathers 
of the church deplored the practice, even disowned the 
institution on principle, but scarcely undertook a resolute 
emancipation. The actual progress of plebeians and 
slaves in status and rights during the later imperial period 
affected large Christian multitudes, and peculiar Christian 
conditions contributed to this social advance. A slave 
could gain honor for his class by suffering martyrdom for 
his faith. The church of Saint Vitale in Ravenna, today 
a monument of marvelous mosaics, was dedicated by 
Justinian to a slave's memory.U Tradition records several 
Christian bishops who had been slaves, ecclesiastical 
parallels of Epictetus. In the early medieval period 
slavery in Western Europe tended to become serfdom, 
villeinage, attachment to the land rather than personal 
thralldom. Then by slow steps of enfranchisement the 
tillers of the soil won their economic freedom. 
11 Compare Lecky, op. cit., 2: 69. 
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The advance was nowise uniform, and historical record 
has some surprising features. The Domesday Book, of 
eleventh-century England, records some 25,000 slaves 
held by clergy and laity. One should have expected the 
church to take a lead in the resistance to slavery, and 
we do read of bishops selling church treasures to purchase 
the freedom of slaves. Yet social historians also tell us 
that the monasteries were among the most reluctant to 
free their slaves. In the fifteenth century Pope Nicholas V 
accorded to Portugal the subjugation of Western Mrica 
into perpetual servitude. When the Jesuits were expelled 
from Tsarist Russia in 1820, they were charged with 
holding 22,000 serfs in Poland. Throughout Russia peasant 
serfdom was a tradition on the vast landed properties. 
The seds were legally a part of their master's estate. As 
Gogo I' s novel Dead Souls indicates, the landowner paid 
taxes on them; they were bought and sold as property even 
as the soil which they tilled. 
The spread of slavery in vVestern countries is a fact 
humiliating to the beliver in social progress. The evidence 
that, after centuries of attaining gradually more humane 
social conditions, Europeans and Americans were still 
capable of such brutalities toward their black fellowmen 
must shock any easy confidence in the reliability of social 
advance. The barbarian layers are still thick under the 
civilized crust. The hard struggle for racial justice and 
civil rights in our own day is a challenge to any com-
placent optimism. Negro slavery in Negro lands has 
been an immemorial iniquity which primitive tribes have 
not outgrown. The dismal reflection is not that savage 
ways of life have not advanced further toward humane 
civilization, but that the most civilized peoples can show 
so much surviving barbarism. 
The Negro slave traffic seems to have been spurred 
by the opening of the African Gold Coast to Western 
exploitation. Trading cotton and gin for ivory was profit-
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able, but more lucrative still was the traffic for black 
toilers needed especially in the Caribbean colonies and 
on the American cotton plantations. More horrible than 
the treatment of the Negroes by ship captains and traders 
was the official legal dismissal of them as so much 
property. In the British colonies Negroes and cattle 
were listed in the same bills of sale; in the southern 
United States the slaves were defined as "chattels personal 
in the hands of their owners ... to all intents and purposes 
whatsoever."12 But it should be noted that, while the 
French Code noir described the slaves as meubles, house-
hold goods, French and also Spanish and Portuguese 
colonial slavery approximated the condition of serfdom; 
it bound the Negroes to the soil; they could not be sold 
at large. 
In the modern antislavery movement English Quakers 
were pioneers; William Wilberforce was a notable cham-
pion. British slave trading was abolished in 1807. Slavery 
in the French colonies had been prohibited in 1794, but 
Napoleon restored it, and final French abolition had to 
wait until 1848. The abolition movement in the United 
States contains the names of John Brown, W. L. Garrison, 
and Harriet Beecher Stowe; it became a national issue 
and led to the crisis of the Civil War and President 
Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation. But the official 
abolition of slavery did not extirpate entirely the deeply 
rooted evils of racial injustice. In varying hostile opposi-
tion and in shifting advance or retrogression, the cor-
rection of flagrant abuses in our country and in other 
lands does not end the social conflict. With new hope 
the deprived masses demand more extensive freedoms, 
but these demands spur renewed resistance by certain 
conservative classes, "the white backlash." The stiff 
Apartheid policy of South Mrica and the firm insistence 
12 Compare Edw. Westermarck, The Origin and Development of the 
Moral Ideas (London, 1906), 1: 705 f. 
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on white supremacy in Rhodesia are instances of un-
yielding racialism. 
Our own American experience manifests in different 
ways the bitter convulsiveness of the racial problem. 
Despite our proclaimed program of civil rights legislation, 
its application has been condemned as too slow and 
inadequate. The deliberate speed urged by the courts 
presumably expressed a recognition of the truth that a 
radical reform in racial relations would involve the neces-
sarily gradual change in social attitudes. But "deliberate-
ness" has also been used to justify persistent delaying 
tactics by entrenched advocates of white supremacy who 
would hold the old line as long as possible and would yield 
the very least that they must. This sort of recalcitrancy 
has aggravated the resentment of the Negroes and in-
creased their demands. The civil rights and other reforms 
which were not granted adequately in the 1950s were 
no longer viewed as sufficient and acceptable in the 1960s. 
While the large majority of the Negro people are still 
marked by patience, growing multitudes of them, espec-
ially of their youths, have been stirred to riots of criminal 
violence, thievery and arson and bombing in towns and 
cities and in the nation's capital. This violence has not 
shown judgment or discrimination. It has struck at 
colleges and universities which had opened their doors to 
blacks needing the higher education that would lift them 
to a better life and career. Even worse than the actual 
riots and resulting destruction has been the spreading loss 
of sympathy for the needed reforms by multitudes of 
whites who have been shocked by the criminal excesses 
of the black rebels. This vicious circle is aggravating the 
tangled problem of racial justice in our society. 
Despite the extensive civilizing work by the great 
colonial powers in sanitation, education, agriculture, and 
industry, the long exploitation of native masses has left 
searing wounds of hatred which are hard to heal. The 
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record varies: the Philippines provide an eloquent con-
trast to the Congo. Great Britain's efforts to prepare 
colonies for self-government, not always successful, have 
provided some good basis for stability in the newly estab-
lished independent states. But how reliable is this ex-
pected stability? Nigeria, which had been hailed as the 
model of successful transition from colonial to self -govern-
ing status, has shocked the world by the unspeakable 
barbarism of its civil war. Throughout the world in 
various ways former colonial states are mismanaging their 
present proclaimed independence and are aggravating 
crises in international relations. Their problems are not 
all political; they complicate regional economic and social 
stability and are a threat to international peace. 
Modern technological advance has expanded the prob-
lems of this chapter, of social order and personal freedom, 
to a worldwide scale. The social range in which we have 
to live has become increasingly global. Accordingly the 
systems of laws and institutions of security and peace 
essential to personal welfare can no longer be framed or 
administered in local or even in merely national terms. 
For good or for ill we find ourselves in worldwide in-
volvement which rules out any isolationism as unrealistic. 
We live in an age when not only our personal well-being 
but our very existence hinges upon the outcome of some 
crisis far away which may threaten a nuclear war. Are 
we to regard with disdain or with pity the cramped 
outlook of some of our neighbors for whom even national 
exclusiveness would not suffice, who demand strictly local 
or regional self-determination? Too stubborn "states' 
rights" demands seem like distressing tribal atavism. 
These reflections on contemporary actualities and ways 
of thought may help us in any fair survey of the agelong 
problem of war and peace in the historical course of 
international relations. Even a first glance at the facts 
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which we are to review should rule out any bland 
optimism, but the irony to which we are repeatedly driven 
must not yield to skepticism or dour negation. We shall 
have to steer between the horrible and the hopeful. 
War is by general consent a deadly cancer in the 
international organism, but it also appertains to a certain 
developed degree of an international order of life. The 
lowest order of tribal savagery does not involve the con-
ditions of waging war in the stricter sense of that term. 
"War has been defined as the legal condition which 
equally permits two or more hostile groups to carry on 
a conflict by armed force."13 While it is the greatest 
obstacle to the full realization of a truly civilized law-
abiding life, war may be seen as itself the result of 
emerging civilization and legality. It is a destructive up-
surge of defiant force, but defiant to a system of law. 
Parasitic in its spread, it draws its resources of violence 
from the increased advances of technology and can be-
come most horrible in the most advanced civilizations. By 
the irony of inverted progress, it has become such an 
unthinkable nightmare in our atomic age that in our 
"hope of despair" we dare to deem it no longer a 
possibility. 
In the earliest stages of savage life, when feud and 
vengeance govern the hostile relations of tribesmen and 
tribal groups, the various procedures of bloody retaliation 
and compounding payment yield in the course of time to 
a law-enforcing control by a superior authority of judge, 
chief, or king. Then the conflict of forces swells the feud 
into a war. Even after the general submission of men 
to the sway of law, they would reserve for themselves a 
recourse to strictly personal settlement of issues judged 
to affect their honor. The historical persistence of dueling 
has been agelong. Civilized states have condemned the 
individual duelist's spurn of law-abiding trial, but in the 
13 Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago, 1942), 2: 718. 
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relations of states to each other the old reliance on the 
verdict of superior force continues. 
Beyond head-hunting and cannibal raids, the border 
clashes, dynastic jealousies, and conflicting claims to 
fertile lands embroiled barbarian rulers in bloody wars. 
The cruelties of ancient battles are on record in monu-
mental inscriptions, in historical chronicles Egyptian or 
Assyrian, and more familiarly to us in the Old Testament. 
What is most distressing is the flagrant or unwittingly 
proud candor with which victorious kings recited and 
engraved the record of their bloody mutilations of their 
defeated enemies. As a relieving contrast we have oc-
casional advocates of mercy with visions of peace. The 
prophet Isaiah sang a promise of the day when the nations 
shall beat their swords into plowshares, and even in blood-
thirsty Assyria the king Tiglath-pileser III set some of his 
captives free in the sanctuary of Shamash, the god of 
righteousness and mercy.H 
On the topic of torture and other cruelties in war the 
historical record is undecided. Some writers believe that 
they can trace a fairly long chronicle of lessened ferocity. 
But they advise not to attribute this gradual abatement 
of horror to any spread of benevolence. Rather has it been 
due to the actual increasing elimination of the bloodier 
lords of battle in every country. History agrees with epic 
poetry in illustrating the Gospel verse that "all who take 
the sword shall perish by the sword." Be it in the 
Mahabharatta or the Nibelungenlied, the epic bards chant 
the battles, the victories, and sooner or later the death 
of one proud warrior after another. So it goes from the 
first page of the Iliad: 
Achilles' wrath, to Greece the direful spring 
Of woes unnumber'd, heav'nly Goddess, sing! 
That wrath which hurl'd to Pluto's gloomy reign 
14 Compare L. T. Hobhouse, Morals in Evolution, 3d ed. (New York, 
1915), p. 249. 
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The souls of mighty chiefs untimely slain; 
Whose limbs unbury'd on the naked shore 
Devouring dogs and hungry vultures tore.15 
History repeats the same agelong story in prose. 
Historical evidence can provide proof for a plausible 
thesis that warfare through the ages has abated in its 
ferocity; but how repeatedly the record is upset by 
counterinstances, our own day has shown with tragic 
emphasis. We read a striking recital of the diminishing 
savagery of English warfare, from the wars of Stephen 
and Matilda in the twelfth century to the wars of the 
Roses in the fifteenth and those of Roundhead and 
Cavalier in the seventeenth. We are reminded of 
Montesquieu's words in eighteenth-century France, that 
"slaughters of prisoners made by soldiers after the heat 
of the action are now condemned by every civilized 
nation."16 But how often the evidence runs the other way. 
Medieval bishops and popes may have banned on pain 
of excommunication any fighting on Sundays or during 
Lent; by the "truce of God" they were to limit battles 
to the first three days of the week. But the Thirty Years 
War of the seventeenth century recorded atrocities which 
reduced Germany to a desert of devastation and in which 
Protestants and Catholics vied in violence. And we who 
read the historical chronicles of the past are shocked by 
our own more recent memories of Rotterdam and Warsaw, 
Dachau and Buchenwald. They are another story humil-
iating to the optimistic historian. 
Significant and enlightening is the gradual change, un-
mistakable though not thoroughgoing, in the popular at-
titude toward war. Traditionally the heroic souls have 
been celebrated in victory and mourned in death. This 
temper of evaluation is deeply ingrained; it serves to 
15 Iliad (Pope's translation) first page. 
16 Montesquieu, Esprit des lois, 15. 2; compare Alex. Sutherland, Origin 
and Growth of the Moral Instinct (London, 1898), 1: 454 ff. 
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maintain the strong appeal of the old epics, and we may 
note its expression in our less poetic estimates of the great 
warmakers of history. The name of Richard the Lion 
Hearted still sounds sweet in English ears, and tourists 
along with Frenchmen are thrilled by emotions different 
from horror and dismay on approaching Napoleon's tomb 
under the dome of the Hotel des Invalides. The warlike 
tone is nowise extinct, but there is a change from pride 
in ferocity to apology for severities as unavoidable, or to 
lying denials of the historical record. Germans and Rus-
sians accuse each other of the frightful slaughter in 
Warsaw. These self-exculpations, so different from the 
ancient boasts of primacy in horror, are not without sig-
nificance. In their false apologies they strive to appeal to 
a recognized popular sentiment which condemns atrocities. 
As Rochefoucauld told us, "Hypocrisy is the tribute which 
vice pays to virtue." The Kafir or Hottentot is quite can-
did in making his own distinction between good and 
evil: "Good is when I carry away someone else's wives 
and cows, and evil is when mine are carried away 
from me."17 
Against the historical and psychological background 
suggested by the previous comments, we may consider 
more closely the causes or incentives to war, and more 
particularly the problem which war or the threat of it 
presents to our age of worldwide crisis. The incitements 
to war in our modern life are many, and some of them 
are ancient. There is the angry wound of outraged na-
tional pride or bitter rancor or envy burning for revenge. 
There is the pressure of seething populations which can-
not be contained within existing national boundaries and 
which would dignify aggression as a public necessity. 
There is the surging protest of races still outside the pale 
of civilization, whose souls have been aroused enough 
17 Vladimir Soloviev, War, Progress, and End of History (London, 
1915), p. 16. 
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to claim justice and to dream of equality, who have 
emerged from colonial servitude to acknowledged formal 
independence but who are not yet really capable of self-
government and are still largely pawns in the global 
conflicts of great powers. The tangle of international trade 
and tariff barriers condemns some nations to virtual serf-
dom and others to futile labor. And the radical problem 
of some form of coexistence by powers of conflicting 
ideologies requires a settlement without which no merely 
political peace can prove enduring.18 
In one of the most extensive works on warfare pub-
lished in our time, Quincy "Tright's Study of War, four 
conditions of modern life are cited as deep involvements 
in the problem of international hostilities: 1) the shrink-
ing of our world resulting from modern technology; 2) the 
acceleration of history; 3) the progress of military in-
vention; 4) the rise of democracy.19 Science and tech-
nology, with perfected communication and transportation, 
have expanded worldwide travel and exchange of goods 
and ideas, have made all nations interdependent in every 
way. With their manifold closer contacts, cooperation but 
also conflicts have become more common. "Acceleration 
of history" has also been the result of the modern tech-
nology and its extensive wider communication of ideas 
and the implementation of them. Social change all over 
the world has become increasingly rapid. Primitive con-
ditions of life are becoming more and more exceptional. 
Social statisticians tell us that, while in the days of Co-
lumbus one out of every four persons on earth was a 
savage, today less than 5 percent can be reckoned as 
primitive, and the next half-century would probably alter 
most of them. 
In the special field of military operations, technical 
invention of wholly new horrendous armaments has revo-
lutionized the entire procedure of war, strategy and tactics 
18 Compare R. A. Tsanoff, Ethics, 2d ed. (New York, 1955), p. 361. 
19 Compare Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago, 1942), 1: 3 ff. 
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alike. Just as it has replaced the traditional soldier class 
by universal military service, it has changed the old war-
fare between armies by a new frightful total war among 
entire nations, without any noncombatants. The fourth 
condition of modern life, the rise of democracy, indicates 
a spreading national consciousness in the various countries, 
the importance of public opinion in determining the for-
eign policies of governments which is swaying the balance 
of decision in times of crisis. We may recognize that this 
popular dynamic has often been the tinder of flaming 
war, but as it has become more enlightened and effectively 
vocal it may also prove to be a growing power in inter-
national peace. 
We should face our contemporary war record forth-
rightly in all its frightfulness, which no optimistic apologies 
can gainsay. How is one to judge Hegel's reported com-
ments, made immediately after the Napoleonic campaigns, 
that "modern wars are carried on humanely. One person 
is not set in hate over against another."2° Contemporary 
sociologists and historians have charged that in our twen-
tieth century man has been more barbarous, more brutal 
and bloody, more inhumane to his fellowman than any 
men of the past. The bare statistics here are more grue-
some than any grim condemnations. According to the 
sociologist Pitirim Sorokin, mankind has suffered during 
our two world wars more destruction of life and the 
resources of civilization than have been recorded during 
the preceding eight centuries.21 Very evidently the his-
torical record shows that man has not lessened his greed 
and aggressive lust of conquest. What ground do we have 
for hoping that men will ever change their nature and beat 
their swords into plowshares? Twice in our century dem-
ocratic freedom has been salvaged, but only salvaged, in 
a precarious truce. It is now facing its third and hardest 
20 Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. S. W. Dyde (London, 1896), 
p. 340. 
21 Compare Wright, op. cit., 1: 237, citing P. Sorokin. 
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trial. The atomic bomb did bring the Second World War 
to an abrupt end in the Pacific; but the incredible ex-
pansion of atomic armament since Hiroshima has magni-
fied beyond calculation the horrors of any future war. 
In terrible irony, just because of the unthinkable universal 
ruin which menaces us all, we are unwilling to resign 
ourselves to its imminence. 
Before the outbreak of the First World War Norman 
Angell tried to check the brewing storm with his book 
The Great Illusion. It was translated into many languages 
and read all over the world, and while it failed to avert 
war it helped to spread the conviction of the "complete 
economic futility of conquest," the vanity of seeking "a 
place in the sun" by fighting for it, the radically and 
finally destructive effects of war all-around. More recently 
Arnold Toynbee has brought his all-historical outlook upon 
this dismal issue of war and civilization. In his book of 
that title he puts in terse statement his conclusion that 
war is "the proximate cause of the breakdown of every 
civilization . . . man's principal engine of social and 
spiritual self-defeat."22 He traces repeatedly the eventual 
undoing of the warlike. This is "the burden of Nineveh," 
and it is exposed throughout the world in the ultimate 
futility of every bellicose aberration of despotic or na-
tional rapacity. Militarism is suicidal. In view of the 
tragic historical record, it is distressing to read the periodic 
glorification of war, as, for instance, the following by 
the Prussian commander Hellmuth von Moltke: "Per-
petual peace is a dream-and not even a beautiful dream-
and War is an integral part of God's ordering of the 
Universe. In war, man's noblest impulses come into play: 
courage and renunciation, fidelity to duty and a readiness 
to sacrifice that does not stop short of offering up life 
itself. "23 
22Arnold Toynbee, War and Civilization (New York, 1950), pp. vii, 
viii. 
23 Compare Toynbee, op. cit., p. 16. 
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Mankind has not yet learned its tragic lesson, not 
even during the past frightful half-century. The urge of 
aggression spurns every effort to settle conflicting de-
mands by negotiation; it forces peace-seeking statesmen 
to defend justice and freedom by armed resistance. But 
the darkness of dismay in which the present crisis plunges 
us should not blind our minds to the recognition of the 
upward strain in men's thinking and in their striving for 
a better day. In the stormy days of civil war in Holland 
and in the flame and desolation of the spreading 
Thirty Years War in Germany, Hugo Grotius saw clearly 
and formulated the principles of international law in war 
and in peace. Condorcet likewise wrote his historical 
outline of the progress of the human mind during the 
bloodiest days of the French Revolution and the Terror. 
Today also men throughout the world are pursuing in 
thought and in active policy the principles of a world-
order of peace and justice and freedom. But, again 
throughout the world, aggressive forces, and they are 
not all Communist, are exploiting every occasion to stir 
conflict and expand their spheres of control by all the 
tactics of rebellion and war, cold or hot. Our American 
dominance as a world power has led us to believe that we 
have the task of policing the world and defending freedom 
wherever menaced. But this terrestrial assignment is 
overtaxing our resources and capacities; it strains our 
best judgment and divides our people in harsh conflicts 
of policies and principles, as most emphatically shown in 
our tangled military involvement and undeclared war 
in Vietnam. We seem to be in a dual quandary. Our 
humane devotion to justice and freedom, we declare, 
compels us to challenge violent aggression with armed 
resistance; but it also forbids us to fight our enemies with 
our total destructive power. So we seek some justifiable 
and hopefully effective strategy between those of Ma-
hatma Gandhi and Genghis-Khan. 
The pursuit of the principle of a world order of justice 
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and peace has found expression in the formulation of a 
law of nations. A clear statement of the reason for it has 
been given by one of the greatest English jurists, Lord 
Mansfield: "The law of nations is founded on justice, 
charity, convenience, and the reason of the thing, and 
confirmed by long usage."24 This basic justice and this 
reasonableness in the interrelations of peoples and states 
have been the agelong aims of enlightened men, but they 
have been obstructed by avid nationalism: both impulses 
evident in the meetings of the United Nations. This world-
wide international forum of available negotiations is also 
an available vast platform for aggressive propaganda. The 
humanitarian appeals to international understanding are 
deafened by violent diatribe. But in their basic principles 
these conferences represent the steady endeavor of en-
lightened statesmanship to achieve a platform of recog-
nized international standards of right, by reliance on 
which all nations, great and small, can secure their rights 
through fair negotiations. The global expansion of inter-
national relations, which is one mark of contemporary 
civilization, does incite unprincipled despots to exploit 
the new global tactics and armament for a more fateful 
enslavement of humanity. But it also inspires the world's 
best social conscience to reach toward unprecedented 
human welfare. "That mankind shares a common heritage 
is a creeping concept that may yet overshadow the claims 
of national sovereignty."25 
24 Quoted by J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations, 4th ed. (Oxford, 1949), 
p. 69. 
25 Elizabeth Mann Borgese, "The World Communities," in The Center 
Magazine (Santa Barbara, Calif., Sept.-Oct., 1971 ), p. 11. 
CHAPTER TWELVE 
Intellectual and Aesthetic Values 
A NOTED contemporary anthropologist has stated: "Of all 
our present creeds, none is more firmly or widely em-
braced than . . . belief in the attainment of knowledge 
as an unconditional good in prospect."1 Aristotle's descrip-
tion of man as a rational animal and of the pursuit of 
knowledge as the characteristically human activity-"All 
men by nature desire to know" -is sustained in the history 
of thought by men's positive or negative appraisals of 
life. There has been a persistent correlation between 
skepticism and pessimism; contrariwise, intellectual re-
assurance, rational or experimental, has tended to give 
our basic attitude toward life a positive if not altogether 
optimistic tone. The belief in social progress is thus vitally 
concerned with the question whether intellectual values 
are attainable and reliable. So we are told: "The great 
aim of nature is intellectual development."2 No other 
satisfaction in life would quite suffice, if men's character-
istic pursuit of knowledge were to be exposed as futile. 
Our problem here has two aspects. Is reliable and ex-
pansive knowledge attainable? And if it is attainable, how 
is it related to the realization of the other values of life? 
The interplay of these questions, which is one of explora-
tion and criticism of men's intellectual capacities, is ever 
disturbed, both in individual experience and in social 
judgment. Scripture and poetry alike may move us to 
ponder in dismay that what we come to know may prove 
lamentable in the learning. So reflects Ecclesiastes: "In 
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much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth 
knowledge increaseth sorrow" ( 1:18). This sort of com-
ment expresses the tragic dilemma of our present age. 
It is well to keep it in mind from the outset. 
Our inquiry into the progress of knowledge brings to 
our attention the dependence of technical advance on 
scientific progress. The two terms might just as well have 
been cited in the opposite order. The intellectual course 
has not always been from craft to insight, nor yet from 
pure to applied science. Men built pumps before they 
understood their operation; they forecast eclipses before 
they had any scientific grasp of astronomy. The sight of 
Stonehenge stirs us to marvel: how can we explain those 
amazing feats of structural execution, achieved without 
the technical machinery made possible by modern scien-
tific mastery of mechanics? The moving of heavy blocks 
on tree rollers led to the discovery and use of the wheel, 
with its incalculable improvement in transportation. Much 
later, in explaining the operation of pumps through under-
standing the conditions and laws of air pressure, modern 
minds expanded, in theory and practice alike, the whole 
field of meteorology. 
It would be superfluous to argue the main case of the 
actual growth of knowledge, certainly in details and to 
a great extent in fundamentals. What is more informing 
and to the point is to consider some of the characteristic 
features of man's maturing intellectual mastery, but then 
also to acknowledge its more important limitations, very 
apparent and maybe real and basic. 
One great mark of the attainment of knowledge is recog-
nized better if we note its dual aspect. Fruitful scientific 
exploration in any field requires specialized methods 
which may involve a high degree of abstraction. Investi-
1 R. R. Marett, Faith, Hope, and Charity in Primitive Religion (Oxford, 
1932)' p. 132. 
2 J. W. Draper, A History of the Intellectual Development of Europe 
(New York and London, ed. of 1905), 2: 394. 
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gation must isolate its specific problem, fasten upon it 
and pin it down for explicit and definite solution. But as 
the problem is thus mastered and solved, it spreads and 
is ramified in implications; the special conclusion shows 
its bearing on other topics and issues; the one answer 
opens up a new variety of questions. In the very fencing 
off of our property for precise survey, we find the extent 
of its contacts with some neighboring estates and its actual 
but previously unsuspected adjacency to others. The 
scientific explanation of pumps leads to advances in 
various fields, to barometers and altimeters and ther-
mometers. The discovery and understanding of X-rays, 
important in nuclear physics, bear fruit in transforming 
modern surgical procedure. The agricultural, industrial, 
and medical involvements of modern chemistry provide 
numerous examples; in one field after another, the under-
standing of nature seems to require acute concentration 
of specific inquiry, but then it yields its fruitage in widely 
ramified directions. 
Another feature in the advance of knowledge, closely 
related to the one which we have just been considering, 
is its cumulative operation, involving periodically some 
startling, accelerated tempo. Some historians of civiliza-
tion, recording the decline and fall of so many social 
projects and institutions, have also noted the more reliable 
vitality of intellectual activities. George Sarton, writing 
in the disastrous years of the Second World War, ob-
served that "scientific activities are the only ones which 
are cumulative and progressive."3 This aspect of scientific 
progress seems to be natural to the higher life of man. 
A scarcely noticeable but deeply pulsing tendency of 
thought that propels it in a certain direction seems sud-
denly to sweep forward victoriously. Even so one may 
scarcely observe in the apparently calm flow of the waters 
3 George Sarton, The Life of Science (New York, ed. of 1948), p. 24; 
quoted here from R. B. Perry, Realms of Value (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), 
p. 306. 
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of Yellowstone or Iguassu the seething surge that will 
presently hurl them thundering toward and then over 
the brink of the waterfalls. Note the creative impetus and 
acceleration of knowledge in the whole field of chemistry 
stimulated by the work of Lavoisier, or the rushing flood 
of invention in every branch of industry which marked 
the second half of the nineteenth century. 
The seemingly steady and undeviating course of 
thought may bring it to a crossroad where it swerves 
radically toward wholly new ground. So we have seen 
rivers that have flowed smoothly across endless plains 
reach the barrier of some mountain height, and instead 
of skirting it and flowing on their level course, suddenly 
veer and plunge into its rocky bounds. The whole history 
of thought records such radical deviations. The shift of 
mental interest from mythology to investigation of nature 
which began in the sixth century B.C. marks the beginnings 
of Western science and philosophy. It took a dramatic 
turn to greatness in classical Athenian thought stirred by 
the Socratic concentration on self-understanding. Across 
some twenty centuries, at the crossroad of civilization in 
the Renaissance, the one city of Florence manifested the 
teeming fertility of creative genius with its dynamic vision 
of a new world to explore and exploit and recreate. 
Future historians will record the even more amazing 
advance of science and technology in our atomic age 
which we are not yet able to comprehend adequately. 
It seems to illustrate both the increasing tempo and the 
radical veerings and shifts of intellectual momentum. 
Professional experts dramatize their statements of the 
marvelous progress of physical science and technology in 
our generation, beyond all previous ages, by telling us that 
the majority of physicists and engineers who have ever 
lived throughout history are still alive. It is not quite a 
hundred years since Jules Verne baffied his age with his 
fantasy Around the World in Eighty Days. Eighty days-
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and they are now minutes for our astronauts. And as to 
radical turns of knowledge into new directions, what is 
more dynamic than the change of course from classical 
to nuclear physics? 
The history of civilization records striking instances of 
what may be called migrations of intellectual centers of 
activity, and in many important centers an ascendancy 
and a decline. Consider classical antiquity: Athens, in-
conspicuous in early Greek philosophy and science, rose 
to outstanding dominance which it maintained for some 
two centuries, but then it declined without promise of 
resurgence at home, though with unparalleled influence 
on all later thought. It was followed by Alexandria, which 
became a world mart of ideas and doctrines, with its 
museum containing not only the greatest library of an-
tiquity in all languages but also an ancient institute of 
advanced studies, which included, among others, Euclid 
and Hipparchus. 
The migration of intellectual leadership takes often 
unpredictable and very strange turns. The descendants 
of the Arab camel drivers who, if tradition is right, burned 
the Alexandrian library were soon to become the medieval 
world's most zealous bibliophiles, leaders in philosophy 
and science, transmitters of classical wisdom, especially 
the Aristotelian, to the Western world. For long centuries 
European medical schools taught from the treatises of 
Arabian Avicenna; and Dante sang in his Divine Comedy 
of Averroes of Cordova "who made the great commentary." 
The historians and chroniclers of knowledge usually 
write of its advance and transmission from culture to 
culture, but also of its eclipse and loss. Its inheritance is 
unreliable even under normal conditions of social stability; 
political or military crises may quite efface it. The broad 
curve of history may point from crude simplicity to social 
complexity and culture; but in many cases the direction 
has been reversed. Herodotus wrote of the developed 
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and highly specialized medical practice in ancient Egypt, 
quite in contrast to present-day conditions in that country. 
A visitor to the lost Inca citadel of Machu Picchu cannot 
comprehend the masterly skill of its builders, working 
without machinery. On an old wall in Cuzco is a heavy 
dressed slab of stone with twelve angles in each of which, 
as in a jigsaw puzzle, other heavy stones fit perfectly 
without any mortar. And in the anthropological museum 
of Lima one can see not only the most delicate textile 
and spider web embroidery, done presumably with fish 
bone needles, but also mummy skulls showing marks of 
cranial surgery. The crushing of all this ancient knowledge 
and skill by the conquistadores, as they ground down the 
Indians to menial labor, snuffed out that ancient mastery. 
In social practice knowledge is not always an abiding 
possession; it is not in itself assured of permanence. No 
idea remains unalterably valid. Of course, this may only 
show the self-reconstitutive character of intellectual ac-
tivity. But the more searching question would still con-
front the mind of its own fundamental reliability. Re-
peatedly in history the expanding domains of thought 
have been menaced by skeptical incursions. 
Although this skepticism has not always concluded on 
a note of utter negation, ever since antiquity it has chal-
lenged the confidence. of productive reflection. Note 
the Sophistic distrust and dismissal of any alleged knowl-
edge in the beginnings of Western science and philosophy, 
or even the more disturbing skepticism of Pyrrho and 
his successors, the more disturbing because it challenged 
the greater and more mature intellectual mastery of 
classical Athenian philosophy and invaded even the Pla-
tonic citadel of reason. Again and again in the history 
of thought, periods of intellectual achievement have been 
unsettled by some upsurge of doubt and disillusion. Mter 
the greatest achievement of Scholastic reason, in Saint 
Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologica, Duns Scotus, "the 
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Subtle Doctor," himself a preeminent master of Scholastic 
logic, distrusted the professed rational foundations of his 
Christian faith and relied rather on the fiat of his pious 
will. Five hundred years later Hegel was declaring that 
the secret nature of the universe could offer no permanent 
resistance to the courage of science. Like a blast against 
this rational assurance, Schopenhauer concluded that "the 
more intelligent a man is, the more keenly aware is he 
of the darkness that surrounds him."4 Byron, in an ironical 
couplet in his Manfred, despaired of science as "But an 
exchange of ignorance for that/ Which is another kind of 
ignorance."5 The eminent physicist Sir James Jeans writes: 
"Many would hold that, from the broad philosophical 
standpoint, the outstanding achievement of twentieth-
century physics is not the theory of relativity with its 
welding of space and time, or the theory of quanta with 
its apparent negation of the laws of causation, or the 
dissection of the atom with its resultant discovery that 
things are not what they seem; it is the general recognition 
that we are not yet in contact with ultimate reality."6 
Neither knowledge nor ignorance can be certified and 
guaranteed by an array of impressive quotations. Despite 
common opinion to the contrary, the basic implications 
of skepticism are not invariably fatal to intellectual re-
liance. The recognition of error, fallibility, and incertitude 
need not be a declaration of intellectual bankruptcy. It 
may well serve as evidence of a more searching and ex-
acting intelligence. The conviction which many minds 
have shared with Spinoza, that truth is to be sought 
through the exposure of error, is significant at more than 
one level. Not only is truth outlined and defined by the 
clearance of errors, but in the very disclosure of error a 
perfected capacity for recognition of truth is revealed. 
4 Schopenhauer, Siimtliche Werke, Paul Deussen Edition (Miinchen, 
1913)' 10: 584. 
5 Byron, Manfred, 2: iv. 
6 Jeans, The Mysterious Universe (Cambridge, Eng., 1934 ed.), p. 111. 
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Furthermore, error may well serve to determine the area 
of available insight. 
Scientific research and philosophical reflection lead us 
to recognize that nature has neither top nor bottom. But 
this would be mistakenly regarded as a skeptical con-
clusion. Rather it should signify to us the boundless range 
of available inquiry in every direction. The searching 
mind is always intent on comprehending, on grasping the 
reality which it investigates, and it aims at the utmost 
available simplicity of statement, at some abstract ra-
tional principle. Nature, however, seems both to gratify 
and to admonish our persistent reflection; at times it 
sagely disillusions us. In realizing the ultimate inadequacy 
of some sort of knowledge, we gain in wisdom, we learn 
that we must pursue our probing at some deeper level. 
So Alfred North Whitehead teaches us basic understand-
ing: "Nature appears as a complex system whose factors 
are dimly discerned by us. But is not this the very truth? 
... The aim of science is to seek the simplest explanation 
of complex facts. We are apt to fall into the error of 
thinking that the facts are simple because simplicity is 
the goal of our quest. The guiding motto in the life of 
every natural philosopher should be, Seek simplicity and 
distrust it."7 
The problem of man's progress or of his stagnation and 
frustration in attaining intellectual values is not settled 
by a critical reply to the general challenge of skepticism. 
Beyond even an encouraging reply to the question whether 
reliable knowledge and understanding are available at 
all, we have to consider the problem of what kind of 
knowledge is within our reach. The student of progress 
is disturbed here not so much by the questioned reliability 
of the intellect generally, but by its patently serious 
limitations of scope. We may call this the Pascalian 
7 Whitehead, The Concept of Nature, p. 163; quoted here from H. 0. 
Taylor, Freedom of the Mind in History (London, 1924), p. 208 n. 
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quandary. Pascal was a master of both analytic and ex-
perimental methods. Had he not even as a youth reasoned 
out in his own unaided way Euclid's theorems; had he 
not proved and perfected the laws of air-pressure? He 
was clear in his conviction that the geometrical method 
was the best method of the mind: it defined its terms and 
it proved its propositions. But while he thus reaffirmed 
Plato's requirement of rational analysis as a condition 
of philosophical reflection, Pascal regarded a man who 
was merely a rational geometer as a skillful artisan. The 
science in which he worked and excelled could attain 
valid conclusions in its special fields, but it did not yield 
understanding and was not even, as science, cognizant of 
the problems which are of the deepest human concern: 
the problem of belief in God, of man's duty and moral 
values, man's ultimate role and destiny. For all man's 
knowledge of details, "the end of things and their first 
principles are hidden from him in impenetrable mystery."8 
Thus we recognize here our two inquiries. We are 
considering our mind's capacity or incapacity to attain 
what may be called intelligence in valuation, reliable 
insight into our spiritual principles and prospects which 
affect us most profoundly. And we are also asking what 
bearing, if any, scientific knowledge and perfected tech-
nology have on these deeper human interests and values. 
These two inquiries are distinguishable but also related. 
Here we are raising the problem of the limitations of 
strictly intellectual inquiry to its physical-scientific factual 
scope. If we are to gain assurance of our available valid 
knowledge of nature, do we not require a conception of 
knowledge and of the conditions and testing of the know-
ing process which are inapplicable to men's so-called 
spiritual experiences? 
Students of the history of philosophy will recognize 
8 Pascal, Oeuvres, Grands ll:crivains ed. (Paris, 1904), 12: 78; 10: 4 f.; 
12: 13. 
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at once the terms of the Kantian vindication of scientific 
knowledge, in The Critique of Pure Reason. Kant ( 1724-
1804) concluded that scientific, universally valid knowl-
edge of the world is possible so long as nature is considered 
as a necessarily connected system of events in space and 
time. To Kant himself this conclusion did not warrant 
unqualified negation or skepticism in morals, art, or re-
ligion. While he disavowed any theoretical metaphysics 
that would justify intellectual conviction of those ultimate 
issues, he did recognize available grounds of moral-dutiful 
conduct, aesthetic judgment, religious belief and devotion. 
Kant's idealistic successors sought to achieve a meta-
physics which would integrate nature and spirit. The 
outstanding philosophical system guided by this strategy 
was Hegel's dialectical idealism. But to many minds Kant's 
critical limitation of knowledge to its physical-scientific 
scope pointed toward a more unyielding naturalism. 
Matters of moral conviction or aesthetic taste or religious 
devotion should not be regarded mistakenly as under-
standable. This sort of conclusion has led many thinkers 
toward outright and unqualified materialism; not merely 
:::~~nostic disavowal of any knowledge of God but a de-
cisive atheistic negation of religion and of all alleged 
spiritual realities. Other minds of naturalistic commit-
ment have acknowledged with some vague tolerance a 
certain range of conviction and taste and faith, but have 
definitely restricted intelligent statements to the factual 
scientific domain. 
In our day we may note a spreading tendency, both in 
philosophical reflection and in more popular common 
reaction, to regard ethical and aesthetic judgments as 
merely emotive reactions, not subject to validation and 
unavailable for proof or disproof. As if by way of crush-
ing rejoinder, in the field of religious discussion, some 
devout existentialists not merely disavow but disdain any 
intellectual basis or proof of religious faith as necessary 
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ground. Their devotion seeks direct encounter with the 
Divine and requires not valid conclusions but life-
consuming consecration. At this point our thought is 
embroiled in greater quandary by the fact that, while the 
existentialism of Kierkegaard and Barth would dismiss 
reliance on intellectualism in order to emphasize unwaver-
ing theistic commitment, Sartre's existentialism is initially 
and finally atheistic. These issues indicate some of the 
perplexities which confront the study of progress in men's 
quest for certainty, in that desire which Aristotle de-
scribed as the natural activity of man, the rational animal. 
Our quandaries increase when we turn to the second 
of the two questions mentioned above: What bearing do 
the attainment of scientific knowledge and its applications 
in perfected technology have on the other values of 
personal and social welfare? Our fair answer will depend 
upon the values which we are considering and even more 
upon the values which we emphasize and exalt. If, with-
out prejudging the course and outcome of our inquiry, 
we may anticipate some of its evident aspects, it will be 
seen that the historical evidence does not warrant an 
answer of exclusively positive nor an exclusively negative 
valuation. Here, even more strikingly than in the survey 
of some other fields of human experience, the advance of 
theoretical and practical mastery is seen to manifest an 
expanding range of perfection and its satisfactions, but 
also an ever graver hazard of misdirection and frustra-
tion. The option and liable outcome of one or the other 
of these alternatives depends mainly upon our choice 
among contending values: upon that all-important humane 
insight without which we lack wisdom but of which it is 
debatable that we have any reliable knowledge. 
Growing intellectual mastery in scientific knowledge 
and its various technical applications can be shown to in-
crease greatly our ability to produce or to prevent certain 
conditions and results of our natural environment: to do 
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or to omit as we choose. We can and we do achieve 
greater and more various and more effective implementa-
tion of what we choose to do. But our eventual well-being 
or breakdown or disaster, while it involves this scientific-
technical competence, depends basically upon our in-
telligence in choice, depends on how we choose. The 
engine which we operate may propel us to a desirable 
destination, but it may also sweep us to destruction. Our 
very first thought about our state of affairs in this atomic 
age drives this point home. 
The advance in man's understanding of the laws of 
nature and in his technical exploitation of its resources 
has been spectacular. Amazingly perfected communica-
tion in telegraph, telephone, radio, television, and in-
credibly accelerated travel and transportation have made 
it possible for men and nations to be in immediate contact, 
closer to each other on the opposite ends of the earth than 
they could be to their fellow-townsmen a bare century 
ago. But though they may thus be factually close to-
gether, they may yet be worlds apart in their purposes, 
hostile and the more destructive mutually because of their 
deadlier capacity to attack each other. 
The spread of univeral education not only at elementary 
levels but also in college and university studies has greatly 
multiplied throughout the world, especially in our Western 
lands, the theoretical and technical competence which in 
unusually creative minds achieves important inventions. 
This range of productive intelligence has been expanded 
beyond belief by the recent perfected administrative 
operation of scientific teamwork which in one short gen-
eration has swept us definitely into the atomic and space 
age. Telstar and weather forecasting satellites, nuclear-
powered ships and peaceful exploitation of atomic energy 
may already be signaling a new and more blessed civiliza-
tion. Three centuries ago John Dryden looked forward to 
our marvelous day: 
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... We upon our globe's last verge shall go, 
And view the ocean leaning on the sky; 
From thence our rolling neighbours we shall know, 
And on the lunar world securely pry.9 
But these boons so amazing are also so dire a hazard 
that our daily lives seem to us a fearful gamble. In 
Goethe's Faust we read the dismal reflection, though it 
is attributed to the devil, that man's use of his intelligence 
has been to perfect his competence in corruption: "He 
calls it reason, 'tis his power increased/To be far beastlier 
than any beast."10 
This problem of the relation of growing scientific and 
technical mastery to social welfare does not concern only 
the bearing of intellectual progress to other social values. 
We also ask: How does the growing intellectual mastery 
affect the present course and future prospects of intellec-
tual activity itself? Two of the institutions of higher 
learning in the state of Texas proclaim on their main 
edifices the exalted worth and the liberating power of 
the pursuit of truth. On the main building of the state 
university are engraved the words of the apostle: "Ye 
shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." 
On the cornerstone of Rice University one may read the 
judgment of Democritus, that he would rather discover 
the cause of one fact than become king of the Persians. 
These are noble expressions of the high worth of intellec-
tual values and of the life devoted to the pursuit of 
knowledge and truth. But what happens when the in-
tellectual energies of men are claimed more and more 
by research of immediate technical application, industrial 
or military? Increased knowledge and technical mastery 
can surely perfect the external conditions of daily life 
and multiply greatly the available natural resources for 
our effective use. This progress has furthermore enabled 
9 Dryden, Annus Mirabilis (Oxford, ed. of 1915), p. clxiv. 
10 Goethe, Faust, Pt. I, Prologue in Heaven, Bayard Taylor's translation. 
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America to defend freedom against tyrannical incursions. 
But beyond the still unallayed fear of a third world war 
is another hazard, perhaps less terrifying but very funda-
mental, the threat to men's intellectual activity itself. 
In medieval Scholastic culture a dogmatic authoritarian-
ism concentrated men's thought and purposes on religion 
and theology. The beginnings of modern thought in the 
Renaissance were marked by an upsurge of unbound 
intelligence pressing forward in every direction for the 
rights of free investigation and free expression. The 
modern mind did not ignore practical application, but it 
resisted dictation or constriction. The lures of industrial 
profit or the exactions of war emergency in our time 
have to a considerable degree regimented the former 
"republic of minds," the world society of scientists and 
scholars. In medieval scholasticism science was regarded 
as the servant of theology, but today it tends to become 
the cook of industry and the recruit of armament. The 
freedom of spirit, essential to intellectual culture, seems 
to be in a precarious state. Aside from the industrial and 
military canalizing of research, we may note overt or 
implied depreciation of humanistic studies: as though 
the humanities were only second choice for one's intel-
lectual career, for minds that are not quite up to the 
principal goals of intelligence, in science and technology. 
The confidence of the believers in social progress is 
being tested these days by the violent disturbances in 
our institutions of higher education. The traditional re-
liance on trained intelligence as a guardian of the higher 
values of life was emphasized especially by the liberalism 
of the Enlightenment. Despite the frightful Terror of 
the French Revolution, Condorcet persisted in his as-
surance that the spread and perfecting of modern educa-
tion would pilot mankind to ever greater progress. But 
throughout the world today the universities, which have 
been trusted to nurture the maturing intelligence of the 
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future guardians of a progressive social order, have been 
swept by the insurgence of riotous and destructive 
excesses. 
These outbursts of violence in various countries have 
been incited by different factors, but they also manifest 
some common sources of propaganda. In many of them 
a well-organized hard core of rebellious leaders are evi-
dently doing their part in the worldwide Communist 
program of stirring trouble. But the spread of disaffection 
is due to a variety of causes in different countries. In 
Latin America, as we have been told, university riots have 
long been endemic, indigenous to a society in which an 
educated young intelligentsia sees slight prospect of ac-
ceptable careers. In Japan the Communist infiltration has 
been fanned by resentful nationalism and by frustrating 
social and economic conditions. In Paris, as is well re-
membered, student rebellion against administrative and 
social grievances was a factor in terminating Charles de 
Gaulle's government. So variously in other countries. 
The problem of violent unrest in American universities 
is particularly distressing because our nation has been the 
chief testing ground of Enlightenment liberalism. More 
than in other lands our universities have respected the 
principles of academic freedom, have offered higher educa-
tion to the large body of young men and women preparing 
for the greatest variety of careers, have sought to make 
satisfactory residential and other provisions for their 
students' welfare. In fact university students in the 
United States have been traditionally so peaceful that 
certain critics have commented on their apparent in-
difference to public affairs. The recent radical change in 
this respect has been ascribed to different causes: primarily 
and still chiefly to the war in Vietnam. The whole problem 
has been aggravated by the disabilities of poverty in a 
highly affluent society, by the gravely menacing conditions 
of pollution, and by grievances against administrative and 
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governmental policies. The Negro insurgence has added 
flame to the fires of revolt. Any forthright consideration 
of the student spirit of unrest in our colleges and univer-
sities is bound to recognize the justification for a strong 
protest against conditions and policies which require re-
form. What is sorely disturbing is not the protesting 
spirit itself but the violent and destructive expressions of 
it on the part of the mostly highly gifted and best-educated 
young minds in our society. The great majority of our 
university students do not participate in the active pro-
tests and nowise in the violent riots. But the problem still 
remains that a great number of students do rebel, riotously 
and destructively. Is the most widely available higher 
education so unreliable a guarantee of a progressive and 
intelligent, responsible way of life? 
Thus we are led to recognize that our modern age has 
shown dramatically both promise and threat in its intel-
lectual advance. Science and its applications can raise 
our whole civilization to unprecedented heights, but they 
also confront us with the hazard of irretrievable ruin. 
The fateful alternative hangs upon our choice of values, 
upon a wise humane insight which science and technology 
cannot formulate but which is a fundamental need in 
this age of world crisis. 
We turn now to the problem of social progress in the 
fields of aesthetic values. The creative imagination is 
perhaps the most characteristically individual expression 
of personality, and unique genius is in many ways un-
available for historical appraisal. But the general direc-
tion which creative activity is likely to follow, the sort of 
art which is apt to flourish is to a considerable degree 
determined by its social-cultural medium. This latter 
aspect, clearly, is more apparent in the popular reaction 
to artistic activity, the creative response or the vulgarity 
or the stolidity of the public. 
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The recognition of the social expressiveness of art may 
be overemphasized in some sort of sociological aesthetics. 
Without going to such lengths we should acknowledge the 
social interrelations of the various aspects of civilization. 
What we divide conveniently in our academic depart-
ments is really organic and interwoven. The arts are 
creative ways of expressing the various outlooks on life 
in the history of civilization, from early antiquity to the 
modern age. The spirit of a historical epoch or a culture 
may be viewed in a variety of artistic media, and that 
spirit or prevailing tone may be disclosed in the ascen-
dancy of some art or the decline of others. Its expression 
in pictorial or plastic forms may share in spirit with its 
poetry or drama or music. The characteristic classical 
genius is recognizable in Sophocles as truly as in Pheidias. 
Dante's Divine Comedy is the poetic version of the Chris-
tian view of human life and nature, which found embodi-
ment also in the medieval cathedrals. The upsurge of 
dynamic creative power in the Renaissance, so evident 
in Leonardo Da Vinci and Michelangelo, is revealed also 
by Erasmus and Shakespeare. The spirit and outlook on 
life in our present world find both portrayal and exposure 
on some walls of our art museums and in our dramas; 
they can be read in our poems and novels. 
Our approach to the arts in their close relation to the 
native character and direction of a cultural epoch is fully 
justified by the historical evidence. Our specialization 
in cultural activities is modern fashion and practice. The 
earlier origins and structure of our civilization were 
marked by a more integral pattern. Taboo and mana 
and magic were not only germinal ideas in primitive 
religion but also gropings toward scientific knowledge and 
practical mastery. The dance and the drama had definite 
religious beginnings. The Greek word techne which we 
translate as "art" appears in our modern languages in the 
forms of technique and technology. In fact, classical an-
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tiquity did not have a specialized concept of "art," or 
"objets d'art," or art museums. 
The arts in the antiquity of our Western civilization 
were expressions of the creative imagination motivated 
by religious zeal and social-patriotic devotion. The ancient 
sages had their inspiration in the folktales and legends 
of immemorial cults. The Iliad and the Odyssey were not 
only the first and still the greatest epics of our Western 
world; they were also a Greek Bible. When the Ark of 
the Covenant was brought to its shrine in Zion, King 
David leaped and danced before the triumphant parade. 
Even so young Sophocles danced before the marching 
Greek warriors after the victory at Salamis. The Parthe-
non of Athens was not only a masterpiece of architecture 
and sculpture but also a temple to Athena Parthenos, the 
tutelary goddess of the Athenian people and the imagina-
tive embodiment of the power and glory of the Athenian 
state. Pheidias who designed and largely executed the 
sculptures and carvings of this religious and patriotic 
shrine was not an exclusively artistic genius. His art was 
also a dedication to his city-state and to its immortal 
goddess. 
The close integral relation of the arts to the religious 
cults and the social-political pattern and order of a people's 
life was bound to determine artistic development and also 
delimit some of its manifestations and forms. This direc-
tion and restriction may be noted especially in several 
ancient civilizations which were controlled by a firmly 
established priesthood and religious tradition; for ex-
ample, the Egyptian preoccupation with men's destiny 
after death determined what may be called the funerary 
strain in their art. And Egyptian sculpture cannot be 
understood without a clear recognition of the zoomorphic 
strain of animal worship in their religious tradition. Many 
of their gods and goddesses had animal heads, as we see 
them displayed on the monuments. If the head was that 
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of a sheep, the deity was Mut; if a crocodile, then it was 
Sebek; if a bull, Apis; or an ibis with a long beak, then 
it was Thoth; if a jackal, Anubis. The statues of the 
pharaohs or the deities with human heads must have 
provided a welcome change to the artists. 
Religious beliefs and practices may thus direct artistic 
design and execution. Religious doctrine and social tradi-
tion may also restrict or entirely rule out certain forms of 
art. We have been speaking of sculptures; but a radical 
shift of attitude occurs as soon as we use the word idols. 
When the religious and cultural development of a people 
reached the stage of monotheism, the rejection of all 
idolatry would terminate the major part of the sculptor's 
art. So the prophetic reformation of the religion of Israel 
rejected all graven and molten images of God as abomina-
tions. The other great religion of Semitic origin, Islam, 
followed Judaism in proscribing idols, and in its orthodoxy 
it went further: it denounced any depiction of living 
forms. A departure from this rigor, by the Shiah sect of 
Iran, made possible the distinctive expressions of Persian 
art. Orthodox Muhammadan genius found its outlets of 
perfection in incredibly versatile arabesques, in mosaics 
or rug-weaving or in architecture, from the Taj Mahal 
of Mogul India to the Alhambra of Moorish Spain. 
The attitude of Christianity toward this use of graven 
and molten images was varied in its historical develop-
ment. The Roman Catholic tradition, as it in so many 
ways overcame but also inherited various forms of classical 
culture, replaced the paintings and sculptures of Greek 
and Roman paganism by Christian images. The Eastern 
orthodox churches, while using icons and mosaics, op-
posed any statuary in the churches as idolatrous. This 
sharp disagreement was in fact one of the factors in the 
separation of Eastern orthodoxy from the Roman papal 
hierarchy. While Byzantine and Russian art produced 
masterpieces of iconography, it had no sculpture. In later 
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years we may note the rigor of Puritan reformers in this 
respect, the resolute clearing of the new houses of Chris-
tian worship of any images whatever. 
A similar survey of other aspects of the creative imagina-
tion would disclose the same cultural interplay, the active 
social interrelation of the arts and general culture, espe-
cially on the religious side. The medieval Gothic cathe-
drals impress us as humble prayers in stone. Turn from 
them to the Cathedral of Florence, in which the spirit of 
the Renaissance seems to contend with Christian contrite 
piety. Alberti beheld it in an emphatically Renaissance 
mood: "Who will hesitate to call this temple the abode 
of delight? Wherever you look you see everything de-
signed for joy and good cheer."11 Imagine such a comment 
about the Cathedral of Chartres! 
The transition from medieval to modern culture is 
manifested very significantly in the ascendancy of secular 
literature not only in the revival of the literae humaniores, 
the more humane letters of classical culture, but also in 
the rise of the vernacular literatures of the modern 
European nations. The examination of aesthetic progress 
in our society can be pursued on more objective lines 
just because our modern society has become so decidedly 
secular; it can be pursued also because of its growing 
specialization which has allowed us a more specific artistic 
expression. 
The individual aspect of great artistic production, as 
in each case the creation of unique genius, would seem 
to set art apart from any appraisal in terms of historical 
progress. In most other fields of human experience prog-
ress has been held to signify an advance in value from 
earlier to later historical stages. This chronological up-
ward curve of perfectibility is obviously not illustrated in 
the arts. Homer or the Homeric bards began epic poetry 
11 Compare 0. Dittrich, Geschichte der Ethik (Stuttgart and Berlin, 
1906), 3: 347. 
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and seemingly forever sealed its unapproachable perfec-
tion. There is no better instance of this aspect of supreme 
creative mind, the timelessness of its consummation which 
defies analysis in historical terms. This does not mean 
that the Iliad and the Odyssey are entirely beyond ex-
planation, but that there is bound to remain a final element 
of artistic perfection which is not the result of anything 
social or historical but is simply its creative self, the 
utterance of genius. 
With all this due acknowledgment of the unique in-
dividual element in great art, we still must recognize 
other aspects of the career and achievements of creative 
mind which bring us back to its social milieu in the his-
torical process. For all his creative individuality, an artist 
-be he a painter, sculptor, poet, dramatist, or composer-
is partly and in many cases decisively affected by the time 
and place and culture of his life and activity. What would 
Michelangelo have become if he had been born in Israel 
during the prophetic reform; or Sophocles or Shakespeare 
as contemporaries of Anselm; or Dante in the age of 
Voltaire; or Beethoven in Mohammed's Arabia? The old 
Latin proverb, poeta nascitur, the poet is born, needs 
revision. Poets and other artists are born and also "made"; 
that is, their native genius requires the right environment 
for its full realization. The Gospel parable of the sower 
and his seeds teaches us here its aesthetic truth. Of the 
same seed, some may fall by the wayside and some among 
the thorns, but some of it on good ground to yield a good 
harvest. Who knows what multitudes of creative minds, 
like "mute inglorious Miltons," never had the right social 
ground which could fructify their genius? 
In considering aesthetic values we are naturally apt 
to emphasize in our thought the creative artist and his 
work; but we should not ignore the importance of the 
artist's public. Art is creative but it is also, basically, 
communication. As the Roman poet Martial put it, "he 
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does not write whose poems no one reads." An artist 
who regards himself unjustly neglected may defy the 
apathy of his age, but still he must be reckoning on some 
future more responsive generation. Like Charles Lamb, 
he may protest: "Hang it all, I shall write for antiquity!"-
but it should be an antiquity yet to come. The historical 
appraisal of artistic progress involves a judgment of the 
public's taste and the corresponding aesthetic experience 
of society in various epochs. 
The relation of the artist and the public is mutual; it 
is an interplay. The artist who needs a public and to a 
large degree depends upon it for the full fruition of his 
powers, also influences his public, redirects it to new 
artistic expressions and satisfactions, and may in some 
cases be capable of creating a new public by the stimulat-
ing power of his radical genius. The artist or poet or 
composer may be wooing and winning a congenial public, 
or they may be laying siege to reluctant or quite un-
responsive reception. Their success or their failure may 
both be relatively immediate or at long range, lasting and 
steady or with some remarkable rise and fall, lapse and 
revival of vitality, :Hashing fame and then oblivion. 
Wagner opened a new door, and Beethoven before him, 
to a whole new world of musical expression. Their vital 
appeal has remained strong, and in Beethoven's case 
supreme. The public response to Brahms, now one of 
spreading and deepening favor, was initially partial and 
precarious. As to Bach, or rather the Bachs, a generally 
favorable reception to several composers of that name 
was followed by the emergence of Johann Sebastian to 
uncontested dominance. 
The pictorial and plastic arts provide similar instances 
of the rise and steady or wavering eminence. Michelangelo 
stormed his citadel and has remained in full possession; 
but Raphael, whose name seemed destined to become 
the synonym for supreme painting, has lapsed somewhat 
from his once preeminent sway. 
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Literature, and especially poetry, affords us instances 
of even more immediate interplay of artists and the 
larger public. In the case of painting and sculpture, unless 
we have access to art galleries, our response to the artist's 
appeal must rest on our study of copies. And the ap-
preciation of music requires for most of us its execution 
by virtuosos or orchestras or radios or phonographs. Only 
the trained musician can enjoy Mozart or Beethoven 
directly by reading their scores. The poet's work, how-
ever, is directly in our hands, to read and repeat and 
cherish. Here there is no question of good or imperfect 
copies, of fine or deficient performance: we have the 
original, and the quality of its appeal and of our response 
to it, the entire aesthetic experience, test directly the 
poet's genius and our capacity of appreciation. There 
need be no third party between us. In dramatic poetry, 
to be sure, this is not quite true, as far as the complete 
artistic appeal or response is concerned. 
As evidence of the enduring vitality of artistic genius 
and of the reliable public possession and progress of 
aesthetic values, literature, poetry, can be most revealing. 
Here also we are impressed by instances of the abiding 
but also of the unstable character of artistic fame and 
what it connotes. Dante, supreme in his day and in the 
Renaissance, seemed thereafter to lose ground for more 
than two centuries before returning to acknowledged 
eminence. The splendor of Victor Hugo and Lord Tenny-
son, crowned masters for our fathers, has dimmed in our 
time, and who can foretell the likely power of their 
appeal to our children? In judging literary fame, the 
evaluation of critical judges and the general public re-
action must both be considered, and these two may often 
disagree. Even if we were to say, the intelligent public, 
and justify our qualification, still we shall find frequent 
disagreement. There are acknowledged and unquestioned 
masters that are no longer read widely: Milton is an 
outstanding example. There are writers who have lost 
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much of their early acclaim by leading critics but still 
command the firm loyalty of the public. In his day Ivan 
Turgenev, even in French translations, was hailed as the 
finest artist since Sophocles. More recent professional 
criticism, Russian and foreign, have depreciated Turgenev 
considerably, but they have not weakened his popularity. 
Even in the Soviet regime, despite his opposition to 
communism from its early inception, Turgenev is being 
read in Russia at the rate of a million copies annually.12 
We have been inquiring in various ways into the his-
torical stability and progress of aesthetic values, and the 
general impression seems to be varied, justifying neither 
optimistic assurance nor pessimistic negation. Our own 
day provides ready instances of both attitudes; considered 
judgment remains undecided. The impressive widespread 
revival of the study of the best books in individual reading 
and in organized groups has revived the old classics and 
made them the cherished choice of millions. Even on 
a much broader scale, the literal flood of paperbacks is 
supplying to multitudes of new readers the best literature 
of the world. One is amazed in looking over the shelves 
not only in bookshops but also in drugstores and on news-
stands the seemingly inexhaustible variety of fine reading 
matter offered at popular prices. Splendid it would be, 
we might surely call it progress, were it the whole story; 
but along with the masters are the literary hacks and 
quacks and panders: trash and perfumed garbage cheek 
by jowl with the gold treasure of the ages. What judgment 
of the public's evaluation are we to draw from this con-
glomerate heap? 
The arts are factors influencing the character and moral 
values of society. Even more characteristically they are 
strong imaginative expressions of the conditions and ex-
periences of men and women. The literature of the 
12 Compare the Soviet Bolshaya Encyclopedia, Article on Turgenev 
(Moscow, 1962), vol. 43. 
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Renaissance is a prime source for the student of Renais-
sance mores and morals and life and character generally. 
Future historians will read of the state and direction of 
our minds and lives in the literature and other arts of 
the present day. Are we confused and dismayed by the 
impression of disorder and dissolution of values in so 
many of our writers and painters and composers? They 
are only echoing the chaotic din of our age. 
We may protest and ask: Are our lives only a chaotic 
din and dissolution of values? An artist's portrayal reveals 
the manner and condition of the life which he depicts, but 
it also discloses and exposes the clarity or the distortion 
of his reflection. Goethe and Hegel both remarked that 
no one is a hero to his valet, not because there are no 
heroes but because he is a valet. And long before them 
Plotinus declared that a great contemplation makes a 
great object of contemplation. Dostoyevsky in his House 
of the Dead portrayed in searing words the moral squalor 
and horror and ignominy of the Siberian convicts with 
whom he, a political prisoner, had been caged, but he 
also caught and reflected the occasional ray of light and 
possible redemption in the midnight gloom of their ac-
cursed lives. Our own age needs more master artists 
that will reveal to us and preserve for posterity our 
contemporary life and character along its entire gamut, in 
full integrity and balanced insight. 
CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
Moral and Religious Development 
No COMMENT on our contemporary culture is more com-
mon than that of the woeful contrast between our technical 
mastery and our moral confusion and decay. This ethical 
dismay is neither exclusively recent nor exceptional. In-
telligent men through centuries have noted that people 
have· attained more knowledge and skill than they can 
be trusted morally to use. In prose or in verse we hear 
Tennyson's refrain, "Knowledge comes, but wisdom 
lingers." We should appraise critically this judgment and 
understand its significance. 
Our problem demands a recognition of the kind of 
solution we can reasonably expect. It may be that the 
intellectual realm is a boundless territory of unending 
exploration and discovery, whence the advance of knowl-
edge and technology follows naturally. Morality, on the 
other hand, while its forms of personal and social expres-
sion may vary with the changing cultural and institutional 
milieu, may involve basically certain principles of human 
character and conduct which abide throughout. Henry 
Th. Buckle (1821-1862), comparing moral and intellectual 
laws, concluded that the dynamic of advance in history 
is along the intellectual, not the moral line. A really 
progressive civilization should include a twofold growth, 
in virtue as well as in understanding and skill. Yet while 
realizing the needed interplay of these two, Buckle main-
tained that the advance of knowledge has not been 
stimulated by distinctively moral motives, nor has growing 
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intelligence led to more virtuous character. The curve 
of progress is in the intellectual field. "To do good to 
others, to sacrifice for their benefit your own wishes; to 
love your neighbor as yourself; to forgive your enemies; 
to restrain your passions; to honor your parents; to respect 
those who are set over you; these, and a few others, are 
the sole essentials of morals; but they have been known 
for thousands of years, and not one jot or tittle has been 
added to them by all the sermons, homilies, and text-books 
which moralists and theologians have been able to 
produce."1 
This view of morality, ostensibly pessimistic, also has 
overtones of positive evaluation. It regards moral insight 
as a fundamental and abiding human possession. There 
can scarcely be progressive gain in man's moral enlighten-
ment and conviction because there has been an initial 
moral mastery. Men here are like the reputed Bostonian 
who felt no need to travel because he was already there. 
This alleged moral competence has been asserted even by 
thinkers skeptical of our intellectual reliability or growth 
in understanding. Voltaire, quite dubious of the avail-
ability of real knowledge, upheld the universality of basic 
moral principles: "Dervish, fakir, bonze and talapoin, all 
declare everywhere; 'Be just and beneficent.' "2 
Historical evidence, however, points to much radical 
development in moral ideas and practices: in men's 
selection and graduation of their cardinal virtues and of 
their vices, also in their changing views of both, in their 
distinction between moral performance and inner spirit 
and motivation; in their outlook on the scope of moral 
relations and duties. The detailed systematic study of 
these differences has been the work of descriptive ethics. 
The moral philosopher is confronted by the variety of 
1 H. Th. Buckle, History of Civilization in England (London, ed. of 
1885), 1: 175, 180. 
2Voltaire, Oeuvres, ed. Moland (Paris, 1878), 13: 181. 
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proposed theories among which he has to make his choice, 
all of them claiming to rest on tested moral experience. 
Wary of the likely dogmatism of any rationalistic doctrine 
of the Highest Good, Francis Bacon urged as a required 
preliminary the direct empirical study of men's actual 
and varied conduct and men's operative judgments of 
approval and condemnation. Progress in this fruitful line 
of inquiry was greatly stimulated by the studies of Darwin 
and by his successors whose treatises on the evolution of 
morals have expanded greatly our knowledge not only of 
the origin and development of moral ideas and practices 
but even of their earlier antecedents, of the possible 
gradual approaches to them in animal behavior. We 
have already noted the leading works in this field, and here 
we shall concentrate our attention on the later history of 
civilization, with its critical reflection of ethical theory 
and its growing complexity of moral problems. 
Consider first the scope of recognized moral territory: 
men's views of the range of moral values and their grada- · 
tion of them, the cardinal virtues of tradition, of tradition 
varying with culture and epoch. Any review of ethical 
reflection in Western civilization naturally begins with the 
Socratic-Platonic view of the good life. It expressed the 
classical ideal of harmonious self-realization through self-
understanding. The principal teaching of Socrates, that 
the unexamined life is not worth human living, that virtue 
is knowledge, emphasized the central importance of 
critical intelligence to control men's desires and direct 
their will-energies. Plato's systematic perfection of these 
basic principles is expressed in his table of the cardinal 
virtues. The good life manifests control of men's appetites 
by reason (temperance), rational direction of their ag-
gression or resistance or defense (courage), intelligent 
outlook and insight (wisdom), harmonious due distribu-
tion of emphasis on all human interests and capacities, 
the virtue par excellence, justice. 
Aristotle's classical ethics of the rational or Golden 
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Mean, while it shifts somewhat the Platonic ideal of 
harmony to one of balance between the extremes of excess 
and deficiency, maintains the classical ideal of rational 
control and direction as the essence of morals. Aristotle's 
naturalistic procedure is manifest in his expanded or 
rather more detailed table of virtues to express the life 
of rational balance in the various fields of conduct: thus 
recognizing, for instance, the virtues of liberality, in-
telligent self-esteem, right ambition, friendly civility, and 
others. Of importance here is his consideration of honor 
and pleasure. He values honor but observes that the at-
tainment of it depends upon those by whom it is accorded 
to a person, and that therefore it cannot be regarded as 
the highest moral excellence. The consideration of honor 
raises the issue of honorable conduct and in particular 
the virtue of veracity. The pursuit of truth, of valid knowl-
edge, was outstanding in classical evaluation, but truth-
fulness is not inscribed explicitly on the Greek lists of 
highest moral attainments. The earlier Greek Homeric 
tradition here seems to have been one of ambivalent judg-
ment. Wily Odysseus was admired for his resourceful 
cunning, but we also read Achilles' forthright outburst 
in the Iliad, directed precisely at the "son of Laertes, 
Odysseus of many wiles": "Hateful to me as the gates of 
Hell is he that hideth one thing in his heart and uttereth 
another." As a dramatic comment on this moral issue, we 
may recall the dialogue in the Philoctetes of Sophocles, 
in which Odysseus endeavors to win over Neoptolemus in 
a plot of trickery: 
Neoptolemus: Thou deem'st it, then, no shame to tell a lie? 
Odysseus: Not if success depends upon a lie.3 
Regarding the pursuit of pleasure, both Plato and 
Aristotle mediated between indulgence and abstinence. 
Unlike the uncritical hedonism of Aristippus, for whom the 
3 Sophocles Philoctetes 108 f., trans. F. Storr, Loeb Classical Library. 
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wise man is a connoisseur of pleasure, like a bee that 
knows how to suck nectar from the bitterest flower, Plato 
advocates a rational curb on passionate pleasure-seeking, 
and Aristotle, while admitting pleasure among the positive 
values of life, would not regard it as the Highest Good. 
After Aristotle the ethics of pleasure became a central 
issue between the Epicureans and the Stoics. Epicurus 
regarded the attainment of pleasure as the chief value of 
living, toward which all control and right direction of 
life should aim. In opposition to this ethical program, 
the Stoic sages urged rigorous conformity to reason, with-
out any concession to the desires and passions, rational 
serenity in all vicissitudes, apathy. 
The history of Greek and Roman ethics reflects the 
characteristic classical outlook on life. The progress which 
its historical development manifests is not a rise from 
lower to higher-from Plato and Aristotle to Cicero and 
Epictetus-but rather a cultural expansion of outlook, from 
an Athenian to a Hellenistic perspective. The spreading 
culture and the intermingling of races in the expanding 
Roman empire, the ancient melting pot of civilizations 
which made Alexandria a world forum of ideas and ideals 
and Rome a veritable museum of religions, was fertile 
ground for new prophets and sages and saviors. \Vithin 
this diversity of doctrines and turmoil of cults Christianity 
took root and in its development gave moral redirection 
to the Western world. 
The turn from classical to Christian morals was a turn 
from secularism or humanism to contrite otherworldliness. 
This radical transition is revealed clearly by a comparison 
of Aristotle's table of virtues with the beatitudes in the 
Sermon on the Mount: Blessed are the poor in spirit;-
they that mourn;-the meek;-they that hunger and thirst 
after righteousness;-the merciful;-the pure in heart;-the 
peacemakers;-they that have been persecuted for right-
eousness' sake. These are not the virtues of self-reliant 
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energetic living, but we are not to misinterpret Christian 
morality as life-denying. It subordinated all human de-
sires and ambitions to the earnest doing of God's will. 
The true fulfillment of man was not to be found in external 
mastery or advantage but in the deepening of the inner 
life and in godly devotion: "For what is a man profited, 
if he should gain the whole world and lose or forfeit his 
own self?" 
Christian reflection did not reject the principles and 
values of classical ethics, at least not altogether, but it 
subordinated them to its religious emphasis. Even in their 
secular perspectives, while the cardinal virtues of Plato 
were good, they were not the essential and final good, not 
"the better part." So Saint Ambrose called them, in a 
phrase that is not so perverse as it sounds, "splended vices," 
and he reinterpreted them all four in the spirit of Christian 
loyalty. Saint Thomas Aquinas likewise exalted the higher 
theological virtues of Saint Paul's triad: faith, hope, and 
Christian love, caritas. 
The upsurge of aggressive humanism during the Renais-
sance is distinguished strikingly by the revival of secular 
self-reliance. The return to Epicurean hedonism, as by 
Lorenzo Valla, was only one expression of the invading 
worldliness. The new spirit found expression on different 
levels of individualism. On the one hand, we may find 
Giordano Bruno's emphasis on unwavering integrity in 
the pursuit of truth, without any supine conformity to 
dogmatic authoritarianism. Under the championship of 
capitalized Truth a new table of virtues for the life of 
free productive inquiry was outlined, including among 
others Law, Judgment, Culture, Philanthropy. On the 
other hand, this very release of men from authoritarian 
restrictions led multitudes to willful abandonment of moral 
standards and principles. This dissolute worldliness may 
be noted in the meaning which the word virtu came to 
have in Renaissance usage. It did not signify virtue in 
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the traditional moral sense; it meant rather astute ef-
fectiveness and finesse in whatever a person might 
undertake, be it even thieving or revenge or profligacy 
or murder: whatever suited one's desires, carried out 
with the skill of a master. 
From our side of the Atlantic, we find this varied 
ethical outlook illustrated in Benjamin Franklin's Auto-
biography, in his list of thirteen virtues by which he 
proposed to guide his daily conduct: "Temperance, 
Silence, Order, Resolution, Frugality, Industry, Sincerity, 
Justice, Moderation, Cleanliness, Tranquility, Chastity, 
Humility: Imitate Jesus and Socrates."4 
The last phrase in Franklin's statement expresses the 
modern spirit at its best, correlating the Christian values 
with those of classical antiquity. In morality as in other 
human activities, the history of our civilization has been 
a process of expanding range and complexity. Progress 
in this field would depend upon the right direction and 
choice between contending values, in an increasingly 
vaster scope, with ever more important alternatives. In-
stances of such progress are notable, but also grievous mis-
directions. We may recognize especially the disparity of 
performance and motivation: despite our appeals, we may 
be condemned by one or the other. As we noted before, 
hypocrisy is called the tribute vice pays to virtue. The 
tribute is also an acknowledgment of commonly recog-
nized standards of conduct. A hypocrite does not really 
conform to the standard in his actual conduct, but he 
does not defy it in his profession, however insincere. 
Men's actual performance rarely follows their avowed 
principles, but acknowledgment of principles and stan-
dards is a normal preliminary to moral progress in conduct. 
So we may read and understand the self-glorification 
of conquering despots graven on cuneiform tablets or 
4 Beniamin Franklin's Autobiographical Writings, ed. Carl Van Doren 
(New York, 1945), p. 626. 
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monuments of victory in Nineveh or Babylon, boasting 
of the thousands of defeated victims, slain or tortured or 
mutilated. In our day Hitler and Stalin actually multiplied 
this black record beyond belief, but in the denial of their 
atrocities lies a recognition of the higher moral conscious-
ness of contemporary civilization. What great modern 
artist would boast of his murderous exploits as Benvenuto 
Cellini, that he had stabbed his enemy with virtu, right 
in the public square among his cronies. The Communist, 
now rattling his atomic weapons, now chanting professions 
of peace in controversy, indicates the dual drift in our 
moral climate. 
As it is with atrocities ancient or modern, so it is with 
international aid. The least suggestion of it in antiquity 
would have been suspected as some sort of a Trojan 
horse. This kind of suspicion is nowise extinct in our 
day. Throughout the world needy nations great and 
small have acknowledged our American readiness to 
spend and tax ourselves in projects that might lift them 
to a more decent level of existence, yet many of the peo-
ples we have helped have joined our critics in declaring 
that all those loans and grants and services have been 
motivated only by selfish reckoning of our own interests. 
We may acknowledge the high motives of philanthropy, 
but we are apt to distrust any alleged or proposed con-
formity to it in project or in action. 
One important mark of moral progress or rather one 
test of it may be recognized in the expanding range of 
acknowledged moral relations and obligations. The curve 
of development seems to point from clannishness to broad 
humanitarianism, from tribal or national limitations, to or 
toward some degree of international morality. Whittier's 
stanza comes to mind as a hopeful prospect. We should 
remember his noble struggle against slavery: 
Yet sometimes glimpses on my sight, 
Through present wrong, the eternal right; 
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And, step by step, since time began, 
I see the steady gain of man. 5 
Even at the present time, we can scarcely regard 
international morality as more than a goal, in many 
respects still dim and distant. Nevertheless, it is today 
a recognized goal. Moral tribalism persists in barbarian 
lands, and even the most advanced societies are not free 
of national exclusiveness. But the best social conscience 
of our day does look beyond traditional boundaries, even 
though our actual conduct still belies our lofty professions. 
Advance in acknowledgment of all-human moral outlook 
has been due to the evidently ruinous results of the 
flagrant disregard of it, but repeatedly a moral atavism 
has driven modern statesmanship to dismal retrogression. 
While diplomacy formulated its elaborate procedure of 
negotiations and formalities in the declaration and con-
duct of war, armistices and peace treaties, the record of 
our age is distressing with its return to undeclared war 
and disregard of international law: Japan's attack on Pearl 
Harbor, Hitler's invasion of Russia and the Low countries, 
Communist incursions in Asia, and the present worldwide 
dread of abrupt eruption of atomic war. And what about 
U.S. incursions in S.E. Asia? 
Public morals, especially in international relations, pro-
vide striking evidence of historical progress but also of 
backsliding or collapse. The record is not very different 
in some other fields of activity involving moral values. 
In the economic area, the progressive advance from slave 
labor, serfdom, and villeinage to the emancipation of 
workingmen in the modem free enterprise system is an 
outstanding instance of moral progress. But the historian 
of our time must record also the check to further advance 
and the moral breakdown represented by the Communist 
economy with its compulsion of the workers by over-
mastering state control. On the other hand, the enormous 
5 Whittier, "The Chapel of the Hermit." 
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power gained by organized labor has been profitable but 
also restrictive to the individual worker and has embroiled 
our modern system in conflicts and strikes with disregard 
for the common welfare. 
Another field may be mentioned, in the more personal 
relations of family life, in which the history of civilization 
is a record of the emancipation of women and in the 
gradual spread of monogamy. Even in Muhammadan 
lands polygamy has become increasingly exceptional. 
Marriage by capture and by purchase survive only in the 
very primitive areas. Even the formally respectable 
mariage de convenance is becoming an anachronism. But 
the spreading instability of modern family life, precisely 
in the more advanced countries, is depressing, especially 
the callous attitude with which it is regarded. The 
scrambling and unscrambling of countless families is 
leading in effect to a modern revival of promiscuity, de-
moralizing to the children and responsible for many of 
the shocking evils of juvenile delinquency. This is the 
seamy underside of the generally enviable record of pro-
gressive freedom of modern men and women in genuinely 
monogamous lives. 
Modern development in history thus relates to problems 
in various fields of individual and social activity. They 
all in one way or another have a moral aspect and involve-
ment. The thought of our age is confronted with the con-
viction of crisis, but a crisis which on a closer study is 
disclosed in a dual perspective: either as a brink or as a 
threshold. 
This chapter deals with two very debatable topics in the 
study of social-historical progress: of these two, religion 
has been even more controversial than morals. Through-
out history it has signified the highest ideal of man's 
devotion, but it has also been the animus of grim oppres-
sion and the most bitter strife. In its own speech it has 
been exalted as the source and sanction of man's best 
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attainments: "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of 
wisdom." Even a secular mind like Goethe observed that 
no religiously stolid age or people have produced poetry 
of the highest worth. Yet from outside the temples 
godless men have flouted religion with taunts of scorn 
and defiance. Lucretius, who might be cited as a classic 
rejoinder to Goethe's tribute, praised his master Epicurus 
in great hexameters for his emancipation of men from 
superstitions: T antum religio potuit suadere malorum. 
"Such is the power of religion, evils in life to engender." 
In our day Communist propaganda has branded religion 
as "opiate for the people." Deeper insight into this issue 
may be gained from the old Roman epigram C orruptio 
optimi pessima-"The corruption of the best yields the 
worst." This insight could also be revealed in our study 
of other high values of our experience: love, patriotism. 
On principle we should expect that religion, professedly 
man's highest spiritual expression, should signify also his 
progressive spiritual ascent. It is of interest to note this 
kinship of religion and progress: the quasi-religious 
element of faith in progress often persists in minds to 
which traditional forms of religion have lost their appeal. 
So we are told by a penetrating student of the historical 
march of ideas, Antoine A. Cournot ( 1801-1877): "No 
idea . . . is closer to the family of religious ideas than 
the idea of progress. . . . Like religious faith, it has the 
virtue of uplifting souls and characters."6 In considering 
the religious aspect of the problem of social progress, two 
related inquiries should be distinguished. Does history 
disclose a progress in religion? And what has been the 
effect of religious beliefs and practices upon social well-
being: has religion been an upbuilding or a retarding 
factor or even a hostile influence, resistant to human 
progress? 
6 Antoine A. Cournot, Considerations sur la marche des idees (Paris, 
1872), 2: 425; cited here from Lord Acton's Lectures on Modem History 
(London, 1912), p. 324. 
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The multiplicity of proposed definitions of religion 
indicates its variety of manifestations in historical de-
velopment. Ancient languages have different words to 
describe the religious experience of their respective 
cultures, but for the general and basic character of them 
all we have to share the Latin term religio. If we ask, 
what is the fundamental meaning of religion-as including 
but not reducible to that which the Hindu Brahmin 
called knowledge or devotion or faith, which was law to 
the Buddhist, the doctrine to the Confucian, the way to 
the Taoist, obedience and submission to the Arab, faith 
to the Christian-the answers would also be many, ex-
pressing many traditions and ways of approach. They 
should be considered as aspects of a more comprehensive 
view. 
The traditional definition of religion as belief in God 
is partial and historically limited. Its inclusion of tribal 
monolatry and polytheism and pantheism and monothe-
ism and deism may be criticized as ambiguous; it may 
also be regarded as a merit of historical comprehensive-
ness. This definition precludes a religion like Confucian-
ism, which is not concerned with any form of theism, 
and Buddhism, which in its original expression was ex-
plicitly atheistic. Should we expand the concept of God 
to signify spiritual Reality, or the Ultimate, or the Infinite, 
it may be objected that these would be alternatives of, or 
alternatives to, theology-a variety of beliefs and doctrines. 
It has been held, however, that religion is not funda-
mentally a belief, a creed, not basically an intellectual 
experience, but rather and essentially a form of practice-
and not merely outward obedient conformity to sacrifices 
and ritual but devout practice, charged with emotional 
intensity-as Matthew Arnold called it, "morality touched 
with emotion." Preeminent expressions of this element 
of feeling by saintly mystics have always evoked the 
deepest religious veneration. So Friedrich Schleiermacher 
(1768-1834), without quite dismissing either theology or 
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godly works, exalted religion as "a sense and a taste of 
the Infinite." 
These various views of religion would describe the 
experience itself and also its object. Our term worship, 
a word of wide and deep connotation, has the merit of 
expressing both of these aspects of religion. It includes 
the idea of that which is worshiped, a worshipful attitude 
toward it, and the translation of belief and feeling into 
a devout life. All the way through we may note the 
central importance of value-connotation in the religious 
outlook. The object of religious worship, call it God, or 
the Divine, or the Holy, or the Infinite, as the supreme 
in value and the heart of religion in its various stages 
and aspects has been its concern with the conservation 
of values and of the highest values. A stanza by Goethe 
comes to mind here: 
The best that each one has and knows 
He names it God, his God, bestows 
Upon him, heaven and earth above, 
His fear, and where he can, his love. 
We have used the word concern; in our day religion has 
been defined as man's ultimate concern or as man's 
deepest solicitude. 7 These are very significant insights 
insofar as they connote utmost devotion. But concern 
and solicitude may also suggest insecurity and may not 
come up to conviction. We may propose a view of religion 
as men's conviction of the supreme reality of the highest 
values, or more broadly if also more vaguely, as men's 
deepest and utmost response to the Highest. 
In turning now to the question whether there has been 
a progress in religion, I should obviously disavow any 
intention of adequate survey. Only some significant high-
points in the history of religion may be recognized. We 
7 Compare Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago, 1951), 1: 12; 
R. B. Perry, Realms of Value (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), p. 463. 
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might study religion, the definition and the historical 
development of it, in an altogether neutral or even in a 
negative spirit, even as we may consider the definition 
and the history of magic. Or we may examine religion 
as we examine art in its different aspects and historical 
development, as a fundamentally significant experience 
and expression of reality. The present discussion proceeds 
from the latter standpoint. 
Whatever our basic view and evaluation of religion 
may be, the study of its development does lead us to 
recognize certain progress in rising and more maturing 
cultures. We may consider only one instance: the Judea-
Christian religion. The biblical writings, as they have 
been reinterpreted by competent modem scholars, pro-
vide us with an impressive record of religious advance, 
both in men's view of God and of their relation to God, 
the religious experience. The early religion of the Hebrews 
was tribal monolatry emphasizing ritual and external ob-
servance. Y ahveh was the God of the tribes of Israel 
and of the Israelitish soil, even as other gods with other 
names were the tribal deities of other peoples and other 
lands. When the Hebrew chieftain Jephthah fought a 
successful battle, he rejected the pleas of his enemies: 
"Wilt thou not possess that which Chemosh thy god 
giveth thee to possess? So whomsoever Yahveh our God 
shall drive from before us, them will we possess" ( Judg. 
11:24). When Naaman the Syrian general was healed of 
his leprosy by the prophet Elisha, he vowed that in his 
own home he would offer sacrifices only to Yahveh. So 
he asked Elisha for "two mules' burden of earth," so that 
he could stand on Israelitish soil in order to worship 
Israel's God. 
From this tribal ceremonial ritual, the prophets of 
Israel, starting with the eighth-century prophets, led the 
people toward a higher religion, to the worship of a uni-
versal God exacting personal devotion in righteousness 
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and justice and mercy and love. The attainment or rather 
the advocacy of this ethical monotheism and personal 
religion marked one of the summits of spiritual advance 
in history. Its inspired utterances, by Micah and after him 
by Jeremiah and "Second Isaiah," are in dramatic con-
trast to the speech of the earlier tribal cult of Yahveh: 
.. He hath showed thee, 0 man, what is good, and what 
doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to 
love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God" ( Mic. 6:8)? 
"Am I a God at hand, saith the Lord, and not a God afar 
off (Jer. 23:23)? .. Who hath measured the waters in the 
hollow of his hand, and meted out the heavens with a 
span, and comprehended the dust of the earth in a mea-
sure, and weighed the mountains in scales, and the hills 
in a balance ( Isa. 40: 12)? "Whither shall I go from thy 
Spirit, and whither shall I flee from thy presence ( Ps. 
139:7)? 
It can scarcely be held that this ethical monotheism 
was fully grasped by the people or adopted by the priests 
of Israel. The challenge of John the Baptist indicates 
the extent to which the old religious ceremonial tribalism 
persisted, long centuries after the prophetic call to reform: 
"Bring forth ... fruits meet for repentance; and think 
not to say within yourselves, We have Abraham to our 
father; for I say unto you that God is able of these stones 
to raise up children unto Abraham" (Matt. 3:8-9). 
Jesus of Nazareth spiritualized thoroughly the idea of 
God, of the Kingdom of God, of men's personal experience 
and worship of the divine. He told the woman of Samaria 
that God is not enclosed or enshrined anywhere, on the 
Samaritan mountain or in Zion's temple: "God is spirit, 
and they that worship him must worship in spirit and in 
truth" (John 4:20). The Kingdom of God is not "Lo here! 
or lo there! for behold, the Kingdom of God is within 
you" (Luke 17:21). And the Sermon on the Mount records 
the deep spiritual reinterpretation of the religious life, 
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from external observance to most intimate personal devo-
tion and fulfillment. 
The skeptical appraiser of religious progress would 
interpose here: Has Christendom through its long cen-
turies come up to the Sermon on the Mount, to the re-
ligious vision of the Gospels, any more truly than the 
Jewish people and the Jewish priests came up to the 
spiritual challenge of the prophets? The sublime ascents 
of religious geniuses have scarcely been matched by a 
corresponding rise in spiritual level of popular insight 
and aspiration. In this respect religion is like art and 
unlike science. While we cannot maintain that the his-
torical course of intellectual attainment since classical an-
tiquity has been marked by an uninterrupted advance, 
we do recognize that by and large the later science is the 
better. No such chronological curve of steadily maturing 
perfection is notable in art or in religion. In these two 
fields of human activity creative genius has repeatedly 
reached summits of perfection and sublimity which were 
not merely contemporaneous expressions of their age but 
ideal heights which later generations might approach but 
scarcely surmount. In this respect Buddha and Jeremiah 
are like Sophocles and Pheidias. Even more truly than 
the great masters of art, the religious geniuses have given 
supreme and abiding utterance of some spiritual values, 
have sanctified a new religious tradition. But we should 
acknowledge that these sublime utterances and visions 
have also lifted men's eyes from high to still higher ideals. 
Thus we may perceive the rise from the prophetic reforma-
tion in Israel to the deeper and more universal spiritualiz-
ing of religious values in the Christian gospel. Historically 
the older gospel and its revision or radical reform have 
developed side by side. Occasionally, as in the heroic 
faith of Zoroastrianism, a profoundly significant religious 
appeal has lost its power and become only a noble episode 
rather than a vital, ongoing religious alternative. 
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To the devout member of each religious confession 
nothing is higher than its own ideal. Even the thoroughly 
objective student of the history of religions cannot rank 
in a spiritual hierarchy all the great prophets and saviors. 
But he would be sure that, whatever the hierarchical order, 
it does not necessarily follow historical sequence. Mo-
hammed is not more sublime than Jesus because he comes 
later. Historical progress in religion may well be traced 
on a very broad scale, from primitive monolatry and 
fetishism to polytheism to monotheism or pantheism, from 
crude ritualism to godly righteousness. But when spiritual 
growth has reached its fuller maturity, its ascents to sub-
limity are various and we cannot grade them confidently 
in every respect. What the course of history may revea.l 
here is progress in the truer and more intelligent devotion 
of men to their avowed savior's ideals. Here again re-
ligious progress parallels the artistic in the growing en-
lightenment and appreciation attained by the public. 
This approach to the problem of religious progress 
appears reasonable, but we are directly embroiled in a 
perplexity. In the course of history savage and barbarian 
rituals have proved less difficult to practice and perfect 
than the worship and piety of the higher religions. The 
loftier the ascent, the more arduous it is. The spreading 
and deepening problems seem ever to outstrip the solu-
tions; the farther the saint reaches, the less within his 
grasp is the holiness to which he aspires. Here is the 
religious parallel to the moral truth which we have been 
told, that the blessings of a satisfied conscience are least 
enjoyed where they are most nearly deserved. In the 
realm of spiritual values progress is not in their complete 
possession and enjoyment, but in the fuller recognition 
of them as ideals still before and above us. And in the 
saint's aspiration toward holiness is his consciousness that 
the ideal toward which he strives must include his own 
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endeavors to pursue it. Josiah Royce ( 1865-1916) ex-
pressed this truth clearly: The best world for a moral 
agent is "one that needs him to make it still better."8 
Only, unlike intellectual or moral commitment, the com-
mitment of religious piety is not wholly self-reliant but 
worshipful: worshipful humility before the ideal, wor-
shipful devotion to pursue it. 
In considering the relation of religious beliefs and 
practices and institutions to general social welfare, the 
positive appraisals of devout praise are readily forth-
coming. In order to approach a reasonable balance of 
evaluation, we should attend to the skeptics and de-
tractors. Even without a hostile animus, competent social 
historians have traced the record of organized religion as 
an obstacle to progress, especially in the intellectual field. 
Distinguished works like The Conflict of Religion and 
Science by J. W. Draper ( 1811-1882) and History of the 
Warfare of Science and Theology by A. D. White ( 1832-
1918) indicate in their titles the substance of their argu-
ments. Dismal records of organized religion expose its 
suppression of critical thought and reform in the persecu-
tion of branded heresy. We are told that the fires of the 
Spanish Inquisition in Toledo did not die down for over 
a century. The clerical trials and tortures of alleged 
witches fill some of the blackest chapters of Western 
history. The martyrdom of Giordano Bruno, the imprison-
ment of Galileo and before him of Roger Bacon are 
tragic instances of the hostility of the surpliced power 
to scientific advance. Bitter intolerance and bigotry have 
repeatedly locked religious opponents in bloody conflicts. 
The one foul memory of Saint Bartholomew's Eve should 
suffice. The Thirty Years War between Protestants and 
Catholics in the seventeenth century reduced Germany 
8 Josiah Royce, The World and the Individual (New York, 1900), 
2: 340. 
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to a desert. The bloody hostilities of Hindus and Muham-
madans in India and of Protestants and Roman Catholics 
in Ireland are contemporary parallels. 
This dreary record cannot be dismissed, but it is only 
one side of the ledger of critical reckoning. Intense con-
viction that so often turns into violent bigotry is also a 
condition of heroic and creative pursuit and attainment 
of high values. A historical survey and appraisal of 
patriotism would be confronted by a grim array of aber-
rations and atrocities, not unlike those of religious fan-
aticism. Neither patriotism nor religion would stand 
utterly defamed by such a judgment. The other side of 
the picture, the rest of the story, is not less striking, and 
it is more enlightening. 
Against the dark aspects of ecclesiastical dominance in 
the persecution of witches and heretics stands the eminent 
record of the medieval church in its gradual civilizing of 
northern Europe during the long "Dark Ages." The 
Order of Cluny, established at the beginning of the tenth 
century and founding hundreds of monasteries through-
out Europe, became a living power of social reform, giving 
chivalry a moral tone, emphasizing duties and responsi-
bilities, the conviction of personal dignity in the system 
of feudalism.9 Organized religion which resisted the ad-
vance of secular thought was itself the medium of en-
lightenment and learning through long years of general 
ignorance 
We should not fail to recognize, across the long span 
of various cults and religions throughout history, a basic 
concern for fairness and charity and goodwill. The Golden 
Rule of our biblical-Christian tradition has been paralleled 
in various forms in other religions: not only to do to others 
as we would that men should do to us, but to avoid re-
taliation and return good for evil. So Taoism taught men 
9 Compare Maurice de Wulf, Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle 
Ages (New York, 1922), p. 27. 
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to requite hatred with goodness; and the Buddhist 
Dhammapada: "Let a man overcome anger by love, ... 
the greedy by liberality, ... the liar by truth." Not 
only in the higher reaches of religious development but 
also at its lower levels religion has stirred and nourished 
the socially binding power of goodwill. A distinguished 
modern anthropologist maintains that "real progress is 
progress in charity" and observes that "the true function 
of religion is to enlarge charity." The spread of charity 
on a universal scale may be impeded by the irreconcilable 
plurality of religious faiths, yet it needs a religious dynamic 
as its motivating power.10 
We seem to be confronted by a paradoxical contention 
of values in which good and evil are productive of each 
other. Religion has been the cohesive power in men's 
higher life, welding common spirit and solidarity and de-
votion. It has been in all ages the expression of men's 
groping and reach after the ideal. Religion has also been 
the animus of dissension and controversy and strife; it 
has stirred and stubbornly preserved superstitions and 
bigoted ignorance. And yet, as Robert Burns wrote, "The 
light that led astray/Was light from heaven."11 Where 
good and evil, high and low values seem to be thus inter-
twined and interacting, how are we to judge not only of 
progress but also of the right hierarchy of values? Milton 
wrote in his Areopagitica: "Good and evil we know in the 
field of this world grow up together almost inseparably; 
and the knowledge of good is so involved and interwoven 
with the knowledge of evil and in so many cunning re-
semblances hardly to be discerned." This passage was 
cited by the author of The Golden Bough as a motto for 
his book The Devil's Disciple: A Plea for Superstition. 
to Compare R. R. Marett, Head, Heart, and Hands in Human Evolution 
(New York, 1935), p. 40; compare also Marett, Faith, Hope, and Charity 
in Primitive Religion (Oxford, 1932), pp. 164-78. 
11 Compare T. R. Glover, Progress in Religion to the Christian Era 
(London, 1922), p. 339. 
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What J. G. Frazer (1854-1941) had in mind was to show 
that in social history many solid institutions rest on rotten 
foundations: "The odd thing is that in spite, or perhaps 
by virtue of his absurdities man moves steadily upward."12 
Even in the murk of savage superstition we may see 
gleams of spiritual vision; but again, the full noonday of 
religious enlightenment has been repeatedly clouded by 
dark bigotry. 
Few instances disclose this duality more strikingly than 
those provided by the evolution of prayer, itself a most 
revealing aspect of religious experience. Three broad 
stages of this development have been pointed out.13 At 
the lowest one, prayers are typically incantation spells, 
magical rites, by the expert performance of which be-
nighted tribesmen believe that they can impose their wills 
on the occult powers in nature and accomplish their pur-
poses, of bringing rain or checking a blight or bane or 
destroying an enemy. As sooner or later these incantation 
spells expose their futility-as Chantecler oversleeps and 
wakes to see the sun rise despite his failure to crow-men 
turn in their prayers from motives of magical compulsion 
to cajolery, to pleas and petitions. At this second stage 
of prayer, what men entreat their gods to give them dis-
closes their views alike of deity and of the order of nature. 
Maturing insight gradually affects men's sense both of the 
seeming efficacy and, more important, of the religious 
appropriateness of their petitions. 
It is at the second stage that we may note, amidst the 
usual benighted pleas, surprising occasional evidence of 
a higher spiritual attitude and also strange lapses from 
much higher ground. The tribesman may beg and wheedle 
and even resort to threats: "Why art thou so stingy? If 
thou dost not amend, we shall also forget thee, and then 
12 J. G. Frazer, The Devil' s Advocate: A Plea for Superstition (London, 
1927), pp. vii, 4. 
13 Compare L. R. Farnell, The Evolution of Religion (London, 1905). 
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thou canst go and eat grasshoppers." This from a Zulu; 
but then amazingly and, of course, not at all characteristic-
ally, this outburst from Martin Luther: "If we should 
finally become angry towards Thee, and no longer bring 
honor and tribute to Thee, how wouldst Thou continue?" 
But common worshiper and seer, prophet and theologian 
are alike humbled and exalted by a deeper sense of the 
divine. Prayers become the expressions of a communion 
with God, consecration and submission of the pious will. 
Instead of seeking by spells and holy magic or by 
wheedling and entreaties to engage the occult Power to 
accomplish their own will, men's prayers in various ways 
tend to approximate to the prayer in the Garden of Geth-
semane: "Thy will be done." Even though, as the wor-
shiper kneels, he may be intensely engrossed by his special 
need and plight, he may be brought by his prayer itself 
to a deeper sense of his real need, to commit himself and 
his will to God and be blessed in godliness. This higher 
attitude in prayer may be noted in all the great religions. 
So the Psalmist prayed: "Create in me a clean heart, 0 
God." And Socrates: "Grant me to become noble of 
heart." And later, in Rome, Epictetus: "Do with me what 
thou wilt." Yet strange and inspiring instances of it may 
be cited from the most primitive stages of religious evolu-
tion: "Thou knowest what is good for us: give it to us." 
Along the entire course of growing spiritual maturity, 
higher and lower values contend for dominance. The 
saint may cry out: "De profundis!-1 call forth from the 
depths!" Despairing contrition alternates with unyielding 
hope. Medieval demonology feared the versatility of 
Satan's wiles; he might enter the blessed service itself 
and assume the Blessed Host in the eucharist. The saint 
who had overcome and rejected the deadly sins of carnal 
living and was reaching the consummation of his monastic 
austerities was warned not to be lost and betrayed at his 
very goal by the sin of athymia, hermit despondency. 
PART TWO 
Most strikingly did John Bunyan ( 1628-1688) drive home 
a similar conviction when he concluded his Pilgrim's 
Progress with the words: "I saw that there was a way 
to Hell, even from the Gates of Heaven, as well as from 
the City of Destruction." 
A study of the belief in social progress could scarcely 
end with a formal concluding chapter. The general out-
look on the historical process toward which our various 
inquiries have inclined us is the view of ongoing civiliza-
tion as an expanding range of men's activities, affording 
greater opportunities for high achievement but also graver 
hazards of downfall. The evidence from various fields 
of human experience reported in the second part of this 
book was intended to test the soundness of our general 
view. 
The conception of belief in progress as the belief that 
the historical course of events records growing improve-
ment does not connote any growing reassurance or com-
placency. This has been patent throughout our study. It 
does not connote clear and decisive finality in our judg-
ment as to what the higher and better values really are 
in any specific situation. We recognize the importance 
of moral and other value development both in active pur-
suit and realization of acknowledged high and better 
values and also in more intelligent and critical under-
standing of what is better. Genuine historical progress 
must be progress in truer understanding of the ideal goals 
as well as progress in the realizing of them. 
If we were to aim at terseness, we might say that a 
progressive civilization is one which increases man's value 
potential. It is advance in the scope of available improve-
ment and rise in values. By the term available here it is 
not meant that the attainment of the higher values is as-
sured, nor even that it can reasonably be expected. It 
may be very problematical or precarious. We mean that 
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it is a really acknowledged alternative: we have arrived 
at the stage where it is clearly presented as a goal or a 
challenge, recognized as a duty and a worthy purpose. 
Persons as well as societies and nations come to such 
rendezvous with high destiny. 
We can thus perceive that a progressive civilization 
involves, along with its prospects of greater rise in values, 
not only the hazards of a graver downfall but also the 
evil of failure to perceive the available higher ascent. 
We have in this recognition a meaning analogous to the 
Christian idea of the sin of omission. Man's first step in 
the performance of his duty is to gain a clearer acknowl-
edgment of it. We are brought from our twofold reflection 
to the Socratic first principle of moral philosophy in our 
Western civilization, that virtue is knowledge. So prog-
ress is increase in insight and outlook as basic to intelligent 
realization. 
The continual rearray of the course of progress is also 
a rearray of the line of battle. This is the dramatic or 
heroic note in personal careers and in the historical process. 
Walt Whitman wrote brave words with which this study 
may fittingly close: "It is provided in the essence 
of things that from any fruition of success, no matter 
what, shall come forth something to make a greater 
struggle necessary."14 
14 Compare Lewis Mumford, The Condition of Man (New York, 1944), 
p. 337. 
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The Promethean Fire-Bringers: 
Pioneers in Social Progress 
FOLKLORE IS THE TREASURY of the traditional mind. Prim-
itive society was retrospective in its outlook; it relied on 
beliefs and practices of immemorial antiquity, tested and 
tried, preserved in myths and tribal customs, imparted to 
growing youths with solemn authority and allowing of 
no deviation. But the spirit of rigid conformity to tradi-
tion was embroiled in a paradox; for while it rejected 
and punished any hint of radical change in its own midst, 
it honored its great ancestors who had led it to new heights 
by their inventive power and who had devised the custom-
ary practices and framework of living which their suc-
cessors were resolved to maintain without any change. 
This has always been the conscious or unwitting perplexity 
of the reactionary: he resists any nonconformity and 
cleaves stubbornly to traditional forms, but these forms 
in their early days must have been advocated by original 
and radical minds, of whom on principle he should 
disapprove. 
In some fields of activity the basic conditions of human 
life have set a premium on fruitful invention, and this is 
nowhere more evident than in the application of knowl-
edge to technical mastery. Here even the most conserva-
tive mind is on the lookout for productive improvement. 
Though suspicious of any religious or social or political 
programs of reform, he is ever ready to hear about tech-
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nical improvement or reconstruction. Primitive tradition 
has preserved in folklore its eulogy of the great inventive 
pioneers of mankind. Ancient bards, epic and dramatic 
poets have sung the glory but also the trials of their 
careers. This strain in folklore and poetry reveals a basic 
insight and a social philosophy of life, expressed not in 
systematic doctrine but in praise of the leaders in social 
pioneering. One of the first and greatest epoch-making 
forward steps in human progress was the discovery of 
the production and the uses of fire. 
Men's discovery of the production of fire is not to be 
confused with their experience of fire or their knowledge 
of some of its sources. Throughout time fires of various 
origins have been more or less common, whether in volcan-
ic regions or in coal or peat combustible deposits or far 
more frequently wherever flashing bolts of lightning split 
the storm clouds and set trees ablaze in the forest. Prim-
itive man was all too familiar with these terrors of unsub-
dued fires in nature; he fled from them or bowed down 
before them in abject worship. But was he ever fireless in 
the sense that he did not have the art of the production, 
the steady possession and use of fire? Even in this more 
restricted sense of the term fireless, modern anthro-
pologists have doubted that any known tribes were ever 
really devoid of fire, although some instances have been 
cited, in Australia or among some hill tribes of India. 
What matters is the degree of mastery in the use of fire. 
Folklore abounds in myths of the great heroes who with 
their wisdom or bravery or guile gained the possession 
of fire and taught men how to use it. Until their mastery 
of this art men could have only the sporadic and un-
reliable sources of fire in nature. 
Numerous ways of fire-making have been recognized by 
anthropologists, but the principal varieties are few in 
number: the stick-and-groove or fire-saw or fire-plow, 
where a strip of bamboo or other readily inflammable 
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wood is rubbed briskly across another; the fire-drill, where 
a sharpened rod is held in a hole or socket and revolved 
rapidly until it inflames some dry leaves or whittlings 
in the hole; the striking of a spark by the use of flints or 
iron; the use of crystal lenses for focusing sun-heat on 
some rapidly combustible tinder; and sundry variations 
of these methods. This briefest recital does not begin to 
report the endless accounts given by anthropologists of 
primitive fire-making throughout the world.1 Outstanding 
are the myths of the great fire-bringers that have been 
animated by the creative powers of religious adoration 
or poetic genius. 
The Vedas of ancient India worshiped fire as their chief 
god on earth. It was called Agni, a name which in other 
Indo-European languages has given us simply the word 
for fire: in Latin, ignis, and in Slavic languages ugni or 
ogn. In some of the very ancient hymns to Agni, in the 
Rig-Veda, we have almost a list of the various ways of 
fire-making. In citing a part of this hymn some explana-
tions are interpolated, which are probably obvious. 
"Thou, 0 Agni, art born to shine forth; thou art born from 
the skies [in the sun], thou from the waters [in bolts of 
lightning in rain storms], thou from the stone [in flints], 
thou from the wood and herbs [in the rubbing of sticks 
and leaves], thou king of men, thou bright one!"2 The 
devout poet, in worshipful adoration, exalted the god to 
universal supremacy: 
To Agni I present a newer mightier hymn, I bring my 
words and song unto the Son of Strength, 
Who, Offspring of the Waters, bearing precious things, 
sits on the earth. . . . 
1 J. G. Frazer, with the ample documentation familiar to readers of his 
Golden Bough, collected a great number of these tales in a volume en-
titled Myths of the Origin of Fire. 
2 Rig-Veda 2. 1. 1; compare F. Max Miiller, Physical Religion (London, 
ed. of 1898), p. 145 ff. 
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When he was kindled, through the power and majesty his 
fiery spendor made the heavens and earth to shine. 
His flames that wax not old, beams fair to look upon of him 
whose face is lovely, shine with beauteous sheen. 
The rays of Agni, him whose active force is light, through 
the night glimmer sleepless, ageless, like the floods. 
What Matarisvan piercing, forced by frictions, Herald of 
all the gods, in varied figure 
Is he whom they have set mid human houses, gay-hued as 
light and shining forth for beauty.3 
In ancient Iran there is an episode from the great 
Persian epic of Firdousi, the Shah-Namah or the Epic of 
Kings, in which Hushang, the slayer of dragons, hurls a 
stone at a serpent, misses his aim, but cleaves a rock, from 
which fire spurts in flames for the use of man: 
That there was fire in stones he also found 
And then light kindled in the world around .... 
The slight stone struck upon a heavy rock, 
And thereon fell in pieces with the shock. 
Out of both stones there sprang a flame of light, 
And the rock's heart itself was rendered bright .... 4 
Moving westward toward Europe, we have the great 
fire masters, V ainamoinen and Ilmarinen, in the national 
epic of Finland, the Kalevala. Here is plain folklore 
exalted to poetic heights. The toothless witch Louhi 
wickedly stole the sun and the moon and also fire. Ukko 
the creator then struck new sparks of fire from his sword 
and hid them in the clouds; but the precious flame rolled 
out and fell to the bottom of the sea. There it was gulped 
by a small powan fish, which was swallowed by a gray 
3 Compare Hymns of the Rig-Veda, trans. R. T. H. Griffith (Benares, 
1896). 
4 The Shah-Namah of Firdousi, trans. Alex. Rogers (London, 1907), 
p. 11. 
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trout, and it in turn by a large pike. Mter long epical 
angling, Vainamoinen caught the great fire-fish and, 
ripping its entrails, released the fire-flame and ordered it 
to serve men's needs: 
Better go thou to my village, 
To the hearth-stones of my people; 
Hide thyself within my chimneys, 
In my ashes sleep and linger. . . . 5 
The other hero of the Kalevala, Ilmarinen, the Finnish 
Hephaestus or Vulcan, trained the fire to serve men's 
industrial needs by coaxing iron to let itself be melted and 
hammered into weapons and tools and utensils: 
Now the master, Ilmarinen, 
The renowned and skilful blacksmith 
From the fire removes the iron, 
Places it upon the anvil, 
Hammers well until it softens, 
Hammers many fine utensils, 
Hammers spears, and swords, and axes, 
Hammers knives, and forks, and hatchets, 
Hammers tools of all descriptions .... 6 
The worship of fire as a deity, Agni, was not exceptional. 
Fire naturally inspired men to adoration. Universally it 
had a major role in religious ritual in all forms of sacrifice. 
The altar fires were sacred, and a major function of the 
priestly class was to preserve the purity of the holy flames. 
This was the duty of the vestal virgins in ancient Rome, 
whose chief, the Pontifex Maximus, was dominant in 
Roman religious ritual. Fire was of such importance in 
the Zoroastrian religion of ancient Iran that it has been 
called fire worship. 
5 Kalevala, Runo 9, trans. J. M. Crawford (New York and London, 
1889), 2: 698. 
6 Kalevala, Runo 9, op. cit., 1: 111 f. 
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The chief fire-bringer of the world's mythology, Prome-
theus, the Greek hero of progress, stands out in his moral 
and spiritual significance, a dramatic embodiment of a 
creative philosophy of life. The Promethean legend is 
first given to us in Hesiod's Works and Days and his 
Theogony. Prometheus, the son of the Titan Iapetus, took 
pity on the hardships of men who were living like beasts 
and wore themselves out to earn a bare and crude ex-
istence. He judged that men's first need was the possession 
of fire to protect them from the rigors of winter, to cook 
their food, and to melt metals to be molded into tools 
and utensils. But fire was hidden by Zeus who, as Hesiod 
says, planned sorrow and mischief against men. So Prome-
theus stole the fire of Zeus from heaven, hid it in a hollow 
stalk of fennel, and brought it to men. For this gift which 
enabled men to rise from beastly savagery to civilization, 
against the will of the high god, Prometheus suffered a 
dire doom. Zeus nailed him in chains against a rock in 
the Caucasus; daily the eagle of Zeus pecked at his liver, 
and at night the liver grew back, so that the torture of the 
hero could be inflicted over again. Thus the champion of 
human culture suffered for more than twenty thousand 
years, until finally Heracles slew the vulture and delivered 
Prometheus. 
This is the legend of the Greek fire-bringer in its main 
outlines. Folklorists have pointed out significant features 
which it shares with fire myths in other cultures. The 
hollow fennel stalk in which Prometheus brought down 
the fire from heaven is the Greek version of a common way 
in which fire was transported by nomadic tribes. The 
very name of Prometheus betrays his character as the 
fire-bringer. This name has been derived from the Sanskrit 
word pramantha which in ancient Indian signified the 
upper parts of the fire drill. 
It is in the great tragedy of Aeschylus, Prometheus 
Bound, that we have the most famous version of the 
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myth. The master dramatist could not openly glorify the 
fire-bringer Prometheus and condemn the high god Zeus 
for torturing the culture hero, champion and benefactor 
of mankind. But by giving Prometheus full dramatic and 
sublime utterance, Aeschylus portrayed the tragic nobility 
of his character. He also revealed the great pioneer as 
conscious of his fate, noble but tragic; in a mighty speech, 
right in the middle of the drama: 
. . . Think not I am silent thus 
Through pride or scorn. I only gnaw my heart 
With meditation, seeing myself so wronged. . . . 
List rather to the deeds 
I did for mortals; how, being fools before, 
I made them wise and true in aim of soul. 
And let me tell you-not as taunting men, 
But teaching you the intention of my gifts, 
How, first beholding, they beheld in vain, 
And, hearing, heard not, but, like shapes in dreams, 
Mixed all things wildly down the tedious time, 
Nor knew to build a house against the sun 
With wickered sides, nor any woodcraft knew, 
But lived, like silly ants, beneath the ground 
In hollow caves unsunned .... 
For lack of drugs 
Men pined and wasted, till I showed them all 
Those mixtures of emollient remedies 
Whereby they might be rescued from disease. . . . 
Enough said now of this. 
For the other helps of man hid underground 
The iron and the brass, silver and gold, 
Can any dare affirm he found them out 
Before me? none, I know! unless he choose 
To lie in his vaunt. In one word learn the whole-
That all arts came to mortals from Prometheus.7 
The great drama has deep spiritual significance. At 
a decisive crossroad and crisis in Greek religious reflec-
7 Prometheus Bound, trans. E. B. Browning, ll. 505 ff. 
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tion, Aeschylus seemed to express a conviction of a radical 
quandary in the faith of men. Deity is presumably per-
fect: but why should Zeus act so unjustly in blocking to 
men their path to the higher life of civilization? Perhaps 
the gods themselves rise from guile and ruthlessness to 
justice and mercy: 
I know that Zeus is stern; 
I know he metes his justice by his will; 
And yet, his soul shall learn 
More softness, when once broken by this ill: 
And curbing his unconquerable vaunt 
He shall rush on in fear to meet with me 
Who rush to meet with him in agony, 
To issues of harmonious covenant.8 
So we may contrast the Zeus portrayed in Prometheus 
Bound with that expressed in the first great Chorus of the 
Agamemnon: 
Zeus-by what name soe'r 
He glories being addressed, 
Even by that holiest name 
I name the Highest and Best. 
On Him I cast my troublous care, 
My only refuge from despair: 
Weighing all else, in Him alone I find 
Relief from this vain burden of the mind.9 
Yet in that first Orestean trilogy the abysmal problem 
of evil still baffies religious conviction. 
The Promethean theme expresses the nobility but also 
the tragic lot of the creative pioneer in the onward march 
of civilization. The Promethean motive in human life is 
the motive in the upward and forward will, the spirit 
of the prophet, the radical reformer, even the utopian 
s Op. cit., ll. 226 ff. 
9 Aeschylus Agamemnon, trans. Lewis Campbell (London, 1890), 
11. 162 ff. 
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visionary, ever ready to spend himself in following the 
gleam of the higher and better social order yet to be. 
The mythological portrayal of the social pioneer and 
radical reformer as the fire-bringer has profound signif-
icance. For fire, a beneficent power for human use and 
betterment, is also a dire element of destruction. The 
hymns to the fire gods in various religions are hymns 
of praise to the benign deity but also terrified hymns of 
his angry devastation. Even so the bright hopes of men 
for a reformed social order have clashed with their stiff 
conformity and their fears of any radical change. 
Do we not have here, in immemorial antiquity, the 
twofold social conviction which split early societies into 
contending classes, conservatives and liberals or more 
emphatically reactionaries and radicals? The social order 
has even been involved in this issue between established 
tradition and urgent reform. The traditionalists in any 
society have been those who honor and guard the old 
established customs and beliefs. They preserve the con-
tinued stability of the common life. This is their merit, 
but it has its serious defects. For if their conservatism 
were never challenged, and they were left in sole do-
minion, social life would stagnate in stiff and often anti-
quated customs. On the opposite side, there are the 
radical reformers who are ever critical of the old order and 
strive to change and improve it according to their own 
preferred designs. They are the leaders of progress in 
human life. But were they to have their way without any 
resistance from the traditionalists, they might plunge 
society into disorder and anarchy. Conservatism and 
change, stability and spurring advance are both needed, 
for their active interplay and counterplay make possible 
the expansive vitality of social institutions. 
Civilization cannot spare its reformers, but it dare not 
be gentle with them, for they propose radical changes 
that may bring blessings to men but might also threaten 
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disaster. This is the tragic note in the career of the social 
pioneer and prophet. We ourselves may see how this 
tragic element in radical change, promising great gains 
but also menacing dire doom for mankind, is illustrated 
in our new age of atomic energy. We are amazed by the 
promise of incredible new mastery and use of hitherto 
untapped boundless energies of nature, but we are also 
aghast at their destructive power. 
The poet Shelley, himself a radical spirit of reform, 
expressed the hope that ultimately the higher values 
would prevail. In his own drama Prometheus Unbound 
he portrayed his hero in his "courage, and majesty, and 
firm and patient opposition to omnipotent force" and also 
as "exempt from the taints of ambition, envy, revenge, 
and desire for personal aggrandisement." Shelley looked 
forward to an ideal consummation, the thought of which 
sustained his hero in his dire tortures: "To love and bear; 
to hope till Hope creates/From its own wreck the thing 
it contemplates."10 
It is not only fire, and more broadly technology, that 
baffles men's reflections on social progress. In a larger 
perspective, the Promethean theme has expressed men's 
perplexingly dual attitude toward other radical changes 
in their thought and activity. Men reach forward, but 
they also draw back. There is the promise of progress, 
but there is also the dread of possible misadventure. This 
double tension has found expression in religion and poetry. 
In the Babylonian epic Gilgamesh, the hero of that name, 
smitten by the terror of imminent death, seeks out his 
ancestor Utnapishtin (the Babylonian Noah) and secures 
through his advice a branch of the tree of eternal life. 
But while he is taking a swim in deep waters, a serpent 
snatches the branch from his reach and a voice from 
above declares that immortality is for the gods, not for 
men. Two tales in the book of Genesis are of similar 
10 Shelley, Prometheus Unbound, end of Act 4. 
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purport. Adam and Eve are banished from the Garden 
of Eden for having eaten from the forbidden tree of the 
knowledge of good and evil. And when men start build-
ing the tall Tower of Shinar, to reach unto heaven, God 
frustrates their hopes by confusing their language so that 
they cannot understand each other's speech: an ancient 
theory of comparative philology! Boundless desire for 
knowledge was suspected by the populace as impious 
presumption. The medieval commonalty suspected the 
seemingly omniscient Gerbert as having trafficked with 
the devil, to whose devices he probably owed his elevation 
to the papacy as Sylvester II. The revival of learning and 
also of worldly sensuality in the Renaissance gave rise to 
the popular tales of Faust and Don Juan; and in the 
seventeenth century, Pascal, himself a distinglished sci-
entist, denounced the "triple abyss" of pride, curiosity, 
and lust.11 Throughout folklore and mythological epos 
and ironic reflection men have expressed their deep sense 
of the contending good and evil involved in any radical 
change in the social process: as a likely step of progress, 
but maybe precarious and fraught with possible dire 
hazards. 
11 Pascal, Oeuvres, Grands ~crivains ed. (Paris, 1904), 13: 440. 
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